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Abstract  
The ultimate goal of the thesis is the construction of 
a text, appropriate for student use, on South Africa's 
social and spatial formation. 
The first part of the thesis is the most lengthy. It is 
a sophisticated account of South Africa's historical 
geography since 1652. This is written in an academic 
style, not for students, but for a learned readership, 
and contains some original insights. In itself, it 
represents an innovative contribution to the literature 
on South Africa's social development. 
The second part is a review of existing texts on South 
Africa's history and geography, written purposefully 
for students. These texts are subjected to a critique 
with content and coverage being the main criteria. 
The third part is an investigation of theoretical 
issues concerning the relationship between readers, 
particularly student readers, and texts. It seeks to 
formulate guidelines for the writing of a student text 
and the devising of learning activities which are 
appropriate for learners. 
In a brief conclusion, attention is paid to the ways in 
which the original aims have been manifested in a 
student text, included in the thesis as an appendix. 
Although this text is another lengthy treatment of 
South Africa's social and spatial formation, this time 
it is written for an intended student readership. It 
draws on the content deemed appropriate in the 
sophisticated text of Part One, seeks to overcome the 
weaknesses identified in current student texts in Part 
Two, and is written in a style, appropriate for 
students, suggested by Part Three. It also contains 
student activities devised in the theoretical context 
introduced in Part Three. The text is deemed to be a 
significant advance on previously published History and 
Geography educational materials. 
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Introduction  
This thesis arose out of a combination of two interests. The 
first is in South Africa's historical development, and in 
particular, how South African society had come to be as it was at 
the end of the apartheid era. The second is in teaching, and 
particularly in teaching students taking A levels or in the early 
stages of degrees. 
The general purpose of the thesis is remarkably straightforward: 
to produce a text on South Africa intended as a learning guide 
for such students. Its execution, however, was more problematic. 
I began the task with pre-formulated ideas about South African 
historical geography - ideas which had been evolving over years 
of study since I visited South Africa as an undergraduate 
researcher. I knew early on that, as a first part of the thesis, 
I wished to formalize these ideas into some kind of grand 
narrative - a narrative which would be eclectic and 
comprehensive. The construction of this narrative would enable me 
to identify that "content" which I would consider most relevant 
for students of South Africa. (I use the word "content" guardedly 
at this stage, for reasons involving the link between language 
and "message", which will become clearer in Part Three). 
I also knew early on that the end product of the thesis would be 
a text, ultimately derived from this comprehensive account, but 
written expressly with students in mind. It would have to be 
different from the original account in two main ways: firstly, 
its coverage could not be so extensive and secondly, its language 
and discourse structure would have to be adapted. 
In regard to the former consideration - of coverage - I turned to 
currently available student texts on South Africa. A review 
enabled me to identify both achievements which I would wish to 
emulate, and limitations which I would wish to transcend in my 
own version. 
The latter consideration - guidance on language and structure -
proved more elusive. At my supervisor's instigation, I undertook 
to read literature on language structure, discourse and genre, 
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produced by literary theorists, educationalists and 
psychologists, all in an attempt to identify what it is which 
makes some "factual" texts more successful than others, for 
students as a particular type of reader. 
By the time I had completed this task, I had collected together a 
comprehensive account of South African social formation, a review 
of perceived successes and failures of current student texts on 
the subject and a consideration of what generally makes for a 
successful student text. All that remained was to write my own. 
This then, is the structure of the thesis: 
Part One: a thorough and "learned" account of South African 
social formation. 
Part Two: a review of student texts on South Africa, focusing 
mainly on their coverage. 
Part Three: a consideration of the relationships between readers 
and texts, and the characteristics of a successful text for 
"learners". 
Overall Conclusion. 
Appendix: a student textbook on South African social and spatial 
formation. 
Contents 
Introduction 	 1 
Part One: The Formation of Social and Spatial Structures 
 
in South Africa, 1652-1994 
Introduction 	 6 
Chapter One: The Foundation of a Society 	 20 
Chapter Two: Colonial Expansion, Industrialization 	 38 
and Afrikanerdom 
Chapter Three: The Germination of a System 	 77 
Chapter Four: The Formulation of a Structure 
	 116 
Chapter Five: Adaptations and Contradictions 
	 151  
Chapter Six: The Reformulation of a Structure 
	 189 
Chapter Seven: Policy and Reality 
	 217  
Chapter Eight: The Changing South African State 
	 252  
Conclusion: Conceptions of South African Socio- 
	 289 
Political Formation  
3 
Part Two: A Critique of Formal Educational Materials on South  
Africa at the Post-16 Level 	 302 
Part Three: The Writing of a Text 	 350 
Overall Conclusion 	 375 
Part One Bibliography 	 379 
Part Three References 
	
402 
Appendix: South Africa's History and Geography:  
A Text For Students 	 407 
Foreword 	 407 
Chapter One: Founding a Colony 	 413 
Chapter Two: Expanding Frontiers 	 436 
Chapter Three: African Experiences and Segregation 	 527 
Chapter Four: Consolidating Segregation and Intensifying 
	
565 
Afrikaner Nationalism 
Chapter Five: Apartheid 	 610 
Chapter Six: Contradictions and Further Adaptations 
	
645 
4 
Chapter Seven: Botha's Reforms and Insurrection 	 677 
5 
Chapter Eight: The Abandonment of Apartheid 	 718 
Conclusion 	 742  
Glossary 	 755 
Appendix References 	 766 
6 
Part One 
The Formation of Social and Spatial Structures in South Africa,  
1652 to 1994  
Introduction 
The purpose of Part One is to render a satisfactory explanation 
of the nature of contemporary South African society and its 
spatial configuration. This explanation cannot be attempted 
without tracing the course of social formation and-adaptation in 
South Africa over the last three and a half centuries. There is 
considerable historical inertia involved in the constitution of 
social structures anywhere, and South Africa's most tangible 
social structures have been more rigidly rooted in the past than 
many. A reading of Part One should enable the identification of 
the most important historical continuities in South Africa -
those processes and traits which have had most to do with shaping 
South Africa's present society: its social group stratification, 
its political institutions, the patterns of its human geography, 
the structure of its economy and its external links. 
However, the following account is coloured by a particular 
interpretation of events and processes. "All history is fiction", 
to a greater or lesser extent, since historical "facts" are 
distorted by the light of interpretation thrown upon them. There 
are conflicting interpretations,- not- just of events and medium 
term processes, but of the structural conditions underlying and 
shaping the course of South Africa's social development. The 
different conceptions ultimately boil down to varying perceptions 
of the psychological motivations of the actors involved in social 
change, and of the way societies in general operate. 
My own interpretation of events has been derived from weighing up 
the explanatory attributes of various "schools of thought". 
Before setting out the structure of the ensuing chapters, the 
bulk of this introduction is devoted to a brief analysis of what 
have been two particularly divergent scholarly tendencies 
(although the delineating characteristics of the two schools have 
blurred recently). An analysis of the traditional cleavage of 
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interpretation between Marxists (or "radicals", a wider term) and 
"liberals", should not only allow my own interpretative 
tendencies to become clear early on; it should also help to 
clarify other, competing poles of interpretation. 
The central issue around which academic conflict between liberals 
and Marxists has revolved, is that of the relationship between 
capitalism as a mode of production, and apartheid's racial 
structures. "Given that South African economic development was 
profoundly structured by racial labour policies, moulded by 
ideology and a violent racially repressive socio-political 
environment, it is not surprising that the interplay between 
political and economic forces. has received a great deal of 
academic attention" (Nattrass,1991,654). 
Behind this "academic attention" though, lies a more subtle and 
nuanced debate over the markers of social identity and the forms 
of self-conception, which divide the individuals comprising 
society into groups. The lines delineating these groups are 
inconstant and fluid, but in specific circumstances, the 
polarization between social units, over certain issues, is 
discernable. 
Where Marxists have tended to find the crucial basis for social 
group formation in the relationship of individuals to the mode of 
production - in narrow terms, class - liberals have sought more 
diffuse parameters of group identity, based largely on 
ideological constructs - ethnicity, religion, nationality and 
culture. In recent years, proponents of both schools have 
recognised areas of weakness in their own accounts and 
interpretations which can be strengthened using insights borrowed 
from the other academic tendency. 
Radicals have traditionally focused on "the enormous expansion 
which has taken place in the allegedly dysfunctional system, the 
continuity of the system of racial domination in the midst of 
economic expansion and the extensive involvement of property 
owners in the system of racial domination" (Johnston, cited 
Nattrass,1991,666). The underlying interpretation is that the 
state has supported economic growth and the interests of 
capitalists, primarily through two forms of apartheid 
intervention: labour domination and proletarianization of the 
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black peasantry (Bundy,1972). Racism has therefore been seen as 
"rational" in the sense that it is an ideology which has 
legitimated the economic exploitation of black labour. South 
Africa has not the kind of capitalist economy in which the forces 
of demand and supply prevail, but a "labour repressive economy" 
(Trapido,1971), in which the accumulation of a white class, or 
white classes, is made possible by political machinery which 
represses blacks (Fisher, Schlemmer and Webster,1978). 
The radical account is not confined to politico-economic 
relations between whites and blacks. O'Meara, 1983, extended a 
class analysis into the field of intra-white politics with his 
study of Afrikaner nationalism. Its revival in the 1930s was, for 
him, not so much the (re)generation of an ideology, but an 
expression of emerging conflict between capitals. In common with 
Marxist accounts of wider South African politics, "If a system 
could be shown to be functional to capitalism, then it was 
assumed that it must have arisen for those purposes" 
(Nattrass,1991,667). 
Probably the clearest manifestation of capital's social-
structuring role came with the mineral discoveries of the late 
nineteenth century. Legassick, 1980, pointed out how the scale 
and purpose of racial relations, developed with industrialisation 
at Kimberley, were quite a departure from South Africa's previous 
racial structures. Migrant labour flows to the mines and 
confinement of workers in compounds, allowed the acquisition and 
control of a large, cheap African labour force, and facilitated 
its separation from the small white working class. -Capitalism had 
not just adapted to the pre-existing racial order, it had created 
a new one. Later, deep level gold mining on the Witwatersrand 
required vast amounts of ultra-cheap labour to make any profit 
out of low grade ore, particularly when the gold price was fixed. 
The economic importance of mining necessitated political 
structures supplying African labour from the reserves for 
temporary work in the mines. 
Despite a lack of consensus within the marxian "camp" (see 
Magubane,1989), during the 1970s in particular, a number of 
radical analysts were collaborating on, or, less evidently, 
mutually supporting, similar interpretations of South Africa's 
historical development, hinging on the changing imperatives of 
capital. 
One of the seminal works of the genre was a paper by Wolpe, 1972. 
Wolpe argued that cheap African labour was reproduced, in the 
early stages of industrialisation, by the pre-capitalist mode of 
production practised in the reserves. Industrialisation itself 
paradoxically undermined this source of cheap labour as 
traditional communal and kinship modes of redistribution in the 
reserves broke down with the penetration of capitalist relations. 
For Wolpe, apartheid was quintessentially an attempt to maintain 
the pre-capitalist reserve economies and, therefore, cheap labour 
through more effective coercion and domination. "Since the 
establishment of the Union in 1910 ... the state has been 
utilized at all times to secure and develop the capitalist mode 
of production" (Wolpe,1972). Apartheid was a state - led drive to 
maintain the rate of surplus value and accumulation in the face 
of a disintegrating pre-capitalist reserve economy, spurred on by 
the fact that disintegration was simultaneously feeding African 
urbanisation and, therefore, political unrest. It was this threat 
in particular which brought the state's political power to bear 
alongside capital's economic power, in a mutual thrust to 
maintain and intensify segregation in the industrial era. 
The flaws of such a reductionist account are now recognised by 
Wolpe himself, whose brand of Marxism is today more flexible 
(Wolpe,1988). Apart from containing a romanticised view of 
African pre-capitalist economic relations, the 1972 account 
bypasses the integral role of the Afrikaner nationalist movement 
and its political successes within the white electorate, in the 
formulation of apartheid. In fact, it was a whole welter of 
complex political and social considerations, which convinced 
enough of the white electorate to vote NP for its policies to be 
implemented after 1948, and which convinced the Afrikaner 
nationalist leaders that the laws forming apartheid were the best 
option for South Africa's future. 
The role of Africans in the industrial economy was, however, 
highly significant in dictating their political position. "The 
measures (the state) undertook to mobilize and control labour 
virtually precluded the possibility of extending political rights 
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to Africans as a way of establishing some degree of legitimacy 
for the state" (Stadler,1987,34). But the relationship between 
capital and the state is not timeless, nor has the government's 
theory on the political treatment of Africans been constant. 
Historical specificity has been recognised as an imperative in 
more recent Marxist accounts. Hence Wolpe, 1988: 
"The contention is that the formation of structures and 
relations is always the outcome of struggles between 
contending ... classes and that this outcome is Janus -
faced, being always simultaneously functional and 
contradictory. Which pole of the relationship will be 
. dominant depends on the historically specific conditions of 
the social formation ... the "fit" or contradiction between 
capitalism and racism may be eroded or expanded within 
particular social and economic spheres and the outcome may 
be a shift towards increased functionality or sharpened 
contradiction resulting in either case in significantly 
altered conditions of struggle". 
Yet these shifts towards functionality or contradiction cannot be 
precipitated by class struggles alone, since narrowly defined 
class relationships, ceteris paribus, are determined by the mode 
of production, which is far less vacillatory than the degree of 
functionality within it. The shifts which occur within the 
overall mode of production must be explained with reference to 
extra-class political and social developments. Interpretations 
must involve concepts of political constituency, nationalism, 
ethnicity and racism as well as class, and allow a greater role 
for human agents' interaction with social structures. 
Wolpe's identification of the need for historical specificity 
though, is part of a more general Marxian move away from 
structuralist assumptions that functionality is synonymous with 
purpose in political and economic relations. Marks and Rathbone, 
1983, place emphasis on local and empirical history, with 
theorization secondary. 
This gives rise to a "more nuanced and empirically detailed 
materialist interpretation of South African social history" 
(Nattrass,1991,673). But such approaches are still scantily 
extended to post 1945 developments. 
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With the introduction of greater "historical contingency" 
(Wolpe,1988) into Marxian accounts, the gap between the liberal 
and Marxist interpretations of old has narrowed. But even some 
modern Marxist accounts face the limitation of an ambiguous 
definition of class in the South African context. If class is 
deterministically taken to be defined by relationship to the mode 
of production, then social group identity in South Africa has not 
been primarily based on class. If the ideologies which liberals 
always focused on - ethnicity, racism etc. - are incorporated 
within one's definition of class, then class more accurately 
defines social group formation. But is such a usage of the word 
class still Marxist or even Marxian? Have "Marxists" in effect 
ceased to become Marxists by adapting definitions of class to 
South African conditions? Attempts have been made to trace 
ideologies back to a material root, so that, for instance, the 
ideology of racism which cleaves South African society, can be 
represented as a superstructure, developed to legitimate the 
material relations which form the substructure of society (see 
Marks and Trapido,1987). But such accounts too often fall into 
the related traps of determinism and conspiracy theory. 
The writers of an early Marxist account - Simons and Simons, 1969 
- would, according to Kuper, 1971, argue that "white and black 
workers perform the same function in the process of production, 
but that various factors obscure or inhibit or distort their 
perception of common interests and of the reality of class 
struggle" (Kuper,1971,281). Such factors include: racial and 
cultural diversities and national/racial cleavages; white 
workers' ability to be absorbed in the rulifig- elite; the effects 
of labour migration and discrimination on Africans; reactions of 
African and "Coloured" leaders to discriminatory policies, and 
the rabid racialism of white workers. Although these are words 
placed in the mouths of Marxists by a critic of theirs, 
admissions of a class approach's limitations must be made by any 
analyst, and far from being mere hindrances to a class - based 
conception of society, they mean, in Simons and Simons' own 
words, that "the binary model of standard Marxist theory did not 
fit South Africa's multiple structure of colour, class and 
cultural groups" (Simons and Simons, (1983 edition), 210). 
The problem encountered by Simons and Simons has remained. 
"Marxists, like Marx himself, have had considerable difficulty in 
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accommodating ethnicity or other communal solidarities to the 
mainstream of their thought ... if ethnicity or communal 
identities cannot be causally reduced to, or derived from, the 
mode of production or class or the division of labour ... then 
Marxism's claims as an explanatory theory of society have to be 
scaled down" (Welsh,1987,189). 
Marxian accounts have persuaded liberals that uneven capitalist 
accumulation and development can exacerbate conceptions of 
ethnicity and tension, but they have not shown how they are 
responsible for the initial formulation of group identity. 
"Europeans expressed revulsion at Khoikhoi customs, language, 
dress and physical appearance" (Welsh,1987,191) well before South 
Africa's age of industrial capitalism. The additional linguistic 
moral connotations of "light" and "dark", "white" and "black", 
gave emphasis to these negative racial attitudes (Welsh,1987). 
This survey of South African historical social formation argues 
that incorporations of groups into colonial society after the 
turn of the 1,8th century occurred in the light of a racial 
stratification first developed under the Dutch East India Company 
at the Cape. 
To suppose that "racial categorisation was imposed by late 19th 
century colonisation under conditions of industrial capitalism 
grossly underestimates continuity from the social structure of 
the early Cape colony" (Welsh,1987,193). The 19th century 
industrialists who agitated for the precursors to modern forms of 
racial labour regulation "were, after all, whites before they 
were capitalists and hence themselves embodiments of "ancient and 
venerable prejudices" (Welsh,1987,197, quoting Marx's "Communist 
Manifesto"). 
The ideological imperatives of a racially conceived society 
continue, at times, to take precedence over materialism. For the 
19th century industrialist, the two were largely compatible, but 
"whites continued to endorse apartheid in the 1987 election 
despite nearly three years of severe economic malaise and 
widespread recognition among the electorate that this situation 
was substantially due to apartheid" (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer,1989). Materialism alone does not suffice as the motive 
force in South African social formation, and capital alone has 
not been the shaper of state racial policy. That policy has 
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meandered, pushed one way and pulled another by white 
constituencies, defined ethnically as well as by class; by the 
process of political electioneering only indirectly related to 
class, and by the political as well as economic effect of black, 
rather than working class, resistance. Group identity, I would 
suggest, has been forged as much by psychological conceptions of 
difference, based on appearance and custom, as by articulation 
with the mode of production. The group interaction comprising 
South Africa's social development then, extends beyond the scope 
of deterministic material accounts. 
Contrary to radical thinking, "classic" liberal accounts, such as 
that of De Kiewiet, 1957, held that racial structures, far from 
enabling economically rational labour exploitation, actually 
precluded its most efficient use. De Kiewiet emphasised the 
retention of African labour on farms, when it would have been 
more productive in the growing urban manufacturing sector; its 
constrained mobility, and the fact that its market value was not 
recognised in its wages. If capitalist market forces alone had 
dictated its use, racial and social integration would have been 
facilitated. Apartheid was therefore not a boon to economic 
efficiency. 
According to such early liberal authors, pre-existing social 
relations determined South Africa's racial order, rather than the 
relations forged during the industrial period (De Kiewiet,1957, 
MacMillan,1930). But "we cannot explain the exclusion of the 
workforce from political rights (in the late 20th century) as a 
consequence of such pre-existing social and political structures" 
(Stadler,1987,35) alone. For instance, the reversal of the Cape 
franchise in South Africa's industrial era represented a 
discontinuity, undermining a previously more favourable black 
political position, rather than a continuation of pre-industrial 
historical progression. 
Most liberals today would recognise that South Africa's 
industrialisation was highly significant in adapting and 
transforming racial structures, much along the lines drawn by 
radicals. Nevertheless, one can temper the more sweeping 
statements, in favour of continuity. While "it was the mining 
industry and particularly gold mining which rapidly and 
profoundly transformed the social and political structures of 
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colonial South Africa" (Stadler,1987), the migrant labour and 
influx control patterns that the industry established were still 
superimposed on a pre-existing social stratification based on 
race and manifested spatially in the mosaic of African polities 
and "white space". A realization of the really significant 
influence that mining capital had over the state in the formative 
period of South Africa's industrial society, should be blended 
with an appreciation of historical inertia. 
This account suggests that the imperatives of modernising and 
progressive capital for economic stability, greater skills in the 
workplace and expanding domestic markets, have been a strong 
force behind recent reforms leading to the abandonment of 
apartheid. Indeed, "it should be evident that the main axis of 
social change ince the 1980s has been the replacement of the 
political and ideological mechanisms of apartheid with market 
relations" (Lupton,1992,95). But this is not to say that Marxists 
have been correct all along in finding the motivation for 
government action in the interests of capital alone. For the 
government, the economy is important more for the preservation of 
its racially defined and multi-class, white political 
constituency's living standards, than for the maintenance of a 
narrower, capitalist class's accumulation (see concluding chapter 
on relations between the South African state and society). 
This is also not to say that the "deterministically" liberal 
O'Dowd thesis is correct. O'Dowd, 1974, 1977, saw capital growth 
in itself as overcoming apartheid, through racial economic 
integration. Blumer, 1965, putg tt►e argument thus: "social 
mobility upsets the established structure of status positions ... 
weakening established systems of authority and breaking down 
established systems of social control" (Blumer,1965,226). Such 
social mobility is a necessary component of the development of 
integrative capitalism. However, this view fails to square with 
the fact that it was the prospect of continued poor economic 
growth which pushed the government towards the abandonment of 
legal racial structures, not the presence of current economic 
growth. Additionally, capitalists alone did not have the power, 
even if they had the motivation, to remove apartheid. 
Just as Marxists have had to incorporate liberal emphases on 
ideology and other non-material motivations in their work, 
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liberals have realized the explanatory value of class 
differentiation, particulary within white politics. Influence 
over the state can be seen as the prize contested through the 
20th century by classes within white society. At a generalized 
level, white farmers and workers including miners, have sought to 
retain African influx controls and job colour bars, while 
industrialists and mineowners have, with varying degrees of 
energy, sought to undermine them. General elections have ensured 
that, at certain times, the state has disproportionately served 
the interests of one or more of these classes. While it was not 
always capital that had the ear of government, class 
differentiation can help define which group did. 
Conceptions of Identity 
The traditional debate between Marxists and liberals over the 
course of South African social development hinges fundamentally 
on the parameters of self-conception. If individuals define their 
identity primarily according to their relationship to the mode of 
production, then they will form groups based on class, and 
history will be shaped by the interaction between classes. If, as 
most Marxists themselves would agree, the parameters of identity 
are more diffuse and ambiguous, the principles of group formation 
may shift more easily over time, and social behaviour be 
comprised of a more complex web of interactions. An analysis of 
South Africa restricted to class relationships is not 
satisfactory since "that conceptualization is disproportionately 
the propensity of educated elites. The participants, especially 
those at the lower levels, also entertain other ideas, some of 
which are at odds with this conceptualization of the conflict ... 
the conflict cannot be reduced to what some of its more organised 
and articulate participants think it is about" 
(Horowitz, 1991,31). 
Simons and Simons' 1969 Marxist account postulated two main 
possibilities for white worker mobilization. The first was 
organisation along class lines with African and "Coloured" 
members of the working class, to attain higher living standards 
in relation to capitalist classes, and, if possible, seize the 
state from them. The second was to join the capitalist class in a 
racial alliance against blacks. This option entailed an 
attachment to the white state, to attain privilege based on race, 
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rather than a furtherance of the class struggle. The white 
mineworkers strike of 1922 demonstrated that these workers had 
emphatically opted for racial superiority rather than class 
solidarity. Thus Simons and Simons were forced to recognise that 
in South Africa, society was primarily organised along racial 
lines, with class divisions being secondary. 
For Schlemmer et al, 1991, it is not race as such which defines 
the dominant cleavages, but culture. Questionnaires revealed that 
white concerns "are precisely those associated with the 
maintenance of a "European lifestyle" in a pervasive cultural, 
not necessarily racial sense. It is about standards, daily 
security, privacy and control over the influences to which 
children are exposed" (172). Historically, "whites have been a 
sub-society in Africa, living by most of the rules and standards 
of a modernising Europe" (op. cit,171). Coetzee, in "White 
Writing", 1988, exposes traits in white literary activity which 
indicate a similar conclusion. 
While, on a global scale, Hobsbawm identifies the mid 19th 
century as formative in capitalism's shaping of world society, as 
representing "the florescence of a classical, competitive, 
entrepreneurial regime of capital accumulation and social 
regulation" (Hobsbawm, cited Soja,1989,27), in South Africa, the 
same period saw the unstable interaction between divergent 
cultures and physically different groups in, and on the eastern 
frontier of, the Cape Colony. While penetrative imperial 
capitalism may have been shaping social interaction on a global 
scale, the attempts of colonial administrators to stabilize 
relationships between divergent racial and cultural groups 
overshadowed interactions between classes in South Africa's 
social body. When, later in the 19th century, capital began to 
exert its socially forming influence in South Africa, African 
incorporation in the colonial capitalist economy was already 
circumscribed by race. Even with the growth of a modern 
capitalist economy, which, to some extent, penetrates across most 
of South Africa, race and culture, rather than class have been 
the most significant markers of social status and identity, and 
the dominant basis of South Africa's social structure. This is 
not to say, however, that South Africa is necessarily unique in 
this regard. Comparative study of other colonies would be needed 
to elaborate on such an assertion. 
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Even with the rejection of class as the fundamental basis of 
South African social organisation, a wider materialist motivation 
can still be ascribed to social formation along racial or 
cultural lines: 
"Ethno-nationalism usually wins when it competes with class 
mobilization. However, this empirical observation in the 
ethnic relations literature always derives from a case of a 
threatened working class or a downwardly mobile petty 
bourgeoisie that compensates for denied aspirations with 
symbolic status. It has yet to be proven anywhere that a 
BMW - owning bureaucratic bourgeoisie with swimming pools 
and servants readily sacrifices the good life for 
psychologically gratifying ethnic affinities. Racial 
sovereignty pr6ves durable only as long as it can deliver. 
A bureaucratic oligarchy can be expected to drop its 
"albatross" when racialism becomes dysfunctional" 
(Adam,1990,236). 
For most whites, identification with the economically and 
politically dominant racial group has proved more "functional" 
than identification along the lines of cross-racial class. For 
Africans, a different prospect has been held out. The 1980s saw 
increasing class divisions within African society as apartheid's 
constraints on upward economic and social mobility began to be 
removed. In a post-apartheid South Africa, urban "insiders" may 
well come to share more characteristics and aspirations with the 
white urban bourgeoisie, than with rural "outsider" Africans. 
Within the cities, increasing polarities between the African 
bourgeoisie and the African working class are to be expected as 
the "levelling" devices of apartheid recede into the past. The 
general perception in the modern literature then, is that class 
divisions may be encroaching more on racial ones as the prime 
cleavages of identity in South African society, but such a 
hypothesis can only be proffered tentatively in the face of 
present, engrained realities of racial stratification. 
Convergence of Interpretation  
Neo-Marxist and liberal interpretations of South African society 
were more readily apparent as distinct tendencies in the 1970s 
and 1980s than they are today. Each tendency has, to an extent, 
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undergone a progressive modification, absorbing the lessons 
proffered by emphases of the other. While "rival theories ... 
can't be compared against an objective scale ... they are simply 
incommensurable, with the result that their exponents may be said 
to be living and working in different worlds" (Kuhn,1970,134-5), 
there has been a convergence of interpretations to the extent 
that, in the South African context, these "worlds" overlap, even 
though each retains an additional discrete portion. 
In the early 1970s, both schools lacked a historical grounding in 
the relationship between white supremacy and economy: liberals 
had glossed over it while radicals "tended to argue from theory 
or from scraps of historical evidence and did no original 
historical research" (Saunders,1988,23). Now analysts from both 
tendencies would broadly agree that segregationist policies aided 
the growth of white farming and mining sectors in the early 
phases of industrialisation by supplying cheap and immobile 
labour, and that these white sectors were divided after 1910, 
with mineowners seeking to retain the reserves for migrants and 
agricultural capital largely pressing for the disintegration of 
the reserves, so as to corral African labour on white farms. The 
racial system which gave mineowners reserves, it is also 
generally conceded, imposed the counteracting cost of a job 
colour bar on this same "fraction" of capital. 
"Radicals" would, by and large, accept that the evolution of the 
racial system in South Africa, whilst functional in many respects 
for white capitals, did not necessarily progress purposefully for 
their gratification, but for more complex reasons. Even the 
government of the day's interest in economic growth could not be 
confined to a response to the imperatives of capital per se. 
Interpretations of the migrant labour system have also served to 
undermine the perception that capital's imperatives alone shape 
social formation. Labour migrated on a fairly large scale well 
before diamond discoveries gave organised, modern capital a 
formative role (see Harries,1982). Migration "was to some extent 
a deliberate form of African resistance to full 
proletarianization" (Saunders,1988b,25). Even some mineowners 
resented the expense of training migrants, and the disruption to 
supplies which was threatened by unsettled labour. 
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For both radicals and liberals, "segregation is now seen not 
simply as something imposed from above, the product of what white 
capital, white labour or a white government wanted, but as shaped 
significantly by what happened on the ground" 
(Saunders,1988b,29). The emphasis of modern radicals on 
unintended consequences, rather than Machiavellian functionality 
forms "a point of contact between the latest Marxist empirical 
scholarship and liberal historiography" (Elphick,1987,168, see 
also Harries,1982). With radicals interweaving in their accounts 
the Marxist "story" of capital accumulation with parallel stories 
of the state, of moral, ethnic and religious communities, of 
natural environmental processes and of the individual, the common 
ground between the two schools has been consolidated. Most 
analysts should now agree that "what is needed is a dynamic 
approach that reifies neither ethnicity, race, nor class, but 
recognizes the situational salience of each" (Welsh,1987,202). 
Such is the interpretive backdrop to the following narrative of 
South Africa's social group formation. 
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Chapter One  
The Foundation of a Society  
Introduction  
In 1652 a settlement was established by Dutch officials at the 
Cape of southern Africa. The society which developed from this 
settlement, extending into the interior of the country, was an 
offshoot from the era of European discovery and mercantilist 
expansion overseas. Just as this era profoundly shaped current 
global relations, so its South African branch catalysed social 
developments that presaged modern South Africa. The period 
between 1652 and the late 18th century has been seen as formative 
for South African social development in two main respects. On the 
one hand, white ideologies supportive of racial exclusivity and 
economic relations founded upon racial stratification developed; 
on the other hand, and more contentiously, a nascent sense of 
Afrikaner nationalism has been held to have emerged on the early 
colony's frontier. It is argued here (with important 
qualifications) that the material and attitudinal relations 
between people of different pigmentation in the early colony as a 
whole, and not just on the frontier, were indeed portentous, but 
that the emergence of a distinct Afrikaans identity must be 
placed later in South Africa's history. Before these issues are 
addressed in more detail, it is helpful if one is familiar with 
an outline history of early white settlement in South Africa: 
A Brief History of the Early Colony 
Officials of the Dutch East India Company (V.O.C.) established a 
small settlement at the Cape in 1652 to provide refreshment and 
supplies to scurvy ridden ships on their voyages around the 
southern tip of Africa en route to the Far East. The subsequent 
performance of the station was not spectacular. It made a loss 
throughout the 143 years of its existence (Ross,1989). The VOC 
had a range of partial monopolies on trade, preventing personal 
transactions, particularly in meat, between colonists and 
visiting ships, and between colonists and the indigenous peoples 
of the Cape. But VOC officials were usually corrupt to the extent 
that they used their own positions to conduct just such a 
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personal trade. These activities were to sow some of the seeds of 
future conflict with settlers, and they culminated in the 
dismissal of one governor, Willem Adriaan Van der Stel in 1706. 
The indigenous peoples, from whom the VOC intended to keep the 
colonists apart, are usually described as existing in two 
distinct categories - Khoikhoi (called Hottentots by the 
settlers) and San (called Bushmen). But for the white settlers, 
Khoikhoi and San were less easily differentiated than is commonly 
thought. While Khoikhoi were generally pastoralists with a strong 
sense of wider group identity and San were hunter-gatherers who 
operated in small bands, throughout the period introduced here, 
conquered Khoikhoi who became dispossessed of their livestock 
would often fall back on hunting with San, and to an extent the 
groups merged (Elphick and Ma?herbe,1989). They were also of the 
same genetic stock, the Khoikhoi having emerged as a stronger 
physical type due to a milk-based diet following their adoption 
of pastoralism. White settlers, despite stereotyping the physical 
characteristics of the two peoples, often confused them. Hereon, 
the term "Khoisan" is therefore used to refer to both peoples 
when describing developments which affected them both similarly 
in the 18th century. 
The Cape was originally envisaged as being a self-contained 
settlement - a vision which turned out to be unrealistic since it 
lacked both the capital and, despite a significant slave 
presence, the labour, to develop agriculture intensively 
(Guelke,1989). From 1657 the VOC allowed white farmers 
(freeburghers) to cultivate and trade on their own behalf whilst 
respecting the company's restrictions. The freeburghers were to 
concentrate on the less labour and capital intensive activities 
of livestock rearing and trading rather than wheat cultivation. 
In 1679 freeburghers, provided with slaves by the company (most 
of whom were subsequently returned due to their continuing 
resistance), were allowed by the VOC to disperse and farm beyond 
the Cape Flats surrounding the station. By 1700 the core western 
Cape farmers were increasing the production of wine, wheat and 
livestock and investing their surpluses in slaves and more land 
(Guelke,1989), while "trekboers", despite the presence of 
indigenous peoples (see below), were continuing to occupy grazing 
land further to the east. The settlers' individual economic 
success bolstered an emerging identity different from that of the 
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VOC's employees (Katzen,1982), but it was an identity 
distinguished by their permanent residence at the Cape, rather 
than by the kind of ethnic bonding between Afrikaans speakers 
that took place later in the 19th century. 
Initially, relations between the small Dutch presence at the Cape 
and local Khoisan clans had been fairly amicable. Over the 
preceding century and a half, Khoisan had fought and killed 
Portuguese sailors who had stopped off at the Cape for supplies, 
when those sailors had attempted to take off Khoisan children or 
enforce unequal terms of trade in cattle. But the Dutch had been 
given express instructions to remain on friendly, if distant 
terms with them. They even offered ceremonial sticks as rewards 
to co-operative Khoisan "captains". Van Riebeeck then, was able 
to secure some cattle (though, he feared, not enough), through 
negotiation with the indigenous peoples. However, the increasing 
European presence manifested by the freeburghers, and their drive 
to occupy Khoisan land and expropriate Khoisan cattle in greater 
numbers, brought more unequal relations. Direct conflict over the 
local resources of production resulted in power struggles which, 
ultimately, given European military technology, could only be 
resolved in the settlers' favour. Khoisan resistance was spirited 
and fierce enough to delay, but not to preclude, further, larger-
scale European conquest through the 18th century. 
As dispossessed Khoisan moved north and east, white settlement 
was pushed inland, ostensibly under company supervision, as land 
at the Cape became scarce and arable farming costs rose. It 
tended to be the less wealthy and the unattached who pushed 
furthest inland, either off their own backs or in the service of 
others, but the basis of the white society emerging at the 
furthest limits of the colony was laid by subsistence farming 
families, with livestock but little capital, renting their new 
farms from the VOC. By the end of the 17th century the most 
extreme area of white settlement was about 80km inland from Cape 
Town. During the 18th century though, it shifted a further 800km 
east. 
Relatively dense Xhosa settlement was, meanwhile, well 
established along the southeast coast of southern Africa. While 
Bantu-speaking peoples, of which the various autonomous Xhosa 
chiefdoms were a part, had been settled in what is now inland 
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South Africa for over 1,500 years, the white vanguard only met 
the settled outlying Xhosa chiefdoms in around 1770, to form the 
subsequently turbulent "eastern frontier". The frontier between 
white settler and Xhosa was never fixed in space or absolute in 
nature, and it was not only a frontier between different cultures 
and "modes of production" (Marks and Atmore,1980), but an 
ecological frontier. The Xhosa had been restrained from moving 
much further west by insufficient rainfall for their mixed 
pastoral and arable economy. 
The formation of the eastern Cape frontier, however, ultimately 
meant the closing of options for the those indigenous Cape 
Khoikhoi and San clans which had been involved, since the late 
17th century, in guerilla warfare with settlers over grazing 
lands, and which had not moved out of colonial reach to the 
Orange River in the north. The meeting of white and Xhosa 
settlement set the seal on their final subjection and 
dispossession within the colony. 
A British force took the Cape in 1795 and kept it until the 
Batavian republic was established in the Netherlands. In 1803 it 
was handed back to the Dutch by the Treaty of Amiens, only to be 
repossessed by the British in 1806, with the expectation of an 
ordered and prosperous colony. But the eastern frontier zone was 
only really incorporated into the Cape colonial system from the 
turn of the 19th century, with a deliberate extension of British 
rule. In a less tangible way the beginnings of industrial, rather 
than the previously limited mercantile capitalism in 19th century 
Europe, helped narrow the gulf between the externally trading 
Cape and the remote interior (Legassick,1989). 
Social Structures in the Early Western Cape 
In the early western Cape colony, a coincidence of status and 
pigmentation was reinforced by VOC policy. Interracial marriages 
which would have blurred the coinciding lines of colour and 
status were prohibited, there were restrictions on black 
ownership of land and the Company appointed only white officials. 
But racial relations confirmed status even outside the province 
of Company intervention. Many of the attitudes behind a racial 
conception of social hierarchy were already present in Europe, 
and the fact that slavery was practised not just at the Cape, but 
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in many of the VOC's territories, has a particular significance. 
By the time white settlers had arrived at the Cape, some had 
already inherited a set of racial attitudes within Europe. They 
were generally predisposed to hold in contempt people unlike 
themselves in behaviour and physical appearance. Yet Snowden, 
1983, in an account of colour prejudice in the ancient world, 
could find no discernable racism within the Greek and Roman 
polities. He links this with the fact that conquered foes of a 
variety of complexions were customarily kept as slaves. With 
later European expansion overseas though, colonisation produced 
evident status distinctions between colonial rulers who were 
white and subject peoples who were black. Accompanying European 
colonisation was a racially exclusive trade in slaves. With 
nearly all slaves black and nearly all masters white, racist 
ideologies, it is argued, developed as legitimation. 
Certainly, participation in the West African slave trade by the 
Dutch had solidified vaguer notions of disdain for blacks 
(Thompson,1985), and a European justification for slavery had 
evolved from crude environmentally deterministic explanations of 
the perceived arrested childlike development of Africans. In the 
northern Europe of the 17th century, Africans were already 
stereotyped in some quarters, as "idolatrous and licentious, 
thieving and lying, lazy and dirty" (cited Thompson,1985,71). 
Although reports of 18th century European travellers in Africa, 
and the earlier journals of shipwrecked sailors making their way 
across the eastern side of southern Africa, were more positve, 
emphasising African attributes of hospitality and equaniminty, 
even early white contact with indigenous peoples was set against 
a background of nascent European prejudice. Sailors who had seen 
Khoikhoi at the Cape were particularly disgusted by their habit 
of eating raw the intestines of animals and then smearing 
themselves with their malodorous grease. By the 17th century the 
"Hottentot" (Khoikhoi) was already becoming a figure representing 
degradation in European literature (Thompson,1985,72). 
Within the colony, the majority of the white settlers' slaves 
(65%) were brought from Madagascar. But others came from Delagoa 
Bay and the East African coast up to Zanzibar, carried by 
Portuguese and Islamic traders (Armstrong and Worden, 1989), and 
the lack of a common language amongst the colony's slaves 
contributed to the creation of Afrikaans as a standard medium of 
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communication. The importation of slaves was at its peak in the 
1690s (Katzen,1982), and thereafter, while slave imports 
continued throughout the 18th century, Cape-born slaves became 
more numerous. 
There were slaves belonging to the company and those belonging to 
private individuals, the latter being more numerous. Many did not 
fit the common perception of a slave, but were skilled artisans, 
although amongst owners they were stereotyped according to their 
area of origin. For most of the colonial period before the early 
19th century, the population of slaves at the Cape, numbering 
some 17,000 by 1795, was greater than that of Europeans (Boucher, 
cited Armstrong and Worden,1989). Shell, 1989, has attempted to 
explain the fact that a smaller white population was able to 
perpetuate slavery in southern Africa, by referring to the custom 
of treating slaves as junior members of a patriarchal family. But 
the facts that slaves of diverse backgrounds were widely 
dispersed throughout the colony and therefore unable to 
communicate, and that punishments for insubordination could be 
extremely harsh, also helped preclude frequent revolt. 
Despite Cape slavery being unusual in some respects, it was 
significant for future social relations in that all slaves and 
most labourers were black, while landowners and employers were 
white (Worden,1994). The white settlers' fear of violence from 
rebellious slaves was a salient factor in shaping white attitudes 
towards Africans (Katzen,1982), but even freed slaves continued 
to be subject to discriminatory legislation in the late 18th 
century; for instance, being required to carry lanterns or face 
arrest (Worden,1994). Slavery cemented a racial conception of 
class relations for over 170 years. "By the late 18th century 
race and class had overlapped for so long ... (that) to many 
Europeans this social structure appeared to be natural or God-
given" (Elphick and Giliomee, 1989, 544). More specifically, the 
system of slavery introduced at the Cape was portentous in that 
it generated the first implementation of passes for "non-white" 
racial groups. From the 1760s slaves and Khoisan were obliged to 
carry passes signed by their employers to prove that they were 
not runaways (Worden,1994,67). 
However, there were spatial differences in social structures, 
even in early colonial society at the Cape. Cape Town society 
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differed from that of its hinterland largely by virtue of its 
external links through international trade. Despite the 
preservation of racial distinction by the "orthodox" elite, there 
was a relatively fluid intermixing of racial and status groups 
here, which was rare in the surrounding districts. External ties 
precipitated seasonal economic fluctuations which made more 
casual wage labour an alternative to the continual upkeep of 
slaves. The rate of manumission of slaves was therefore highest 
here. Interracial sexual relationships were also more common due 
to the presence a garrison and the periodic influx of sailors 
from visiting ships. Apart from its economic links to the outside 
world Cape Town was more closely attuned to the external flow of 
ideas. "Cape Town was the sluice through which passed all the 
colony's contacts with the outside world" (Elphick and 
She11,1989). These contacts included the importation of western 
European ideological currents. Later burgher revolts against the 
VOC were to carry the rhetoric of Enlightenment thinking from 
Europe and there was a negative correlation between the 
expression of such ideas and the distance of their implementers 
from Cape Town. 
While social structures in Cape Town itself were relatively 
fluid, the southwestern Cape environs of the settlement were 
marked by a more rigid set of relations. This was a settled, 
arable, slave-owning area, engendering stability and a more 
ordered social fix. Aspects of European culture were adopted by 
blacks but they were not included in the white church or society. 
Prestige was tied to land and land was in the hands of whites by 
dint of conquest. 
Khoisan Dispossession  
As far as many historians are concerned, the most notable feature 
of South African social systems has been their marshalling of the 
"non-white" population into a labouring role for white employers. 
These material relations have been seen as laying at the heart of 
the later systems of segregation and apartheid. Slavery 
represents an earlier and more universal form of such a system, 
but the first "non-white" labouring force developed purely on 
southern African soil was composed of dispossessed Khoisan. The 
independent clans of Khoikhoi and San which had inhabited the 
Cape before European arrival were reduced by 1800 to a servile 
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labouring class under the control of whites, mostly farmers. 
Khoisan dispossession was traditionally traced back largely to a 
devastating smallpox epidemic of 1713, but in fact the process 
began early on in their interaction with white settlers (Wilson 
and Thompson,1982). This outcome and the mechanisms which brought 
it about are held to have ramifications for the later 
relationship between race and class in South Africa. 
The subjection of Khoikhoi to the political authority of whites 
at the Cape was resisted from as early as 1659 (Worden,1994). 
Mutual cattle raiding resulted by the 1670s in the loss of 
independent Khoikhoi means of subsistence in the Cape Peninsula. 
Further north and east, Khoisan continued striving to eject white 
settler farmers from accustomed grazing land, through a series of 
raids, particularly in the 1730s, and there was a major 
"rebellion" in 1799, once nominal colonial authority had been 
established. But ultimately the Khoikhoi were in a weak position 
due to the form of their pastoralist society (Elphick and 
Malherbe,1989). The prestige of chiefs was dependent upon their 
ownership of livestock. Once this had been lost to VOC-backed 
expeditions securing supplies for the station or on punitive 
raids, they also lost their ability to rally effective 
resistance. If, on the other hand, they kept their cattle, their 
mobility as fighters was restricted. 
Once independent Khoikhoi political authority had been broken 
through conquest, individual Khoi were more accessible to white 
farmers, now moving further into the interior, who demanded their 
skills of rearing and herding livestock. In return, in the early 
stages of colonial development, the farmer could offer a refuge 
to the family of the labourer from San attacks, filling the 
vacuum left by the collapse of Khoikhoi chiefly authority. Thus 
the dispossessed pastoral inhabitants of the western Cape were 
incorporated into the white agricultural economy, the terms of 
their incorporation being subservience to white authority and a 
labouring function. Such conditions were obviously facilitated, 
indeed encouraged, by pre-existing white racial attitudes. "No 
one before the turn of the 19th century considered it the duty of 
government to end labour bondage and allow freedom of ownership 
and movement" for people who were not white (Elphick and 
Malherbe,1989). White society's view of the Khoikhoi became so 
entrenched that the missionary John Philip wrote 
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"under the most favourable circumstances the great body of 
the Hottentots cannot be in any other condition than that 
of labourers for centuries to come. Individuals among the 
Hottentots...may in 30 or 40 years, rise to possess little 
farms" (cited Elphick and Malherbe,1989). 
By 1800 the Khoikhoi of the interior were landless, largely 
immobile and dependent. After their incorporation as servants 
only two institutional options remained as alternatives for some. 
These were service in the Cape Regiment which employed Khoikhoi 
soldiers under white leadership from 1793, and life on a mission 
established by a European, which involved significant concessions 
to European cultural mores (Elphick and Malherbe,1989), with no 
necessary social recognition by Europeans to accompany such 
concessions. 
The involvement of black people in the growing economy of South 
Africa was set along the lines established in this period. Black 
workers were to be primarily labourers and were to be subservient 
to white bosses. To this extent the incorporation of the Khoikhoi 
set the mould for the marshalling of the more powerful Bantu 
speaking tribes into the white economy once their resistance was 
broken during the 19th century. A coincidence of race and (pre-
industrial) class had already been formed by the end of the 18th 
century. 
Social Relations on The Frontier 
In the South African version of the Turner thesis 
(MacCrone,1937), the frontier between colony and Xhosa has been 
credited with a special role in presaging the later social 
relations of South Africa as a whole. Specifically, the mentality 
of racial segregation, and later, apartheid, has been said to 
have first emerged here (MacMillan,1923). In this conception, the 
Calvinist pastoral trekboer (who, despite the name, usually 
settled permanently once a farm was established) dominated, with 
family, slaves and Khoikhoi labour subject to his control. Whites 
entered the eastern area with preconceptions of their superior 
Christian status over the "treacherous and violent" blacks of the 
frontier region. The Xhosa were, if anything, perceived as being 
even further removed from the white moral community than were the 
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Khoikhoi, and the hardships of competition for cattle and grazing 
with those of a different pigmentation solidified racial 
distinctions. 
While there is a great deal of truth to this account, it is a 
simplification of the complicated pattern of relations on the 
frontier. Firstly, the white patriarchal family was merely the 
norm, not universal on the frontier. Guelke, 1989, has shown that 
a significant portion of frontier colonial society was composed 
of a "plural" community of, generally poorer, white men and 
Khoikhoi wives. The offspring of such unions were known as 
"Bastaards", and later, a polity of this origin, the Griqua, 
played out a significant role on the northern frontier 
(Legassick,1989). Even the racially discrete social norm of the 
"orthodox" frontier community was not new in Southern Africa, but 
derived from that established in the slave-owning districts of 
the southwest. The development of the white frontier community's 
racial attitudes was also more complex: 
The Khoisan of the eastern frontier region experienced 
dispossession later than those of the west, and, initially, with 
less onerous implications. During the period of the "open" 
frontier of 1770-95, when the outermost limits of Xhosa 
settlement had only recently been encountered by colonists, white 
population densities were low, with farmsteads at intervals of at 
least one hour's ride (Christopher,1984). Khoikhoi were thus able 
to move relatively freely between farms to work, and their 
employer's coercion to remain was not always effective. There was 
an element of symbiosis between white farmer and black worker and 
no concrete fix of race and status. Not all whites were masters 
and not all non-whites servants, and relations between white and 
black were not so much master-slave; more patron-client 
(Legassick,1980). 
However, racial attitudes were indeed hardened and solidified 
because of material struggles between white settlers and Xhosa on 
the frontier. The series of wars which became so important in 
eastern frontier life were triggered by disputes over occupation 
of land and mutual raiding of cattle. Antagonism along racial 
lines was exacerbated by the maltreatment of Khoisan and Xhosa 
servants, the incursions of Xhosa into "colonial" territory 
(especially following drought), and the absence of overwhelming 
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force on either side to impose order. White administrators, when 
negotiating with Xhosa leaders, failed to understand the nature 
of Xhosa fragmentation into mutually independent chiefdoms. Even 
though the precedence of certain chiefs was recognised by various 
Xhosa groupings, this did not mean that these chiefs could impose 
a negotiated arrangement on them. Similarly, within the white 
settler population, officials could not control the actions of 
widely dispersed individuals (Wilson,1982), and mutual distrust 
on the part of larger groups was continually heightened by the 
violent acts of small parties (Giliomee,1989). 
But it would be misleading to represent racial relations on the 
eastern frontier as a permanently volatile blend of mistrust and 
antagonism periodically bursting into warfare through the 18th 
century. For many whites on the frontier, Xhosa were trading 
partners and labourers before they were foes. Xhosa and trekboer 
were also aware of shared attitudes - especially towards cattle 
raiding as an opportunity for both to build up stock and power. 
The permeability of the frontier in the late 18th century 
facilitated a spectrum of relations between both groups with 
conflict lying only at one extreme. 
By 1811 though, Xhosa had been expelled from the eastern limits 
of the colony, and with the infilling of white settlement, the 
Khoikhoi, despite frequent bouts of resistance, were reduced to a 
dependable labour force. Increasing pressure on the land within 
the colony meant that by 1812 only 18% of whites owned land, 
while virtually all had in the 1770s (Giliomee,1989). As Khoikhoi 
were deprived of their remaining land, their ability to decline 
to work for whites disappeared. They were kept as servants on 
white farms by a variety of tactics on the part of the farmer. 
These included the withholding of wages, impounding of the 
servant's livestock and detention of the family of an employee. 
The new British administrators, in spite of some sympathy for the 
Khoikhoi, needed the consent of the frontier farmers to secure 
order and the labour of the Khoikhoi to secure meat supplies for 
the growing Cape settlements. The outcome of their intervention 
was therefore to bolster the labour securing practices of white 
farmers. Indenture for "Bastaard" children of servants until the 
age of 25 was introduced, and, as we have seen, at the end of the 
18th century a pass was required for Khoikhoi and slaves to move 
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between farms and to towns in the colony. An ideological 
construct - "white space" - had been created in southern Africa 
by dint of conquest. There were still more black people than 
white living in this space, but most blacks had to obtain 
permission, in the form of a pass from a white employer or owner, 
to move within it. By the early 19th century then, race had 
become a more concrete determinant of status and class, with 
Khoisan and "Bastaards" merging into an undifferentiated servile 
class only slightly above the level of the slaves themselves. 
Afrikaner Identity 
It has been argued that the material relations which were formed 
in the early period of colonisation were portentous. There is 
also an assertion that Afrikaner nationalism, which would later 
combine with a concern over the preservation of established 
material relations to bring about the apartheid system, had its 
origins in the period between white movement inland and the early 
19th century (Sparks,1990, De Villiers,1988). The seeds of an 
exclusivist Afrikaner identity are said to have been sown among 
the Dutch speaking trekboers and farmers of the early colony, 
conflict with the British nurturing its growth. 
The bonding elements which have been identified in the generation 
of a collective Afrikaans identity on the frontier include the 
Calvinist religion and the nagmaal, a kind of festival associated 
with it; the need for collective defence against a visibly 
different, and much more numerous black group made hostile by 
white conquest and competition for land and cattle; and common 
antipathy to the attempts of first the VOC, and then the British, 
to extend control (but not protection) over the independent-
minded trekboers. To this list De Villiers,1988, adds the common 
belief that retreat into the interior was a way to solve the 
problems of poverty and harassment by the British law (a belief 
apparently manifested in the Great Trek of the 1830s). 
Yet it is not necessarily the case that a prototype Afrikaner  
identity was formed in these early years. The factors listed 
above helped to forge a bond between settlers of the frontier, 
but their independence was often a stronger force than their 
collective spirit. The rise of a collective sense of ethnic 
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Afrikaans solidarity, and particularly nationalism, must be 
placed later in South Africa's history. The identity which 
emerged at this time was that of settlers in a relatively hostile 
colonial environment, not that of a nation in the making. 
The rate at which farms were taken up in the interior was not 
related to market fluctuations, which leads one to conclude that 
it was primarily the desire to be the master of one's own land 
that motivated whites to settle there (Guelke,1989). Once there, 
many had little contact with Cape Town. Trips to the town were 
occasioned by specific needs - for ammunition, tobacco, coffee, 
tea, sugar, baptism, or to sell a surplus. From the Zuurveld a 
return trip would take about three months (Guelke,1989). The low 
density of settlement in the first half of the 18th century and 
the remoteness of the frontier necessitated an in6pendence of 
spirit and an ability to be a "jack of all trades" rather than a 
sense of communal solidarity. 
However, isolation and independence were not unalloyed. The 
nagmaals tempered the trekboer's exclusion from wider society. 
These were intermittent gatherings of the settlers of the 
frontier regions for the purposes of Calvinist religious renewal 
and reassertion, the marketing of home produced goods and the 
enjoyment of social intercourse. Calvinism itself was an 
important bonding factor, but as Du Toit, 1982, points out, it 
did not serve an Afrikaner sense of being the chosen people, but 
a more diffuse conception of being chosen in contrast to the 
heathens of the region. It did not therefore necessarily 
encourage an exclusivist Afrikaner identity as distinct from the 
later British presence. 
The absence of VOC authority emanating from Cape Town in the more 
remote districts, is also said to have served the waxing sense of 
Afrikaner frontier identity, since the settlers substituted for 
central authority by running their own form of government 
involving paid officials (landdrosts) and part time burgher 
administrators (heemraden). 
The VOC presence was weak on the frontier, and it was indeed 
resented. The Company on the one hand tried to monopolise, or at 
least supervise, trading relations with the Khoikhoi, like it did 
in the west, but on the other hand, was not able to offer the 
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acceptable aspect of authority on the frontier - protection from 
indigenous enemies. The Company was not only perceived as a 
wholly negative influence by many; it was also incapable of 
punishing insubordination in the remote districts when 
challenged. And challenged it was in 1795 when the eastern 
settlers rose up in a rebellion which was finally to be put down 
only by the new British administrators. 
The independence of spirit and rebelliousness of the frontier is 
often held as an example of new traits developing amongst its 
settlers (Sparks,1990, De Villiers,1988). These traits may have 
represented the emergence of a different identity from that of 
the more stable west, but it was not yet an ethnically defined 
and exciusivist Afrikaner identity. This was not shaped by white 
settler antagonism to blacks or burgher antagonism to the VOC in 
this period, but by resistance to British interference in a late 
19th century context (see next chapter). Although the first 
indications of antagonism to British intervention emerged in the 
early 19th century, they were restricted to a small group within 
settler society. 
The administrative actions of the British which had the most far 
reaching effects on settlers penetrated in two main directions -
the protection of Khoisan "rights" and the attack on slavery. The 
centrepiece legislation regarding the Khoisan was ordinance 50 of 
1828. This abolished passes for the Khoisan, stated their right 
not to be forced into service and to own land and made parental 
consent a condition of child apprenticeship. Contracts were 
required for work of over a month, and were not to extend beyond - 
a year (Elphick and Malherbe,1989). Slavery was undermined first 
in 1808, when further trade in slaves was halted, and finally 
abolished in 1834. 
These moves on the part of British administrators have been 
credited largely to liberals in Britain in the case of slavery, 
and in the case of the Khoisan, to missionary influence within 
the colony (Elphick and Malherbe,1989), although there is also a 
materialist argument that Ordinance 50 represented an early 
attempt to establish free market labour relations (Newton-
King,1980). But the impact of the legislation was never as 
dramatic as its instigators would have liked. Elphick and 
Malherbe point out that it did not alter the essential nature of 
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the Cape economy - "namely its reliance on cheap, immobile 
labour" (p.52). In spite of Ordinance 50 the de facto position of 
Khoikhoi servants remained essentially unchanged. In fact slaves 
were often treated better than contracted Khoikhoi since they 
represented an asset of their owner (Stockenstrom, cited Elphick 
and Giliomee,1989,452). 
The lack of de facto change can be put down to official 
unwillingness to stir up the wrath of white settlers of the 
colony. This was the element of the Cape's population in whose 
interests the government was most concerned to act. Whites were 
the wealth makers and the guarantors of political stability and 
minimal costs for the officials at the Cape. The British 
administrators therefore trusted markets and missionary 
intervention, rather than their own direct intervention, to 
improve the position of the Khoisan in line with liberal 
thinking. Indeed when further legislation entered the field from 
the official camp it was to be emphatically on the side of white 
employers. 
Even the abolition of slavery in the colony can not be said to 
have dramatically changed its social characteristics. Following 
emancipation, slaves were bound to the same master for four years 
to make the transition easier for their owners, and after this 
interval, most had no option within the prevailing social 
structures but to continue working full time or on a casual basis 
for their accustomed "employer". 
Despite the practical ineffectiveness of these British moves 
against white despotism, they generated disgust and apprehension 
on the part of some white settlers. It was clear that the general 
trend of British policy was more favourable to the black 
inhabitants of the colony than settlers were accustomed to. 
Specific incidents out of which much was later made, such as 
Slagtersnek, where British officialdom intervened forcefully 
against settlers for their maltreatment of a servant (see next 
chapter), were a manifestation of the trend. That the trend was 
resented by many is clear. That it became a focal point in the 
early 19th century for the emergence of Afrikaner identity in 
opposition to British official interference is far less clear. 
Indeed, for most of the late 18th and early 19th centuries, the 
new British administrators of the colony cooperated with Dutch 
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speaking local officials in their organisation of warfare against 
Xhosa. It was later Dutch speakers who would use the events of 
the period to create a sense of Afrikaner nationalism, not those 
who lived at the time (Thompson,1985). 
Conclusion  
This chapter has been an attempt to trace back the origin of 
South Africa's racial order, and to address the question of an 
early emergence of Afrikaans ethnic awareness. With regard to the 
former issue, if one can question the extent to which later 
social structures emanated from 18th century ones, one cannot 
doubt that in the 18th century a social order based to a great 
extent on pigmentation was created. In examining the mode by 
which this racial order originated, Elphick and Giliomee, 1989, 
place emphasis on the official intervention of the VOC. A racial 
order, they argue, was created rather than emerged. The legal 
structures of the VOC, imposed in the first years of settlement, 
provided the skeleton of the society that was to grow in the 
Cape. It was this basic form that was to be adapted over the 
following two centuries of geographical expansion and economic 
development. The legal status groups of the early Cape - 
freeburghers and Company servants, Khoisan, slaves and, later, 
free blacks - were the precursors of the racial categories which 
characterised subsequent South African society. 
Such an argument may not, however, be sufficient in explaining 
the origins of South Africa's racial order. It emphasises 
administrative structures and an official moulding of the social 
perceptions of the population. But the members of this population 
brought with them ideas wherein could lie the origin of a racial 
structuring of society. The actions of the VOC could be seen as 
not so much initiating, but guarding and bolstering burghers' own 
preconceptions of what was a natural social order. The view of 
society entailed in VOC legislation already saturated the white 
society that the VOC administered. "The pattern of racial 
relationships established in the 18th century Cape must be seen 
in the light of the formation of the Cape colonist as a whole, 
the form of his inheritance from Europe and the exigencies of the 
situation he had to face" (Legassick,1980,68). 
European social values brought ashore at the Cape were, however, 
36 
modified by its VOC-ruled, slave owning society. Here, settlers 
readily adopted racial attitudes which favoured them by slotting 
them into a social hierarchy according to their skin colour and 
European background. 
Once established, such a hierarchy would be defended against, on 
the one hand, the physical threat of the those defined primarily 
by their race, and on the other, the cultural threat of a loss of 
European identity in Africa. The consolidation of white racism on 
South African soil stemmed initially from fear - the isolated 
coloniser's fear of the colonised, dispossessed and enslaved. 
Racial "attitudes on the frontier derived initially from those in 
the Western Cape, and despite a period of relative social 
fluidity, became more extreme with increasing competition between 
Xhosa and settler societies for land and grazing. While conflict 
between colonists and Xhosa was over material possessions (land 
and cattle), and the opposing sides in frontier conflict were not 
entirely racially discrete, pigmentation was the most obvious 
marker of allegiance and source of identity. 
As Xhosa too, began to be dispossessed by whites, missionaries 
and some administrators developed the aim of "civilizing" them 
and incorporating them in white society. But the dominant settler 
conception held that they were to be kept outside of white social 
structures, and even outside of white space, unless they were 
servicing whites' labour needs. Prior to white settlement on the 
frontier, different Bantu speaking polities had dispossessed each 
other (as well as Khoisan) of land; but certain shared cultural 
assumptions and the lack of an obvious physical difference 
between dispossessed and dispossessor had facilitated a high 
degree of subsequent assimilation. The interaction between white 
settler and Xhosa was of an entirely different nature. 
Ideological barriers associated with physical and cultural 
difference, notably over "ideas about land tenure, labour, 
marriage and the causes of disease" (Wilson,1982,268), plus the 
salient fact that Xhosa numbers were not only much greater than 
white, but growing much more quickly, made the assimilation of 
coloniser and colonised unacceptable to the vast majority of 
whites. 
The shifting frontier zone did not, as in the "frontier thesis", 
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represent the seedbed of racism in South Africa, since racial 
conceptions associated with inherited European traits, slavery 
and the VOC order were already fixed in the southwestern Cape. 
Nevertheless, despite much interaction for the material gain of 
both white and black along the frontier, the region did see the 
consolidation of racially defined identity, partly because it was 
coincident with cultural identity. Although there was increasing 
class differentiation within the white population, and indigenous 
societies were never as egalitarian as is often believed, race 
assumed and retained paramountcy in defining social relations 
across the whole of the colony in the early colonial period. 
Within the white population of the colony, by the early 19th 
century, discrepancies in outlook were emerging between British 
administrators and the slave-owning settlers - differentiated by 
their language, religion and sense of relative independence from 
authority - but they were not yet being expressed as significant 
ethnic cleavages. Despite legislation which was relatively 
liberal, the British administrators generally upheld fairly fixed 
racial relations, favourable to the settlers, based on a 
controlled labouring function for blacks in "white space". 
While they are significant, the importance of early colonial 
racial ideologies and material structures for South Africa's 
later development, must not be overemphasised. "There was nothing 
in Cape society to suggest a race consciousness stronger than in 
many, perhaps most colonial societies of the day, nor anything 
that particularly prefigured the later elaboration of apartheid" 
(Freund,1989,334). While, elsewhere, similar systems were 
subsequently diluted by succeeding economic and social 
developments, in South Africa the system was modernised as far as 
possible. 
The racial order was significantly changed as a result of South 
Africa's interaction with a world economy, its witnessing of an 
intra-white struggle and, most importantly, the incorporation of 
a numerically superior black population in rapidly developing 
industrial structures in the 19th century. The gap between early 
colonial social structures and those of 20th century apartheid -
a more deliberate ideological imposition - is even greater. While 
the pre-industrial period as a whole laid the foundations for 
later systems of segregation and apartheid then, it did not 
dictate their form. 
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Chapter Two 
Colonial Expansion, Industrialisation and Afrikanerdom 
This chapter is divided into three sections, each dealing with 
one of the most fundamental transformations of the 19th century. 
Part One examines the processes and more conscious decisions by 
which not only African, but also white polities to the east and 
north of the Cape Colony were deprived of political independence, 
and often, ownership and control over land. Part Two describes 
the evolution of systems for the control of African labourers in 
"white space" during South Africa's first industrial revolution, 
and Part Three accounts for the emergence of Afrikaner 
nationalism in the late 19th century. 
1. Colonial Expansion  
Introduction  
The land, both as symbol and as reality, has had resonant 
implications in the history of South African society. Possession 
of land was, since 1652, a theme of contention between racially 
and ethnically defined participants, and remains so today. The 
19th century brought to fulfilment the white appropriation of 
African soil and the minerals beneath it. By the end of the 
century there was no enforceable African claim to most of South 
Africa. The magnitude of the transformation entailed was hidden 
from the view of most whites. J.M. Coetzee, 1988, has shown how 
two strands of white literature emerged, reflecting this fact. 
The "pastoral novel", exemplified by the writing of Van den 
Heever, is permeated with the assertion of white ownership of the 
land by right of occupation. Boer and soil are bound together and 
the Boer is South Africa - "the land lives in the culture of the 
farmer people through the plough". The "empty landscape novel", 
exemplified in the work of Olive Schreiner, portrays a South 
African landscape that is silent and forbidding. There is no 
recognition of a black occupation, indeed blacks are silent 
through most of white writing. This silence is imposed over the 
presence of the dispossessed. It reflects, according to Roy 
Campbell, the "curbed ferocity of beaten tribes" (cited 
Coetzee,1988). Yet the menacing and brooding presence of Africans 
lies just outside the thin boundaries of white society, and it is 
39 
a recurrent image in white South African thought; available to be 
manipulated for political purposes. 
Gunner, 1988, provides an account of the black literary response 
to dispossession. Sol Plaatje, writing in "Mhudi" at the end of 
the era of black dispossession, used the past as a source of 
inspiration and strength, harking back to a time before the 
frontier gave way to white advance, when Boers respected and 
feared their African neighbours. An indication of the nature of 
the intervening transformation, and of its impact on Africans, is 
present in the writings of R.R.R. Dhlomo and Benedict Wallet 
Vilikazi. In these, the ability to adapt to the industrial 
present is demonstrated by the experience of migrant mineworkers. 
Vilikazi also "wrestled with the question of how to reinterpret 
the Zulu past and how to write in a society where his own people 
were becoming increasingly dispossessed and displaced" 
(Gunner,1988,223). One response was to eulogise the paramounts 
who had presided over a powerful and independent Zululand, or 
resisted white incursion: Shaka, Dingaan, Mpande, Cetshwayo and 
Dinizulu. Many educated blacks hankered for a mythologised past 
in which possession of the land by black communities provided for 
a power and a tranquillity no longer to be found, especially in 
the industrialising cities. 
While the literature of the late 19th century can tell us 
something about how attitudes across the most significant racial 
divide were shaped by African dispossession, it does not tell us 
how that dispossession came about. In order to comprehend the 
magnitude of the transformation which took place in the ownership 
of the land, and the use that was made of it in southern Africa 
during the 19th century, it is useful to simplify what was a 
complex series of interactions between different polities into 
two broad stages. The first stage was mainly to do with 
competition over grazing land: on the one hand, between settlers 
along the eastern frontier and the Xhosa, and on the other, 
between Dutch speaking trekkers, establishing republics to the 
north of the colony, and surrounding African polities. During 
this stage, which lasted from the late 18th to the mid 19th 
century, the loss of African independence often occurred through 
indirect, as well as direct means - the role of labour flows, 
missionaries and trade being particularly important. In the 
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second stage, beginning in the 1860s, mineral discoveries were 
seen by the British colonial administrators as necessitating a 
new geographical and economic order in the region. Those African, 
and even independent white polities, which had until now retained 
their autonomy, had it removed in the late 19th century, 
generally by overwhelming British military force. 
Colonial Penetration in the "First Stage"  
A seemingly tangled web of cooperation and conflict between white 
and black, Boer and British, and between African chiefdoms 
grouped under paramounts, characterises the early 19th century. 
But certain events stand out as microcosms of the broader 
interactions occurring, and they have a clear spatial dimension. 
There is an obvious distinction between the "settled" western 
Cape, where Khoisan dispossession had already occurred, and the 
turbulent frontiers to the north and east, where whites were 
encountering much more formidable Bantu speaking polities. 
In the east, the zone where disputes over land and cattle were 
initially felt most acutely was the Zuurveld - in summer, an area 
of rich and nutritious grasses, which turned sour in the winter. 
Here, after a series of inconclusive skirmishes interspersed with 
periods of trade and barter with white settlers, the Rarabe Xhosa 
chiefdoms under Ndlambe were finally cleared across the Great 
Fish River by a more aggressive British administration in 1812. 
There was to be a total of nine wars between the colony and 
various groupings of Xhosa chiefdoms, caused largely by the 
vagaries and inconsistencies of British colonial policy and 
periods of increased competition for grazing land brought on by 
drought (see Mostert,1992), but being the first all out assault 
on Xhosa territory and sustenance, this action was the 
pathbreaking one. 
The British authorities tried to consolidate their influence over 
rebellious frontier settlers and Xhosa in 1820 by importing some 
5000 civilians from Britain and placing them as settled farmers 
along the disputed tract between colony and Xhosa. The settlers 
were the first significant British civilian presence on the 
eastern frontier. They provided a backdrop for further British 
colonial intervention against the Xhosa in the area. Few of them 
stayed on their isolated allotments long. Most drifted to the 
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nascent towns of Albany District, as the Zuurveld was now known, 
and found their new livelihood in transport riding, trading, 
craft or hunting. By May 1823 only 438 of the original 1004 male 
grantees remained on their rural sites, the infertility of the 
soils and the unaccustomed hazards of frontier life, including 
Xhosa raids and three successive seasons of rust, drought and 
flood, having driven the rest away. Where they failed in the bush 
though, they generally prospered in the towns, turning tiny 
colonial "dorps" like Graaff-Reinet into "entrepots" of new trade 
(Peires,1989a). 
While the British settlers were acting as "apostles of free 
enterprise and free trade" (Peires,1989a,472) within the 
extremity of the colony, rumours were filtering down from the 
northeast, carried by traders, trekboers, missionaries and 
hunters, of great upheavals among the Bantu speaking peoples with 
whom white settlers had not yet made contact. It seems likely 
that a combination of ecological crisis, brought on by the 
structure of pastoralist agriculture, population growth and 
drought, and competition over trading monopoly with the 
Portuguese at Delagoa Bay precipitated a change in the structure 
of the northeastern polities around the turn of the 19th century 
(Guy,1980, Hedges,1978, Wright and Hamilton,1988). Certainly the 
chiefdoms of the Ndwandwe under Zwide in what became northern 
Zululand, and the Mthethwa under Dingiswayo along the east coast, 
underwent a militarization of the amabutho (originally age cohort 
elephant hunting groups), a centralisation of state power over 
neighbouring clans and a period of intensified conflict, known as 
the mfecane, which resulted in the regional hegemony of the Zulu, 
under Shaka. Militaristic consolidation of clans into more 
centralised structures led to a diaspora of peoples from an 
epicentre in Natal. For instance, an intrusion of Matiwane into 
the Cape Colony was met with repulsive force in the belief that 
these refugees were themselves the imagined "rampaging" Zulu. 
The lack of recorded evidence of these developments beyond the 
limit of European involvement means that no interpretation will 
be definitive. At the time, a hazy awareness of significant 
upheaval and of the rise of powerful groupings in a not too 
distant hinterland, permeated the frontier zone and presented yet 
another insecurity for the British settlers there. 
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Boers in their thousands had already, singly and in groups, 
escaped the confines of the colony to inhabit "Transorangia" to 
the north, alongside the Griqua, Khoisan remnants and groups of 
Tswana. But the decision of some 15,000 to embark upon their own 
enterprise of state construction away from British territory 
added a new and profound dimension to the course of social 
formation from 1836. The collection of parties moving out of the 
colony extended the sphere of white influence to the north and 
hastened the pace of conflict with, and dispossession of Bantu 
groups. After the Trek, the geographical spread of white settlers 
achieved the envelopment of the two largest black polities - the 
Zulu and the Xhosa, thus paving the way for their eventual 
conquest. 
The decisive collapse of the western Xhosa's means of 
independence came in the 1850s. The loss of pastures, the 
destabilising conflict with the colony, the psychological impact 
of a steady undermining of Xhosa culture, and the toll of cattle 
lungsickness resulted in the invocation of a form of spiritual 
assistance - that of their ancestors. The context of the 1850s 
was a particularly propitious one for the prophesies of a young 
girl, Nonqawuse, and her guardian, Mhlakaza, to become widely 
accepted (Peires,1989b). She foretold that sacrifices of cattle 
(many already seemingly forfeit to lungsickness) would bring 
forth hordes of ancestor warriors who would banish the whites and 
restore plenitude to the land. Such prophecies were not 
unprecedented in Xhosa society, and they subsequently occurred in 
other parts of the world where indigenous societies were under 
threat (see Wilson,1982). The circumspection of many Xhosa was 
treated as treachery by a growing force of believers as cattle 
slaughtering gained momentum. Various chiefs sent emissaries 
during 1856 and 1857 to Nonqawuse at the Oxarha River mouth to 
ascertain a date for the resurrection, but a sequence of such 
dates passed and finally the participating Xhosa realized their 
predicament: thousands starved, their basis of subsistence 
destroyed and the only option, dependence on the colony where 
eager employers were waiting for their labour. Despite nearly a 
century of resistance, the Rarabe Xhosa was the first Bantu-
speaking polity to be dispossessed. 
The Gcaleka Xhosa to the east retained possession of their land 
and control over their labour until later in the 19th century. 
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Further north, in the wake of the mfecane, the trekkers, who had 
eventually established two new Boer republics - the Transvaal 
(later, South African Republic) and the Orange Free State -
initially became involved in a complex series of alliances and 
conflicts with nearby, centralised African groupings. Most 
immediately, the Transvaal settlers were in dispute over land 
with the Ndebele (an offshoot from the Zulu kingdom), whom they 
subsequently drove out of the region entirely. In the 1840s, 
Orange Free State burghers both purchased land from the Griqua 
and fought the Basotho, under Moshoeshoe's leadership, for 
possession of grazing land between the Caledon and Orange Rivers 
(Worden,1994). Neither of the republics, however, was strong 
enough to enforce its will over the stronger, post-mfecane, 
centralised polities of the region, such as the Pedi in the north 
and the Basotho bordering the Orange Free State (see Marks and 
Atmore, eds.1980, Davenport,1991). Their conquest would not occur 
until later British intervention. 
Certain agencies were responsible for preparing the ground for 
African political subjugation, both to the east of the Cape 
Colony's frontier and around the trekker republics, in this early 
period. Labour contracts, for instance, between white farmers and 
individual Xhosa, made it increasingly difficult for the Xhosa 
chiefs to maintain the cohesiveness of the group (although in 
polities further from the colony's frontier, greater chiefly 
control was established over migrant workers' movements - see 
Beinart,1982, Delius,1983). Missionaries from the white colonies 
mostly viewed conversion and the adoption of Western parameters 
of civilisation as proceeding concurrently (William Shaw, cited 
Peires,1989a,487), and even the influential pro-Xhosa missionary, 
John Philip recognized that he was extending British influence 
and the Empire. In an innovative account, Comaroff and Comaroff, 
1991, have shown how Tswana cultural practices and sources of 
authority were subtly modified to reflect an awareness of the 
colonial power manifested by missionaries, well before colonial 
conquest itself. Traders were also influential in eroding the 
underpinnings of pre-colonial African societies before their 
final subjection, by allowing individuals within African polities 
to by-pass traditional chiefly control over trade, and amass 
wealth on their own behalf (see Colenbrander,1979, and 
Kennedy,1981, for the role of trade in the Zulu kingdom). 
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Individual African responses to contact with white society in 
this early period depended to a great extent upon the "shape of 
(their) rural communities" (Beinart,1982), and the nature of 
their pre-colonial political functioning. A comparison between 
Mpondo (Beinart,1982) and Mfengu (Bundy, 1972) is illustrative. 
The Mfengu had already had their chiefdoms destroyed by the 
mfecane before they met white colonists. As refugees from Natal 
they were accepted by the Xhosa, but as inferiors in the 
hierarchy of distribution. Having no independent political 
structures and little independent means of subsistence, the 
Mfengu were especially receptive to colonial culture, 
particularly conversion to Christianity. Many became allies of 
the colony in subsequent wars against the Xhosa. By comparison, 
although Mpondo adaptation occurred in the second phase of 
colonial penetration, when industrialisation of the interior was 
well under way, chiefly power was not only intact, but able to 
dictate the terms on which Mpondo would migrate to the colony. 
Chiefly direction of the processes of incorporation even extended 
to the collection of wages by the chief on behalf of workers from 
his area. 
For Zulu-speakers in Natal too, even though they were under 
tenuous colonial rule, there was still a relatively high degree 
of autonomy until the later 19th century. Atkins, 1993, traces 
the attempts of refugees returning from places of shelter from 
the mfecane or escaping the marriage restrictions of the Zulu 
King to the north, to reconstitute their accustomed lifestyles in 
the region. From their position of numerical strength and their 
ability to attain access to land, many of them were able to 
successfully resist incorporation in the colonial economy as wage 
labourers, or, when they did participate, to do so to some extent 
on their own terms. It was this ability which lay behind the 
constant refrain of "the Kaffirs are lazy", coming in the second 
half of the 19th century from the colonial settlers of the 
region. 
Colonial Conquest in the "Second Stage"  
"As late as the 1870s the subcontinent was divided into a large 
number of polities, chiefdoms, colonies and settlements of widely 
differing size, power and racial composition, without political 
unity or cohesion" (Worden,1994,5), but by the end of the 19th 
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century, the lands of what had once been the independent African 
polities, had generally been reduced by a combination of war and 
peaceful, but insidious processes, to areas reserved on European 
terms for continued African occupation. During the intervening 
period, not only the Sotho, Tswana, Griqua, Gcaleka Xhosa, Zulu 
and Pedi, but also the white settler republics of the Transvaal 
and the Orange Free State, had been subjected to a form of 
British imperial control. 
The explanation for this expansion of imperial intervention, with 
its commitment of vast British resources, lies in mineral 
discoveries; first of diamonds in Griqualand West in 1868, and 
then, in the 1880s, of gold in the Transvaal. By raising the 
prospect of a self-sustaining, and even organically expanding 
economy within a united southern African whole - in other words a 
confederation - the discoveries made the independent Boer and 
African polities of the interior seem much more significant 
thorns in the side of the British colonial administration than 
they had previously appeared. 
The aim of a confederation of white ruled polities in the region 
was not a new one; initially, it had been motivated in London by 
a desire to reduce imperial commitment and involvement in 
colonial vicissitudes by granting fairly cohesive self government 
to the region, including the Boer republics. After the 1870s 
though, diamond mining shed a new light on the British 
administrative aim. A political confederation of colonies and 
republics would be a significant step towards the goal of smooth 
economic functioning, particularly by allowing for the 
administrative integration of the diamond mines and their labour 
source areas, and the reduction of the harassment that the labour 
received as it traversed the Boer republics towards the mines. 
Basutoland was taken under British authority in 1868, after 
Moshoeshoe, concerned at the increasing white interest in the 
region, had seen the writing on the wall, and requested British 
imperial protection. Griqualand West was annexed in 1871 and a 
rebellion there put down in 1878. Carnarvon's annexation of the 
bankrupt Transvaal (weakened by war with the Pedi) in 1877 and 
Bartle Frere's appointment as the prospective first Commissioner 
of a federated South Africa, were further milestones in the 
infusion of the idea of confederation into policy. A dispute 
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within the Xhosa polities gave a pretext to wage a savage war on 
the remaining independent Gcaleka Xhosa in 1877-8, but the first 
major setback came in 1879 when a British column, moving to 
eradicate the independent Zululand's impediment to the scheme, 
was defeated at Isandhlwana. 
The eventual submission of the Zulu though, still did not leave 
the path to confederation clear. In the northern Transvaal, the 
Pedi, who had successfully fought off Boer attempts at control, 
were defeated by British soldiers with Swazi help, shortly after 
the Zulu war, and during the first British occupation of the 
Transvaal. However, despite the profusion of blood spilt and the 
enormous sums of money spent, confederation was still not 
achieved. In 1881, Transvaalers rebelled and defeated British 
regiments at the Battle-of Majuba. With the prospect of a costly 
war to regain control of the Boer republic, confederation was 
abandoned. 
Abandoned, that is, until the gold discoveries of the 1880s made 
it seem once more possible to outweigh the costs of conquest with 
the economic dividends of a united colony. Southern Bechuanaland 
had been annexed in 1884 to secure sources of timber, grain and 
labour supply to the Kimberley mines, but Southern Tswana 
resistance was only finally crushed after the gold mines had 
provided further reason for confederation, and following the 
Langeberg "revolt", in 1897. 
The Cape Colony, having enjoyed responsible government since 
1872, was opposed to this second, gold-led drive for 
confederation, seeing in it a threat to its own economic status. 
But the greatest obstacles to the new push for confederation 
remained the Boer republics. Their leaders were rather less 
concerned with economic rationality for the region and rather 
more preoccupied with maintaining their independence from British 
influence. The mines also brought mixed economic blessings for 
the republics, along with their political uncertainties. In the 
1880s, farming had still been the dominant sector in the 
republics and, despite regulations restricting African labour 
mobility and farmers' own initiative in securing "apprentice" 
labour, acute labour shortages set in once the mines were 
functioning. By the end of the century only prosperous farmers 
were able to attract sufficient labour. 
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The republics' attempts to contain industrialisation and to 
control the flow of entrepreneurs and labourers entering the 
diamond and gold fields, constituted a serious obstacle to 
British plans for confederation, and provided the backdrop to the 
1899 to 1902 Anglo-Boer war (see Part Three of this chapter). 
Once this last and most bloody, intra-white colonial war was 
over, the nature of the British colonial role in the region had 
shifted anyway, making confederation a redundant concept (see 
Chapter Three). 
While the confederation policy was still being pursued, African 
polities, once conquered or absorbed within colonial structures, 
responded in different ways to the opportunities that presented 
themselves. During the second half of the 19th century, an 
independent black commercial peasantry emerged. Bundy has done 
most to recover the struggle of this peasantry to compete in an 
emerging market economy for agricultural produce. Mfengu in the 
Herschel district of Ciskei, bordering the Orange Free State and 
Lesotho, for example, "made considerable adaptations, departing 
from the traditional agricultural economy and emerging as small 
scale commercial farmers" (Bundy,1980,209). Marks and Atmore, 
1980, note that many African polities had already had experience 
of producing an agricultural surplus during and after the 
mfecane; not for sale, but to provide tribute to a neighbouring 
and more powerful group. In the 1860s the emergence of commercial 
participation in agriculture in Herschel was indicated by the 
presence of new ploughs and wagons and the increasing diversity 
and quantity of crops produced. The boom stage came with the 
expansion of the diamond town of Kimberley in the late 1860s and 
1870s, when western houses, furniture, clothes and artifacts were 
adopted, some going so far as to employ servants. 
Increasing prosperity for some, however, coexisted with greater 
desperation for those squeezed out by the growing concentration 
of landholding. From 1883 the number of passes issued to wage 
seekers leaving the reserve significantly increased. What had 
been the fate for some soon became the fate of many, despite an 
ephemeral economic upswing for the region following the 
Witwatersrand gold discoveries and the miners' demand for riders, 
grain, oxen and wool. From 1895 to 1899, drought, locust and 
rinderpest conspired with the colonial authority's poll tax and 
fluctuating market prices to inflate the numbers of destitute and 
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increase the rate of emigration. The social stratification 
evident in the 1880s had become pronounced by 1900. White 
farmers, facing similar ecological and market forces, could rely 
on government assistance, but not the African peasant producer, 
both in Herschel and elsewhere. By 1920, Bundy writes, the 
reserve was easily distinguished from surrounding white areas by 
its evident poverty with, according to Gaoler, a large percentage 
of its population on "the very lowest level of bare subsistence" 
(quoted Bundy,1980,219). 
In the early 20th century, elite Africans began a new, political 
phase of resistance, with the founding in 1912 of the forerunner 
of the ANC, the SANNC (South African Native National Congress). 
It was the creation of the solidly middle class Africans, John 
Dube, Pixley Seme and Sol Plaatje. These were representatives of 
a relatively new phenomenon - a cohesive section of African 
society which had used a European style education and a 
willingness to adopt white cultural mores, not only to improve 
its own social and material position, but also to speak out on 
behalf of Africans with less access to white opinion. Lodge 
argues that its mobilisation in 1912 was a response to the 
closing off of opportunities for the social advancement of 
Africans following the Union of the two colonies and two ex-
republics to form South Africa in 1910 (Lodge,1983). The Cape's 
assimilationist constitution had held out the potential for the 
advancement of educated Africans not only to social grace, but to 
political power. It came as a bitter pill when the Act of Union 
not only failed to extend the Cape constitution to the other 
provinces, but removed the potential for black Members Of 
Parliament at the Cape and substituted white representatives. 
In its early stages the SANNC acted primarily in the interests of 
its middle class founders rather than Africans as a whole. An 
early complaint about segregated waiting rooms on the railways 
was lodged on the grounds that its members would have to share 
benches with uncouth rural Africans (Lodge,1983). The 
organisation operated to defend class privilege for a new social 
group, as much as to fight denial of the wider racial group. Yet 
its very presence denoted that, by the early 20th century, the 
core of Africans who had already accepted the fact of white 
conquest, and even a mission education from whites, were already 
looking for a political solution to their problems of social and 
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economic mobility. The political approach would gradually diffuse 
from this core group, through "tribal" representations, to a much 
broader cross section of African society. 
2. Industrialisation  
The Infusion Of Capital  
African dispossession by no means proceeded entirely with the 
growth of industry in mind. It followed from the settlers' desire 
for land and security well before minerals were discovered 
inland. But the seal was set on African dispossession by the 
enhanced economic and consequent political power that industrial 
growth would proffer to its white masters. For millions of 
Africans the industrial system dictated the terms of 
incorporation into the world created by whites in South Africa. 
In the first half of the 19th century the growth of an export 
industry, centred in the Cape, was achieved with viticulture, 
wool, mohair, and ostrich feathers from the more arid regions, 
but it was the mines of the interior which generated the wealth 
to transform South Africa from an essentially peripheral position 
within the world economy to that of a "sub-core". The mines did 
not just allow South Africa's economic integration with the world 
economy; they also brought about an internal economic 
integration. As Browett, 1976, points out, the gold wealth was 
not all returned to overseas investors; much of it was put to use 
in the development of new South African industries and the 
infrastructure necessary for further industrialisation. 
Despite initial Boer reluctance, by the early 1890s, Johannesburg 
had already become the largest city in Africa south of Cairo, and 
the region's industrial and financial core. Browett and Fair's 
1974 survey of the economic geography of South Africa at certain 
intervals since 1870 is useful in providing the outline story 
behind South Africa's present spatial economic relations, 
although its terminology and simplicity are somewhat outdated: In 
1870, the only major regional "core" in South Africa was Cape 
Town, with Durban representing a minor regional core. Surrounding 
the two towns were belts with the highest white population 
densities and commercial farming. Lying beyond these areas were 
zones of medium population density, the inhabitants of which 
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participated in commercial livestock farming, and which contained 
fairly well developed urban structures for the period. Two 
"resource frontiers" were just emerging in the 1870s, with 
diamonds attracting settlement at Kimberley, and copper in 
Namaqualand. 
Browett and Fair's next description is of the idealised South 
Africa of 1911, where the impact of the diamond and gold mines 
over the preceding 41 years had had dramatic effects. A result of 
the spatial concentration of newly discovered resources had been 
increasing differentiation in the geographical distribution of 
economic assets. South Africa's space had also become better 
integrated through the stimulation of regional specialisation, in 
response to growing market opportunities. Both trends were the 
outcome of an infusion of capital, catalysed by the mineral 
discoveries. The appearance of the new mineral based cores had 
provided first an incentive for British imperial control and 
conquest, and, later, magnets for black population shifts, and 
had brought into being a pattern of migrant labour that has 
formed a key characteristic of South Africa's human geography. By 
1911 there were three major cores, Johannesburg being the 
largest. Below these Browett and Fair envisaged six minor cores 
lying outside mainstream economic growth, but still experiencing 
expansion. There was intensive economic activity using railway 
networks around each of the major cores and around Port 
Elizabeth, and it was these areas which had the highest 
employment densities and the most extensive urban structures. 
Regions lying beyond these immediate hinterlands responded to the 
demands for local and regional products from the minor cores 
(Bundy's Herschel is a case in point, where it was African, 
rather than white farmers who responded). Each of the major cores 
in 1911 was more cohesively joined to its own periphery by the 
flows of black migrant workers moving to and from it, than it was 
to the other cores. 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, dramatic changes were 
occurring in the physical and social landscape of the areas which 
were evolving into "cores". An informal type of urban segregation 
was emerging within the white population (for example the large 
gardens and elaborate design of the residences in Parktown 
overlooking Johannesburg contrasted sharply with the small plots 
and gridiron pattern of the dwellings in Vrededorp, physically 
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and metaphorically beneath it, Van Onselen,1982); but the 
consequences of spatial segregation by race were far more 
dramatic, being ordered and structured, rather than passively 
opposed by government. 
The essential premise behind the treatment of black workers 
resident in the cities of Kimberley and Johannesburg was that 
they were there temporarily, and largely to extract the finite 
mineral resources (Smit,1979). The possibility that blacks could 
become acculturated participants in a racially shared urban 
environment was inconceivable to most whites. The "fact" that 
Africans in the cities were to be only temporarily resident was 
seen as necessitating officially ordered migrancy and urban 
influx control, and these in turn helped forge racial segregation 
in the cities. 
Lemon, 1982, has described South Africa's migrant labour system 
as a means of reconciling the social separation of races with the 
economic interdependence of a modern, expanding economy. He 
states that South Africa is unique in having imposed an 
institutionalised and legally entrenched migrant labour system on 
racial lines. But the policies of the government were not 
internally derived and then simply externally imposed. To a large 
extent they reflected and reinforced cultural and social practice 
on the part of white settlers, and, partially, of Africans 
themselves. Lemon points out that, from the 1850s, Africans in 
the Cape had been forced by white settlers, backed by the 
administration, to choose between assigned locations and service 
on colonial farms. Denied the previous strategy of farming on 
white owned land, and facing the demands of taxation, increasing 
numbers of Africans came to work for white farmers. 
Migrancy to the white farm was further encouraged when railway 
branch lines were built to areas of white farming so as to avoid 
black peasant producing regions like Fingoland (Bundy,1972), thus 
denying Africans equal access to markets, and stimulating their 
resort to employment. But even while African polities like the 
Pedi, Tswana and the Mpondo remained independent, their 
paramounts had sent workers into the British colonies and Boer 
republics. Controlled migrant labour flows were a valuable way 
for African polities to secure not only consumer goods, but also 
firearms to resist further colonial incursion. Labour flows to 
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the sources of white employment were expanded dramatically when 
the destination shifted to the mines. After 1870, first the 
Kimberley diamond fields and then the Witwatersrand gold mines 
brought forth streams of potential workers. By 1899 nearly 
100,000 Africans were on the gold mines alone, many from farther 
afield than the four states of the region themselves 
(Lemon,1982). 
Kimberley's significance extends beyond the centripetal force it 
exerted on African workers. The closed worker compounds which 
were built there to prevent smuggling of diamonds and establish 
control over the African workforce, set the mould for other 
mining, and then manufacturing concerns. The first step on the 
road to racial discrimination in the new, industrialised South 
Africa, was a revolt by white prospectors and merchants in 1875, 
to protest at undercutting by Africans. 
After 1876, larger mining companies (which, as costs rose with 
the depth of excavation, were becoming increasingly centralised) 
introduced registration passes and fixed contract terms for 
workers, but the 1841 Master and Servants Laws were invoked to 
restrict the practice to black miners, who could now be arrested 
if found in the area without the proper pass. Developed by white 
prospectors, the pass system was further institutionalised by the 
Cape administration when the area came under its jurisdiction. 
Organised mining capital very much had the ear of this 
administration, particularly when Cecil Rhodes (who, with the De 
Beers company, had established a virtual monopoly over diamond 
mining) became Prime Minister. 
Strip searches of workers for hidden diamonds began from the 
1880s, but further strike action by white miners, ironically with 
initial black support (Wilson and Ramphele,1989), led to the 
further restriction of this practice to Africans. Closed 
compounds for African workers followed, not just to prevent 
smuggling, but to enable direct supervision and control of the 
companies' workers and to allow wage savings, justified by the 
bulk provision of food and accommodation (Turre11,1984). It was 
the political power of the centralised mining houses that made 
such controls over the workforce in the Cape possible, and it was 
the racial status differences established in the pre-industrial 
period, that enabled only white workers to combine successfully 
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in resistance to the worst of them (Turre11,1987). 
In the Transvaal, the overall cost structure of the gold mines 
was critical for the development of further aspects of 
discrimination in the mining workforce - lower wages for Africans 
and job reservation. If owners could cut their overheads, then 
the less lucrative seams could be mined profitably. It would have 
to be the unenfranchised and "uncivilized" African worker who 
bore the brunt of the attempt. In 1887 the Chamber of Mines was 
formed on the Rand to encourage uniform policy and practice of 
labour recruitment across the colonies and republics. Its first 
attempt to impose a standard African wage disintegrated under the 
force of competition for labour in a period when it was still 
relatively scarce. But subsequent government controls over 
recruiting enabled employers to uniformly cut African wages by 
20% in 1896 and a further 30% in 1897 (Davenport,1991). The white 
Transvaal Miners' Association was formed after a 1902 strike to 
resist further cost-cutting piece work rates, which were now to 
be applied to whites as well. 
After the Anglo-Boer War wages were again cut due to the fall in 
production and the need to exploit lower grade ores. In 
combination with the growth of job opportunities on the railways, 
the wage cuts contributed to another shortage of mineworkers. The 
Chamber's temporary response was the introduction of Chinese 
workers, whose presence was resisted by white miners afraid that 
oriental labour would eventually take their own jobs. The first 
job reservation system was applied against these Chinese workers, 
but it was subsequently extended, under white labour pressure, to 
cover Africans. By 1907, African labour had met the shortfall and 
the machinery for its recruitment was functioning again, but the 
difference in conditions of work for white and black had firmly 
taken root. 
Urban Structures 
Agricultural towns were already racially segregated to some 
degree in terms of area of residence and type of accommodation, 
but Kimberley's pattern of white workers in boarding houses and 
homes of the town proper, and blacks in segregated compounds "was 
an unfortunate precedent for South Africa's first industrial town 
to set" (Worden,1994,39). 
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Where Africans did settle according to unauthorised initiative -
in backyards or vacant lots, rather than in controlled locations, 
like established servants, or in compounds - vociferous demands 
from white townspeople for official urban segregation ensued. 
Rapid black urbanisation was perceived as a threat to the 
established order of town life for South Africa's white 
population. The increase in the urban African population 
represented, for many, the demise of "white civilization", ever 
held to be in tenuous occupation in an African environment. 
The fear of urban racial integration in South Africa is set in 
comparative colonial context by Christopher, 1983: "It may be 
argued that the historical foundations of modern Soweto...were 
laid by Edward I in his Welsh military foundations in the 13th 
century at Flint, Conway and Caernarvon". The basic premise is 
that English colonists, in an effort to maintain the dominant 
political and economic position of the English townsman, always 
resisted integration with the different cultural groups found in 
their colonies. Generally, the fear of the colonised is at the 
heart of the colonial settler psychology. Equality between the 
coloniser and colonised, in any respect, would serve to bring the 
spectre of a violent overthrow of the colonial yoke and its 
representatives closer. Physical, and particularly cultural 
disparities between colonisers and colonised, and a superiority 
in the numbers of the colonised, contribute to the ruling group's 
disquiet over urban assimilation. 
However, there was significant variation in the level of urban 
segregation in South Africa's early cities, even between cities 
in the British colonies of Natal and the Cape (Christopher,1990). 
Prior to the Union, each of the four administrations in South 
Africa pursued separate policies of urban planning: 
While the Cape's pre-industrial towns were less rigidly 
segregated than others, the "natural" segregation of wealth and 
class tended to assume a racial composition anyway. Many ex-
slaves were clustered on mission stations, while, from 1847, the 
eastern districts of the colony had municipally managed locations 
and part of the "Coloured" population outside the white towns. In 
Cape Town the expanding migrant labour system was responsible for 
the appearance of compounds separated from the white residential 
areas, Kimberley being invoked as a model for African migrant 
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control. From 1901 to 1904, an outbreak of bubonic plague in 
parts of the country brought about what has been labelled the 
"sanitation syndrome", in which fears for the health of the 
(white) population informed official attempts at urban 
segregation. In response, separate location construction took 
place in Cape Town, while in Port Elizabeth, Africans were 
shunted from their homes to the township of New Brighton. By the 
early 20th century the Cape had joined the rest of South Africa 
in implementing pass laws and influx control regulations and it 
was engaging in the resettlement of illegal black squatters. 
Under the rather more severe Natal administration, Africans were 
discouraged from town locations early on and directed into 
barracks, under a system known as "togt". From 1873, to stay in 
town, Africans seeking da" labour in Durban and Pietermaritzburg 
would have to register and wear a badge. 
The scheme was soon extended to cover all Africans present in the 
town, and accompanied by an attempt to provide barrack locations 
for single male workers to live in while they were there. Marks 
and Atmore, 1980, explain the system as an attempt at security on 
the part of an early colonial presence which was weak compared to 
the strength of African polities in the region. Subsequently, 
revenues from a municipal beerhall monopoly were used to 
construct segregated African townships for the city. 
Barracks were the only early accommodation for indentured Indians 
brought to Natal from the 1860s to work on the sugar 
plantations - a form of employment rejected by the nearby Zulu. 
By the late 19th century, the impulse for segregation here was 
primarily directed against the Indian population, growing as 
traders established themselves alongside indentured labourers. In 
response to Indian trading competition, the local state pursued 
"residential segregation, political exclusion and commercial 
suppression" (Swanson,1983). 
Blacks were housed in the towns of the Boer republics by their 
employers or in locations built near, but outside the town. There 
was some differentiation between the republics, the Transvaal 
being less efficient in its racial ordering of urban space (and 
also having Indian residents, who were banned from the Orange 
Free State). In Johannesburg, the "sanitary syndrome" led to old 
African slums being razed in the early 20th century, and their 
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inhabitants removed to the location of Klipspruit. However, a 
high proportion of Africans remained living neither in compounds 
nor formal townships, but in freehold or leasehold accommodation 
in Sophiatown, Martindale, Newclare or Alexandra. These were 
rather anomalous townships: due to the specific circumstances of 
their historical development, blacks within them could own the 
plots on which they lived (see Lodge,1983,156). 
No general model of South African city development, let alone 
colonial city development, can accommodate the specific 
influences which contributed to the moulding of each city's form 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries; rather, like a 
palimpsest, the influences were layered one upon another over 
time, and while some of those influences may have been more 
universal, others were local and contingent. Nevertheless, in 
each of the territories of South Africa, the first industrial 
revolution, brought about initially by mineral extraction, had 
set in train fundamental social changes. While white townspeople 
were forced to readjust to a far larger, non-servant African 
presence, no longer silent and externalised, but economically 
vital, and on their doorstep, their politicians groped for a 
policy to order urban space and provide the social controls 
necessary to reassure them. 
Sevegationism 
Industrialisation brought about a contradiction central to South 
Africa's subsequent social, economic and political development -
that between large scale African labour requirements, inclining 
social structures towards racial integration, and ideologies and 
administrative systems of spatial separation. The African labour 
presence in the cities could only remain temporary and separate 
if there were enforceable regulations overseeing arrivals to the 
urban areas, and territories set aside outside the cities where 
Africans could reside when not employed in them. The Cape Prime 
Minister, W.P. Schreiner summarised the official attitude towards 
African workers: "let them do their work, receive their wages, 
and at the end of their term of service, let them go back to the 
place whence they came - to the native territories, where they 
should really make their home" (cited Swanson,1971). The 
diffusion of this view - segregationism - helped put an end to a 
competing vision of racial relations - that of assimilation. 
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George Grey, the governor of the Cape Colony from 1854 to 1861, 
had pursued a policy of partial racial integration on white 
terms, to make the Xhosa "a part of ourselves, with a common 
faith, common interests, useful servants, consumers of our goods, 
contributors to our revenue" (quoted Davenport, 1991,221). The 
material basis of such "liberal" thinking is set out by Trapido, 
1980, but many "philanthropists" adopted the same assimilationist 
premises more out of a concern to benefit Africans, by 
introducing them to the implicit and unquestioned advantages of 
European civilization. Under Grey, the Cape, with a new "non-
racial" constitution based on a property franchise qualification, 
witnessed the development of mixed-race schools and hospitals, in 
which whites and Africans were treated identically, .and Grey 
himself even paid for forty sons of Xhosa chiefs to be educated 
in a mission school of the colony (Wilson,1982). Meanwhile a 
debate on the merits of assimilation was taking place within 
Xhosa society, between, on the one hand, Christian converts and 
those who had attended colonial mission schools, and on the other 
hand, "reds" - those who continued Xhosa traditions such as 
smearing oneself with red clay (Wilson,1982). 
Within the colonies, while assimilation could guarantee the 
required African labour supplies, the threat of an integrated 
urban African workforce, particularly in Natal with its 
numerically overwhelming African population, was influential even 
before the advent of rapid urbanisation. In 1852 a commission was 
set up in Natal to investigate the colony's "Native Policy". The 
commission revealed a strong segregationist discourse among white 
respondents. However, spatial segregation for peace and security, 
was to be tempered by the colony's labour requirements 
(Thompson, 1985). 
Shepstone's Natal "Native Policy" is most often cited as the 
original in large scale, formal, spatial segregation. From 1845 
into the 1850s, the reservation of areas for African occupation 
was systematically pursued in the colony. The reserves were ruled 
by appointees subject to Shepstone himself, under what was 
described as "traditional law". Despite a British government 
grant, ostensibly for their development, Shepstone, in an attempt 
to ensure the colony's labour supplies, allowed the reserves to 
stagnate. The reserves came to embody stores of relatively cheap 
labour reproduction. Yet Shepstone himself was not an early 
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segregationist ideologue. He was a pragmatist, an administrator 
whose brief and desire was to ensure that the most efficient 
systems of administration were implemented in the interests of 
the white colonial settlers and the British government. He, 
unlike later South African administrators, was not attempting to 
implement a pre-formulated ideological programme. 
The Cape Colony's Glen Grey Act of 1894 represented a more 
systematic attempt to implement a coherent "Native Policy" in one 
area. It is often interpreted as being assimilationist in nature 
(Davenport,1991, Graaff,1990), since it gave African producers in 
the Transkei (later Ciskei too) small plots of land, and by 
alienating the land from the remainder of the local African 
population, encouraged migration to supply the colony's labour 
needs. But Rich, 1981, has argued that it had an important 
influence as a precedent for later, segregationist, rather than 
assimilationist, notions of reserve administration. For the 
first time under the act, areas with separate administrations 
were deliberately set aside for African occupation; areas which 
would nevertheless remain functionally linked, through labour 
supplies, with "white space". The architect of the Act, Rhodes, 
saw Africans as children just emerging from barbarism. For him, 
it was futile to imagine that these vessels would yet contain the 
standards of western civilization (Parry,1983). Turning 
segregated plots of 8 acres (little enough to bar qualification 
for the Cape franchise by dint of property) over to Xhosa, and 
leaving the Kholwa (Christian convert Africans) out of the 
scheme's provisions, effectively signalled the replacement of 
official attempts to amalgamate black and white societies. 
Instead, attempts to enforce their separation ensued. 
Segregation then, already established in Natal, became accepted 
in the Cape by the end of the 19th century, as a device to ensure 
that African social advancement in an industrialising economy 
should not undermine white supremacy. It was a means of both 
regulating unskilled labour and entrenching white political 
control, and it was legitimated by the racial "science" of the 
era - a distorted form of social Darwinism. The strand of thought 
which had Africans as an inferior branch of an evolutionary chain 
prevailed in nearly all publications in the first decades of the 
20th century, even in a history written in 1920 by Silas Molema, 
an African himself (Thompson,1985,95). The prominent late 19th 
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century white historian, Theal, thought that the intelligence of 
individual Africans depended on the amount of white blood their 
ancestors had acquired in North Africa before the Bantu migration 
to the south. With such immutable differences between the races 
"proven" by the contemporary practice of anthropology, 
assimilation was bound to fail, since Africans were incapable of 
absorbing the European traits of civilization. In accordance with 
the pursuit of its alternative - segregation, the Cape franchise 
qualification was raised under Spriggs in 1887 and under Rhodes 
in 1892, excluding thousands of African voters. Journalistic 
resistance by educated Africans like Jabavu (who, in themselves 
were an anomaly for the "scientific" theory) proved ineffective, 
and by 1910, the Cape had liquor laws preventing sale to 
Africans, segregated residential locations and compulsorily 
segregated education. 
The rejection of the prospect of equality between races was, for 
most whites, an implicit assumption, and it was maintained in 
church and state through the ensuing industrial era (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer, 1989). For Smuts, writing in the 1930s, the "Native 
Question" was "a matter decided for me in far-off days by my 
temperament and outlook", which were those of a white South 
African brought up in the late 19th century, and which "cannot be 
affected by what passes or happens today, but of course I see the 
rocks ahead quite clearly" (cited Ingham, 1988,189). 
It was Milner's post Boer War Native Affairs Commission 
(responsible for the production of the Lagden Report), 
established to design a pattern for the reconstruction of the 
region, which encouraged the universality of segregation and 
portrayed it as a more coherent ideological programme. According 
to Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, it laid the foundations for the 
system of segregation adopted "deep into the 20th century". 
Ashforth, 1990, who has paid particular attention to the 
assumptions implied by the report's language, argues that it was 
part of a "search for a formula, expressible in terms acceptable 
to "civilized" opinion in the mother country and the colonies of 
South Africa, by which labour for capitalist enterprise could be 
secured" (27). The reservation of land for "Natives", it was 
implied in the report, required a reciprocal gesture on their 
part: the offering of their labour, for the mines in particular 
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(Ashforth,1990). The commission's proposals included the 
construction of locations for Africans near their centres of work 
in the white areas, with passes to control the influx of workers 
to these locations and a one year limit on their residence there. 
When not employed in the "white" towns, Africans would reside in 
their own reserves, where they would be free to practise 
agriculture. 
By 1910 and the union of South Africa, "segregation" had already 
entered the language of official discourse to describe such a 
system, and it was being promoted, though with different emphases 
of rationalisation, by British administrators, capitalists and 
Afrikaner political leaders alike. In 1913 a piece of legislation 
was enacted which helped to reify the conception of the Native 
Affairs Commission in a united South Africa. The philosophy 
behind the 1913 Land Act derived from the inevitable outcome of 
colonial dispossession. By the 1870s there was already a shortage 
of farming land for both whites and Africans. Squatting, 
sharecropping and labour tenancy were commonplace, but in the 
1880s and 1890s, a new class of white entrepreneur began, for the 
first time, to exclude both white and black smallholders from the 
market. Smallholders were transformed into squatters - a wholly 
different legal phenomenon. Given the orthodoxy of racial 
attitudes, both white officials and white society in general 
favoured action to ensure that, if there had to be squatters, 
white squatters should be favoured over black. Thus, African land 
occupation across the country was limited to designated reserves 
comprising 7% of South Africa's land area. Parcels of land 
already owned by Africans outside of these reserves became known 
as "Black Spots", and their inhabitants lost all security of 
tenure even though many remained for some time. The misery of 
those forced to leave is graphically portrayed in Sol Plaatje's 
"Native Life in South Africa", 1915. The reserves, to which they 
were forced to move, would provide the basis for large scale 
African segregation through the 20th century. 
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3. Afrikanerdom: The Formation Of An Ethnic Identity 
The late 19th century, then, saw increasing tension, primarily 
between white and African, but also between white and Indian. 
However, it is a great (and often repeated) error to assume any 
kind of intra-racial group solidarity as a backdrop to the 
history of inter-racial group conflict in South Africa. Urbanised 
Africans were still attached closely to their fractious 
traditional polities (see Beinart,1987, for the extent to which 
this was still true in the mid 20th century, and Horowitz,1991 
for a contemporary analysis). Indian solidarity was impeded by 
differences of caste, status, region of origin and of treatment 
by other racial groups. As the 19th century drew to an end, white 
fractiousness too, was developing into a vital and politically 
portentous phenomenon, through the emergence of a strong 
Afrikaner identity. 
Twentieth century nationalist movements invariably shared (and 
share) certain core characteristics which facilitated the 
mobilisation of a large mass in the cause articulated by an 
intellectual leadership group. These characteristics were: an 
implicit threat to the culture, especially religion and/or 
language of a body of people; a constructed, but widely perceived 
history, the interpretation of which rests on the shared 
experience of "the group"; a threat to the economic fortune of 
most members of this historically defined group; and the creation 
of a set of symbols by which the group is demarcated and exhorted 
to act (see Mare,1992). 
All of these features played a part in the development of an 
Afrikaner nationalist ideology in the 20th century. All were 
emerging in the decades at the end of the 19th century. But many 
of the symbols which defined the group's historical experiences 
were drawn from the early 19th century. Characteristics of late 
19th century Afrikaners were subjected to a conceptual time leap, 
and used to describe people of the early 19th century who were, 
in fact, very different. Not all commentators on South Africa 
have yet realised the falsity of this conceptual atemporality. 
De Villiers says of the early 19th century British repossession 
of the Cape "in Afrikaner terms the enemy had arrived; the 
Afrikaners were about to enter their Een Van Onreg, their Century 
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of Wrong, which would open and close with war and defeat but 
which would serve to consolidate the tribe and form the volkseie, 
the fierce group cohesiveness, that drives them to this day" (De 
Villiers,1988). But the "Een Van Onreg" was the publication of a 
20th century Afrikaner intellectual attempting to mobilize an 
Afrikaner constituency, not a phenomenon that was consciously 
experienced and identified by the Dutch speaking population of 
most of the period in question. 
Throughout the 19th century, members of the Dutch speaking 
population resented, and sometimes resisted, British interference 
in the ordering of their lives, but in the early decades of the 
century there was no cohesive "Afrikaner tribe", as such, to 
mobilize against the British. The "Een Van Onreg" was part of a 
much jater attempt to create such a group. It is the 
characteristics of this attempt which are of most importance in 
the story of Afrikaner nationalism. 
The Reconstructed Nationalist Past  
The traditional narrative of the emergence of an Afrikaner ethnic 
awareness represents an acceptance of a history created in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries. It has the actions of the 
British, intent on political and economic modernisation, turning 
the 19th century Cape into a laboratory in which the 
"distillation of Afrikanerness" (Sparks,1990) occurred. The 
distillation is held to have proceeded from incidents of British 
repression of the Boers, notably, Slagtersnek, when Afrikaner 
rebels were hanged, at the second attempt after ropes broke, in 
1815, and the later Anglo-Boer War. With nascent group identity 
repressed and language and culture threatened by Milner after the 
war, plus the growing "poor white" problem, the necessary result 
is held to have been a widespread nationalism held latent until 
1924 and 1948, when it achieved political expression. 
This outline of the common approach is a crude one, but the 
emergence of a sense of affinity, of a shared identity or an 
"imagined community", is much more subtle than a catalogue of 
historical events, no matter how exhaustive, can indicate. As 
with frontier ideology, Afrikaner nationalist ideology is a 
complex and non-unitary phenomenon, with material as well as 
ideational dimensions. A proper account of it must therefore be a 
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spatially and temporally differentiated one. 
The early 19th century British administrators, settlers and 
missionaries did indeed introduce more forcefully a set of ideas 
in contradistinction to those held by most Dutch speaking 
frontiersmen, but in a less heavy handed and far more 
contradictory way than orthodox accounts allow. 
The Enlightenment movement in Europe had set in train a set of 
social philosophies which influenced the early 19th century 
British administrators who arrived to take up residence in the 
Cape (see Mostert,1992). Philosophies of liberalism, 
utilitarianism and humanitarianism were introduced by those with 
political influence, to a closing frontier environment. 
Humanitarianism lay behind intervention by the colonial 
authorities in Khoisan labour-master relations. Nevertheless 
there is a distinction to be drawn between the ideological 
leanings of the new political elite and the change which they 
effected. 
Despite the new labour regulations, John Montagu, the Colonial 
Secretary at the Cape from 1843 to 1852, felt compelled to say 
that colour "still forms a bar to social intercourse and intimate 
relations far more formidable than any rising either from 
diversity of origin, language or religion" (cited Elphick and 
Giliomee,1989,568). 
Although the British assumption of political power over the Cape 
did-not bring about great material improvement for most of the 
colony's black inhabitants, it did set up a contrast between 
white governors and white governed more apparent than when the 
VOC or the Batavian Republic were the administrators. The 
difference in language alone was enough to ensure this, since 
there was no significant English speaking presence amongst the 
governed prior to 1820. The English literature of the period 
indicates that a slighting perception of the Dutch speaking 
population was held by many English speakers in the colony. 
Around the turn of the 19th century the Afrikaner came 
increasingly to join the Hottentot in being portrayed as idle and 
degenerate in popular writing, as the dominant discourse of the 
Cape became a British one. Boers were commonly characterised as 
lazy and malicious, their life of inactivity achieved at the 
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expense of their slaves (Coetzee,1988). 
However, the forging of a greater distinction between colonial 
rulers and colonists did not automatically lead to conflict and 
the sharpening of an identity of opposition. Rather, cooperation 
between authority and settler was the norm in the early 19th 
century, with incidents of outright opposition on the part of the 
latter the exception. When the contested Zuurveld was 
systematically cleared of Xhosa in 1812, it was Boer commandoes 
under British command who were the most effective participants. 
There was conflict between Boers and representatives of British 
authority in the early 19th century, but it was exaggerated in 
scope and significance by a late 19th century generation of 
Afrikaners embroiled in a deeper conflict of interest with the 
British authorities of their own time. 
The incident at Slagtersnek became central to this late 19th 
century construction of an Afrikaner history. The Afrikaner 
political establishment came to hold a mythology constructed on 
two key foundations: the historical suffering of the yolk under 
the British yoke, and the persistent threat to the yolk posed by 
the numerically superior black population. Both were sustained by 
the interpretation of Slagtersnek that was adopted in the late 
19th century (Thompson,1985). On the one hand the incident was 
held to be a manifestation of ethnic conflict between British 
rulers and a nascent Afrikaner yolk. (In fact, the administrators 
on the scene of the rebel hangings, and most closely involved 
were themselves Dutch speakers). On the other hand, the episode 
resulted from the challenge posed to Afrikaners' status relative 
to blacks, because the hanged men had rebelled over laws limiting 
their behaviour towards their Khoisan servants. 
Before the 1870s Slagtersnek was not treated in histories as a 
prominent event in the forming of South African society. During 
that decade though, the phrase wrongly attributed to relatives of 
the hanged men, "we can never forget Slagtersnek", was repeated 
frequently enough for one to believe that it was indeed a 
formative event. In the 1870s Slagtersnek was being reinterpreted 
in the light of a contemporary form of British imperialism much 
more thrusting than that which existed at the time of the 
incident itself. The British policy of confederation was 
threatening the independent Boer republics. To the Boers who had 
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struggled to build these republics, the rebels of 1815 became 
heroes of an earlier struggle against British domination much 
like their own, and therefore, symbols of a historical continuity 
of resistance by the mythical volk of which they were a part. 
No matter that the lifestyles of the Slagtersnek rebels, the 
Bezuidenhouts and their allies, hardly corresponded with the 
1870s ethnic leadership's ideals of religious observance and 
racial purity, nor that most Boers at the time of the rebellion 
wanted nothing to do with it; the myth would provide historical 
legitimacy for the present struggle. Even though the incident of 
Slagtersnek itself was a relatively insignificant interruption to 
"normal" frontier life, the interpretation of it subsequently 
adopted, proved, in the late 19th century, a powerful mobilizing 
factor for Afrikaners. 
While the volk's early struggle with the British was a largely 
constructed history, there was a real historical experience, 
shared by many Boers through the 19th century, which helped 
provide support for a nationalistic tendency. By the second half 
of the century, the continuance of the Boer custom of divided 
inheritance, which had initially fuelled the push of white 
settlement eastward, became impossible for many families; 
fragmentation had already reduced inheritances to uneconomic 
sizes. A class of poor and landless Dutch speakers began to 
emerge, and to provide support for the nationalism that would 
give it dignity, and perhaps protection from competition in the 
labour markets of the expanding cities. 
An earlier Boer response to landlessness was the trek to the 
north, beyond the confines of the colony. In the interpretation 
of the past which helped foster a sense of Afrikaner national 
identity in the late 19th century, the Great Trek was seen as 
even more important than Slagtersnek. This interpretation had the 
Trek as an expression of the volk's urgent desire to be rid of 
the yoke of British interference, and to manifest their ethnic 
solidarity in the form of a new and pure Afrikaner state. In 
fact, while the British did institute changes on the frontier 
which were highly significant in the decision of some 15,000 
boers to emigrate, their impact was not directly to hammer a new 
nation into shape. 
The British desire to establish the "solid prosperity of a 
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thriving and industrious population" (cited Peires,1989a,498) on 
the frontier was translated into a uniform and effective land 
tax, the abolition of monopolies and a revamped Land Board to 
give title and collect payment. There was to be a thoroughgoing 
shake up of the relatively anarchic VOC frontier political 
economy. The appointment of resident magistrates and Civil 
Commissioners to replace landdrosts and Heemraden, represented a 
decisive shift of power, in favour of the British and at the 
expense of Boers in the country districts. Anxiety about further 
changes was a major impulse for many who decided to leave the 
colony. A frontier farmer of the 1830s expresses the sentiment: 
"now we have a civil commissioner to receive our money for 
government and for land surveys, a magistrate to punish us, a 
Clerk of the Peace to prosecute us and get us in the Trok (gaol), 
but no Heemrad to tell us whether things are right or wrong...The 
Englishman is very learned...They and the Hottentots will squeeze 
us all out by degrees" (cited Peires,1989a,498). 
The aim of the 1830s emigration was to "generally reconstitute 
the way of life of which the revolution in government had 
stripped (the migrants)" (Peires,1989a,499). New implementation 
of rent collection, including arrears, the threat to established 
methods of dealing with black labour, and the legal intervention 
of the British, seemingly biased towards those who were not 
white, were already establishing dissatisfaction among burghers 
by the 1830s. The revelation that compensation for the loss of 
slaves after abolition (worth four fifths of their value) could 
only be collected in London, added insult to injury. As an early 
promise of laws to channel mfecane refugees into "useful labour" 
receded, and abolition approached, preparations to leave the 
colony were made. They were hastened by the advent of the sixth 
frontier war with the Xhosa. 
In the interpretation of the late 19th century Afrikaner 
nationalists, in their decision to leave the British colony, the 
trekkers were upholding the volk's staunch racial integrity and 
antipathy to racial intercourse. In fact Tregardt, one of the 
Trek's leaders, had lived in Xhosa territory under Hintsa before 
leaving the frontier, and many Boers expressed their disgust at 
the British murder of the paramount chief. The old prospect of an 
alliance with Xhosa arms in a fight against the British was 
revived at times by the generation of Boers which supplied the 
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Trek. Legassick, 1980, argues that most of the Boers of the 
period were prepared to concede equality to the independent 
African nations, whilst defending the exploitation of their own 
black labourers. Equality, though, may be too strong a word. The 
respect Boers had for African polities was based more on the 
force that they could muster than on an ideological recognition 
of equal worth. Nevertheless "there can be no doubt that the 
emigration was a response to specific policies of the colonial 
government rather than an Afrikaner nationalist reaction to 
British rule or a response to the breakdown of black - white 
relations on the frontier" (Peires,1989a,499). 
The Late 19th Century Reality 
Despite the mythology of a later generation of Afrikaners, 
nationalism was not a prominent feature of the consciousness of 
Boers in the early 19th century. Adam and Moodley, 1986, state 
that the first real ethnic political mobilization of Afrikaners 
in fact occurred at the Cape in 1872. During this year 
"responsible government" was granted by the British government to 
the Cape Colony, with a franchise qualification set, after 
intense debate (primarily over the extent of African 
participation it would allow), low enough for even the poorer 
sections of the white population to vote. 
Since 1820 the incoming British settlers had largely stayed clear 
of agriculture, leaving Afrikaners predominant in the 
agricultural sector. With the Cape now setting its own economic 
policy, these farmers mobilised to safeguard their material 
interests. Their virtual mono-ethnicity gave their political 
mobilisation an obvious ethnic dimension. They mustered around 
the pursuit of low taxes, agricultural credit, secure and cheap 
labour supplies and further state support for the sector. In the 
late 19th century though, the conception of ethnic struggle 
within the Cape extended beyond the farming sector and into the 
financial realm. Butler, 1989, and Giliomee, 1989, have traced an 
intensifying conflict between British-based and local Afrikaner 
banks, fought over the custom of the predominantly Afrikaans 
farmer. The fact that smaller banks with a more local and 
Afrikaans identity, in spite of receiving greater sympathy, were 
losing out at the end of the 19th century to the better terms 
offered by the bigger "foreign" banks, fed into the growing sense 
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of Afrikaner ethnic defensiveness. By the turn of this century 
then, materialistic concerns were intricately and inextricably 
interwoven with ethnic identity for a core group of Afrikaners in 
the colony. 
But the political mobilisation of Afrikaners was not restricted 
to the Cape in the late 19th century. Davenport, 1991, has 
charted the creation of a politically expressed ethnic identity 
in the South African Republic (S.A.R,) and Orange Free State. 
Here, Afrikaners had constructed independent states following 
their emigration from the Cape Colony. The leaders of the 
republics had found it difficult to inculcate a national pride 
during the years in which they were left alone by the British, 
but when confrontation with the British administration of the 
Cape Colony developed, a catalyst for ethnic mobilization was 
provided from without. 
Britain had already annexed the trekkers' republic of Natal in 
1843. In 1852, realising that economic dependence on the Cape 
Colony and Natal would continue, it had recognised the 
independence of the S.A.R. and in 1854, that of the remaining 
trekker republic, the Orange Free State. But the new phase of 
imperial expansion in response to mineral discoveries was about 
to begin. In the year that Britain annexed Basutoland, 1868, a 
play about Slagtersnek was first performed in Cape Town, and a 
Bloemfontein journalist advised his readers to "Think of 
Slagtersnek" (Thompson,1985,126). 
The 1815 incident was cemented in the infant mythology in-1877 
with the British annexation of the S.A.R. and the Rev. S.J. Du 
Toit's publication of "Die Geskiedenis van ons Land in die Taal 
van ons Volk" ("The History of Our Land in the Language of Our 
People", 1877, Cape Town). Du Toit was a key participant in the 
formation of Afrikaner national identity in the late 19th 
century. He was based in Paarl, the town which became the hub of 
Cape nationalism, and edited its nationalist paper "The Patriot". 
In his influential book, six pages were devoted to the "Uprising 
of Bezuidenhout", with the rebels portrayed as heroes resisting 
British tyranny. The Great Trek was interpreted as a direct 
consequence of the precedent of resistance they established. 
By the end of the 19th century, the interpretation of Du Toit had 
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found apostles among authors who were sympathetic to the 
republics striving to resist expansionist British imperialism. 
Sympathizers were galvanised particularly by the success of the 
Transvaal in shaking off the British yoke in the first Anglo-Boer 
War of 1881, when the Boers inflicted a major defeat on British 
line regiments at Majuba. The two major thrusts of 20th century 
Afrikaner nationalism - anti British and anti black - had 
crystallised by the 1890s, in opposition to the British 
"unnatural and stupid policy of equalising born masters and born 
servants" (Thompson, 1985,130). 
The ideological momentum developed in the late 19th century soon 
generated political organisation. The first branches of the 
Afrikaner Bond were formed in the Cape in 1880, with a Kuyperian 
theology as defence against "liquor, lucre and redcoats" 
(Davenport,1991,93). Du Toit played a major role in the 
organisation of the Bond. Initially the organisation was not 
approved of by the republic's leaders, but branches were 
subsequently set up in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. 
Du Toit was eventually displaced as the leading light of the 
organisation by Jan Hofmeyr, after the latter had gained control 
of the Transvaal branches. 
The mixed reception of the Bond by Afrikaners reveals their 
divided political outlook in the period. Although a certain 
momentum had been given to the adoption of political ethnicity, 
the structuring of political views according to ethnicity was by 
no means universal by the beginning of the second, and major 
Anglo-Boer War. When gold was first discovered in the Transvaal, 
many Cape Afrikaners, including Bond members, feared the 
potential for economic competition from the S.A.R. and placed 
their allegiance with the British colony rather than with the 
Afrikaner republic. In 1889, when the potential for Cape farmers 
and speculators to profit in central Africa was realised, Hofmeyr 
even pledged Bond support for Cecil Rhodes in his scheme to 
extend British influence northwards. Thus Rhodes, the arch 
British imperialist, became involved in a parliamentary alliance 
with the Afrikaner Bond in the Cape Parliament. 
The Rhodes-Bond political alliance was maintained in the Cape, in 
economic opposition to the Boer republics, until the 1895 Jameson 
Raid. The raid was a bungled attempt by Rhodes to stir a 
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rebellion of uitlanders ("outsiders" - mostly English speaking 
prospectors and traders) in the S.A.R. The rebellion would be 
ignited by an incursion of armed men, led by Jameson, and it was 
hoped that the Boer republic would collapse. In fact, the 
conspirators were rounded up and the raid led to an irreversible 
split between Rhodes and the Bond in the Cape. Cape politics now 
reflected the wider division in the region between ethnically 
defined political competitors. The split between Rhodes' 
Progressive Party and the Afrikaner Bond presaged the infinitely 
more violent conflict between British and Afrikaner in the 
subsequent Anglo-Boer War. 
By the 1890s the Republic's export value exceeded the Cape 
Colony's, meaning that "imperial paramountcy would soon become a 
meaningless phrase" (Davenport,1991,187) if the South African 
Republic remained independent. The inevitable Anglo-Boer War of 
1899 to 1902 was fought then, "to determine which white authority 
held real power in South Africa" (Davenport,1991,198). If British 
control could be established over the gold mines, the lab-our 
supplies and infrastructure necessary for their efficient 
exploitation would no longer be impeded by the independent Boer 
polities. Added to this, British financiers, particularly nervous 
after the recent collapse of the Baring Brothers financiers, 
could rely on the gold deposits as the biggest single source of 
the standard on which money was based - on the eve of the war 
gold supplies at the Bank of England were falling again 
(Worden,1994,26). 
When Milner was appointed as governor at the Cape, the-drive 
towards war began in earnest. For Milner, as with other British 
Cape officials, war with the Transvaal would not be purely an 
economic matter. The republic's government was perceived as "not 
one "friendly" to, and prepared to collaborate with, British 
imperial interests. Control over the polity of the Transvaal as 
much as over the economy of the mining industry, was crucial" 
(Smith,1990, quoted Worden,1994,26). 
The ensuing war, pre-emptively initiated by President Kruger of 
the S.A.R., "entrenched a bitterness between Boer and British 
which was to endure throughout the 20th century" 
(Worden,1994,28). British scorched earth tactics, in a systematic 
attempt to end prolonged guerilla resistance, resulted in the 
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deliberate destruction of over 30,000 farms. In British 
"concentration camps", set up to deny succour to Boers continuing 
the fight, over 26,000 Boer women and children died 
(Spies,1986,214) through disease and neglect. By creating 
thousands of martyrs for the cause of the yolk, and uniting the 
ethnically homogenous republics against a powerful enemy, the war 
was a major stimulus to further Afrikaner nationalist 
mobilization, across what was to become the whole of South 
Africa, the Cape included. 
The settlement of the war also contributed to Afrikaner ethnic 
formation. Milner's avowed aim of Anglicizing South Africa after 
the war, led to a policy of outlawing Dutch instruction in 
government schools and promoting everywhere the use of English. 
During the attempts by Afrikaans political leaders to vitalise 
Afrikaner ethnicity in the 1880s and 1890s, many Dutch speakers 
had placed their identity largely within class, religious or 
territorial boundaries, rather than ethnic ones, as the Rhodes-
Bond alliance demonstrates. But the war and this policy of 
deliberate repression of "Afrikaner-ness" helped generate a focus 
on precisely that ethnicity as the prime marker of identity. 
Yet, the emergence of a political constituency willing to back a 
nationalist political programme within the Afrikaans population, 
also had a great deal to do with economic conditions which were 
developing both prior to, and after the war. What ultimately 
galvanised a general, politically expressed Afrikaner nationalism 
was the disproportionate impact of economic distress on a broad 
section of the Afrikaans population. With an economic-battle to 
be fought, and the participants clearly defined by their culture 
and ethnicity, ethnically based political mobilization was 
inevitable. The growing shortage of land had been creating a 
squatter (bywoner) class around the old eastern frontier through 
the second half of the century. With the industrialisation of the 
Rand, commercial farmers across the country began to fully 
utilise the land they owned so as to supply the expanding urban 
markets. Landless Afrikaners found their rural options narrowed 
as landowners began to evict unprofitable tenants, and the volk's 
drift to the cities began, as individual families felt the broad 
shifting structures of economic development impinging upon their 
lives. For those who retained ownership of the land, increasing 
profits were available, with government aid in credit, research 
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and training for farmers, plus the expansion of road and rail 
networks, around the turn of the century. 
Prior to the Anglo-Boer war, the presence of dispossessed 
Afrikaners in the cities, and their obvious impoverishment 
compared to the traditionally urbanised English speaking 
population, had already helped to stimulate an urban Afrikaner 
political and cultural awakening (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
The movement received extra boosts with the agrarian rinderpest 
crisis of 1890, which ejected more "poor white" smallholders from 
the land, and the attack on Afrikaner life, property and culture 
during and after the war. 
In the rural regions which provided the sources of the migrants, 
there was particular resentment at the fact that black tenants 
and share croppers were becoming wealthier than many of the 
Afrikaners being forced out. One white landowner was nearly 
beaten up when he remarked that he could get more out of one of 
the African families on his farm than he could out of seven 
bywoner families (Keegan,1986). Anti-British and anti-black 
feeling defined a sense of independent identity, this time in the 
cities. For poor Afrikaners, urbanisation brought both an obvious 
material disparity with urban English speakers, and an erosion of 
material superiority over Africans. The material concerns of the 
migrants dovetailed perfectly with the ideological fervour of 
ethnic "revival" promoted by leaders like Du Toit. As urban slums 
containing a mixture of poor whites and blacks sprang up, first 
in the eastern Cape, then throughout South Africa, the challenge 
to an established racial order was concentrated-on a large 
section of the Afrikaner population. 
Political ethnic mobilization represented a way of pulling 
Afrikaners out of their new, urban predicament. As the material 
gap narrowed between urban Afrikaners and Africans, a wider group 
came to adopt an ideology and a theology which stressed the 
innate differences between the races. Even if material security 
could not be assured, at least psychological dignity could be. 
The Afrikaner nationalist emphasis on Calvinism stems from the 
late 19th century. Afrikaner historians of the period tried to 
give expression to the implicit differences that they felt 
existed between their "yolk" and blacks by stressing religion's 
role in the formation of an Afrikaner people. In 1882 and 1898 
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respectively, F. Lion Cachet and J.F. Van Oordt traced the 
Calvinism of the yolk back through a continuum of opposition to 
both secular British and heathen black (cited Thompson,1985,85- 
6). 
With a reinterpreted past, a recent experience of ethnic 
suffering at the hands of the British, an ethnic intelligentsia 
leading a nationalist revival, and a new material predicament, 
Afrikaners really were beginning to feel a sense of innate 
difference, and to forge a separate political identity, by the 
turn of the 20th century. This nationalist identity was to reach 
its apotheosis in the formation of the apartheid system after 
1948. 
Of great importance too (although it-has been relatively 
neglected), was the development of a separate "Coloured" 
political identity through the same period in which Afrikaans 
identity was solidifying. Prior to the 1890s, many "Coloureds" in 
the Cape, and particularly in Cape Town, felt that the 
distinctions between them and whites were lessening. The Cape 
franchise gave them the same political rights, and some had 
achieved a degree of success in business. But with the late 19th 
century raising of the franchise qualification - primarily in 
order to exclude Africans - and with increasing competition in 
the growing urban arena for work and custom from rural migrants, 
sections of the "Coloured" population felt themselves being 
squeezed from above and below. On the one hand, local authorities 
were becoming increasingly concerned to protect "poor whites" 
from "Coloured" competition, and on the other, Africans were 
proving an additional threat to established "Coloured" economic 
status. For "Coloureds", "there was simply too much to lose 
through identification with Africans" (Goldin,1989,248). 
Intensifying "Coloured" identity then, was both a reaction 
against greater white discrimination and "a rear guard action" to 
preserve what distinction there had been between "Coloured" and 
African. Both were resorted to in an attempt to restore the 
possibility of "Coloured" - white integration. 
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Conclusion 
By the beginning of the 19th century, the Cape Khoikhoi, despite 
the granting of de jure equality with whites, represented a 
distinct class as well as a racial grouping. Following their 
dispossession, 
"the "coloured" survived because they possessed only their 
labour power. Cape liberalism gave them equality before the 
law, access to the courts, protection against lawlessness, 
a free labour market, and in all other respects permitted a 
high degree of discrimination. They were emancipated from 
slavery, but not from poverty, ignorance and disease. As 
the legal gap narrowed, the social gap between them and the 
colonists widened" (Simons and Simons,1968,29). 
The 19th century brought crucial transformation to all of South 
Africa's social groups, as agents from Britain extended the 
economic and social patterns of capitalism to incorporate them. 
The industrial systems they forged set the conditions on which 
both Africans and Afrikaners would be brought into "modernity", 
just as the farming systems of the Boers had forced the Khoikhoi 
into a particular social niche in the 18th century. Africans in 
the 19th century, like the Khoisan before them, found their 
labouring function entrenched in social relations by law, both in 
the colonies and the republics. An uprooted African peasantry was 
made available for work through cultural and military conquest, 
annexation, taxation, and, finally, market competition. Despite a 
mid-century assimilationist discourse, racial discrimination 
became an inherent and largely unquestioned principle of 
government in both republics and both colonies, even if it was 
theoretically disallowed by legislation in the latter. 
But- the systems which characterise South Africa's human geography 
as a whole - migrant labour, influx control and spatial 
segregation - were not uniformly imposed on South African 
society. 
They evolved incoherently through the century from a 
configuration of regionally and locally specific processes. There 
was no centralised, overarching attempt to order South Africa's 
spatial flux - its urban growth, its labour flows and the 
distribution of its races - until the era of apartheid. This was 
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not just a consequence of South Africa's division into four 
separate states for much of the century; it was also the result 
of poorly connected elites, each striving to manage threatening 
change within their own localities. South Africa in the early 
20th century represented a summation of varied local efforts to 
fix a racial order into dynamic social, economic and spatial 
relations. Each of these local agents was, directly or 
indirectly, under the influence of the British Empire, with its 
own inconsistent Colonial Office policy. 
While the localities of the 19th century were not well physically 
connected for most of the period, they were articulated by a 
fairly universal hegemonic group ideology. It owed its origins to 
white distinctiveness at the early Cape, but it had developed and 
been entrenched by the experiences of warfare, industrialisation 
and urban growth. The novels of J.M. Coetzee, Andre Brink and 
Christopher Hope all impressionistically convey a white 
incapacity to "become African". The Boers early on adopted an 
African mode of production and an affinity with the African 
landscape and soil, but their consciousness was derived from 
Europe, as was their cultural expression of it. The black African 
presence was still "silent" in most white minds, despite the 
massive transformation and integration of social and material 
life, at the end of the 19th century. Even the physical presence 
of Africans in their cities was made more remote, externalised by 
segregationism in urban planning. The ideological legacies of the 
18th century - the assumption of exclusive white access to power 
and wealth, and the expectation of service from cheap black 
labourers - were made tangible in space through industrialisation 
and urbanisation in the 19th century. With the option of armed 
resistance gone by the end of the century (though there was a 
last Zulu revolt, largely over taxes, in 1906), and economic 
competition on equal terms disallowed, most blacks either tried 
to maintain a subsistence in the reserves, worked for white 
farmers on the platteland or worked, with varying degrees of 
compliance, in the white towns. 
Afrikaners meanwhile, had responded to the uneven material and 
ideological consequences of the closing of the frontier, and the 
penetration of British capitalism and imperialism, with the 
development of an ethnic particularism. A nationalist tradition 
was invented, and became established in the late 19th century. 
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The impression that the 1950s generation of Afrikaner political 
leaders made on South African society and space could never have 
been so deep without a profound sense of national identity and 
destiny, inherited from the late 19th century, and extending 
beyond mere racial consciousness. 
Chapter Three 
 
The Germination of a System 
Introduction  
The seeds of the 20th century system of white domination and 
segregation had been planted in the 19th century, by African 
dispossession and by early industrialisation. The structures by 
which that system would be administered germinated with Milner's 
post Anglo-Boer War reconstruction, and took firm root across the 
nation during the period from South Africa's formation as a 
nation state in 1910 to the Second World War. 
The bulk of this chapter is split into two main parts to address 
the most salient characteristics of this period. In the first, 
the ideology of segregationism and the legal structures which 
resulted from it, are traced through the first half of the 20th 
century. The second part interprets the increasing political 
success of Afrikaner nationalism. This movement reached its 
apotheosis in 1948, with the election of a regime determined, 
with the policy of apartheid, to shore up white supremacy and 
uplift the volk, through the second half of the century. 
But before the elaboration of a segregationist system can be 
properly explained, it is useful to introduce, in the next few 
pages, the institutional and class struggles that South Africa 
experienced from 1910 to 1948. These struggles provided both the 
context, and an important impulse, for legislation firmly 
entrenching an edifice of segregation. 
Class and Institutional Struggles, 1910 to 1948 
The British Empire, the South African state, English and local 
capital, and black and white labour were the main structures and 
agencies whose interaction shaped mid 20th century South African 
society. Through their dynamic relationships they provided the 
context for the political and economic struggles which prefigured 
apartheid. 
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Immediately following Union, the South African state was led by 
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two Boer generals, Botha and Smuts. Their government deliberately 
acted as the vanguard of a sentiment of reconciliation between 
British and Boer. The debates within white politics, for the next 
decade and a half, were to centre around this government's 
compromising and conciliatory stance towards South Africa's 
English speakers and the British Empire. 
An alliance between wealthier Afrikaner farmers, mostly in the 
Cape and the Transvaal, and English mineowners, formed the 
backbone of the governing South African Party (SAP). While the 
party ran the country, the Chamber of Mines, through its command 
of finance and economic organisation, effectively ran the economy 
(Terreblanche and Nattrass,1990). 
The obvious challenge to inter-ethnic harmony came from 
nationalistic Afrikaners led by J.B.M. Hertzog. Their main 
grievance was the leverage exerted over South Africa's political 
economy by English speakers within the country, and the British 
government without., The anti-alliance group remained within the 
cabinet until 1912, when it broke away under Hertzog and, in 
1914, formed the Nationalist Party (NP). 
In 1914 to 1915, nationalist Afrikaners led a rebellion against 
the government when it decided to enter the First World war as an 
ally of Britain, and to invade German South West Africa on 
Britain's behalf. 
Throughout the 20th century, the Afrikaner nationalist tradition 
would continue to be represented both by formal political and 
parliamentary organisations - the descendants of Hertzog's 
party - and by extra-parliamentary, and often violently inclined, 
more extreme groups (see part two of this chapter). 
While the state, representing an alliance of ethnic elites, was 
ideologically and politically challenged by Afrikaner 
nationalists between 1910 and 1924, a more tangible challenge 
came from increasingly well organised workers in the economic 
sphere. 
In 1918-19, Afrikaans, English and African workers struck in 
response to a decline in living standards. The result was limited 
gains for the white workers, and the repression of their black 
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counterparts. Racial differentiation within the workforce was 
consolidated with the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924, which 
restricted the advantages of new collective bargaining structures 
to unionised whites and "Coloureds", to the exclusion of 
Africans. 
The divergence between white and African worker experience was 
not solely due to legal discrimination. In the early 20th 
century, Africans had little experience of industrial 
organisation, while whites were more able to draw on European 
traditions of workerism. The difference was reflected in the 
formation by whites, in 1921, of the Communist Party of South 
Africa (CP), founded in the belief that "capitalism and white 
domination ... rested on the four pillars of racialism, 
nationalism, jingoism and reformism" (Simons and 
Simons,1968,270), and that workers' collective action could 
undermine these pillars. 
White workers, as the CP hoped, did come together against 
capitalists spectacularly in 1922, but they were in violent 
opposition to their African counterparts. In November 1921 the 
Chamber had responded to a falling gold price and rising costs by 
announcing its intention to eliminate the colour bar in semi-
skilled work, thus facilitating the employment of cheaper black 
labour in jobs previously reserved for whites. The announcement 
raised the possibility of some 2000 white jobs being retrenched. 
White miners came out on strike in January 1922 and organised 
themselves into unofficial commandoes along the Rand. Even CP 
members, in their encouragement of the strike, adopted a racist 
stance. Their specious argument ran as follows: support for the 
miners in their attempt to protect the colour bar was justified, 
since the strike, by opposing the employment of blacks at lower 
rates, could be seen as a necessary step to raise levels of pay 
for all workers. Hence the paradoxical slogan sported on 
workers' placards: "Workers of the World Unite and Fight for a 
White South Africa". 
The state's economic dependence on the mines ensured that it 
would have to back the mineowners' drive for continued capital 
accumulation (Ingham,1988). Smuts authorized police action 
against the union commandoes, which resulted in three deaths at 
Boksburg. The union proclaimed a general strike, and Smuts 
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announced martial law. Several days of bitter fighting ensued 
which, combined with the heavy handling of previous strikes in 
1913 and 1914, the war time rebellion and the shootings of 
Africans at Port Elizabeth and Queenstown in 1920 and 1921, gave 
an impression of the government's hands being stained with blood, 
and of Smuts himself as an autocratic ruler (Davenport,1991), 
The NP and the LP had shared sympathy for the strikers in the 
early stages of their struggle. The brutality of the ensuing 
conflict helped mobilize a union of anti-capitalist and Afrikaner 
nationalist sentiment which swept an NP-LP alliance to a victory 
over the SAP in the 1924 election. 
Terreblanche and Nattrass, 1990, describe this result as the 
first serious chalTenge to colonial capitalism in South Africa: 
"The (white) artisan had won the struggle for recognition within 
the white power structure. New industrial laws, the "civilized 
labour policy" and the LP's presence in the coalition government 
marked his absorption in the ruling elite" (Simons and 
Simons,1968,327). 
The new state stood firmly for white labour and small Afrikaner 
farmers. However the political position of unskilled white 
workers (predominantly Afrikaners), was still in doubt. The 
allegiance of this class was the prize fought over by the left 
wing trade unions and the Afrikaner nationalists. 
In an attempt at greater autonomy, the new government encouraged 
import substitution with a Board of Trade, and in 1928 a 
nationalised Iron and Steel Corporation (ISCOR) was established. 
The trauma of modernisation and urbanisation for the white poor, 
80% of whom were Afrikaners, was moderated by a welfare state. 
Small Afrikaans farmers had not only the assurance of cheap black 
labour supplies through the denial of black trade union 
membership and the 1925 Wage Act; they were also cushioned by 
state financial support. Poor urban Afrikaners were eligible for 
state protected employment on the railways or in government (the 
beginnings of a highly significant trait). 
With incorporation in the state sector and the help of the post 
depression boom, the "poor white problem" had been as good as 
eliminated by 1939. Further, the radicalizing potential of the CP 
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and the white trade union movement had been effectively 
neutralised by the government's action in taking white labour 
under its wing (Davenport,1991). 
The tension between the alliance of class forces represented by 
the 1924-33 state on the one hand, and mining capital on the 
other, has been seen by some writers, as part of a wider conflict 
between foreign and domestic capital (Legassick and Hemson,1976, 
Bozzoli,1978, Rogerson,1982, O,Meara,1983). Domestic agricultural 
and industrial classes had a powerful ally in the state with its 
capacity for economic intervention. The NP's hold on government 
allowed it to divert English capital's surplus into investment 
within South Africa (Nattrass,1981,cited Lemon,1987), notably for 
the government's main economic constituencies - agriculture and 
domestic industry (see also Davies, Kaplan, Morris and 
O,Meara,1976). 
Unfortunately for the Pact government, a close understanding with 
domestic capital and a fervent desire for economic self 
sufficiency and detachment from imperial influence, were not 
enough to ride out the economic depression which struck the world 
economy in the early 1930s. Although South Africa was relatively 
insulated from monetary collapse by its gold reserves, it could 
not help being articulated with the world economy, and the 
depression had significant domestic political repercussions. 
In the early 1930s the international demand for South Africa's 
exports began to fall as consumption overseas plummeted. The 
government, however, refused to devalue like other affected 
countries, not only on the grounds that it was demonstrating its 
cherished independence from external influence, but also because 
devaluation would raise the price of imports. Speculation that 
South Africa would nevertheless devalue led to a drain of local 
currency as money was invested on the London Stock Exchange. 
(After devaluation this could then be converted back at a 
profit). The speculative drain itself eventually contributed to 
the decision to finally abandon the gold standard and devalue in 
December 1932. 
In 1933, with Hertzog fearing a loss of the next election, an 
approach was made to Smuts for a coalition of the NP and the SAP 
on certain terms, including South Africa's autonomy, the 
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retention of the national flag, equal English-Afrikaans language 
rights, the safeguarding of white farmers and workers and the 
maintenance of "white civilization and political separation" 
(Davenport,1991,276) in "Native Policy". Such terms for coalition 
were acceptable to many in the NP (especially in the two northern 
provinces), but to others, particularly in D. F. Malan's Cape 
section of the party, coalition on any terms with the party of 
English capital and imperialist collaboration, was a betrayal. 
Ultimately though, not just coalition, but fusion, was to occur 
between Hertzog's NP and Smuts's SAP, creating the United Party 
(UP), while Malan was to lead most of the Cape caucus of the old 
NP, plus northern sympathizers, into the Gesuiwerde, or 
"purified" NP (hereon, simply NP). 
The fusion government bore the brunt of social tensions arising 
out of the most rapid secondary industrialisation and 
urbanisation South Africa had yet seen and, with Smuts in 
government once again, the English establishment was readmitted 
to political power. The cabinet considered a programme of more 
liberal policy options towards urban blacks, which for many 
Afrikaners represented a threat to the established order. 
During the war, with white workers lost to the army, the job 
colour bar was openly flouted, with the tacit approval of the 
English liberal element in government. A first, tentative step 
towards permanently filling skilled posts with blacks was the 
Native Education Finance Act 1945, which freed black education 
from its reliance on finance raised solely from black taxes. The 
reforms which were envisaged beyond this, especially those 
suggested by the UP's Fagan Commission, set up to investigate the 
changes required of "Native policy", went a long way towards 
losing the UP the 1948 election. Government officials were 
contemplating, by the end of the war, the stabilisation of 
complete African families in the cities, village building for the 
landless in the reserves and the issuing of passes which would be 
voluntarily applied for and linked to secure employment 
(Davenport,1991). In private, some cabinet ministers may even 
have considered ending the traditional migrant labour pattern 
altogether, reversing the established principle of temporary 
urban African residence (Wolpe,1988). 
Such thinking was induced by a dawning recognition of the need of 
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the expanding manufacturing sector for a stable African workforce 
and a more wealthy domestic market for its goods (dependent on a 
better paid black population). It was further stimulated by the 
1946 strike of 70,000 African mineworkers, in response to rising 
expectations, the cutting of rations and an attack on their 
union. The strike, like that of 1922, was crushed by the state, 
but the African workers of 1946, unlike their white predecessors, 
were not subsequently to gain access to government. 
It was urban employers who required a stable urban African 
workforce, but it was the UP government which would shoulder the 
responsibility of supplying it and face the threat of a loss of 
white electoral support. The NP's Sauer report - rival to the 
UP's Fagan Report - represented an early "spelling out of the 
gospel of apartheid" and "seemed to offer more security on more 
familiar lines" (Davenport,1991,312-3). While improving the 
conditions of African workers may have furthered the interests of 
manufacturing capital; mining capital, white labour and white 
farmers, were generally protective of their dominance over black 
labour. Such was the prelude to the assumption of power in 1948 
of Malan's NP, and its alternative programme of apartheid. 
1. Ideology, Segregation and the Urban Arena, 1910 to 1948 
By the beginning of this century, the Cape assimilationist 
discourse of the mid 19th century had been effectively replaced 
throughout South Africa by a quasi-Darwinian scientific racism. 
Scientific racism held that "the relative position of "pure 
races" along the evolutionary scale was "immutable"" 
(Dubow,1980,82), with the qualification that white civilization 
could potentially "regress", notably through "miscegenation". 
In the 1920s though, on the Witwatersrand, a new "breed" of 
liberal anthropologist began to identify differences between 
African and European as cultural, rather than as objective 
degrees of civilization. Bantu Studies - the anthropological 
project that was to occupy many university departments through 
the first half of the 20th century - had begun. Liberals like 
Alfred Hoernle and Edgar Brookes found in the rather ambiguous 
phenomenon of "culture", a quality which would always progress, 
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eliminating the fear of a regression of civilization. For 
liberals, the concept of culture represented a compromise wherein 
blacks were held to be at present inferior, as acknowledged by 
general white opinion, but with the capacity for advancing, in 
the context of an urbanised, industrial society, to a state in 
which they would meet the white population's cultural standards. 
Most liberals agreed on the essential distinction between 
adaptable cultural, and immutable racial differences. However, 
because of the cultural gulf which separated whites from Africans 
in South Africa at the time, many liberals argued, along with 
white society in general, that the policy of segregation should 
be continued, at least for the foreseeable future. In the 1920s 
"segregation appeared to be beyond the realm of political 
dispute" (Dubow,1980,9). 
From the late 19th century to the 1920s, segregationist Acts had 
seldom been interpreted as "integral elements of a united 
ideological package" (Dubow,1989,39), although English speaking 
liberals had fostered the idea of spatial segregation as a 
protective shield against further black dispossession. But by the 
1930s, it was becoming increasingly clear that segregation was 
being implemented, under Afrikaner nationalist patronage, to 
counter English liberal hegemony and to ensure continued white 
dominance over blacks in the cities. 
In the atmosphere of threatening African worker mobilization, 
particularly under the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union 
(ICU), the concept of a cultural gulf between the races could be 
invoked to stem the threat of radicalisation by promoting a 
return to traditional African "tribalism" in the reserves. The 
segregationism of the 1920s and 1930s was an attempt to "bolster 
a more conservative system as a means of social control" 
(Worden,1994,77) against an alarming alternative focus - militant 
African workerist resistance. Heaton Nicholls, MP for Zululand, 
expressed the fear behind the 1920s segregationist drive 
succinctly: "if we do not get back to communalism we will most 
certainly arrive very soon at communism" (cited Dubow,1989,71). 
Liberals in the 1930s and 1940s then, had to re-evaluate. The 
liberal principle of "protective" segregation for Africans had 
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been used instead, to uphold white political and economic 
dominance against the threat of African proletarianization. It 
was also ensuring the impoverishment of the reserves. The liberal 
historian, W.M. Macmillan, was highly critical of the early 20th 
century form of urban segregation, arguing that it was founded on 
an insufficient rural base. Reserves such as the formerly 
successful Herschel in the eastern Cape were being noticeably 
eroded as their occupants' numbers swelled (W.M. Macmillan,1930, 
cited Rich,1984). 
Such criticisms provoked the government response of 
"developmentalism" - the aim of improving the reserves with 
agricultural demonstrators, soil conservation and instruction. 
But the level of financial commitment ensured that, for most 
rural Africans, the material impact of the policy was 
insignificant. 
Out of the abuse of traditional liberal ideology grew a new 
oppositional, or counter hegemonic ideology (or rather, an old 
one resurrected). Assimilationism assumed greater legitimacy 
among liberals as the 1930s, and particularly the 1940s, 
progressed. If Africans were only to be subjected to white 
privilege and power under segregated institutions, their best 
hope for advancement lay with greater integration into European 
social and political structures. The basis for the new liberal 
critique of segregationist trusteeship was well expressed by 
Patrick Duncan at the beginning of the 1930s: 
"The people of South Africa - the European people - will 
not give up the idea that the country is theirs, the only 
home they have for themselves and their children. They do 
not consider that they are here as invaders with no title 
as against the natives but that of conquest ... But of 
course, it is not really a question in the end of title, 
legal or moral. In the end it is a question of survival in 
numbers and on that ground our prospects here do not look 
very bright. But the point here which makes our position 
different from most is that we are here as a minority 
having built up the country out of barbarism and 
established the conditions under which the other race could 
flourish in peace, and we claim the right to rule not as 
trustees but as a dominant and civilized race ruling their 
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own country and with it the subject race which partly for 
comfort and partly for the embarrassment of the rulers will 
persist in inhabiting it ... That works alright so long as 
the under race is content with its primitive state and does 
not feel the stirrings of national and political feelings. 
When they do - as they are beginning to do here now - the 
trouble begins and grows apace. What the end will be, 
whether we will slowly evolve into a Jamaica or be the 
ancestors of a new brown race no one can tell. But it 
certainly seems unlikely that the white man will be able 
permanently to maintain the outlook to which he clings now" 
(quoted Ingham,1988, 173). 
The fundamental problem liberals encountered in their move 
towards assimilationism was its unacceptability to the body of 
white opinion. Political and social assimilation could not 
proceed in a spatially segregated landscape, and as long as the 
town was seen as a "European area in which there is no place for 
the redundant native" (Davenport,1971, cited Christopher,1983), 
the segregated landscape would remain. "Over and over again", 
liberals in parliament, and as Native Representatives, tried to 
explain how hunger and poverty in the segregated reserves, and 
the industrialisation of white areas, were fostering the influx 
of Africans so resented in the cities (Lewsen,1987,103-4). Some 
argued for a settled urban black population, independent 
commercial black farmers, and the abolition of the migrant labour 
System and influx control regulations. But, by and large, their 
protestations fell on deaf ears, both in parliament and in the 
wider society. Inter-war liberals in Craddock, for example, felt 
embattled and defensive, "unable to transform a body of ideas 
into practice because they could not appeal to the perceived 
interests of a sufficient number of the enfranchised" 
(Sutler,1987,97). 
However, liberals were not a group completely extraneous to wider 
white society. Usually, publicly or privately, they shared the 
fear of "miscegenation", and "friendly personal relations across 
the colour line were rare, though meetings were fostered by 
official occasions and letters were exchanged" (Lewsen,1987,104). 
(The misunderstandings accompanying such cross-racial 
correspondence in the subsequent apartheid era are well 
represented in the epistolary "Not Either an Experimental Doll", 
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ed. Shula Marks, 1987, The Women's Press, London). Nevertheless, 
parliamentary liberals were instrumental in effecting minor 
adaptations of segregationist structures, for example, in 
persuading Smuts to extend legal recognition to African trade 
unions during the war. 
The liberal desire for African tutelage and progression within a 
more integrated urban environment represented one extreme of 
white ideological influence on urban policy. At the other extreme 
lay the well established principle of Stallardism. This was a 
philosophy of urban African administration developed in the late 
19th century, but enunciated more coherently in the early 1920s 
by the Stallard Commission. The commission had recommended that 
only the temporary sojourn of economically useful Africans be 
permitted in the cities, and that they be efficiently despatched - 
to the reserves once their term of work had expired. In the 
1940s, Smuts's government found itself tugged part way towards 
the liberal extreme by manufacturing interests' desire for 
stable, skilled and semi-skilled African labour, and towards the 
Stallardist extreme by mining capital's continuing need for 
cheap, unskilled migrant workers (Maylam,1990). 
The continuing impact on public opinion of the "sanitation 
syndrome" was a decisive factor in favour of maintaining 
Stallardist segregation. In the first half of the century 
unhealthy living and working conditions, long hours of work and 
inadequate nutrition, all conspired to make a large proportion of 
both the black and white urban population susceptible to 
infectious and nutritional disease. But, in whites' minds, 
disease became particularly associated with the proliferating 
black presence in the cities, and "the imagery of infection and 
epidemic disease provided a compelling rationale for major forms 
of social control, and in particular, the segregation of African 
locations" (Marks and Anderson,1988,176). 
But the general white belief in segregation stemmed from a blend 
of material interests and more opaque cultural assumptions. 
Historians vary in the emphases they place on the two influences, 
and before considering the practical implementation of 
segregationist policy prior to 1948, it is worthwhile to consider 
interpretations of its ideological substructure in more detail. 
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Sparks, 1990, argues that segregationist assumptions derived from 
the transplantation of a European culture to unfamiliar African 
territory, and that culture's inability to adapt to, and absorb, 
exotic African cultural forms. Thus segregationism represented an 
attempt to keep Africa and Africans at bay, to preserve what was 
innate to European identity in a very different environment. On 
the other hand, Marxian historians stress the functionality of 
segregation, its compatibility with white material accumulation 
(Wolpe,1976). It can be argued that segregationist ideology 
developed as a justification for the material privilege of a 
group defined by race, and, some would argue, class (Marks and 
Trapido,1987). 
J.M. Coetzee's overview of "White Writing", 1988, finds that 
early 20th century South African literature echoes the historical 
problem of "Europe in Africa". Africa lacks a depth of meaning to 
the European eye (Butler, cited Coetzee,1988). 
In Europe, the long historical association between landscape, 
language and culture, allowed the "historical resonances" of the 
past to be carried continuously through, giving succeeding 
generations a secure foundation for their sense of identity. The 
African landscape, though, lacked this association, having no 
historical meaning yet conferred upon it (the Africans' own 
association remaining inaccessible and therefore silent, in 
European representation). Coetzee argues that literature carried 
"the burden of finding a home in Africa for a consciousness 
formed in and by a language whose history lies in another 
continent". Extending a literary critique to the political 
sphere, that consciousness transplanted, meant that whites 
strived to realize a European lifestyle on the African continent. 
Such a project could be effected only through the segregation of 
Africans, so that white society could maintain its cultural form 
unchallenged. 
Counter to the abstractedly cultural premises of such an 
interpretation, runs the firm materialistic interpretation of 
Marks and Trapido, 1987. For them, segregation emerged to "solve 
the problems of industrialisation". It was a finely balanced 
system which supplied the material requirements of an 
industrialising capitalist society, using an accessible, cheap, 
black proletariat. For the cities, it ensured large numbers of 
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unskilled workers from the reserves. These workers were 
complemented by a core of skilled, stabilised and "incorporated", 
urban, white workers. The costs of the unskilled African labour 
were kept low by the independent reserve base which would ensure 
its reproduction. The costs of social control would also be 
minimised under segregationist structures, through the 
administrative incorporation of chiefs. The system gave white 
farmers control over African tenants and labourers in white rural 
areas, and protected white urban workers from cheaper African 
competition through urban influx control regulations. The 
segregationist premise was, then, a natural one for most white 
classes to adopt, since it was in their own material interests. 
Segregationism allowed material functionality by supplying the 
cities with their labour needs, but it also facilitated white 
political and cultural security, preventing a threatening, large 
scale African proletarianization by containing the spatial base 
of this labour in the reserves (Dubow,1989). The practical 
application of the principle and the spatial forms resulting from 
it, provided the structures which the apartheid ideologues would 
seek to consolidate. 
The Implementation of Segregation  
Before 1948 there was much greater differentiation in the 
application of spatial segregation than after. Nevertheless, from 
the 1920s, the general direction was towards increasing 
centralisation of control over spatial form, and the 
standardisation of segregationist policy. Maylam, 1990, argues 
that the 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act (see below) in 
particular, paved the way for apartheid planning. However, prior 
to this, the Housing Act 1920 gave assistance to municipalities 
for building housing estates, but only racially homogenous ones. 
The Act was an early, formal incursion, into the already 
informally, and partially segregated housing market. Before 1923, 
the 1913 Land Act already provided a legal basis for universal, 
and systematic segregation in the rural areas (although there was 
no legislation to remove blacks from land owned prior to the Act 
until 1939). 
The 1923 Natives (Urban Areas) Act itself supplemented the rural 
legislation by decreeing that urban African "locations" should be 
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separated from their white towns. The 1923 Act was passed by the 
Smuts government, under the influence of the Stallard Commission. 
Under the Act, the African locations would be funded through a 
separate Native Revenue Account. Thus Africans could be excluded 
from white funded urban amenities, for which they had not 
contributed taxes. Johannesburg and Kimberley were the first 
cities to respond to the new legislation by proclaiming 
segregated areas. Cape Town followed in 1926, and Durban in the 
early 1930s, although, by 1937, only eleven towns systematically 
implemented influx controls to the segregated locations. While 
the machinery to do so was there, it was not used with :"optimal 
efficiency" (Maylam,1990) until after 1948. 
Hertzog's NP-LP government was to follow the 1923 legislation up 
with more systematic rural segregationist measures. The 1927 
Native Administration Act finally committed all of South Africa 
to a 20th century form of Natal's old system of rural 
segregation, decisively denying the Cape assimilationist 
tradition. The Governor General was now the supreme chief over 
all Africans. The government had the power, inter alia, to 
appoint chiefs, define boundaries, and alter the composition of 
"tribes". Chiefs and headmen became government agents, paid 
according to the taxes they collected. 
The imposition of authoritarian rule over the reserves was, 
however, characterised by a degree of flexibility on the local 
scale. Chiefs who proved not to be easily coerced into the role 
prescribed for them under the Act, were treated largely according 
to local initiative. The strategy of paramounts such as Solomon 
in Zululand, and Marelane in Pondoland, was to try to win formal 
recognition from the white authorities, as representatives of 
their peoples. In particular, they shared a concern that chiefly 
control over natural resources, concessions, traders and tariffs, 
be continued under the new system (Beinart,1982). Their methods 
coincided at some points - for instance, the organisation of 
spectacular, traditional royal hunts - an expression of the 
chiefly status being ignored by the authorities. By and large, 
their claims were dismissed, but this did not preclude local 
flexibility in the granting of some concessions. For example, in 
a number of cases, the chief was allowed to continue to collect 
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death duties from his subjects. 
In order to maintain the return of migrants to the reserves, and 
to restrict the urban black population, influx controls for women 
were made available to municipalities in 1930, although they were 
difficult to implement, since passes for women were not yet 
necessary. "Urban stability" was further enhanced in that year by 
the passage of the Riotous Assemblies Act, a "security backstop" 
(Davenport,1991) for the body of segregationist legislation. In 
1934 a powerful tool was made available to enforce segregation in 
the poor, racially mixed, inner city areas, particularly of 
Johannesburg, with the Slums Act (Parne11,1988, cited 
Christopher, 1990). 
One of Hertzog's conditions of fu-sion had been more complete 
political segregation. This was achieved in 1936, after a 
legislative struggle, with the Representation of Natives Act. 
This legislation finally removed African voters from the Cape 
electoral role, and placed them on a separate role to elect three 
white representatives to the House of Assembly. Four senators 
were to represent Africans nationwide. The Act represented the 
end of the Cape assimilationist tradition in practice. As partial 
compensation for the loss of the common vote, the land area of 
the African reserves was to be extended from 7% to 13% of South 
Africa's total area under the 1936 Native Trust and Land Act. 
Smuts's 1923 structure for urban segregation was consolidated 
with the 1937 Native Laws Amendment Act, which implemented, at 
the local authority's discretion, influx control to the 
"locations" outside white towns. An African migrant staying in 
the location was permitted 14 days to find work (reduced to three 
days in 1945). If the municipal returns showed a surplus of local 
labour, individual Africans could be "rusticated" (Lemon,1991) 
i.e. sent back to the reserves. At the same time, controls over 
women's entry to the urban areas were reinforced. By the time 
Hertzog left the government in 1939, a legal system holding back 
African advancement in the political, economic and spatial 
spheres, had been designed, and was being implemented with 
varying degrees of effectiveness across the country. 
Following Hertzog's departure from the government on the outbreak 
of war, Smuts's post 1940 segregation measures were largely 
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directed against Indians in Natal. Their ability to trade and 
occupy land on equal terms with whites, was successively 
diminished by the Trading and Occupation of Land Act 1943 and the 
Asiatic Land Tenure Act 1946. But Smuts was to implement one more 
major piece of urban African segregationist legislation before 
leaving office. The 1945 Natives (Urban Areas) Consolidation Act 
created the "section 10" legal category of urban African - those 
who may claim permanent urban residence by virtue of their having 
resided in the urban area continuously since birth or lawfully 
for the last 15 years, or by having worked there for the same 
employer for 10 years. The clause was only available where 
requested by the local authority. 
While the discretionary nature of most of this urban segregation 
legislation permitted much local variation until the 1950s, one 
feature was growing universally apparent in, or rather outside, 
South Africa's cities in the 1940s. This was the sprawling 
squatter settlement. The proliferation of shacks was particularly 
noticeable during the war, when resources were diverted away from 
formal house construction in the locations. Post war industrial 
expansion generated further migration from the impoverished 
reserves, but little urban housing was constructed even after the 
war due to municipal reluctance to finance building through rate 
rises. There was also lingering uncertainty over the permanency 
of large scale urban African residence, since the extended life 
of the gold fields was still in doubt (Lemon,1991). 
The cities around which squatter settlements grew, differed 
widely in their application of the segregationist doctrine. 
Apartheid's standardising impact in the 1950s cannot really be 
appreciated unless one has a knowledge of how varied the spatial 
dispensation for Africans, "Coloureds" and Indians was before 
1950. 
In 1936, one third of Cape Town's population lived in racially 
mixed residential areas. African passes to enter the city were 
introduced in 1909, but, once there, they could buy or rent 
anywhere until 1913. From 1919 they required exemption to live 
outside the location. The first "buffer zones" between African 
locations and white residential areas were introduced in the 
planning of Langa location. Between 1933 and 1948, African 
employment in the Western Cape increased by 534% (Olivier,1953, 
93 
cited Cook,1991). Eighty percent of the Africans who had been 
attracted to the city lived in informal shacks along the railway 
line after Ndabeni location had been cleared for redevelopment in 
1935. The African Nyanga township was planned beyond the built up 
area, to tidy the spatial pattern, in 1946, but the city's plans 
for segregation of its "Coloured" community were deferred 
following vociferous protests from the Malay "Coloured" 
population (Cook,1991). 
In East London, Africans had been restricted to three locations 
prior to 1923, and within them, they were mostly accommodated in 
owner-built shacks, on council rented land. By 1948, these 
locations had the highest rate of TB in South Africa, provoking 
opposition to local segregation by African trade unions and in 
the press. Commissions reported on the problem in 1937 and in 
1949, and they were followed by the building of Mdantsane 
township, where the bulk of the town's African employees now 
live, within the "independent" Ciskei homeland's boundary. In the 
pre-apartheid period, local fears were-directed more against the 
Indian population. The Daily Dispatch of 16th August 1928 
expressed fears of the town developing like Durban, a "town in 
the python coils of an Asiatic menace" (cited Fox, Nel and 
Reintges,1991). "Coloured" segregation was encouraged, but not 
enforced, by the construction of the exclusively "Coloured" 
township of Parkside (Fox, Nel and Reintges,1991). 
Durban's segregation policy, as we have seen in the last chapter, 
was unusually systematic, in that separate provision was in place 
for each race's finance and administration. Most municipalities 
relied on a series of ad hoc measures, rather than coherent, 
segregated planning bodies, when implementing spatial 
segregation. In Durban the Native Beer Act of 1908 had given the 
municipality a monopoly over the brewing and sale of traditional 
African beer. The revenue from the scheme was directed into 
African housing, thus "satisfying a capitalist precept that the 
user must pay" (Davies,1991,76). A Native Administration 
Department was established in 1910 to regulate African influx to 
the municipality. Durban's administrative and housing scheme came 
to be known as the "Durban system", and was used by the 1923 Act 
as the model for a national structure. Yet Durban, like every 
other major city, had a housing shortage, the inevitable 
accompaniment of which was the informal construction of shacks on 
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the periphery of the controlled urban area (Davies,1991). 
The degree of consideration behind urban planning for blacks is 
demonstrated nicely by Pietermaritzburg. Here, before 1923, there 
were only council barracks and peripheral slums for blacks. The 
response to the 1923 Act was the construction of Sobantu 
location, the "sanitary syndrome" dictating its placement well 
outside the pretty colonial town, and adjacent to the refuse 
dump. The municipal sewerage works was a later addition to the 
township neighbourhood (Wills,1991). 
Despite the variation in urban segregation prior to 1948, from 
informal and incomplete separation in Cape Town to Durban's 
tightly controlled system, all of South Africa's cities and towns 
displayed some form of spatial exclusion along the lines of race, 
inherited from the late 19th century colonial era and elaborated 
to cope with an increasing rate of urbanisation. As 
segregationist legislation from the central government 
accumulated from 1920 to 1948,, local authorities' discretion in 
urban policy was incrementally undermined. First came the 
Minister of Native Affairs' capacity to compel any local 
authority to implement any section of the 1923 Act, then the 
Housing Amendment Act 1944, which set up a National Housing and 
Planning Commission with powers to intervene in local housing 
policy (Lemon,1991). The trend of centralising control over urban 
space was underway, then, even before the accession to central 
government of Malan's NP. 
Encroaching centralisation was protested by some white local 
authorities, but it was actively resisted by members of the black 
population it sought to control. Formal, organised black 
resistance was encouraged by the subtle modifications in 
consciousness and culture wrought by urbanisation, the compounds 
and the factories in the first part of the 20th century. 
African Cultural Change and Political Responses 
Migrancy served as a means of channelling new, urban behaviour 
patterns back to the reserves - patterns which challenged 
traditional African structures even more than 19th century 
missionary activity had. But migrancy was not simply imposed upon 
Africans by employers and the state. It was a strategy well 
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suited to Africans with a viable reserve base, and one with a 
long tradition (see, for instance, Delius,1983 and Beinart,1982). 
A temporary sojourn working for white employers in the city or on 
the land, enabled the retention of contact with the independent 
home base and often simultaneously encouraged greater cooperation 
with other migrants at work (Beinart,1987). 
Beinart argues that traditional ethnic consciousness among 
migrants in some ways facilitated the gradual development of a 
new class consciousness in the African workforce of the 1920s and 
1930s. Traditional and "progressive" identities coexisted, with 
the established ethnic bond between migrants bolstering a new 
sense of class affinity. Ethnically "particularist associations 
at work made self-protection and organisation possible, rather 
than constraining them" (Beinart,1987,289). While the bulk of the 
less educated migrants tended to join such ethnically homogenous 
groups in the cities, some joined student associations, with 
wider African nationalist affiliations. However, the feeling of 
class identity that developed out of ethnic consciousness did not 
displace ethnic awareness. Ethnic identity remains a strong 
motivating factor behind some of the violence in African 
townships today. 
The urban gang was a tangible expression of African ethnic 
association in the cities of the 1920s and 1930s (see Van 
Onselen, cited Beinart,1982,197). Newspapers on the Rand and in 
Durban expressed concern over the proliferation of knifings in 
fights between ethnic gangs. Councillors also rued the "immoral 
practices" of homosexuality, sometimes associated with gang 
coercion, in the migrant worker compounds (Beinart,1987). 
With the circularity of migrant flows, urban traits were soon 
transferred to the reserves. In a rural Pondoland setting, beer 
drinking groups of young men borrowed a hierarchical form of 
organisation from the urban gangs. Such groups combined with 
migrant worker gangs to present a continuing threat to both the 
white rural administration and the chiefs (Beinart,1982,159-60). 
Another cultural influence contributed to the atmosphere of 
crumbling stability in rural areas, as the reserves opened wider 
to mission education and tuition in the early part of the 20th 
century. 
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In the cities themselves however, African cultural adaptation 
extended well beyond gang mobilization. In the 1930s and 1940s, 
the township environments of the Rand and Pretoria, characterised 
by poverty, overcrowding, illegal drinking dens called shebeens 
and pass raids, produced "a distinctive popular culture known as 
"marabi"" (Worden,1994,62). The blending of traditional, 
missionary, ragtime and jazz traits, produced a new, peculiarly 
urban form of African music (Coplan,1985, cited Worden,1994,62). 
But beyond music, marabi was a "distinctive way of life, 
impenetrable to outsiders, which helped to deal with poverty and 
the "lack of visible means of subsistence"" (Worden,1994,62-3, 
quoting Koch,1983). Parallels to marabi developed in other South 
African urban environments: for instance, the development of 
popular music, carnival and self-help organisations in Cape 
Town's District Six (Worden,1994). 
Adjustments in African culture and consciousness soon fed into 
the forms of organised resistance to white administration adopted 
by Africans. In rural areas, the encroachment on chiefly 
authority embodied in the 1927 Native Administration Act was 
resisted in novel ways. For example, in Pondoland, an attempt was 
made to reject the chief imposed by the authorities in court, 
because he was the inheritor of a tradition represented by the 
19th century chief Sigcau, who had aided white labour recruiters 
in Pondoland, and thus "sold" the country for his own benefit 
(Beinart,1982). Rural resistance, however, was to reach its peak 
when the succeeding apartheid government sought to consolidate 
its rule in the reserves with far less flexibility. 
In the inter-war period, most organised resistance came from more 
radical, urbanised blacks, who led the ANC from the 1920s, with 
many also, or exclusively, supporting the powerful urban and 
rural socialist movement, the ICU. The ICU taught the ANC a 
lesson in radicalisation over the period. If the ANC was to 
represent the expanding African industrial working classes, it 
would have to distance itself from the "courtly and often pompous 
discourse of African politicians" (Lodge,1983,6) who currently 
led the movement. The founding of the CP in 1921 infused a 
further radicalizing influence, enhanced after the CP abandoned 
the racism of the white labour movement following the 1922 
strike, and committed itself to black mobilisation. 
97 
Garveyism was another radical movement in the black politics of 
the period, but it was distinct from the "left wing" tendency. 
While Dube, of the ANC leadership, reflected the American ex-
slave, Booker T. Washington's accommodationist line towards 
whites, many young blacks, experiencing the appalling conditions 
attendant upon rapid urbanisation, followed the contrary American 
line of Garvey, stressing black pride and perceiving black 
Americans as redeemers (Marks and Trapido,1987). In one rural 
millenarian movement, reminiscent of the Great Xhosa cattle 
killing, black American aircraft pilots would intervene to 
protect oppressed black South Africans (Marks and Atmore,1980). 
Even the socialist ICU blended elements of Garveyism into its 
doctrines. The Garveyist movement was strongest in the Western 
Cape. Here, Xhosa with their Africanist traditions, and black 
Americans in the docks, combined to diffuse the ideas. Marks and 
Trapido, 1987, highlight the contrast between the thrusting 
radicalism of this region's black population, and the 
conservatism of the "organic intellectuals" of Natal, where Zulu 
ethnicity and the maintenance of the Zulu monarchy's legitimacy 
were the most cherished ideals of African political mobilisation. 
Resistance to the state was largely precluded by them, and their 
pursuit as goals was gladly assisted by the state in its support 
for the Zulu Society. The political quiescence of Natal in the 
1930s and 1940s provided the prelude to the violent manifestation 
of Zulu ethnic chauvinism in Durban in 1949, discussed below. 
Meanwhile, the conjunction of socialism and Africanism in the ANC 
rank and file was radicalizing the movement, a tendency 
manifested in the election of Josiah Gumede as president;-The new 
blend of political ideology was encapsulated in one motion passed 
on Gumede's accession - "the right of self - determination 
through the complete overthrow of capitalism and imperialist 
domination ... the principle of Africa for the Africans" (quoted 
Lodge,1983,8). Some members of the ANC and SACP came to share an 
understanding that South Africa contained a colonial situation 
for which two stages of liberation were necessary - a nationalist 
democratic revolution in co-operation with reformist African 
petty bourgeois organisations, followed by a socialist revolution 
(Lodge,1983). This premise continued to be held by the SACP 
throughout its resistance to apartheid, but it was less well 
diffused through the ANC, which retained a core conservative 
membership. 
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Gumede was replaced as leader by Pixley Seme in 1930, and "with 
his ascendancy the ANC shifted several degrees rightwards into 
almost total moribundancy" (Lodge,1983,9). At the same time, the 
SACP was moving onto a confrontationist course with the 
government, a course which was to destroy its organisational 
structures in South Africa. 
Although the ANC reached the nadir of its influence in the 1930s, 
by wooing traditional chiefs and businessmen, "identifying them 
with the general good" (Lodge,1983,10-11), another turning point 
was reached in the 1940s as African political organisation 
adjusted to the massive wartime expansion of the African working 
class, mainly in Johannesburg. 
In the wartime decade, many more blacks than ever before came to 
pursue their wellbeing in an urban and industrial context. From 
1936 to 1946, the urban African population grew by 57.2%, from 
1,141,612 to 1,794,212, overtaking the white urban population by 
about 75,000 (Pose1,1991,24). The urbanisation of Africans and 
their incorporation as a large industrial workforce in themselves 
presented challenges to white urban political and economic 
hegemony. A sense of threshold, of the 1940s being a critical and 
portentous time, is apparent in contemporary reports (0. 
Walker,1948; Blackwell and May,1947; C. Norton,1948; E. 
Robeson,1946). 
Despite Smuts's tentative reformism, urban Africans felt 
compelled to make their own attempts to resist the further 
encroachment of poverty. In Alexandra, in protest at fare rises, 
bus boycotts took place in 1940 and 1945, and from 1944 to 1947, 
a Johannesburg squatter movement culminated in the incorporation 
of Orlando into older housing estates to form the largest African 
township of Soweto (Southwest Townships). Workerist action was 
added to the "repertoire" (Tilly, cited Introduction, 
Clingman,1991,) of resistance, with the increasing importance of 
African labour during the war and falling wages contributing to a 
series of relatively successful strikes on the Witwatersrand in 
1942 and 1943. Once the war was won, however, the African 
mineworkers union was destroyed in the crushing of the 1946 
strike, and the Council for Non European Trade Unions, which had 
been formed during the war, was severely weakened. 
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The ANC could not help but incorporate some of this flourishing 
radicalism. The Africanist element of it was manifested in 1944 
with the founding of the ANC Youth League (ANCYL). The ANCYL soon 
developed influence over the leadership of the organisation as a 
whole, infusing it with the spirit of Africanism. Its leader, 
Anton Lembede, saw, in the urbanisation of the African populace, 
a source of mass support which, so far, the Congress leadership 
had shamefully neglected (Lodge,1983). However, the Africanists 
were wary of that other radicalizing influence, communism. They 
saw in it an updated form of white paternalism, and felt their 
own oppression to be clearly based on race rather than class. 
Radicalization of black political organisations was also 
encouraged indirectly by the state's own actions in the 1940s. 
ANC members were pushed into more radical stances by brutality 
towards the strikers in 1946, the extension of influx control 
regulations to the Cape, the creation of segregated political 
institutions for "Coloureds" and Indians and the consistent 
hedging of the Natives Representative Council into a 
pusillanimous ("toy telephone" to the government) role. 
"Coloured" and Indian Responses to Segregation  
While African organisations were being moulded into more militant 
forms in the 1940s, the political position of "Coloured" and 
Indian populations was more ambiguous. "Coloured" political 
identity and mobilization had been spurred by the post Boer War 
settlement, when the "Coloured" franchise was confined to the 
Cape and withheld in the northern republics. Polttical protest 
was organised by the African Political (later People's) 
Organisation (APO). Ethnic mobilization was aided by the fact 
that Coloured voters were influential in at least six Cape Town 
City Council seats (Marks and Trapido,1987). With the lingering 
influence of scientific racism's classifications, "Coloureds" 
were able to utilize their perceived status as a race more 
advanced than Africans: "the advantages of a separate identity 
for "Coloureds" came to be appreciated (Marks and 
Trapido,1987,29). That the APO could benefit from drawing such a 
distinction became clear when "Coloureds" were exempted from 
carrying the passes introduced for Africans with the 1923 Act. 
The Indian population was subject to much greater internal class 
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differentiation. There was little sense of an Indian communal 
identity in political discourse until the state defined such a 
community by its discriminatory legislation. Indian South 
Africans in the late 1940s though, had the advantage of 
international leverage, the Indian government being willing to 
act on their behalf in a global arena - the United Nations - when 
legislation was enacted against Indian land occupation and 
trading rights. To a certain extent this compensated for a lack 
of the cultural ties with Afrikaners that "Coloureds" had (Marks 
and Trapido,1987). 
After Union in 1910, a South African-born, Indian political elite 
had begun to mobilise against the separate registering of Indians 
in the province of the Transvaal. These clerks, interpreters, 
teachers and professionals, provided the personnel for Gandhi's 
first satyragraha campaign. Later organisation, however, mostly 
revolved around the property rights threatened by Smuts's 
government, and there was little linkage with African political 
movements. Indeed the 1949 Durban riots were a traumatic 
experience of involvement with Zulus. A minor affray between an 
Indian and an African set off Zulu attacks on Indians in the 
city, leaving 142 dead. The conflict of culture between Indian 
and African had been steadily exacerbated by exploitation of Zulu 
workers by an Indian petty bourgeoisie, and state manipulated 
competition between African and Indian entrepreneurs. Continuing 
white invective and incitement against Indians probably gave 
extra impetus to the conflict (Marks and Trapido,1987). 
From Segregation to Apartheid 
The period from 1910 to 1948 was one in which the political and 
spatial groundwork for apartheid was laid, but in a varied and 
inconsistent manner. While centralisation of control over South 
Africa's space was progressing through the period, it was only 
partially accomplished by 1948, and there was a great degree of 
variation in political and spatial structures on the ground. 
Nevertheless, the legal framework for a more rigid implementation 
of spatial and political division along the lines of race, was in 
place by 1948. 
Pre-apartheid state intervention had also precipitated an 
expansion of the "repertoire" of black resistance, a repertoire 
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that would be a crucial destabilising factor for future 
government spatial and political projects. 
By the mid 20th century, the context for black resistance had 
decisively shifted to an urban arena, and its general form had 
likewise altered from armed resistance to dispossession, through 
passive protest at ill treatment, to "modern" industrial action, 
although more traditional forms would coexist with the modern, 
being particularly prominent in the reserves. At the individual 
level, evolving systems of white social control would continue to 
be met with black non-cooperation. 
Apartheid's historical context included the spatial and political 
forms of segregation legislated over the previous fifty years, 
the attitudes behind them, and the methods of black opposition to 
them. It also included another strand reaching back half a 
century or more - that of a sense of Afrikaner identity, 
developing progressively towards nationhood. The more 
fundamentally segregationist regime elected-in 1948, was intent 
on a material and spiritual revival of the Afrikaner volk. Behind 
the success of the NP lay a far more coherent expression of 
Afrikaner nationalism than South Africa had yet seen. 
2. Vitalizing Afrikaner Nationalism, 1910 to 1948 
Introduction 
During the 1930s, somewhat of an intellectual "renaissance" 
(Sparks,1990) emerged among Afrikaner nationalists. The 
scholastic elite of the Afrikaner community engaged itself in 
redefining and solidifying a nationalistic ideology which had its 
roots in the late 19th century. The late 1920s and 1930s provided 
an ideal context within which such ideologies could attain mass 
adherence, bringing a world economic crisis and particular 
material crisis to South Africa's "poor white" Afrikaners. There 
has been some debate over the motivation for the resurgence of 
nationalistic feeling in the 1930s, some writers emphasising the 
ideological and cultural "entrepreneurship" of ethnic leaders 
(Moodie,1975, Welsh,1987, Davenport,1991), others, the material 
impetus behind ethnic political mobilisation (O,Meara,1983, Marks 
and Trapido,1987). 
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Nationalist ideology in the 1930s has been interpreted by Marxist 
scholars as a mental construct, built upon the solid material 
plight of Afrikaners experiencing discrimination under English 
dominated capitalism. An alliance of class "fractions" lay at the 
heart of Afrikaner nationalist mobilization, each fraction 
seeking to improve its material position through broader ethnic 
mobilization. However, liberal writers have placed more emphasis 
on the original divisions of language, history and religion 
between English and Afrikaans speakers; divisions which, in the 
first place, ensured that the impact of capitalism would be felt 
differentially. Such writers would not agree that the grounding 
of ideology in material conditions is direct. The success of 
nationalist ideologues in the 1948 election was brought about by 
a welter of subtle, non-material factors, interacting with 
material concerns. 
Material Concerns 
In the 1930s and 1940s, more people than ever before identified 
their political interests as lying with the NP. The pressing day 
to day, material concerns of these people, traced by O'Meara, 
1983, helped foster their allegiance. A cluster of Afrikaans 
speaking classes came to realize that the programme of the 
nationalist movement, led by the secretive Broederbond, and 
politically represented by Malan's NP, could alleviate the 
material problems each was facing. 
By 1948 the alliance was composed of a petty bourgeois leadership 
group, farmers and urbanised Afrikaner workers, but it was 
financed by, and achieved its material apotheosis in, Afrikaner -
run commercial enterprises. Mobilization of the alliance was 
triggered largely by the blocked aspirations of the petty 
bourgeoisie in the northern provinces. 
The frustration of this middle class was first manifested in the 
1910s over the specific issue of language. English was the 
language of the workplace and of education, and it was English 
which opened doors to state employment. Dutch remained the 
language of "hymn, sermon and bible" (Marks and Trapido,1987,17). 
If Afrikaans speaking journalists, writers, teachers and clerics 
were to advance in the professional fields using the vernacular, 
they would have to mobilize a new constituency to empower their 
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language. The concentration on the importance of language, its 
centrality to identity, was in clear distinction to the politics 
of the established Afrikaans leadership, represented by Botha and 
Smuts. 
In 1918, the Broederbond was established by aspirant 
professionals in the Transvaal to work for the interests of 
"Afrikanerdom", but specifically, in its infancy, for the 
promotion of the vernacular. The institution took firm root in 
the province, backed particularly by the Transvaal's Afrikaner 
teachers (Moodie,1975). The Broederbond "provided a superb 
vehicle for the discussion, elaboration, adoption and eventual 
execution of what, after fusion, amounted to the independent 
programme of the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie" (01 Meara,1983,64). 
Central to O'Meara's materialist argument is that this class, in 
order to remove the obstacles to its advancement, needed to 
mobilize the support of two sectors of the Afrikaans constituency 
in particular : the farmers of the Transvaal and Orange Free 
State, who had displayed a willingness to support Smuts's UP 
after fusion, and urban Afrikaans workers, who were being enticed 
by the left wing movements. The ideologues of the Bond therefore 
sought, through their covert influence in the inter-war period, 
to unite these forces into an ethnic coalition. Such an alliance 
would "burst open the doors of economic advance" (0'Meara,1983), 
presently barred to the Afrikaner petty bourgeoisie by the use of 
their mother tongue. 
In the meantime, though, this class had to endeavour to 
"participate in the industrial capitalist economy through the 
medium of its own language" (01 Meara,1983,66). A prerequisite was 
the generation of specifically Afrikaner capital. One man was 
particularly influential in this respect - W.A. Hofmeyr. Unlike 
the leaders of the Broederbond, Hofmeyr was based in the Cape. He 
had channelled capital derived from Cape commercial farmers into 
the establishment of three overtly Afrikaans companies - 
Nasionale Pers (press), SANTAM and SANLAM (insurance and credit 
companies). 
By the 1930s, Hofmeyr and the Broederbond had some mutual goals. 
In order to drive the nationalist economic movement, the Bond 
needed capital to invest in the north, while Hofmeyr was seeking 
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to extend his influence northwards from the Cape. A tension-
wrought co-operation emerged from a meeting of these, and other 
like-minded Afrikaners, at the 1939 Ekonomiese Volkskongres. 
Here, the Broederbond's official "front" organisation, the FAK 
(Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings), was active in 
creating a number of institutions to further the economic 
interests of the volk. The Federal Volksbelegging was set up to 
utilize Afrikaner capital to build up Afrikaner participation in 
industry and commerce. An Ekonomiese Instituut (EI) was to lead 
Afrikaans capital into the volk's own commercial companies, like 
Hofmeyr's SANLAM and Volkskas. 
Economic advancement was necessary, but if the movement initiated 
by the petty bourgeoisie was to be ultimately successful in the 
political arena, it would need the support of a significantly 
wider section of the white electorate - particularly, as we have 
seen, farmers and workers. O'Meara argues that it was the promise 
of economic salvation which generated this support. In the 1930s, 
many Afrikaners, both on the land and in the cities, were in need 
of material redemption. By 1939, the state estimated that some 
300,000 whites (mainly Afrikaners) were in "terrible poverty" 
(Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989,31). The 1932 Carnegie Commission 
found that one third of Afrikaners were "desperately poor", while 
another third were classified as "poor". The bankruptcy of small 
farmers in the 1920s and 30s was given as the main explanation. 
In 1939 Afrikaners constituted 41% of blue collar and other 
manual workers, while only 27% of white collar workers were 
Afrikaners. With the prospect of demobilization and redundancies 
following the war, fears of further immizeration for the "poor 
whites" of the cities arose. 
Even from its formation in 1933, the new NP thought that it was 
possible to "capture" this "poor white" voting constituency. The 
1924 NP government had sought to protect Afrikaners from the 
effects of English capital, which, unmitigated, could have left 
most small white farmers as poor urban workers. But fusion 
brought the old NP's abandonment of that protection, and common 
cause between Hertzog and "Hoggenheimer", an Anglo-Jewish 
caricature, and the Afrikaner nationalist's despised enemy. 
Malan's new NP stood for the continuity of the former protection 
(O'Meara,1983). 
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Ethnic mobilization behind the new NP would confer new material 
blessings upon the volk, and the FAK would create the structures 
needed. The Reddingsdaadbond (RDB) was set up to pursue the lead 
of the EI in raising Afrikaner consciousness of the volk's own 
financial power and redeeming it from English economic 
domination. Membership of the RDB brought participation in 
cultural events, cheap life insurance from SANLAM, burial 
schemes, loans, training and an Afrikaans employment bureau. The 
RDB "directed a clear message to all Afrikaners - only as part of 
the Afrikaner volk, only in exclusively ethnic and Christian 
national organisations would their economic interests be 
fostered" (O'Meara,1983,142). In effect the RDB acted as the link 
between poor white and Afrikaner capitalist institution that the 
Broederbond sought, and which paved the way for the NP's 1948 
success. The economic movement as a whole helped diffuse the 
Afrikaans intelligentsia's nationalist ideology to the masses. 
The short term aim of the movement was to channel capital, 
derived from northern and Cape farmers, into industrial and 
commercial enterprises for urban Afrikaners (with dividends and 
interest as the reward for the farmers) - a rural to urban 
redistribution of the volk's assets to accompany that of the volk 
itself. 
However, Afrikaner urban workers had choices as to where to place 
their allegiance, and their trust in a brighter economic future. 
If the nationalist movement was to secure their support, it would 
have to compete with the leftist trade unions in the workplace. A 
nationalist assault on trade union structures (and even, in some 
cases, on the persons of members) took place in the 1930s. 
Nationalist mobilizers stressed that ethnicity was the common 
denominator among poor whites of the city. Ethnicity must 
therefore be the organising principle behind an improvement in 
the workers' fortunes. The fact that, in 1939, almost 40% of 
adult male Afrikaners were unskilled, compared to only 10% of 
other whites, could be portrayed as deliberate ethnic 
discrimination by an alliance of "foreign" (English/Jewish) 
capitalists and trade union leaders. For instance the white 
mineworkers' union was, at one time, in an agreement with the 
owners which often ran contrary to the interests of its members 
(01 Meara,1983). Signs that Afrikaner workers may be replaced by 
cheaper Africans were interpreted as an imperialist state 
attempt, aided by trade union leaders, to consign Afrikaners, en 
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masse, to poor whiteism. Only unions of a nationalist nature 
could really further the cause of the Afrikaans worker. 
The Garment Workers Union was particularly successful in 
diffusing Afrikaner nationalist sentiment amongst its women 
members. Nationalist sentiment about women's role as the 
motherhood of the volk was blended with anti-capitalist rhetoric 
by the union's membership in the second half of the 1930s 
(Berger,1987). 
O'Meara argues that it was only when the Broederbond became 
involved in matters extending beyond ideology, that it became 
successful in its political aims. By focusing on the material 
affairs of white workers, it was able to mobilize both their 
political support, and their savings for the nationalist economic 
movement, which in turn, generated further political support. 
Afrikaner nationalism and material accumulation thus proceeded 
hand in hand, the former leading the latter. But the origins of a 
specifically Afrikaans constituency itself lay in ethnic 
differentiation, rather than material, or class, distinction. 
Non-Material Concerns 
Marxists have tried to depersonalize the forces which created a 
distinct position for Afrikaners under South African capitalism. 
For example, Marks and Trapido, 1987, state that nationalism "can 
best be understood as a response to the social dislocations and 
problems posed by the uneven development of capitalism in South 
Africa". But the factor which defines the unevenness of 
capitalism's impact - ethnicity - is already present. The 
distinction between those who, by and large, benefited from the 
penetration of capitalism, and those who, by and large, did not, 
was already established. It was a sense of ethnic identity which 
distinguished Afrikaners from other white South Afridans, and 
this identity , while it may have been reinforced, was not 
created, by impoverishment under capitalism. Behind it lay an 
ideational realm, a sense of being that was only partially 
connected to material status. Capitalism alone could not have 
wrought the mobilization of Afrikaans speaking whites, as 
Afrikaners, "unless some line of ethnocentrism, however mild, was 
an intrinsic accompaniment of the process of differentiation ... 
One need not regard this ethnic sentiment as "primordial" or deny 
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the degree of contingency in its formation to assert that 
ethnicity played an autonomous and growing role in Afrikaner 
politics in the 1930s" (Welsh,1987,200). 
The Afrikaner's material situation, in a time of world economic 
crisis, was probably the key factor behind the eventual scale of 
nationalist support, but the nationalist movement transcended 
economic concerns, and was firmly planted in a world view 
determined by ethnicity. Members of the Broederbond stressed the 
interrelationships between the political, economic, cultural and 
spiritual dimensions of their nationalism, and not merely to 
mobilize support for their economic interests. Each one of these 
forms of identity has its own "situational salience", and while 
class was an important form, it was "woven into a racial and 
ethnic fabric" (Welsh,1987,202). Ethnicity was a much more 
powerful mobilizer of political force than class alone could have 
been. 
The ideology of Afrikaner nationalist leaders in the 1930s was 
linked to that of contemporaneous German nationalists, themselves 
extremely successful at mobilizing within exclusive group 
boundaries. However, there is disagreement over the extent of 
German influence over the course of events in South Africa (see 
Bunting,1969, Sparks,1990, Moodie,1975, Bloomberg,1990, chapter 
6) 
The most tangible link was that of the Afrikaner nationalist 
leaders who studied in Germany in the 1930s, and who returned to 
diffuse new ideas of nationhood within South Africa. But a more 
subtle, literary link is identified by Coetzee, 1988. German 
volksideologie emphasised the rootedness of the volk in its 
native landscape. Early 20th century Afrikaner poets also found 
evidence of a "natural" bond between yolk and land - "that is to 
say to naturalize the volk's possession of the land". 
The exclusive frame of reference of the Afrikaner nationalists 
reached its apotheosis in the 1930s, when the rhetoric of the 
Afrikaner's communion with the sublime in the landscape became 
prominent in Afrikaans writing. This was a communion denied to 
other ethnic groups, less proximate to God. In the 1930s, 
literary expressions of Afrikaner distinctiveness also reflected 
the pressing material concerns of the yolk. The Bauernroman, or 
Plaasroman (farm novel), became popular in both Germany and South 
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Africa, as a rural way of life was increasingly threatened by 
urbanisation and the penetration of commercial farming capital. 
In C.M. Van den Heever's "Groei", 1933, tilling the soil is 
represented as a "quasi-religious act in a Lebensraum free from 
capitalistic relations, subject only to natural laws" 
(Coetzee,1988,76). In such novels, the tangible expression of 
this capitalistic threat was often the Jewish or English 
professional, a character who would enter the narrative as a 
revolutionizer of tradition, looking to buy a viable farming 
operation and drive the Afrikaner from his land through 
competition, breaking the bond of "Blut and Boden". "The 
Plaasroman grows out of the Afrikaner's anxiety that he will lose 
his economic independence and cultural identity if he leaves the 
land" (Coetzee,1988,135). 
The importance of cultural identity was stressed by the 
Broederbond, an organisation that was not merely O'Meara's 
vehicle of petty bourgeois aspiration. Moodie, 1975, emphasises 
the Bond's, republican political leanings. There was no republican 
dimension in the early Cape Afrikaans language movement, but the 
desire for a firm political expression of cultural independence 
informed a strong republican sentiment in the northern Bond. The 
demand for an explicitly Christian National State was added to 
those for Afrikaans schooling, radio time and songbooks, and, by 
the 1930s, was attracting overt criticism from Hertzog. The new 
NP's call for an Afrikaner led republic became a clamour in the 
1930s, heard even above those for language rights, segregation 
and economic protection for poor whites (Moodie,1975). 
Beyond the economic component of Bond activity lay a spiritual 
dimension, difficult to account for in a purely materialist 
interpretation. The Bond set itself the task of maintaining "the 
nations's religious character as well as acting as the watchdog 
over all its interests" (Bloomberg,1990,31) and, in line with 
this aim, it admitted only practising Calvinists, its members 
having to show "the highest degree of religious conviction" 
(op.cit.31). In the Bond of the 1930s, there was a strong current 
of thought that the volk was created by God as an independent 
entity, and that it should remain so. A republic, divorced from 
British imperial interest, would be an immutable political 
expression of this national entity. 
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Even within the Bond though, there were ideological divides. 
Theological fissures, in particular, split the ethnic leadership 
group. One prominent tendency derived its ideas from the Dutch 
Calvinist theologian, Kuyper. Kuyperians, like all nationalists, 
believed that the Afrikaner nation had been forged by God, out of 
the furnace of British imperialism and African savagery. But they 
saw the nation as one among many spheres, including the family 
and the individual, through which God fulfilled His intentions. 
Each of the spheres was autonomous in its relationship with God. 
This tendency was most coherently represented by H.G. Stoker, a 
leader of the Broederbond in the 1930s. Malan himself had been a 
dominee of the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk (NGK), which sought 
to preserve its institutional independence from the state (hence 
Malan's resignation from the church on entering politics), but 
which was broadly supportive of nationalistic politics. 
During the 1930s, Kuyperian theology faced competition within the 
Bond, from a more secular, neo-Fichtean line of thought. 
Academics, such as P.J. Meyer, H.F. Verwoerd (later Prime 
Minister), G. Cronje (author of the Bond's "Native" policy) and, 
most notably, N. Diederichs, returning from German universities, 
brought with them a preoccupation with the volk as an organic 
body, held together by common historic culture. Diederichs 
developed a social metaphysics argument that individuals, and 
humanity, only exist in and through the nation. Any identitative 
abstraction beyond the nation, such as "universal humanity" was 
too vague, in an immediate sense, to have meaning (Moodie,1975, 
Davenport,1991,288), and any identity below the level of the 
nation precluded efficient social interaction. 
Kuyperians like Stoker and L.J. du Plessis saw this as virtually 
deifying the nation, and restricting the power of God over it, 
since it was no longer held to be one of many spheres through 
which His will is implemented. The nation for them, had a value 
in God's scheme alongside that of the individual and the family, 
not greater than them. 
The practical implications of both tendencies, despite the 
differing nuances of their theological standpoints, were largely 
indistinguishable: the furtherance of the volk's interests. While 
it was the economic movement which did most to diffuse 
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nationalist thinking to a mass base, ideological persuasion was 
also influential. The constant neo-Calvinist expounding of the 
Volk's election as a chosen people allowed a flattering sense of 
dignity to filter down through the Afrikaans population. There 
was more pride to be had in ethnic identity, than in an identity 
founded upon other parameters. 
Popular political support for the NP was also generated in the 
purely ideological sphere, notably with the FAK - organised 
celebration of the Great Trek and Blood River's centenary in 
1938. the immense popular enthusiasm, and even hysteria, 
generated by the celebratory trek of wagons, each named after one 
of the Trek's leaders, is well documented by Moodie, 1975. Behind 
the enthusiasm was a new mythology, surrounding the vow to God 
taken by the original trekkers, led by Sarel Cilliers, before the 
Battle of Blood River. In 1838 the trekkers in Natal, in the 
event of a God - given victory over the Zulu, had apparently 
pledged to celebrate on that day in the indefinite future. The 
Vow was, in fact, largely forgotten until the late 19th century, 
when it was revived as part of the early Afrikaner nationalist 
movement. The largely mythical Vow played a central role in the 
1938 celebrations which, in themselves, precipitated a welling 
desire for Afrikaner unity in politics. "Afrikaners had learned 
in their worship at the oxwagon altars how very much they had in 
common as Afrikaners" (Moodie,1975,185). The NP's virtual 
monopoly on organising the celebrations was a vital step in 
wresting control over the political expression of Afrikaner-ness 
from Hertzog and the UP (Thompson,1985). Malan himself skilfully 
incorporated an appeal to urban Afrikaners in his celebratory 
speech, using the "civil religion" theme (Moodie,1975), with 
urbanisation portrayed as a new 20th century trek. The 
battleground on which these trekkers would have to fight was not 
Blood River, but the labour market, supervised by foreign 
capitalists, and manned by an insidiously increasing urban 
African population. 
The nationalist economic movement did not simply aim to increase 
the influence of SANLAM and remove obstacles from the 
accumulation of the urban petty bourgeoisie, it was also an 
attempt to transform the very basis of Afrikaner participation in 
the economy, from individualism to ethnic mobilization, in order 
to edify the Afrikaners as a nation. 
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The awakening ethnic identity in the inter war years was 
stimulated by a sense of affinity with Afrikaner forefathers. One 
man, Gustav Preller, was particularly active in bringing the 
mythologised exploits of these historical figures to the 
attention of the public. Preller was a nationalistic Afrikaner 
with supreme leverage over the media of communication. His 
hagiographic biography of the trekker leader, Piet Retief, ran 
through ten printings and sold over 25,000 by 1930. This book 
alone "moulded the historical consciousness of many Afrikaners" 
(Thompson,1985,181). Preller was more than just a writer. He was 
a leader in the drives to formalise the Afrikaans language, and 
to establish an Afrikaans historiography. But possibly his most 
crucial contribution was to popularize an influential version of 
Afrikaner history (Hofmeyr,1991). He effected this visually, 
through writing the script, and determining the appearance of the 
1916 film "Die Voortrekkers". This was the first popular 
representation of the Trek and its leaders, and some 15,000 
people queued each week to see it. Its contribution to the 20th 
century version of the Afrikaner tradition was enormous. It was a 
vital thread in what Hofmeyr, 1991, describes as "the cultural 
fabrication of nationalism". Preller shared the implicit 
assumption of many nationalists: that the biographies of key 
historical figures amalgamated to form a biography of the nation 
itself. He used all mediums to proselytize the nationalist faith, 
also being the editor, in the 1930s, of the NP paper, Ons 
Vaderland. But it was especially his visual images which made the 
nationalist elite's conception of identity concrete in the minds 
of Afrikaners in general. 
Nationalist Disunity 
Despite the coherence of its organisation, and the individual 
flair of its leaders, the tide of Afrikaner nationalism in the 
1930s did not sweep away the other political identities of the 
volk en masse. By 1939, Afrikaner nationalism had taken on new 
force, through a combination of material inducement and 
ideological fervour, but it could not present a cohesive and 
undifferentiated front to the challenges that it faced. Regional 
differentiation had marked the nationalist movement from its 
inception, but the late 1930s and 1940s brought a plethora of 
political offshoots and competing factions within nationalist 
politics. 
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After fusion, Malan's NP had been able to assume control of much 
of the old NP's organisational structure in the Cape, but it 
faced a UP that had successfully retained most of the old NP's 
support in the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Within the 
NP, the provincial party units were semi-autonomous, and had 
divided political interests. The "various Afrikaner nationalist 
movements in South African history were always constituted by a 
differentiated and shifting ensemble of social forces - each 
clearly articulating widely different conceptions and 
expectations of the "yolk" and what "its" interests were" 
(01 Meara,1983,6). The Cape's NP component tended to be more 
externally orientated than those of the northern provinces, with 
SANLAM and the relatively wealthy vine and wool exporters 
articulating with the world, rather than just the domestic, 
economy. NP structures in the Transvaal tended to be strongly 
protective of the poor whites of Johannesburg and of the small 
farming sector from which they derived. Party members in the 
Orange Free State were inclined towards the interests of the 
province's domestic cereal producers. 
Although these diverse material interests were, by and large, 
accommodated within the NP by 1948, ideological differentiation 
was far more divisive for Afrikaner mobilization. The NP 
leadership was thrown into a dilemma by the emergence of Oswald 
Pirow's fascistic New Order group, and the mass recruitment of 
the militant extra-parliamentary Ossewabrandwag (OB). Both 
organisations shared some ideological tendencies with the NP, but 
each was unacceptable to the body of nationalist leadership 
opinion. On the one hand the NP could hope to gain support by 
accommodating such tendencies. On the other hand, it could 
interpret their existence as a challenge to the party's 
fundamental values, and hope to successfully compete with them 
for allegiance. The OB was finally dealt with when the NP invoked 
the aid of its enemy, the government, to repress it, while the 
New Order group died out with the defeat of Naziism, but the 
story of the NP's relations with both indicates the extent of 
political deviation within the body of "the volk" (see 
Moodie,1975, O'Meara,1983, Davenport, 1991). 
By the end of the war, the NP was the unchallenged political 
representative of the nationalist movement. The party was astute 
in quieting its membership's contentious republican clamour in 
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the run up to the 1948 election, focusing instead on the areas of 
clear agreement between the Dutch Reformed Church and the 
Broederbond: mother tongue education, the communist peril and 
checks on African social and economic advancement (Moodie,1975). 
The NP's first overtly racial policy directive arose out of 
concern that the gains of the Afrikaner economic movement should 
not evaporate through competition with Indian traders. An early 
NP policy pledge was to remove Indians to their "own areas", and 
prevent them living or trading in white areas (01 Meara,1983). The 
wider apartheid policy arose from the mutual concerns of 
Afrikaners, given their marginal position in society and the 
economy. Apartheid was first mooted as a vague concept by Malan 
in 1943, to maintain white purity, and to secure supplies of 
cheap African labour to white farmers by further controlling 
African migration to the cities. Even though the scheme was 
vague, it was clear that it would favour each of the class 
components that the NP was concerned to protect. 
Afrikaner businessmen, who had experienced rising African wages 
during the war, rendering competition with English capital 
harder, would be able to lower their costs. The NP would also 
combat the "laziness" of African workers, supposedly induced by 
their sense of security with Smuts's unemployment benefit. Once 
in power, one of the first moves of the NP was indeed to restrict 
the African unemployment benefit scheme. The financiers of the 
volk's mobilization in the Afrikaner commercial institutions like 
SANLAM, would also be assured of state accounts after a NP 
victory. 
Afrikaner farmers were keenly concerned with the continuity of 
their African labour supplies, threatened by industrial growth in 
the cities. The NP Member of Parliament, de Wet Nel said in 1944 
"just take the Free State or the Transvaal. One simply cannot get 
a Native to work there. The farmers are at their wits end" (cited 
O'Meara,1983,177). Apartheid held out the promise of more rigid 
influx control than Smuts was willing to implement, and thus the 
retention of labour in the rural areas. The NP would also 
recognise the farming community's financial contribution (via the 
commercial companies) to the volk's economic mobilization, and 
the marketing board would once more be used to protect farmers, 
rather than drive food prices down as it had done during the war 
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under Smuts. 
The "poor whites" who had already left the land for the cities, 
sought in apartheid, protection from the competition of cheaper 
African workers, again through stricter influx control 
regulation. They could also hope for a reversal of the erosion of 
the job colour bar, which had occurred during the war. 
The 1948 election, then, saw a crucial shift in allegiance 
towards the NP, from the UP in the case of northern farmers, and 
from the LP and the UP in the case of Afrikaans urban workers. 
O'Meara's petty bourgeoisie now found an open forum, within the 
state itself, for the ideology it had developed. The success of 
the NP in the 1948 election though, was owed to something more 
than just the successful mobilization of Afrikaners, with varying 
interests, as an ethnic bloc. NP propaganda, based on the_swaart 
gevaar (black peril) and oorstrooming (swamping), touched on the 
concerns of a wider post-war white electorate, and political and 
economic circumstances lying beyond the influence of the 
nationalist leadership, such as the perceived blood on Smuts's 
hands, also conspired to bring about the NP's narrow electoral 
victory (see Davenport,1991). 
Conclusion  
Conciliation between English and Afrikaans speakers after the 
Boer War, was never allowed to be complete. Just as, in the first 
decades of the century, Botha and Smuts's cooperation with 
English speakers in the SAP was resented by Hertzog, so Hertzog's 
own fusion with the SAP in 1933 was resented by a generation of 
Afrikaners that had assumed the mantle of nationalist leadership 
from him. 
While ethnic sentiment remained strong, racial sentiment in the 
white population was fully entrenched by the beginning of the 
century. The 1922 strike revealed that a racially exclusive sense 
of identity was still far more powerful than that of class, even 
after some fifty years of blacks and whites working alongside one 
another (one group, of course, supervising the other) in the 
mines. White fears of the changes that industrialisation and 
urbanisation might bring, were superimposed on an established 
racial ideology. Together, they brought about increasing 
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centralisation of control over segregation, although there were 
still anomalies in South Africa's spatial patterning in 1948. 
In the 1930s and 1940s, the increasing pace of industrial and 
urban growth magnified political dilemmas. Smuts contemplated the 
reforms which were needed to cope with the influx of African 
workers that was needed, but simultaneously resented, in the 
cities. However, reforms conflicted with the prevailing racial 
ideology, and thus contributed to the popularity of the NP. But 
this popularity was enhanced by ethnic mobilization, coming from 
within the nationalist economic movement, itself feeding on the 
material conditions of poor Afrikaners in the cities. 
Urbanisation, then, was the context for the implementation of 
South Africa's late 20th century spatial, political and social 
structure. It was ultimately the changes wrought by urbanisation 
that made Smuts's potentially reformist government unpopular. The 
threat that urban African competition brought to whites in the 
lowest paid jobs, helped drive that government's reactionary 
alternative into power. 
From 1910 to 1948, the enduring legacy of late 19th century white 
supremacist ideology was manifested in new spatial forms, and 
transplanted to new urban environments. An "elaboration of 
segregationist discourse" (Dubow,1987) took place in 20th century 
South Africa despite the increasingly assimilationist stance 
being adopted by liberals, and indeed, the rest of the world's 
governments. In 1948, apartheid planners inherited an urban form 
that was already substantially segregated under central 
directive. But centralisation of a kind had also occurred in 
black resistance politics. Urbanisation again, had wrought 
profound changes. A new radicalism had emerged and, coordinated 
largely by the ANC, it found its expression in new forms of urban 
resistance, forms which were added to those of the established 
"repertoire". 
Chapter Four  
The Formulation of a Structure 
Introduction  
There is a common perception that the 1948 change of government, 
and the ensuing implementation of apartheid, represented a clean 
break with previous social trends and political outlooks. 
However, a number of structural continuities bridged the period. 
In an analysis of the nature of apartheid, the theme of 
continuity versus discontinuity is revealing. This theme 
underlies the first half of this chapter. The second half deals 
with the subsequent evolution of apartheid policy, and the black 
resistance that it provoked. 
On the one hand, apartheid arose out of a continuation of social 
characteristics dating from well before 1948: racial ideologies, 
an Afrikaner nationalist sense of identity, the structuring of 
material relations between races, and the spatial structure of 
segregation. Its impact as a body of policies was slow to take 
effect and NP conception of policy in the apartheid era was often 
ad hoc, rather than pre-planned (see Pose1,1989). In all these 
senses, apartheid represented a continuation; an elaboration and 
an increase in fundamentalism, but, nevertheless, a building upon 
inherited forms. 
On the other hand, insofar as apartheid marked the accession to 
government of a "new breed" of Afrikaner nationalist, and the 
generation of new ideological legitimations for its type of 
policy, it represented a novel development. Apartheid was also a 
discontinuity if the frame of reference is taken to be the 
preceding decade, rather than the preceding half century, in that 
it reversed the tentative reforms that Smuts had begun during the 
war. 
At the level of the individual too, both continuities and 
discontinuities were evident. Whites would continue to experience 
social, political and spatial supremacy, but through policies 
which took them ever further away from international norms, and 
which generated more fundamental attitudes of both support and 
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dissent at opposite poles of the white political spectrum. Blacks 
were to feel, in the most concrete sense, the discontinuities of 
apartheid, with the extinguishing of the glimmer of material 
improvement sensed during the war. Africans were to be barred 
more securely from the cities and to have a new, limited, state-
conceived political role conferred upon them. "Coloureds" and 
Indians were to experience large scale urban segregation and 
removals, similar to that which Africans had already undergone. A 
new distance developed between culturally articulated "Coloureds" 
and Afrikaners, and Indian politicization broadened out, from the 
elite group which had protested Smuts's prior discrimination, to 
involve a wider cross-section of the Indian population. 
1. The Nature of Apartheid 
When the NP narrowly won the 1948 general election, it brought to 
government an ideological standpoint that was distinct from that 
of the preceding government. The basic racial attitudes of the 
two ruling groups did not diverge in kind, only in degree, but 
their conception of white society differed fundamentally. 
Analysts who have sought a material rationale for apartheid have 
often overlooked such discontinuities in the nature of ruling 
group ideology. Wolpe's influential article of 1972 explains 
apartheid as a rational response to the material difficulties of 
accumulation that, by the mid 20th century, South African capital 
was facing. Here, apartheid is represented as an all-embracing 
system, implemented on behalf of capital by a compliant state: In 
the early 20th century, mining, industrial and commercial capital 
had still benefited from viable African reserve bases. The 
reserves had acted to reproduce cheaply the migrant labour that 
capital required. But with the gradual penetration of a 
capitalist mode of production into the reserves themselves, 
increasing inequalities undermined the redistribution of 
resources that had sustained a partially independent (and 
therefore cheap) labour force in the cities. As the communal 
productive base of the reserves was eroded, so the permanent 
urban African population increased. For Wolpe, apartheid was an 
attempt to keep African labour costs low in the new conditions of 
the mid 20th century, when the reserves themselves could no 
longer bear the costs of reproduction. If capital were to 
continue to pay low wages to Africans without an independent 
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reserve base, the resulting unrest in the cities would threaten 
the whole political structure. Thus the state involved itself in 
economic relations, to maintain cheap African labour through new 
structures of repressive legislation. "Racial ideology in South 
Africa must be seen as an ideology which sustains and reproduces 
capitalist relations of production" (Wolpe,1972). 
The new government's ideology may have been partially founded 
upon the preservation of advantageous material relations, or at 
least, their justification, but it was not confined to this. The 
government was motivated by a plethora of non-material aims, 
coexistent with those of a material nature. Even the treatment of 
"the government" as a homogeneous and coherent bloc is false, but 
the differentiated components of government will be discussed 
later. Here, the overall direction of policy outcomes will be 
taken as indicating "the government's" position. 
Three basic objectives are often ascribed to the newly empowered 
NP (Price,1991, Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989, Terreblanche and 
Nattrass,1990). Firstly, the party sought to maintain a 
segregated society "in keeping with the precepts of the Afrikaner 
politico-religious doctrine" (Price,1991), and by so doing, to 
preserve Afrikaner identity. Marks and Trapido, 1987, declare 
that it was the "petty bourgeois obsession with racial "purity" 
and eugenics" (21) that lay behind the passage of the Population 
Registration Act, the Immorality Act and the Mixed Marriages Act, 
but it seems likely that the preoccupation with racial "purity" 
extended well beyond just this class. Regarding the Immorality 
and Mixed Marriages Acts, the "primary intention and the 
practical effect ... was to take away from white men the freedom 
to drop out of the ranks of the labouring class, take up with 
brown women, settle down to more or less idle, shiftless, 
improvident lives, and engender troops of ragged children of all 
hues, a process which, if allowed to accelerate, would, in the 
end, they foresaw, spell the demise of white civilization at the 
tip of Africa" (Coetzee,1988,35). 
A second goal was the securing of white political supremacy and 
economic privilege from potential internal and external threats, 
notably those of African urbanisation and social advancement. In 
1930, 90,517 Africans had been employed in manufacturing; by 
1955, there were 342,150. The permanent African population of the 
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cities was now larger than the white urban population and 
Africans were beginning to assert a strong moral claim to 
political participation (and, implicitly, therefore dominance), 
in the new democratic conditions of the post-war world. 
Their steadily progressing assumption of positions of economic 
power posed a long term political threat to white control over 
government (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). White political and 
economic supremacy could only be obtained by halting African 
urbanisation, extending the migrant labour system from mining to 
manufacturing, and deflecting urban African political claims. 
Those urban Africans who were seen by the NP as being already 
"detribalised", were initially to be allowed to remain in the 
interests of the economy, but this urban labour force would have 
to be fully utilized before others would be allowed to join it 
(Pose1,1989). Subsequently, however, for Prime Minister Verwoerd, 
"the survival of white civilization in South Africa" became "of 
more importance, ... even more important than expanded industrial 
development" (Rhoodie,1969, cited-Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
The NP's third overriding aim was to elevate the Afrikaner 
community into a position of social and economic equality with, 
if not dominance over, the English speaking population. A three-
pronged programme would be pursued until the 1960s. New 
discriminatory legislation would be applied to Africans and 
extended to "Coloureds" and Indians, in order to preserve the 
hegemony, as members of the dominant racial group, of the poorest 
Afrikaners. The bureaucracy and the parastatal sector would be 
enlarged in order to generate specifically Afrikaner employment, 
and welfare programmes would be instituted to redistribute wealth 
within the white population for the uplifting of poor (Afrikaner) 
members of the racial group. The success of these measures is 
indicated by the fact that in 1970, Afrikaner per capita income 
was 70% of that of the English speaking population; in 1946, it 
had been less than half (Terreblanche,1989, cited Terreblanche 
and Nattrass, 
1990). 
These three considerations were undoubtedly prominent in the 
minds of apartheid's administrators, but they were never 
coherently expressed as a programme of administration in the way 
that is often implied. Apartheid was not the unified conceptual 
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model it is often thought to have been. The influential 
nationalist editor of "Die Burger" from 1954 to 1978, Piet Cillie 
described apartheid thus: "A system? An ideology? A coherent 
blueprint? No, rather a pragmatic and tortuous process aimed at 
consolidating the leadership of a nationalist movement in order 
to safeguard the self-determination of the Afrikaner" (cited 
Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). Beyond the often conflicting 
interpretation of policy within government circles, Posel, 1989, 
shows "that the powers and interests of central and local state 
institutions, individual African workers as well as mass 
organisations, individual employers as well as organised commerce 
and industry, must all be taken into account in explaining how 
Apartheid took shape" (18). 
Legitimating Apartheid 
Even if the conception behind apartheid policies was not entirely 
clear, and the policies themselves were pursued in vacillatory 
ways, apartheid as a broad strategy could still be legitimated, 
for whites, through a variety of media. A further step in the 
"scientific" differentiation between races, was one such medium. 
The initiative came in the 1950s, from Afrikaans university 
departments of Anthropology. "The departments of "Volkekunde" 
were expected to contribute to the theory and practice of 
apartheid. They have generally done more or less what was 
expected of them" (Kuper,1988,35). The scientific racism of the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries was generally unacceptable by 
the 1950s. Blatantly racist language and argumentation was 
therefore largely avoided by apartheid theorists. Anthropology 
provided a new rationale for the emphasis on racial 
differentiation, or rather, resurrected an old one, through the 
use of the ambiguous word "culture". 
In the 1920s, "culture" had given liberals a less rigid means 
than social Darwinism had allowed, of explaining racial 
differences. But the concept was now used to maintain that these 
differences were immutable, ignoring the possibility, stressed by 
the earlier generation of liberals, of their diminution over 
time. W.M. Eiselen was a leader of the field. He held that blacks 
were not inferior to whites according to any objective standard, 
but that they were culturally different. Apartheid sought merely 
to preserve the cherished cultural identity of each group, thus 
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preventing mutual cultural degradation. Thus "Eiselen and his 
students - and their students - were in search of a fundamental 
alternative to race in the ideological edifice of South African 
"Native policy". With different emphases and in different ways 
they chose to identify "culture" as the alternative basis" 
(Kuper, 1988,45). 
Such a mutually protective policy would require a separation in 
space, based on adequate resources for each racial group. "At its 
most idealistic apartheid was a projection of the aims of 
Afrikanerdom onto others. All must wish to survive as distinct 
ethnic units, with their own language, religion and traditions" 
(Kuper,1988,46). 
While Anthropology provided a secular, academic justification for 
intensified segregation, the Dutch Reformed Church (DRC) ensured 
that "apartheid had many of the trappings of a moral crusade 
beyond the more bland social engineering designs of the previous 
Fabian segregationists" (Rich,1969). The Church's theology was, 
by and large, derived from the Kuyperian notion of separate 
spheres of divine intention, only boundaries were now drawn 
between the spheres of nationhood to coincide with those of 
racial group. With the evangelization of apartheid by the DRC, 
its broad support within the Afrikaner community was, to a large 
extent, assured. Its wider legitimacy was mainly to be achieved 
in the field of education, discussed below. 
At the same time that apartheid's legitimacy was being secured 
for whites within South Africa, the world was moving away from 
the principles which had supported the colonial segregation upon 
which it was built. Apartheid was implemented by "a more insular 
governing elite that now relied far less heavily on the external 
Commonwealth supports, and drove segregationist ideology into an 
ethnocentric creed to try and fit a new world order of declining 
European colonial empires and resurgent African nationalism" 
(Rich,1989,292). Outside South Africa, racist suppositions were 
gradually being dropped. Inside, after 1948, a modified racist 
mythology was cocooned, and propagated ever more fervently by 
politicians, radio, teachers, textbooks, and from the 1970s, by 
television (Thompson,1985). 
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New Policies 
The first concrete changes to emerge from the hand over of power 
in 1948, were largely brought about by the NP's concern to 
safeguard specifically Afrikaner interests. But these 
interventions were soon followed by those directed at securing 
the racial order as a whole. 
On assuming power, the NP leaders began a minor purge of the 
senior civil service, the army and the police. Nationalist army 
officers, who had resigned on the outbreak of war, were 
reinstated, and the use of Afrikaans was insisted upon, to the 
detriment of those English speakers who were not sufficiently 
bilingual. English street names were changed and the military 
establishment at Roberts Heights near Pretoria was renamed 
Voortrekkerhoogte (Le May,1971). The nationalist economic 
movement's goals were brought closer to fulfilment with the 
transfer of municipal bank accounts to Afrikaans institutions. 
Afrikaans financial houses also received a boost from central 
state contracts which helped, by 1980, to establish them on a par 
with English owned interests (Marks and Trapido,1987,21). 
The state's preservation of the yolk was not confined to the 
economic sphere. In 1927, sex between African and white had been 
banned. In 1950, the new government extended the ban to cover 
intercourse between a white and any "non-white" person under the 
Immorality Act. Not content with this, in 1957, "intimacy" 
falling short of full sexual intercourse, between members of two 
different racial groups, was also banned. 
The NP's centralisation of control over South African society was 
the most prominent departure from the characteristics of 
government prior to 1948. Legislation was introduced to penetrate 
every area of social relations. The Immorality Act is an extreme 
example on a personal level, but centralisation also occurred on 
a broad economic scale. 
After 1948, the government's influence over the economy increased 
dramatically with the development of parastatal corporations, 
initially constructed to aid in Afrikaner economic upliftment. By 
1974, the state was responsible for 45.6% of total investment in 
South Africa, and 29.6% of industrial investment (Rogerson,1982), 
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largely through corporations such as ARMSCOR (arms), ISCOR (iron 
and steel), ESCOM (electricity), SENTRACHEM (chemicals), SASOL 
(oil from coal) and NATREF (oil refining). With its participation 
in these concerns, the state sought to occupy "the commanding 
heights of the economy" (Weiss,1975, quoted Rogerson,1982). 
A more subtle kind of centralisation lay behind the government's 
intervention in the education system. If apartheid was to 
function, its ideology would have to be secured for the future 
through schooling. The 1953 Bantu Education Act was the most 
prominent piece of legislation in this regard. This not only 
pegged expenditure on black education back to the level of black 
taxes, it also provided an apartheid epistemology. The structures 
of knowledge that the education system conveyed were to be 
tailored according to racial group. F.H. Odendaal, the 
administrator of the Transvaal province, told its school 
principles "we must strive to win the struggle against the non-
white in the classroom rather than lose it on the battlefield". 
Within the white education sector, Afrikaners, separated in their 
own schools, were given a "Christian National Education". 
Bloomberg, 1990, argues that the Broederbond's innate Calvinism 
and sense of ethnicity was solidified into a firm Christian-
Nationalist ideology in the late 1920s and early 1930s, largely 
in response to the growing influence of Potchefstroom theological 
academics, and in opposition to the old NP's fusion with the 
secular and Anglican SAP. With the extension of the ideology from 
the Bond to Malan's newly empowered NP, its influence over 
Afrikaans education was ensured. The History syllabus, for 
instance, focused around the story of God's revelation of 
purpose; a God who has "willed separate nations of people" 
(quoted Thompson,1985,50). Afrikaner teachers, many of whom were 
Bond members, were organised into unilingual professional 
associations which "are among the most reactionary forces in 
South African society" (Thompson,1985,51). 
African education under the Bantu Education Act was more 
restrictive than that given to the proteges of the nationalist 
leaders. Prior to 1948, a large part of African education was 
conducted under the auspices of church and mission schools. The 
relative freedom of content and interpretation they allowed was 
construed as a challenge to the envisaged role of Africans under 
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apartheid. 
The 1953 Act forced most such schools to close, and transferred 
the administration of state African schools from the provinces to 
the central Department of Native Affairs, which would in future 
devise syllabi and regulations. "Coloured" and Indian education 
would also be centralised in the 1960s, but the immediate threat 
of "non White" social advancement lay with the large and 
expanding African population. 
African primary school tuition, contrary to the demands of 
African political leaders, was to be given in the mother tongue, 
rather than in English. In 1959 the Minister of Bantu Education 
outlined the rationale: "The Bantu must be so educated that they 
do not want to become imitators, that they will want to remain 
essentially Bantu" (cited Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). The 
education that was deemed suitable involved lower spending than 
on whites, less, and lower qualified teachers, and - the 
centrepiece grievance - a syllabus designed to complement the 
apartheid model of society. Of the version of history that was 
taught to blacks, even in the pre-apartheid period, Z.K. Matthews 
said "if it was difficult for us to accept the white man's 
account of his own past doings, it was utterly impossible to 
accept his judgements on the actions and behaviour of Africans, 
of our own grandfathers in our own lands. Yet we had to give back 
in our examination papers the answers the white man expected" 
(quoted Thompson,1985,66). By the 1950s, "Coloured" teachers in 
Cape Town were dictating two sets of notes to their classes. One 
was headed "For Examination Purposes Only", and the other, "Tice 
Truth" (Thompson,1985,67-8). Discriminatory education was 
extended beyond the school sector and into Higher Education with 
the paradoxically named Extension of University Education Act, 
which provided for segregated learning in these institutions. 
Through the new education system, it was hoped that the 
segregationist impulse would be instilled in the minds of young 
South Africans. To complement this conceptual differentiation, 
the state would legally enforce greater communal separation. But 
before racial discrimination could be legally entrenched, the NP 
had to establish a legal basis for differentiating between the 
races, a task which was by no means clear cut after 300 years of 
racial mixing. Nevertheless, each individual would have to have a 
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racial category assigned to him/her, so that the discriminatory 
laws, which applied to racial groups as a whole, could be 
enforced. This groundwork was laid with the 1950 Population 
Registration Act, described by Cohen, 1986, as a means to 
"systematize previously confusing and scattered legal usages and 
race definitions and to stop the high incidence of "passing" 
(usually from "Coloured" to white) once and for all". The 
original criteria for classification were appearance, descent, 
generally accepted racial status and repute. Later, habits, 
education, speech, deportment and demeanour could also be taken 
into account. Enormous suffering was imposed (especially in the 
light of the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts), simply through 
a bureaucrat's decision as to which racial category an individual 
fitted. 
Once racial categories had been more firmly engraved on the 
consciousness of South Africans than ever before, further 
legislation could be enacted to keep the categories apart. In 
1953, the government responded to a court declaration that the 
racial reservation of government railway facilities was illegal 
because it did not reflect the doctrine of "separate but equal" 
which the government professed. The Reservation of Separate 
Amenities Act now made racially segregated facilities such as 
beaches, libraries, post office entrances, swimming pools etc. 
legal, even if they were of an unequal standard for whites and 
"non whites". 
The NP was concerned, from its early days of power, to curtail 
the political rights which distinguished "Coloureds" from 
The 1956 Separate Representation of Voters Act was the 
culmination of a complicated series of manoeuvres to by-pass the 
constitutional safeguard of a Cape "Coloured" franchise. It 
brought their removal from the common voters roll and gave them 
as substitute four white representatives in parliament, elected 
on a separate roll. 
The Geography of Apartheid 
Apartheid's radical thrusts into education, personal relations 
and political rights, was matched by its drive to remodel the 
South African landscape, particularly in the urban areas. The 
Separate Amenities Act necessitated spatial segregation, but it 
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was only really one facet of the major piece of apartheid spatial 
planning, the 1950 Group Areas Act. The act demarcated the areas 
in which each of the races might reside in the city. For Malan it 
was "the essence of the apartheid policy which is embodied in 
this bill". The Durban Indian-African riots of 1949 provided an 
official pretext for declaring separate zones of the city for 
each race's occupation. For the government, the riots were 
evidence of the friction that is generated when different 
races/cultures (the terms became interchangeable) rub alongside 
each other in an integrated urban environment. It was inevitable 
that, at some places and at certain times, enough heat would be 
generated to start a conflagration. Peaceful race relations could 
therefore only occur under conditions of complete racial 
separation. 
Practically, the planners achieved, through race zoning and the 
Separate Amenities Act, the prohibition of "even the limited 
inter group social contact which might naturally occur ... in 
churches, sports clubs and even schools" (Lemon,1991). But in the 
terms of its own justification, the Group Areas Act has failed 
dismally. Instead of reducing racial conflict, it has exacerbated 
interracial urban tensions to a marked degree. Even the 
government's own Theron Report reached such a conclusion 
(Western,1982). As Whisson,1971 (cited Smith,1982) puts it, "the 
policy ... has been successful in creating self-sustaining 
barriers which make group attitudes of suspicion more likely and 
individual non-racist attitudes less likely". What interracial 
gatherings have occurred despite the urban boundaries, "have 
tended to be self conscious, and it is almost impossible to be 
truly "colour blind" in human relationships ... For the majority 
then, race zoning has kept people from knowing or understanding 
one another" (Lemon,1991,9). Whilst it must be remembered that 
such psychological barriers between individuals of different 
racial groups were not new (recall, for instance, the 
embarrassment inter war white liberals experienced in social 
meetings with Africans), apartheid's measures certainly 
perpetuated, and probably exacerbated them. Generally, whites did 
not (and do not) penetrate the black areas of the cities 
(excepting young white males, who will have done so under the 
extraordinary conditions of national service). But many blacks 
had more of an appreciation of white lifestyles, through their 
experience in domestic service. 
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The Group Areas Act's alienating impact was manifested in the 
subsequent design and location, according to strategic 
considerations, of African townships. Western, 1982, notes how 
their open streets allowed the rapid crushing of urban 
resistance, while their limited access points allowed them to be 
easily cordoned off, to prevent the overspill of instability into 
white areas. A secondary effect of the Act was to distance the 
problems of the urban poor from white eyes, particularly high 
crime rates and low standards of health. Implementing the Act, as 
far as possible, natural barriers were used to separate racial 
zones. If not, industrial or commercial belts were used. 
The Group Areas Act has been seen as providing a general model 
for the "apartheid city", reproduced across South Africa. Many of 
the anomalies in the generally segregated urban forms of South 
Africa were ironed out with its implementation. Yet, even with 
the unusual degree of standardisation that it brought, the term 
"the apartheid city" still lacks utility beyond that of 
descriptive simplification. While the Act "was to be the ultimate 
framework of control to secure a formal city more effectively 
structured in the image of the social formation" (Davies,1991), 
the timing and the extent of its application still varied widely 
between municipalities. The Act only became practically 
applicable after it was amended in 1957. The implementation of 
coherent urban segregation between all races could then provide 
the basis for segregated education, health and social services. 
Those most affected by relocation under the Act were "Coloureds" 
and Indians, Africans being already' largely segregated under the 
1920s urban legislation. Although many of the cleared areas, like 
Sophiatown in Johannesburg and District Six in Cape Town, 
contained slum localities, there was "emotional plenty among the 
material shortage" (Hart and Pirie,1984). Western, 1981, 
emphasises the bond between community and place, the two sharing 
a history of growth and development that was broken when people 
were forcibly removed from their homes. In terms of the Act's 
effectiveness, one example is representative. In 1951, the degree 
of Indian-African segregation in Durban had been 81%, that of 
"Coloured"-white 84%, and that of African-white 81%. By the 
1960s, segregation between each group, excepting black servants 
granted accommodation in white areas, was virtually 100% (Kuper 
et a1,1958,156-7, Lemon,1987). 
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Municipalities varied greatly in their enthusiasm for, and degree 
of cooperation with, the Act. In Cape Town, where the whole of 
the Table Mountain area to the west of the railway line from the 
city to Muizenberg was zoned white, the City Council was so 
shocked by the potential impact on the established "Coloured" 
community, that it boycotted the public hearing of the Group 
Areas Committee (Western,1981,103-4). In the event, the 54% of 
the city's population that was "Coloured", was moved to 
segregated areas comprising 27% of the land. After 1954, in order 
to deter further African urbanisation in the Western Cape, and as 
somewhat of a gesture of reconciliation to its "Coloured" 
population, the region was declared a "Coloured Labour 
Preference" zone. This meant that, if available, a "Coloured" 
applicant would be awarded a job in preference to an African. The 
policy also entailed the removal of Africans from the region's 
urban centres, to the Transkei and Ciskei reserves, at the rate 
of 9000 people a year for 5 years (Cook,1991,30). 
The range of municipal responses to the Group Areas Act is 
illustrated by a comparison of Cape Town's reluctance with 
Durban's enthusiasm. Durban City Council was a prime mover behind 
the tabling of the group areas legislation, perceiving it as an 
opportunity to diminish the threat of the city's "Asiatic 
menace". Three council representatives were sent to inform the 
NP's administrator, Donges, of their support for the Act and the 
NP expressed its gratitude to the council for its advice 
concerning the drafting of the bill (Maharaj,1992). 
Other local authorities across the country were ranged on a scale 
of support for the Act between the extremes of Durban and Cape 
Town. Port Elizabeth's diligence in implementing segregation 
prior to the Act's enforcement, was commended by government 
ministers. Here, in 1951, 31% of the population had been in the 
"wrong" area. By 1960 this was down to 16.2%, and by 1985, 3.8%. 
In 1951, 1.1% of the city's white population faced resettlement. 
Of the African population, 43.1% would be removed (but not 
directly under the Group Areas Act); 59.5% of "Coloureds" faced 
removal, as did the entire Indian population of the city 
(Christopher, 1991). 
East London's local authority was opposed to the Act, but it 
welcomed the promised state assistance with rehousing African 
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slum dwellers in Mdantsane location. However, the central Group 
Areas Board, backed by Verwoerd, went on to overrule a local 
authority scheme to extend Duncan Village for further African 
occupation (Fox, Nel and Reintges,1991). 
In Pietermaritzburg, application of the Act involved changing the 
occupants of 700 to 900 properties, and removing 9000 to 15,000 
people. Of those moved, 76% were Indian, 11% "Coloured", 12% 
African and 1% white. The council here not only co-operated with 
the Act, but submitted its own additional proposals for 
segregation to the Board. Under the Act, the 43% of the town's 
population that was Indian was relocated to 13% of the land area. 
The town's growing Indian middle class found itself unable to 
afford the housing supplied to the wealthy in segregated Indian 
private developments, with only the poor municipal housing 
estates as alternatives (Wills,1991). 
A later refinement of the urban race zoning of South Africa's 
cities, going beyond the provisions of the 1950 Group Areas Act, 
was the segregation, within the African areas, of different 
"tribes" (documented in the case of Bloemfontein by Krige, 1991). 
The impact of the enforcement of the government's spatial ideal 
on the social formation, was tremendous. The government's own 
Cillie Commission, instituted to enquire into the causes of the 
1976 Soweto riots, emphasised that "no single government measure 
has created greater Coloured resentment, sacrifice and sense of 
injustice" (cited Western,1982). For the bulk of the "Coloured" 
population, rather than introducing a new psychological distance 
from Africans, to reflect the spatial distancing, the Act served 
to increase solidarity. 
While the Act's greatest impact on "Coloureds" was in Cape Town, 
Indians were affected predominantly in Natal, and Durban in 
particular. Here, the Board's 1958 proposals entailed the removal 
of 75,000 Indians (Maharaj,1992). A crowd of 20,000 Indians 
mustered to protest the measures. Even when the council balked at 
the financial cost of moving the established Indian population to 
new homes (necessary under the Act), the proposals were 
implemented by the Board (Maharaj,1992). For many Indian traders, 
it was not just a move of home that the Act entailed. A number of 
traders in central locations depended on African and white custom 
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for over 75% of their turnover. To be relocated to an exclusively 
Indian area was often disastrous (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
Even in the Transvaal, by 1966, only 7.5% of Indians remained 
materially unaffected by the Act (Lemon,1991). 
Although the impact of the Group Areas Act was in itself 
dramatic, it was to be only the beginning of the apartheid scheme 
for control of the city. From the 1950s, new mechanisms were 
added to those already in place to control African entry to, and 
activity in, the urban areas. 
The NP fulfilled its promise of tighter influx control largely 
through the 1952 Native Laws Amendment Act. Whilst, in response 
to a "pragmatic" line of reasoning within the party, the Act 
recognised the 1945 Act's "section 10" exemptions, it made a more 
efficient form of influx control compulsory and helped to slow 
down the rate of African urbanisation. Other developments 
included the extension of passes to women, but with considerable 
delay caused by the scale of African protest, and the involvement 
of centrally controlled labour bureaux to determine who should 
receive passes and where they should be permitted to go. In the 
cities, prosecutions for being without a pass increased, and 
farmers received the benefits in the form of an increasing supply 
of convict labour. 
The protection of the NP's farming support base was an important 
motive behind these measures: "emigration control must be 
established to prevent manpower leaving the platteland to become 
loafers in the city" (Verwoerd, cited Lipton,1985, 25). 
African rural to urban movement was additionally controlled by 
the 1951 Illegal Squatting Act, aimed at the peri-urban shack 
dwellers who were outside the local authorities' jurisdiction for 
influx control removals (Lemon,1987). The 1952 Native Laws 
Amendment Act laid a basis for the distribution of Africans 
between towns. Movement between prescribed areas would be 
permitted according to labour demand. 
Even where Africans were permitted in the cities, the jobs they 
could perform were restricted, so as to favour the poor whites, 
their competitors in the labour market. The job colour bar was 
reimposed after 1948 with more vigour. In 1959 the Minister of 
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Labour was empowered to reserve any job in any area for 
particular races. Skilled work in the clothing industry was 
reserved in 1957, but a challenge from the courts resulted in the 
fixing of racial percentages instead. White job reservation was 
subsequently extended to ambulance driving, firefighting, and 
traffic policing in Cape Town. Lifts were only to be operated by 
whites unless they were for "non Europeans" or goods 
(Davenport,1991). The 1950s marked the "high water mark" 
(Davenport,1991) of the industrial colour bar. 
While the state was engaged in limiting the quantity and the 
employment prospects of Africans in the cities, it was aware that 
many urban manufacturers required an expanding permanent labour 
force. During the 1950s and early 1960s, township construction 
for "section 10s" proceeded on a considerable scale, and it was 
only from the 1960s that the emphasis shifted to confining 
African workers in the reserves, by encouraging industry to move 
to them instead (Maylam,1990, see below). With the rate of 
urbanisation increasing in the early 1950s, the state sought for 
ways to reduce the costs of township house construction. Site and 
service schemes were adopted early on, as was the attempt to make 
employers pay directly towards the reproduction costs of their 
labour, with the 1952 Native Services Levy Act. Nevertheless, the 
bulk of maintenance costs was imposed on the Africans themselves. 
"Exercise of control over urban Africans ... involved costs which 
the various parties wanting control were generally unwilling to 
bear. This was one of the major contradictions in the urban 
apartheid system. Moreover control not only involved large 
financial costs, it also generated resistance giving rise to 
further contradictions" (Maylam,1990). These contradictions, 
emerging from the inception of urban apartheid planning, were to 
become nearly insupportable by the late 1980s. 
Even in the 1950s, the problems were bad enough. In Johannesburg, 
industry and commerce generally refused to subsidize employees' 
housing, or pay them higher wages so that they could improve it 
themselves. Municipal action to improve African housing was 
limited by the need not to tax the important mining houses too 
greatly. So most black urban housing in the 1950s remained 
neglected. The slums of Soweto were so visible, and represented 
such a tangible threat to the order of the city, that Ernest 
Oppenheimer gave a R3 million loan to the municipality for their 
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clearance (Lea,1982). 
It was partly the presence of the slums, but also the desire for 
a clearly demarcated racial pattern, that led to the 1954 Natives 
Resettlement Act. This allowed for the removal of thousands of 
Africans, so far little affected by the apartheid stock of urban 
segregation legislation, from the homes which they rented or 
owned in Sophiatown and other parts of Johannesburg's "Western 
Areas". 
The traumatic social disintegration caused by this action is well 
documented in Trevor Huddleston's "Naught For Your Comfort", 
1956, London. Even legislation which was not explicitly racial in 
content was used for racial reallocation of urban space. Scott, 
1992, charts the disruption of a settled informal Indian 
settlement at Clairwood, south of Durban, by the implementation 
of "normal" municipal industrial planning laws. 
From the morass of apartheid spatial legislation, certain key 
principles can be discerned. There is the imposition of firmer 
central control over African movement to the urban areas; the 
attempt to extend such control, through segregation, curfews and 
housing provision, to the activities of Africans who have been 
admitted to the cities; and the requirement that African urban 
areas be self financing. 
But even in its early stages, the developing system of urban 
apartheid faced certain deep seated contradictions. Despite the 
government's influx control measures, increasing numbers of 
Africans continued to leave the impoverished reserves and the 
modernising white farms of the platteland, to establish informal 
dwellings or live in rented accommodation in and around the 
cities. The section 10 concession, provided in response to the 
needs of urban employers, proved crucial in undermining entirely 
successful influx control. By permitting the economically 
"redundant" families of workers to reside with them in the 
cities, it meant that, contrary to the aim of keeping the urban 
African presence to a necessary minimum, not all Africans in the 
cities were employed. Influx control was also undermined in the 
1950s by the exploitation of loopholes and straightforward 
evasion of the law on the part of Africans (see next chapter) and 
by the fact that Africans looking for work were permitted to be 
in the urban areas for 72 hours before their expulsion. This made 
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it impossible to monitor the illegal presence without an 
ubiquitous police force (Posel,1989). 
Wolpe, 1988, has noted the state's actions in closing down the 
"space" for the more obvious judicial challenges to state 
legislation. For example, the Appellate Division's declaration 
that the removal of "Coloured" voters from the common roll was 
unconstitutional, was finally overcome by state manoeuverings in 
the mid 1950s. But the government's elaboration and 
intensification of discriminatory and repressive legislation 
helped mobilize a mass opposition far more threatening than the 
judiciary. The bulk of security legislation was directed at 
narrowing this opposition's potential for legal political action. 
The 1953 Public Safety Act increased penalties for protest 
offenses, and the burden of guilt was shifted onto the accused in 
some political trials, with the judge's discretion limited. 
Ultimately, NP supremacy in parliament through the 1950s allowed 
the executive to override the authority of the judiciary in the 
matters which most concerned it (Wolpe,1988). 
In addition to restricting direct political challenges, the new 
security legislation had another dimension. Much of it was 
directed, at least partially, at controlling black urban labour. 
The 1950 Suppression of Communism Act has been seen in this light 
(Terreblanche and Nattrass,1990). Whilst declaring the CP 
illegal, the Act was used to smash the non-racial and black trade 
union movement. The 1953 Natives Settlement and Disputes Act 
banned blacks from registering with trade unions, and provided 
emasculated "works committees" instead. The 1956 Riotous 
Assemblies Act was used not only against demonstrations, but also 
against strike pickets. 
Despite the extensive and deeply penetrating nature of the early 
apartheid legislation, it did not amount to an impregnable and 
immutable edifice of state control. Political, economic, social 
and spatial planning on a grand scale was always going to be 
undermined by the activities of individuals collectively striving 
to create their own favoured conditions of living, in spite of 
the government's desire to the contrary. The high degree of NP 
influence over the structures of state - parliament, government, 
courts and police - facilitated impressive restructuring of South 
Africa's society and space in the image favoured by the party's 
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leaders. But, as the example of influx control demonstrates, the 
party was never completely successful in imposing its ideal 
conception of order upon that society, nor upon its spatial 
expression. Even within the party, apartheid was not a 
preconceived blueprint, but the outcome of competing viewpoints 
(see Pose1,1989). Adaptations to the apartheid structure, 
resulting from pragmatic struggle within and without the NP, 
began as soon as the NP was in power, and continued until the 
demise of the system. 
2. The Evolution of Apartheid, 1948 to 1960  
Apartheid was constantly being adapted, reflecting power 
struggles within the ruling group, and to enable its legal 
provisions to cope with its changing social context; but a 
passing from one distinct phase to another has also been 
identified (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989, Sparks,1990, 
Pose1,1989). The second phase was based upon a new conception of 
the role of the reserves, which had not featured prominently 
alongside the urban concerns of the 1950s planners. From the 
1960s the reserves were to become the bases for "Separate 
Development", as the government called it, or "Grand" apartheid, 
as it has been unofficially labelled. Grand apartheid was born 
out of the state of flux in which administrators found themselves 
in the late 1950s. At this time, the inadequacies of current 
apartheid practice were becoming clear, but no coherent plan had 
yet been devised to push the apartheid concept on into the 1960s. 
The first apartheid phase is characterised by Giliomee and 
Schlemmer, 1989, as primarily an attempt to form statutory groups 
and implement their residential segregation. While "advances" 
were made in the fields of labour and influx control and 
security, they were not yet part of a coherent scheme. The second 
phase of apartheid was introduced through the agency of Verwoerd, 
Prime Minister from 1958 to 1966. Verwoerd was a determined 
ideologue, backed by the increasingly influential Broederbond. He 
would help push through a more systematic policy of segregation 
despite the more pragmatic demands of many within the NP. The 
programme of the 1960s was partly prompted by black resistance, 
but it was facilitated by a crushing of that resistance early in 
the decade, an economic boom placing extensive financial 
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resources in the government's hands (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989) 
and the more secure grip of the NP on parliamentary power 
(Pose1,1989). 
Apartheid's "Second Phase"  
The thrust of Verwoerd's innovation in policy was directed at the 
reserves, but his government also modified the mechanisms of 
urban control. Firstly, labour repression was made more 
systematic. An example is the treatment of the popular SACTU 
(South African Congress of Trade Unions), an alliance of black 
unions. This was identified by the state as being related to the 
black Congress opposition movement, and its leaders were banned 
and the organisation proscribed for three months in 1961. Under 
the Sabotage Act, the General Secretary and eight others were 
forced to sever connections with the union. The government 
claimed that "there are recognised federations which are 
representative of, and entitled to speak for organised workers in 
South Africa. The so-called SACTU does not fall within this 
category" (cited Bunting,1969,368). 
Steps were taken to deal with the problem of political 
representation for those Africans living permanently in the urban 
areas. All vestiges of black representation in the "white" 
political system were removed, and the forcible removal of blacks 
in the cities without permission was stepped up. The "loophole" 
category of Section 10 was also to be narrowed in response to 
continuing African urbanisation. African commercial concerns in 
the townships were limited, and redirected to the reserves, in 
order not to allow the trappings of permanency in African urban 
areas. 
Africans who were not required as workers were also to be removed 
from the white rural platteland. Here, the state and agricultural 
restructuring combined to break the link between Africans and the 
land (Marcus,1989). 
The official destinations for Africans expelled from the cities 
and the white farming areas were the reserves. These were now to 
form the centrepiece of Verwoerdian apartheid policy. They were 
to develop as semi-"independent", and, ultimately "independent" 
nations. Each "homeland", as they would be called, would be the 
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territorial and national expression of a different African 
"tribe" (excepting the case of the Xhosa, who were to have two 
homelands). It was this innovation which lay at the heart of the 
official replacement of apartheid by the policy of "Separate 
Development". 
Separate development was by no means an easy step for many in the 
NP to take. Many of the Afrikaner nationalists who had helped 
bring the party to power in 1948 instinctively saw independent 
and autonomous political representation for Africans as a threat 
to permanent white control over South Africa's territory. Even 
Verwoerd told parliament that it "is not what we wanted to see" 
(Pose1,1989,231). The shift in the NP's tack represented by the 
policy was not solely due to Verwoerd's persuasiveness. It had a 
lot to do with South Africa's relations with the external world. 
The end of the 1950s brought a changing international context for 
the South African government's actions. Decolonisation was 
occurring to the north and various African peoples would soon 
achieve self determination within new nation states. South Africa 
could expect increasing pressure from without its borders, to 
force a deracialisation of existing domestic policy. It had not 
been long since Smuts was humiliated at the UN over racial 
policy. Many of the newly independent African states would be 
likely to follow India in using that forum to condemn South 
Africa. The gradual move towards apparent independence for the 
homelands could be presented to the outside world as a kind of 
internal decolonisation, and a recognition of autonomous African 
nationhood (Grundy,1991). Within restricted NP circles, there was 
genuine idealism along these lines. The government-appointed 
Tomlinson Commission of 1956, for instance, had advocated that 
the South African government pursue large scale economic 
development of the impoverished reserves, so that they might 
become a viable basis for the homelands. 
A "massive programme of social engineering" (Marks and 
Trapido,1987,22) was indeed implemented, but it was not directed 
at the economic development of the homelands; rather at the 
uprooting of four million people from "white" South Africa, and 
their removal to the homelands, which would always be too poor, 
and too dominated by the South African government, to be regarded 
by any country, other than South Africa, as national states. 
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While homeland governments could not deserve such recognition, 
they did have a tremendous impact on the lives of their subjects. 
"Sham or not, the Bantustan (homeland) policies had by the late 
1970s created "new facts". New political institutions and the 
deliberate use of welfare to give reconstructed ethnic identities 
a material reality have created conflicting interests which now 
have to be taken into account in any struggle for the 
transformation of South Africa" (Marks and Trapido,1987,22). 
Ideological justification of the policy followed the "separate 
but equal cultures" line of Afrikaans anthropology, shifting away 
from the traditional invocation of Bantu inferiority. A material 
rationale for homeland autonomy was also developed from the 
1960s, as their political development was linked to government 
industrial decentralisation incentives. Most analysts see the 
decentralisation policy primarily as an attempt to stem the flow 
of Africans to the cities (see next chapter), but for Wolpe, 
1972, the policy was designed to create an alternative to 
migration as a means of obtaining cheap labour power. If 
industries moved to or near "independent" homelands, they could 
employ Africans, at lower wages, to do the jobs set aside for 
whites in the cities. They could also benefit from the fact that 
homeland governments would not recognise African trade unions, 
and they would be freed from pressure to provide a housing 
subsidy for their workers, since the homeland government was to 
cater for the welfare of its citizens (Wolpe,1972). In practice 
the decentralisation strategy was not successful and the degree 
of homeland government functionality for South African capital is 
debateable. 
But before looking at the progress of the separate development 
policy in the next chapter, it is necessary to stress its 
ideological dimension - no mere expression or justification of 
material goals. The extent of Verwoerd's personal influence has 
already been mentioned. It is significant that he was Minister of 
Native Affairs before his accession to the Prime Ministership. 
His firmly rooted ideological stance was derived from his 
experience in that office. In his mind, the notion of preserving 
white society, and in particular Afrikaans identity, clearly 
coincided with the need to place firm limits on black social, 
economic, spatial and political encroachment. If black political 
expression must be denied within white South Africa, the shifting 
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climate of international opinion meant that it had to be catered 
for in "black South Africa", i.e. the homelands. 
With Verwoerd's encouragement, from 1958, the Broederbond took 
upon itself the role of proselytising a republic (as it had done 
for a period prior to 1948), within which the new vision of 
apartheid would hold sway. In the early 1960s the Bond had 8000 
members. By the late 1970s the figure was over 12,000 (Giliomee 
and Schlemmer,1989). The Bond's members, occupying virtually all 
of the top positions in political, civil service, church and 
educational structures, were in an extremely advantageous 
position to diffuse the new conception of separate development. 
All cabinet ministers were members, as was three quarters of the 
NP caucus, every principle of the Afrikaans universities and 
colleges, half the schciol principles and inspectors and 40% of 
Dutch Reformed Church ministers (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
The state and the Broederbond's scheme of separate development 
was not reliant on black consultation, but blacks nevertheless 
proved influential in the development of the policy. The 
increasing scale and growing diversity of black resistance 
contributed vitally, in the 1950s and early 1960s, to the state's 
need to adjust existing apartheid structures. 
Black Political Organisation and Resistance, 1948 to 1960  
The overall impact of black resistance in the 1950s was formed 
from the interweaving of localised and geographically 
differentiated strands of protest, into a fabric of broad, 
national scale organisation. The interaction between local and 
national currents of resistance is a key factor in the history of 
black resistance to apartheid. Black resistance has always been 
of most concern to the state when diverse localities were 
consciously articulated in their actions, and most problematic 
for the national resistance organisations when they were not. The 
following section is largely informed by Lodge's "Black Politics 
in South Africa Since 1945", 1983. 
The tone for black organisation at the national scale was set in 
1949 when the ANC conference was dominated by the movement's more 
radical Youth League (ANCYL). During the conference, six members 
of the ANCYL, including Nelson Mandela, Walter Sisulu and Oliver 
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Tambo, were elected onto the national executive. Arrayed against 
the Youth League members were representatives of the more 
moderate "old guard" and the communists (the Youth League had 
attempted to expel communists from the party in 1945 and 1947). 
Once in the executive though, the prominent ANCYL representatives 
tended to moderate their Africanist line in the interests of 
compromise with other members. 
The 1950s began with organisation for a stayaway, directed 
against the Suppression of Communism Act, which, in fact, was 
invoked to suppress far more than just communism. The regionally 
fragmented response of this campaign was representative of the 
general geographical pattern that subsequent resistance 
campaigns, over the next decade, would reflect. The stayaway was 
particularly strong in the Eastern Cape, especially around Port 
Elizabeth. Natal saw relatively firm support from some quarters, 
but its overall response was muted by division, while the action 
was less successful in the Transvaal. Despite the spatial 
variation of this campaign, the stayaway became an important item 
in the "repertoire" of resistance through the 1950s. As a tactic 
it was successful in highlighting the increasingly important 
position of Africans in the economy, and it was relatively easy 
to organise among the concentrated and segregated populations of 
the townships. Apart from the state's response, the greatest 
difficulty faced by the organisers of such a campaign was, and 
continued to be, that of mobilising those migrant workers 
confined in local hostels or barracks (see Chapter Seven). 
During 1952, prompted by the deprivation of "Coloured" voting 
rights, the ANC leadership organised a broad Defiance Campaign. 
Volunteers were to systematically break the racial taboos of 
apartheid. As it progressed, the action's targets widened from 
the Separate Representation of Voters Act to encompass the pass 
laws, stock limitation in the reserves, the Bantu Authorities 
Act, the Group Areas Act and the Suppression of Communism Act. 
The most enthusiastic response was again from the Eastern Cape. 
Eventually rioting in East London and Port Elizabeth, the 
government's imposition of bans on individuals, increasingly 
harsh prison sentences for breaking laws in protest, and the 
organisational confusion accompanying the spreading spatial 
extent of the protest, culminated in the immobilization of the 
campaign. 
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Lodge's explanation for the particularly vibrant opposition of 
the Eastern Cape throughout the decade centres on its industrial 
characteristics and the unusual form of administration it 
experienced. Port Elizabeth was the fastest growing urban centre 
in South Africa: Ford had established a manufacturing plant there 
in 1923, attracted by its port and its centrality relative to 
South Africa's major conurbations. 
The plant was soon joined by smaller, linked industries and a 
wider range of heavy and light manufacturing. The expanding 
African working population was relatively easily organised by 
trade unionists, being ethnically homogenous (95% Xhosa) and 
having no internal linguistic barriers. The fact that these 
workers were accommodated in townships rather than in company-
supervised hostels or barracks also facilitated communication and 
mobilization. 
Port Elizabeth's local government had earned a reputation for a 
lax approach to influx control. Its -stance was determined to a 
large extent by local manufacturing's need for labour supplies to 
maintain industrial expansion. But Africans moving to the city 
purely to find work were joined by those escaping the 
increasingly eroded reserves, and those evicted from surrounding 
white farms. A large squatter settlement developed which, by 
1949, had the highest rate of TB in the world. 
By the 1950s then, Port Elizabeth's African population was 
exceptional. A fairly cohesive industrial working class was found 
alongside the extreme poverty of peri-urban shack dwellers. 
In 1949, raised fares prompted an extensive township bus boycott, 
but this action was merely a prelude for the firm resistance with 
which the government's subsequent, more rigid, influx control 
measures would be met. In Port Elizabeth particularly, "drawing 
on a well-established local tradition of mass protest the African 
community was able to link parochial concerns with more general 
political ideas: popular politics transcended the usual anxieties 
over subsistence which predominated in everyday life" 
(Lodge,1983,55). 
During the Defiance Campaign, Natal too showed incipient 
tendencies towards popular mobilization. Here, however, the 
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effectiveness of the campaign was impaired by the Zulu - Indian 
tension which had erupted in the 1949 Durban riots. In a later 
period, it was to be the divide between the Zulu nationalistic 
Inkatha and the UDF/ANC which would be the main obstacle to a 
united regional resistance. 
With the unprecedented spatial extent of the Defiance Campaign, 
and a hingepin role in the formulation of the Freedom Charter, 
through the 1950s, the ANC leadership enjoyed increasing 
popularity. But the crushing of the Defiance Campaign had taught 
it a lesson: it would need a long term programme and a means to 
sustain its hold over a larger and more dispersed following, if 
future campaigns were not to collapse in disorganisation just as 
they achieved widespread popularity. Z.K. Matthews first proposed 
the drawing up of a "Freedom Charter" of the expressed aims of 
the opposition movement, as a unifying and guiding force. Various 
oppositional bodies, including the white Congress of Democrats 
and the parliamentary Liberal Party, liaised, with the aim of 
planning local committees throughout the country, to elect 
representatives to a national convention. The convention in turn, 
would incorporate the people of South Africa's demands into the 
Charter, rather in the style of the 1789 cahiers of France. In 
the event, provincial ANC branches were responsible for much of 
the local organisation, and, at the centre, the Charter was 
produced by a small drafting committee, drawing on material 
supplied by sub committees. (Africanists within the ANC were 
deeply disaffected by the influence of whites on this committee). 
In 1955,the Charter was publicly presented at Kliptown, where 
3000 delegates amassed. Once the police were confident that the 
ANC and its allies had been given "enough rope to hang 
themselves" (Lodge,1983), the meeting was broken up and 156 
Congress Alliance members were arrested on charges of treason, 
launching the five year "Treason Trial". 
The tensions already implicit within the ANC became explicit in 
1958, during its Transvaal Provincial Congress, when brawling 
broke out between Africanists and executive supporters. The 
Africanists had grown further distant from the executive line in 
the years since the Kliptown Congress. They perceived a base for 
their "embittered and vengeful" mood (Lodge,1983) among the 
young, and especially with the migrant workers of Cape Town. For 
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them, the ANC was too accommodating towards whites, and towards 
"foreign" ideologies like communism. Much of their thinking 
derived from a realistic assessment of popular opinion: "The 
masses do not hate an abstraction like "oppression" or 
"capitalism" ... They make these things concrete and hate the 
oppressor - in South Africa the white man" (Golden City Post, 
Johannesburg, 1959, cited Lodge,1983,83). 
Such was essentially the principle behind the Africanists' 
decision to break with the ANC and form the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC). Its leader, Robert Sobukwe, believed though, that 
whites could be African if they altered their behaviour and 
thinking in line with those of Africans. The early PAC 
concentrated its organisational efforts in those areas where the 
ANC was weak - the townships around Vereneeging in the Transvaal, 
and the Cape peninsular, where migrant Xhosa in particular had 
been overlooked by the ANC. Towards the end of the 1950s, the PAC 
began to mobilize its first anti-pass campaign, in order to wrest 
the initiative of resistance from the ANC. 
The sum of African resistance to apartheid in the 1950s was not 
constituted entirely by the ANC and PAC. There was also the All 
African Convention (AAC), originally founded to oppose the 1936 
legislation depriving Cape Africans of the vote. Its following 
was largely composed of African Marxists, and its strategy was 
based on rural mobilization through educational and legal 
services, and against enforced land rehabilitation. The movement 
directed abuse against the ANC for its "collaboration" in 
government advisory boards, but its own influence was largely 
confined to Cape intellectuals. 
We have seen how a regional differentiation in the extent and 
effectiveness of resistance to apartheid accompanied political 
divisions in the 1950s, and has remained characteristic. A 
further characteristic of subsequent black resistance also 
developed during this decade. This is the role of certain places 
as symbols of wider national opposition, and as leaders by 
example. Soweto in 1976 and the townships of the Vaal triangle in 
the mid 1980s, had their forerunner in Sophiatown during the 
1950s. Whilst in the former cases, there was violent physical 
resistance against various aspects of apartheid, in Sophiatown, 
tangible physical resistance was weak. Yet Sophiatown was 
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similarly significant for the wider pattern of resistance. 
Sophiatown was a dynamic, vibrant, often violent, mixed race 
freehold area, connected to Johannesburg. For many of the city's 
whites, it manifested the very threat of an ascendant and 
proximate urban black population, that had persuaded them to vote 
NP. For the government, it was a standing contravention of the 
aims of apartheid. Not only could Africans own property in "white 
space" there; racial intermixing was the most prominent 
characteristic of the place. It was additionally the haunt of a 
plethora of urban criminal gangs. Consequently the government 
determined, during the late 1950s, to remove the African 
population of Sophiatown to an externalised, closely supervised, 
state-administered township. 
The removals took place gradually, and with an element of support 
from some sections of the settlement's population. There was no 
wholesale, determined resistance. But there was articulate 
opposition nonetheless, particularly from African journalists 
resident in the area (see "Blame Me On History" by Bloke 
Modisane,1963). 
The everyday non-cooperation displayed by the residents, their 
persistent breaking of apartheid laws in the face of repeated 
raids, arrests, evictions and "rustications" and their 
maintenance of a vital community spirit, became known and admired 
by blacks (and many whites) further afield. Sophiatown's verbal 
and literary, if not physical, resistance, and the state's 
ultimate resort to coercion, informed the "heritage of 
resistance", which provided the context for later struggles 
elsewhere. 
It has been part of a more general critique of the 1950s ANC that 
it did not involve itself greatly in the local impact of 
apartheid, or the localised forms of resistance, like that in 
Sophiatown, with which apartheid was met. Apart from its 
organisational structures being amateurish at this stage, Feit, 
1965 (cited Lodge,1983), argues that the ANC's limitations were 
those of a bourgeois leadership trying to resist its own demotion 
to the socio-economic level which apartheid prescribed for all 
Africans. But apartheid itself helped to erode the distinction 
between an African bourgeoisie and the wider African population, 
by lumping them together in the segregated townships of the poor 
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and the working class: "African townships, though socially 
heterodox in a number of ways, did not have the "geography of 
class" that was a feature of white suburbia" (Lodge,1983,92). 
While the preservation of class distinctions may have been an 
initial aim of some leaders in the ANC, their aims were modified 
by the very thing which they sought to resist - an integration 
with wider urban African communities. The African intellectual 
and bourgeois leadership was likely to retain some distinct 
concerns, but by immersing them in the wider problems of urban 
Africans as a whole, apartheid's spatial planners helped generate 
more universal aspirations. 
Even the urban gangs, who usually preyed on their own community, 
were likely to pool their political interests with those of the 
wider community when it came to resisting apartheid. In fact, 
urban gangs were quite well adjusted to political protest as they 
had a ready made organisational structure which could be brought 
into action at short notice. In Sophiatown, for instance, they 
helped mobilize what little physical resistance to the police 
that there was, using their signalling system of banging on 
street lights to warn of an approaching police presence 
(Beinart,1987, Huddleston,1956). 
At either end of the urban African social scale then, the 1950s 
witnessed a convergence of political concerns. Towards the 
intellectual pinnacle of urban African society was the "Drum 
generation" - a well defined group of African writers and 
reporters who contributed to the English language magazine, 
"Drum". Together, they showed a "social compassion and depth of 
anger that went well beyond their immediate class interests" 
(Lodge,1983,93). The group was distinguished by its "raucous, 
zany, prolific, and frequently penetrating" style of writing 
(Gunner,1988,224). Its members included Can Themba, Casey "Kid" 
Motsisi, Todd Matshikiza, Nat Nakasa, Henry Nxumalo, Ezekiel 
Mphahlele and Bloke Modisane (whose "Blame Me On History", 
mentioned above, warranted a Penguin Modern Classics edition). 
"They were urban to their fingertips. They wrote about the 
crowded back streets, side streets, alleys, shanties and shebeens 
of places like Alexandra and Sophiatown", the urban freehold 
areas around Johannesburg that were "soon to crumble under the 
bulldozers" (Gunner,1988,224). African literary expression had 
finally followed the African geographical shift, from rural 
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roots to the new urban arenas of white domination. These writers 
were not political activists, but they shared in, and represented 
in their writing, the vibrancy and identity of black urban 
culture in the 1950s (Gunner,1988). 
In the 1950s, many of the ANC's leaders had had the benefit of an 
elite mission education. In this respect they were most 
unrepresentative of the larger African community. The desire to 
share in the rewards that education could offer was especially 
strong among the poor, particularly in the eastern Rand and the 
Eastern Cape. Many of the educated ANC leaders failed to perceive 
education as a fundamental material concern of the urban poor, 
alongside transport costs, food prices and housing. 
Popular mobilization against the governmant's African education 
policy initially arose not so much out of the Bantu Education Act 
itself, as out of changes associated with it: the 2 shilling 
monthly education levy that would be raised on urban households, 
the increasing pupil-teacher ratios, the falling per capita 
expenditure on pupils, the cessation of school meals and the 
abolition of caretakers' posts, which would involve the pupils 
themselves cleaning the schools. "For an underprivileged society 
in which access to education provided the most common means of 
social mobility for one's children these were serious blows" 
(Lodge, 1983,117). 
Once the boycott of government schools had been initiated by 
teachers' associations, influenced by Africanists in the 
Transvaal, and by the AAC in the Cape, the ANC proved not to have 
the resources to provide an alternative education and within the 
ANC, there was tension over the degree of militancy that should 
be pursued once educational resistance had begun. 
Prior to the Bantu Education Act, a tradition of student 
militancy had already emerged within mission schools such as 
Lovedale and Healdtown. Damage to school property, class boycotts 
and, occasionally, attacks on teachers had developed out of the 
issues of food and discipline in these boarding institutions. The 
specific problems of the 1950s were addressed through these 
"older, recognised repertoires" (Tilly, cited Hyslop,1991,86) of 
action. The Bantu Education Act precipitated the shift of these 
forms of resistance from mission to urban day schools, and from 
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petty bourgeois students to an urban African, working class 
youth. The Act also brought about a wider focus of anger amongst 
urban youth, from educational structures in particular to the 
increasingly prominent and interventionist authoritarian state in 
general. Yet the militants within the ANC, in endeavouring to 
encourage more general opposition to the state, were to find, in 
the 1950s and in the future, that "men and women struggling to 
survive economically and to provide a better world for their 
children are not necessarily revolutionaries" (Lodge,1983, 128). 
The Scope of Resistance in the 1950s 
Despite the absence of widespread revolutionary commitment, the 
1950s did mark a novel phase of resistance. Lodge, 1983, narrates 
the unprecedented level of women's mobilization both against 
African men's pusillanimity, and directly against the influx 
control and land rehabilitation measures as they affected women 
in particular (Lodge,1983,139-153). Rising transport costs, 
crucial for Africans externalised in the townships, were 
protested in the bus boycotts of Evaton and Alexandra, which owed 
much of their success to local ANC initiative. Once again, the 
rift between the township community and the alienated and 
isolated migrant hostel dwellers manifested itself. In Evaton 
there was violence between supporters of the boycott and migrant 
Basotho vigilantes. 
Resistance in the 1950s extended beyond the urban areas. This and 
the succeeding decade were punctuated by a series of rebellions 
against government attempts to restructure rural social 
relations. The failure of reserve agriculture, which the 
government intervention was designed to combat, was itself 
exacerbated by the government's policy of concentrating the 
economically "surplus" African population in the reserves, with 
tighter influx control and anti-urban squatting legislation. The 
government's attempt to limit stock and prevent access to the 
land to allow its recovery, could not be countenanced by those 
already at bare subsistence level in the reserves. The disparate 
rebellions of Zoutspansberg, Sekhukuniland, Witzieshoek, Marico, 
Natal, Tembuland and particularly the nine month Mpondoland 
insurrection, taken together, resulted in hundreds of deaths, 
but, distanced and locally inspired, they were not articulated as 
a general revolt (see Lodge,1983,269-288 for the course of the 
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revolts in general, and Beinart,1982,160 for the Mpondoland 
revolt in particular). 
It was not only the characteristics of subsequent resistance 
which were first established in the 1950s; the government's 
response also founded a pattern. It consistently attempted to 
impute blame for all "unrest" to the ANC's incitement. The 
strategy was often counterproductive. Further African support was 
generated for the organisation credited by the government with 
being its greatest foe and threat. In reality, however, the ANC 
could not, during the 1950s, marshall all the elements of 
resistance to different aspects of apartheid under its own 
direction. On the whole, it was reactive in its organisation, 
more than it was proactive. 
But the importance of resistance in the 1950s lies deeper than 
any organisational structures. A transformation of African 
political consciousness lay beneath the expanding repertoire of 
resistance. Beinart, 1987, traces, through the experiences of a 
Mpondo migrant "M", the wider development of African political 
awareness through the mid 20th century. Many traditional rural 
ideas and values were retained by the growing urban African 
proletariat, but it was gradually transcending the narrow limits 
of ethnic identity, to encompass a broader class and "all -
African", "national" consciousness. M's political identity 
allowed a sympathy for both Congress's national campaigns and 
narrow, ethnically based strategies of rural resistance. It was 
through people like M that African nationalist and trade union 
leaders in the cities were able to "reach the great majority of 
South African blacks who had not fully absorbed their generalized 
positions" (Beinart,1987,307). 
Beneath even the collective level of resistance, blacks had their 
own individual, day-to-day forms of resistance to personal white 
domination and to the racism of the workplace. White stereotypes 
of blacks as lazy, careless and stupid workers reflect the forms 
of resistance adopted by people fighting an all pervasive 
repression: foot dragging, feigned ignorance, false compliance 
and pilfering are all everyday manifestations of non-compliance 
with a system of exploitation and oppression (Sparks,1990). 
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Conclusion  
In 1948, the government of South Africa, not for the first time, 
passed into the hands of an elite determined to protect, and 
further the particular interests of a small minority of the 
population. Previous governments had seen the primary cleavage in 
South African society as being a racial one, and had endeavoured 
to respect and maintain that cleavage in their policy. However, 
the NP government, whilst continuing to safeguard white 
superiority with even more extreme measures, was additionally 
concerned with the maintenance of a division within white society 
- that between Afrikaans and English speakers. Its priority was 
the elevation of the volk, whose identity lay at the very core of 
its leadership's secular and spiritual world view. Afrikaners 
would be protected from the economic competition of both English 
speakers in the white population, and blacks being incorporated 
in the industrial economy. Paternalistic job provision and 
welfare distribution would ensure protection from the former, 
while it had long been politically legitimate to curb the 
activities of the latter through discriminatory legislation. 
Yet the 1948 apartheid government's "Native Policy" marked a 
departure from the trend which had characterised the last years 
of Smuts's administration. Instead of accommodating and utilizing 
an expanding urban African population for the sake of the 
economy, the outcome of compromise between competing viewpoints 
within the NP was an emphasis on maintaining an older pattern -
the preservation of cities for their white populations, with firm 
control over only a strictly necessary number of black workers in 
the urban areas. Apartheid, then, represented both a 
discontinuity in the trend of government policy and a continuity 
in the pre-existing shape of urban society. The Group Areas Act's 
"apartheid city" was built upon the "segregated city" of the 
1920s to 1940s. Initially each city's degree of correspondence to 
the "apartheid model" was determined by the local authority's 
reaction to central initiative and its assessment of the 
potential force of black resistance (Pose1,1989), but by the 
1960s, despite local variation in attitude, increasing 
centralisation of state authority under the NP would result in a 
more standardised South African city form. 
Attempts to develop the envisaged apartheid city were accompanied 
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by new forms of African resistance, as the conditions of a 
segregated and policed city shaped more and more African lives. 
In particular, the residents of the townships, thoroughly urban, 
but externalised from the cities in which they worked, mobilized 
around the issues of transport and education. 
As the cities were being moulded to fit more closely a central 
design, a parallel transformation of the reserves progressed. 
Increasing overcrowding and land deterioration in the countryside 
was largely a consequence of the redistribution of the poor, the 
weak and the unrequired from the cities, as stricter influx 
control took effect. The rural decline in turn, provoked further 
government intervention, which precipitated resistance of an even 
greater intensity and violence than in the cities. 
Even though the NP government did not, as is often thought, 
implement a cohesively pre-planned system, the apartheid 
government's aggregate intention - to shape South African society 
and space so as to preserve an inherited, cracking mould of white 
superiority - involved an unprecedented degree of state 
intervention in black people's everyday lives. From the 
individual working as slowly as possible in a factory without 
jeopardising his/her job and the thousands of Africans who simply 
would not abide by influx control regulations, to the 
organisation of a mass Defiance Campaign or a Ciskeian battle 
with police, such intervention provoked resistance. 
Unprecedented coercion was needed to retain economic relations 
based on pigmentation, and to ensure the monopoly of white 
political and social authority, through a modern, industrial era. 
Academia searched for a way of extending the ideological 
justification for such a system in South Africa while it was 
being abandoned elsewhere. Its findings were more easily 
supported by the white population the more the government 
legislated to keep the races apart: in commuting, in swimming, in 
queuing, particularly in education and even in bed. The inherent 
conception of a racial division of mankind, handed down to whites 
over three hundred years, was consolidated as they were 
prevented, even had they wanted to, from forming relationships 
and socialising with blacks, and as they were educated to respect 
an exclusive identity. 
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The legacies left by the 1950s, and subsequent apartheid social 
engineers include more than just the obvious political problems 
faced by South Africans today. They also include a deliberate 
contribution to the lived urban and rural inadequacies of 
shelter, health and education for the bulk of the country's 
population. 
Chapter Five  
Adaptations and Contradictions 
Introduction  
The turn of the 1960s brought a forceful new incentive to 
elaborate a firmer plan for deflecting African political claims 
away from the white urban areas, and towards "independent" 
reserve structures. The incentive came in the form of a 
resurgence of urban unrest, culminating in the internationally 
condemned Sharpeville shootings. In 1960, the relatively small 
township of Sharpeville, outside Vereeniging in the Transvaal, 
acquired international symbolism as an example of the repressive 
nature of apartheid. After Sharpeville the government opted more 
firmly for the new interpretation of its racial policy as 
"Separate Development" and, from 1960, real steps were taken to 
develop separate "homeland" administrations. Part One of this 
chapter explains the context for, and the reaction to, the 
shootings at Sharpeville, including the nature of separate 
development and the "homelands". 
Yet, even the adapted structures of apartheid rule continued to 
be riven by internal contradictions and fractured by the social 
pressures which brought South Africa into the 1970s. Part Two of 
the chapter is devoted to introducing the evolution of these 
contradictions and their influence on the government's attitude 
towards apartheid. In turn, the impacts of continuing 
urbanisation, of the economic constraints of apartheid, of 
regional (southern African) political, and world economic 
changes, of black resistance and of socio-political changes in 
the Afrikaans constituency, are assessed. 
1. Sharpeville and Separate Development  
Sharpeville 
In December 1959, both the ANC and the PAC announced campaigns 
directed against the pass laws. The ANC's envisaged 
demonstrations and petitions, however, seemed weak compared to 
the ongoing manifestation of disaffection in Cato Manor in Natal, 
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where violent revolt was proceeding with the involvement of local 
ANC members (Lodge,1983). The PAC's plan was a clearer reflection 
of the anger felt in many areas after a decade of NP rule. Its 
campaign was launched early in 1960. Volunteers without the 
necessary pass would offer themselves peacefully for arrest, 
calling for the police to act with restraint. At a variety of 
venues, PAC members gathered to hand themselves into custody, 
witnessed by supporters and demonstrators. 
At Vanderbijipark the crowds were dispersed by baton charge, and 
at Evaton, by low flying jets. Aircraft failed to scatter the 
crowd at Sharpeville though, and the police at the local station 
refused to arrest the volunteers. PAC officials would not call on 
the crowd to disperse until the PAC leader, Robert Sobukwe, was 
able to address them. Police reinforcements brought the 
participants in the ensuing events to 200 police and about 5000 
members of the crowd. A scuffle broke out at the gate in the wire 
fence surrounding the police station and, as the crowd surged 
forward to investigate the cause, police started firing, later 
claiming that they were being stoned. By the time the firing 
stopped, 69 Africans were killed and 180 wounded, most shot in 
the back. Only after a mass funeral of the victims did the 
residents of Sharpeville trickle back to work (from Lodge,1983). 
Chaskalson, 1991, has described the particular context of the 
national PAC campaign in Sharpeville. Circumstances in the 
township conspired to generate particularly intense disaffection 
with government intervention. Here there appears to be a paradox, 
since Sharpeville was seen- as a "model township", and had better 
facilities than most. The resentment stemmed from the progressive 
removal of residents to Sharpeville from their former "Top 
Location". 
Top Location was subject to more lax administrative control than 
was Sharpeville. A large, informal economic sector allowed the 
survival of low paid and unemployed residents in the location, 
but they were being squeezed out by the stricter regulation of 
economic activity in the newer township. Top Location's 
administration had also been lax in another sense: nearby 
Vereeniging's employers regularly overlooked a lack of workers' 
passes, facilitating a large population of "illegals", who would 
be endorsed out of the urban area once the location was entirely 
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cleared and removed to Sharpeville. 
Even for the legal residents, relocation to Sharpeville meant a 
longer and more expensive bus journey to work in Vereeniging. 
They would also resent the more efficient policing of the 
township, since bans on certain political groups and on meetings 
of over ten people had been introduced to counter the recent 
urban African political organisation. The very quality of 
Sharpeville's housing was an additional drawback, given the 
higher rents that had to be paid, especially with local 
authorities being increasingly pressurised to make their 
townships economically self-sufficient. 
Vereeniging's industries were gradually becoming more capital 
intensive. For the township's youth, this meant declining 
opportunities. As the number of young unemployed increased, their 
discontent was manifested in more numerous instances of reckless 
resistance to authority. The same factor may also have been 
associated with the greater prevalence of gangs of tsotsis (young 
violent criminals). By the late 1950s the local authority was 
employing African vigilantes to expel them to Native Affairs 
Department labour camps. But local disorder was not caused solely 
by the tsotsis. The "Russians", a migrant Basotho gang 
accommodated in local hostels, added their contribution. The rate 
of pass raids was stepped up, ostensibly to rid the community of 
this menace, but township residents soon found their own 
illegally resident relatives endorsed out of the township instead 
of the Russians. The disruption and menace of the raids is 
attested by Petrus Tom: "People hid under beds, in toilets, 
inside wardrobes and in dirty washing tubs. The raids started as 
early as 1.00 a.m." (cited Chaskalson,1991,134). 
In Sharpeville then, it was the success of urban apartheid's 
implementation which generated the communal anger of the crowd 
surrounding the police station. The fact that similar crowds 
surrounded other official symbols in different parts of South 
Africa, indicates the range and depth of official interference 
and disruption in Africans' lives, and the resentment generated 
by apartheid's attempt to "level down" the quality of those 
lives. It was a drive to collect rent arrears at the end of 1959 
which provided the final spur for Sharpeville's residents to join 
the PAC's campaign. Elsewhere it was other local pressures that 
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were more significant, but all were added to the already 
intolerable burden of apartheid's intervention. 
While, due to the loss of life it endured, Sharpeville became the 
enduring symbol of the anti-pass campaign, the campaign mobilized 
far more Africans in the Cape than it did in the Transvaal. 
The African population of the Western Cape was subjected to 
particularly harsh influx control, involving the "rustication" of 
Africans to the reserves in order to maintain the region for 
"Coloured" employment under the Coloured Labour Preference 
Policy. While the Xhosa migrant workers of Cape Town's Langa 
township saw opportunities in the city being closed to them by 
this policy, their families in the reserves were being denied 
land rights by the land rehabilitation policy. The settled 
township population was similarly suffering discrimination in 
favour of "Coloureds", and already had a tradition of support for 
the Africanist ideology. The PAC campaign then, found a large 
following among both migrants and township dwellers in Cape 
Town's environs. The campaign here also met with a violent police 
response, followed by riots, an extended strike supported by 
white liberals, a march of 30,000 on Cape Town and the cordoning 
off of the entire Langa township (see Lodge,1983, for details). 
On a national scale, the 1960 anti-pass campaign marked a turning 
point when, after ten years of apartheid's implementation, 
passive protest was generally transformed into more active 
resistance. But, despite a 90% successful stayaway, organised by 
the ANC in the wake of the shootings, the resistance was still 
centred in localised islands, set in a sea of relative 
acquiescence. 
Nevertheless, the state of turmoil into which national politics 
was thrown by the events of 1960 had permanent significance. 
Firstly, Sharpeville marked a departure in the government's 
methods of dealing with black opposition. Prior to 1960, the 
courts and the law, adapted for government purposes, were used to 
stifle opposition. Often, nothing other than the neglect of black 
representations had sufficed. After 1960 though, the main 
opposition movements were banned and extra-legal activity 
commenced on a wide scale, both by black opposition movements and 
by the state's own security forces. 
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For the PAC and the ANC, banning meant exclusion from legal 
politics. The implications of this were clear and highly 
significant. If they were to continue resisting apartheid, they 
now had no alternative but to do so illegally. The state's use of 
overt violence during the 1960 campaign was also crucial for the 
subsequent development of resistance politics. So long as the 
state was willing to meet non-violent protest with brute force, 
and so long as white public opinion was willing to condone such a 
response, mere passive protest, the leaders of the ANC and PAC 
reasoned, would never be effective. Both movements now formed 
insurgent offshoots. The ANC's Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK) began a 
carefully controlled campaign of sabotage, avoiding, in its early 
stages, any bloodshed. The Pogo movement was based on the PAC's 
enduring, idealistic vision of inspirational attacks on whites 
precipitating a popular uprising. The protest politics of the 
1950s, which Lodge believes was well adjusted to specific and 
local grievances, but had been applied ineffectually to national 
campaigns, was now abandoned by both organisations. 
With its new strategy, however, the ANC faced enormous 
difficulties, not the least of which was the supervision of its 
own covert units, which frequently acted independently of 
regional and national command. When the MK leadership was 
captured at Rivonia, the ensuing trial resulted in the long term 
imprisonment of Nelson Mandela (already incarcerated for leaving 
the country without valid documents) and Walter Sisulu, among 
others. 72 charges of minor damage, 95 of incendiary bombs in 
public buildings and 7 of dynamiting installations like railway 
lines, were levelled against the defendants. The 23 attacks which 
MK guerillas had launched against policemen and "collaborators", 
mostly in Port Elizabeth and Durban, reflected more the 
indiscipline of local units than the strategy of central command 
(Lodge,1963). 
While the Rivonia capture revealed that MK was not a particularly 
successful guerilla movement in its own right, the tradition of 
resistance that its very existence symbolised, became a key 
factor in the ANC's revival of fortune over the next two decades. 
More violent than the ANC in the 1960s were the PAC's Poqo and 
the white student - backed, African Resistance Movement, 
responsible for bombing Johannesburg's railway station concourse. 
Poqo was involved in a series of localised killings and 
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skirmishes with police, resulting in 202 convictions for murder. 
The movement inspired particularly vehement action in Paarl, 
where two insurgents were killed by police, and the insurgents 
themselves killed a 17 year old girl and a young man. Here, anger 
at the authorities was especially fierce, as the African men had 
recently been "resettled" from informal settlements to bleak 
camps, and separated from the women, who were "endorsed out" of 
the urban area to the Transkei (Lodge,1983). 
In rural Tembuland, Pogo's actions were largely directed against 
Matanzima, a chief who had taken advantage of the government's 
patronage under the Bantu Authorities Act 1951 to establish an 
independent power base, and who subsequently headed the 
"independent" homeland government of Transkei. In targeting 
_ 
Matanzima„Poqo reflected the popular opposition to his new found 
status. The resistance offered by the movement, here and across 
South Africa, was ended with mass arrests in 1963, after 
effective police infiltration and intelligence. 
Following the internal suppression of the two main resistance 
organisations, the ANC proved to be by far the better adapted to 
exile politics, with its necessity of mobilizing international 
support. The PAC was hampered by a fractious and uncompromising 
appearance. The ANC was thus in an advantageous position for a 
return, in the 1980s, to ideological and organisational influence 
within South Africa. 
In the 1960s, black mobilization was reflected not only by the 
political resistance movements, but also, in an overt way, within 
the workforce, as trade union organisation gained ground. The 
foundations had been laid by the Congress-linked South African 
Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU) in the 1950s, with its firmly 
expressed rejection of job reservation, exclusion of Africans 
from collective bargaining, racial pay differentials and 
restrictions on African residence and mobility (all accepted with 
resignation by the rival Trade Union Council of South Africa 
(TUCSA)). 
By 1962, SACTU had 55,000 members, its strength rooted mainly in 
Durban and Natal. The specific trade union actions of the 1960s, 
even after the suppression of SACTU in 1965, led to arrests, 
dismissals and local organisational disintegration, but, 
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cumulatively, the strikes helped to raise the general level of 
African wages by the end of the decade ( Lodge,1983, Luckhardt 
and Wa11,1980). Lodge, 1983, believes that, "It must be admitted 
... that with the adoption of a guerilla strategy in 1961, the 
Congress chose to jettison a powerful weapon in the trade union 
organisation" (198). 
1960 marked the ANC's departure from previously legal activities, 
but it had similar significance for the security forces. A series 
of amendments through the 1960s and 1970s allowed the police to 
detain suspects for longer, and finally, indefinite, periods 
without trial. Behind the improvised legal edifice of repression, 
the use of torture, as part of the interrogation of many of these 
suspects, became prevalent. 
The government's strategy for dealing with its black political 
opposition after Sharpeville had repercussions well beyond South 
Africa's borders. The Sharpeville shootings and the ban on 
domestic political opposition precipitated a growing 
international isolation, marked by its face-saving withdrawal 
from the Commonwealth and, following a referendum, its 
declaration as a republic in 1961. In 1963, condemnation of 
apartheid at the UN resulted in an arms embargo on South Africa. 
The international condemnation brought on by Sharpeville, 
however, also prompted a material crisis, which was of greater 
immediate concern to the government than ideological disapproval. 
After the shootings, capital, deterred by the potential for 
continuing instability, poured out of the country and the Rand 
plummeted. Sharpeville really seemed for a time to mark the 
crisis of an attempt to carry apartheid into the modern, 
interdependent world. 
The economy's relative isolation prompted the government to 
pursue domestic development of the more capital intensive, 
strategic sectors of manufacturing. Growth sectors in the 1960s 
and 1970s included cars and accessories, chemicals, pulp and 
paper, military hardware, capital goods equipment and electronic 
and computer manufactures (Leggasick,1974, cited Rogerson,1982). 
A second grand attempt to achieve import substitution was 
launched. Rogerson, 1982, cites the car industry as an example. 
Initially, local activity was restricted to the assembly of 
imported components, but by differentially taxing cars with a 
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high percentage of foreign components, the state succeeded in 
encouraging the local evolution of "backward linkage 
manufactures" (Grundy,1981, quoted Rogerson,1982). As this 
example suggests, the initial capital flight from South Africa 
proved by no means disastrous for its economy. A drain of $576 
million from 1959 to 1965 was converted into a $2.4 billion 
inflow of capital from 1965 to 1970 (Houghton, cited 
Price,1991,24). South Africa's economic growth rates were close 
to those of Germany and Japan (prompting many observers to 
conclude that apartheid was compatible with, and even conducive 
to, capital growth). 
The government response to progressive diplomatic exclusion and 
alienation was "outward" diplomatic gestures to the rest of 
Africa. Jack Spence describes the years 1961 to 1974 as the 
"golden years of South African diplomacy" (quoted 
Grundy,1991,30). Confident of its control over the internal black 
opposition, Vorster's late 1960s government focused on 
ameliorating international opposition to its policies by gaining 
diplomatic recognition to complement its economic leverage over 
southern Africa. But Malawi alone among the black ruled African 
states entered into formal diplomatic relations, in 1967. 
For the western nations, the government stressed its shared 
commitment to the global anti-communist struggle, particularly 
elaborating the communist threat that black opposition to its own 
policies portended. Among other influences, the tactic seemed to 
work fairly well. US policy from 1969 to 1986 (except during the 
Carter years) was informed by National Security Study Memorandum 
39, which recommended that friendly encouragement, rather than 
pressure to reform, should be proffered to the South African 
government (Grundy,1991). 
After 1960, the South African government, particularly Vorster's 
(1966 to 1978), found itself channelling more of its efforts 
towards further limiting damage in its international relations, 
and to preventing another outbreak of domestic opposition. Both 
policy thrusts could be boosted by an elaboration of Separate 
Development. "Grand apartheid" (the package of "independent" 
homelands and decentralisation of industry to homeland border 
areas) would stem the flow of Africans joining the politicized 
masses in the cities, and pacify international opinion about 
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internal black political representation. 
Separate Development 
Verwoerd saw homeland self-government as sufficiently "taking 
into account the tendencies in the world and in Africa" (cited 
Price,1991,22). While outright "independence" was not envisaged 
for some time, it was perceived as increasingly feasible in the 
light of the independence of Britain's neighbouring High 
Commission territories: Botswana in 1960, Lesotho in 1966 and 
Swaziland in 1968. The South African government appreciated that 
these territories, although politically independent, were still 
economically dependent on South Africa for the employment of 
their migrant workers, and without South Africa having to pay for 
the social costs of-this labour (housing, schooling, health 
etc.). This realization encouraged a more coherent plan for 
homeland political autonomy, leading eventually to South Africa's 
own conferring of "independence". Immediately however, steps were 
taken to abolish what white representation in parliament there 
still was for Africans, who would, in future, be represented only 
in their respective homelands. 
In 1961, the UN General Secretary informed Verwoerd that 
"independent" homelands would only be recognised if certain 
conditions were met. They included sufficient and coherent 
territory, resettlement in the homelands only on a voluntary 
basis, the rapid economic and industrial development of the 
homelands and the consistent respect of human rights (Urquhart, 
cited Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989,101). In fact, their 
"independence" has remained unrecognised in all but South African 
government circles. 
The patent falsity of the "separate but equal" rhetoric lying 
behind the development of homeland administrations, has 
encouraged Marxian authors to explain the homeland policy in 
terms of its "functionality" to South African capital. Halbach, 
1988, sees the "autonomous" homelands' significance as being 
"reduced more and more to that of a labour surplus reservoir and 
a dumping ground of surplus labour, which in effect has always 
been their implicit role". However, Lemon, 1987, questions this 
labour pool function, arguing that a shift in labour demand, from 
unskilled towards skilled labour, has accompanied the evolution 
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from competitive to monopoly capitalism. This means that labour 
reproduction of the type required by the more influential 
employers is no longer carried out largely in the homelands, but 
in the urban areas (Keenan,1984, cited Lemon,1987). 
If not particularly functional in an economic sense, the 
development of "independent" homeland structures certainly had 
advantages in a political sense. Overall, the policy was geared 
towards guaranteeing the white minority's political supremacy in 
the bulk of South Africa. "Independence" enabled black citizens, 
who would otherwise have continued to agitate for political 
rights within South Africa, to be conceptually, administratively, 
and geographically transformed into "foreign" guest workers from 
neighbouring states, with no claim to political expression in 
white South Africa. The Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970 
ensured the legality of the transformation. With these workers 
now the responsibility of separate homeland governments, the 
South African government would no longer shoulder political 
responsibility for their poverty, nor for their periodic 
unemployment. It would also cease to be the direct provider of 
their welfare costs, although the economic dependence of most 
homeland governments on the South African government meant that 
it was still effectively an indirect provider. 
A further, more subtle, political gain could be secured by 
dividing the homelands according to ethnic group - the 
reinforcement of "latent national and regional tribal ethno-
centricisms" (Halbach,1988) - to hinder a more unified African 
opposition. 
However, it must be remembered that the ethnic divisions which 
the homeland administrations have sometimes exacerbated, have an 
existence independent of those structures, and they do not always 
remain latent. "Africans really are divided by local 
competitions; it is not all done by mirrors ... nationalism can 
result in brutal chauvinism against residents of the "wrong 
tribe"" (Lonsdale,1988,7). Soni, 1992, believes that, in addition 
to further ethnically dividing resistance, the homeland 
structures serve to spatially divide the working class, hindering 
mass organisation. However, while this may have been a welcome 
spin off for the government, it seems unlikely to have been a key 
consideration in the formulation of the original policy. 
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In various ways, then, the development of extra political 
structures in the homelands was intended, or incidentally proved, 
to be politically functional. But the homeland governments were 
more than the politically expedient puppets of Pretoria. The fact 
that they provided an outlet for power, even if localised and 
constrained by Pretoria, fuelled their development and their 
entrenchment as independently existing entities. From the early 
1970s, a prominent middle class of politicians, civil servants, 
teachers and businessmen, began to emerge in the homelands. 
Whilst having a stake in the order comparable with that of the 
chiefs of the Bantu Authorities Act, they showed an ability to be 
more critical than their predecessors (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer,1989). 
The development in the homelands of "a fully differentiated state 
bureaucratic-military machinery, budgetary resources upwards of 
R1 billion to back it up and concerns and anxieties ranging from 
foreign affairs to winning elections" means that, in order to 
accurately assess the significance of Separate Development's 
homelands for South African political and social structures, "a 
theory of the state is required" (Graaff,1990, 61). Graaff goes 
on to define bantustans as states attempting to exert power over 
territory, a quality less than that of nation states like, for 
example, Zimbabwe. The territory theoretically under their 
control may actually be more influenced by Pretoria than, for 
instance, Bophuthatswana's capital, Mmbatho, whose Winterveld 
District is economically integrated with the P-W-V region. 
Pretoria's control has generally tended to be tightest over 
homeland defence, security and mass media policy, and loosest in 
the fields of education, agriculture and urban development. 
Despite Pretoria's influence, for the "independent" homelands 
(Transkei, Ciskei, Bophuthatswana and Venda), a position "on a 
tightrope between Pretoria and their voters periodically calls 
for public stances which are hostile to Pretoria" (Graaff, 1990). 
This became increasingly the case as the contradictions of 
apartheid mounted in the 1980s. 
With a homeland's "independence", the conduit for Pretoria's 
influence shifted from the "verkrampte" (conservative) Department 
of Rural Affairs, to the "verligte" (enlightened) Department of 
Foreign Affairs and its Development Bank of Southern Africa. This 
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amounted to a move from the influence of the right wing of the NP 
to that of the left wing, and, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
it brought much greater access to private sector funds for the 
"independent" homeland governments. But the crucial drawback to 
autonomy, even for the "independent" homelands, proved to be 
their continuing economic dependence on "white South Africa", 
primarily a result of overpopulation of the restricted areas 
provided and of a lack of internal agricultural and industrial 
capital. 
The overcrowding of reserve land was evident even in the 1920s. 
Far from being eased over time, with the political development of 
the homelands, overcrowding was exacerbated by the removal of 
Africans from "white South Africa". In 1960, the reserve 
population was 4.5 million. By 1980, it had increased to 11 
million (Wilson and Ramphele,1989). Apart from natural increase, 
between these two dates, the homelands had to accommodate 1 
million Africans removed from white farms, 600,000 from "black 
spots" (African owned land in "white South Africa"), and 750,000 
from the cities. From 1918 to 1950, the population density of the 
reserves had varied between 50 and 60 people per square mile. By 
1970 the figure was 125 per square mile. 
However, the backward state of homeland agriculture is not 
primarily to do with overcrowding. In fact, much of the 
homelands' territory is under-, or unutilized (in Nkandla, 
Kwazulu 50% of the area is unused, constituting 16.3% of the 
possible arable total according to Wilson and Ramphele, 1989, and 
one third of this potential according to Halbach, 1988). The main 
causes of this neglect are the absence of adequate labour, with 
males seeking work in the cities, and the lack of capital (seeds, 
oxen, implements) to work the available land. The former 
difficulty is illustrated, again by Nkandla. Here, 81% of the 20 
to 50 year old population are women and a quarter of the 
household heads are pensioners (Wilson and Ramphele,1989). In the 
Transkei, the sources of cash for rural households earning under 
R125 per month, were found to be 68% remittances from urban 
workers, 16% from pensions, 13% from local jobs, and only 3% from 
home production. The most significant contribution to Nkandla's 
cash economy was from the pensions of the over 65s (Wilson and 
Ramphele,1989). 
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To the problem of inadequate labour, Halbach, 1988, adds the 
shortage of agricultural credit, deriving from a lack of lending 
institutions and the absence of assets to secure loans. Where 
capital is available, there are often inadequate advisory 
extension services and a dearth of information. Apart from these 
structural constraints, localised overgrazing, property 
fragmentation originating in traditional land laws, and 
opposition to modern farming methods, make local contributions to 
the generally dire state of homeland agriculture (although the 
late 19th century response of African peasant producers like 
those of Herschel indicates that, in many areas, the limitations 
of "tradition" could have been readily overcome if it were not 
for the colonial government's direct and indirect suppression of 
African commercial production (Bundy,1972, Marks and 
Atmore,1980)) . Despite their predominantly rural nature and the 
fact that they lie mostly in adequate rainfall zones, the 
homelands taken together produce only one third of their own food 
requirements (Halbach,1988). The shortages have recently been 
exacerbated by the severe drought which, over the last few years, 
has plagued southern Africa. 
There has been no compensatory level of homeland industrial 
development. The context for a lack of agricultural development 
has been a shortage of labour and capital; for the lack of 
industrial growth, it has been the deficiency of urban 
infrastructure. In 1960, there were only three homeland towns, 
containing a combined population of 33,486. Smit et al, 1982, 
cite two reasons for this: the lack of a widespread African urban 
tradition and the inhibition placed on homeland urban development 
by the draining of labour to cities in South Africa proper. 
Once the South African government had embarked on a programme of 
the decentralisation of industry, partly in order to stem further 
urbanisation in "white South Africa", it was more willing to 
subsidise urban development in the homelands. 66% of the budget 
for homeland physical development was awarded to urban 
infrastructure from 1961 to 1966. With a target of 80,000 houses, 
38,500 were built and, from 1961 to 1978, over R520 million was 
spent by the South African Development Trust, homeland 
governments and development corporations on the establishment of 
homeland towns. In 1986, there were 88 such towns, but the 
increase since 1960 was not primarily because of the increasing 
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attractiveness of urban homeland life. 
Rather, it was the consequence of the removal of 68,144 Africans 
from white areas to homeland towns between 1960 and 1970, and the 
freeze on African house building in white cities, implemented 
from 1968, and further contributing to the already extensive 
backlog. The limited decentralisation of industry that the South 
African government succeeded in promoting, also encouraged 
homeland urban growth. 
The number of Africans employed in manufacturing and commerce in 
"white" South Africa, had increased by 50% from 1951 to 1960, 
fuelling an urban African population expansion from 2.4 million 
to 3.5 million (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). The planned 
decentralisation of this industrial magnet to the borders of the 
homelands would, it was thought, allow employers to continue to 
meet their labour requirements, whilst preventing the further 
growth of a politicized urban African population in "white South 
Africa". The 1967 Environment Planning Act introduced the first 
statutory controls to accelerate decentralisation. New industrial 
developments or extensions envisaged in South Africa's urban 
areas now had to receive central permission, and firms in the 
proscribed areas found their African workforce limited in size 
(Natal was excluded from this provision), until employers's 
protests brought about a fixed ratio of African:white employees 
instead. Disincentives to expand in the cities were complemented 
by incentives to move to the homeland and border regions. They 
included grants and loans, plus the indirect advantages of lower 
wages and poor worker safeguards (less holiday and sick leave and 
a longer working week) in the homelands. From 1970, minimum wage 
legislation was scrapped altogether inside the homelands 
(Rogerson, 1982). 
However, neither the incentives nor the disincentives addressed 
the fundamental locational disadvantages of a "border" area 
deprived of infrastructure (Lemon,1987). From 1960 to 1972, a 
total of only 85,544 jobs emerged from the government's scheme in 
the homeland and border areas (Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989). 
Without an independent economic base, the homeland governments 
remained to various extents, dependent on Pretoria, 
Bophuthatswana coming closest to self sufficiency with its own 
platinum mines. The dependence is manifested through a reliance 
on both Pretoria's aid budget (constituting 70 to 80% of 
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Kwazulu's income and from 50 to 70% of Transkei's and 
Bophuthatswana's in the early 1960s, (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer,1989)), and on the earnings of migrants employed in 
white South Africa. Even with the remittances of these workers 
taken into account, 50 to 85% of the homelands' purchasing power 
leaks back into white South Africa, where the major services and 
centres of employment are concentrated (Halbach, 1988). When 
assessing the degree of homeland autonomy, Lelyveld, 1987, noted 
that the homeland of Lebowa's GDP is exceeded by the subsidy that 
the South African government provides to bus its workers across 
the border. 
2. The Pressures on Apartheid, 1960 to 1976 
Economic Contradictions  
Clearly, the homelands have failed as separate economic entities. 
It was probably never the South African government's intention 
that they should succeed as such. It did intend however, to 
create in the homelands, an outlet for African employment and 
urbanisation outside of white South Africa. Although the methods 
by which it would be achieved were the subject of dispute, since 
1948, the government had always perceived limitations on further 
African urbanisation as being one of the central goals of 
apartheid. 
Apart from the incentives for industrial decentralisation and the 
assistance with homeland industrial development, during the 
1960s, the government employed other, more insidious measures to 
prevent further African urbanisation outside the homelands. The 
administration of the urban townships was transferred from the 
white local authorities to the Department of Bantu Administration 
and Development. This centralisation of control enabled tighter 
supervision, and the implementation of further restraints on 
African movement, labour, housing, education and social welfare 
in South Africa's urban areas. "No dictator in history has 
exercised more power over human beings than the South African 
Minister of Bantu Administration" (Douglas Brown, cited Giliomee 
and Schlemmer,1989,69). 
In order to combat the increasing numbers of Africans becoming 
legally resident in the cities by working for the same employer 
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continuously for ten years, from 1968, migrants were compelled to 
return to their homelands at least once a year, so that the 
continuity of their employment would be broken. Such "Catch 22" 
urban residence rights were to continue to be a feature of the 
adaptations of urban apartheid legislation. Through the late 
1960s and 1970s, the Labour Bureaux joined the struggle to hold 
back further African urbanisation, by dictating legal job choices 
and destinations to those seeking work from the homelands. 
By the 1980s though, the situation in the homelands had become 
sufficiently desperate for hundreds of thousands to bypass the 
bureaux and illegally squat or rent in the cities. Strategies to 
evade the system of influx control included a flourishing trade 
in forged passbooks, and time consuming applications for new 
passbooks once the "lost" original had already been stamped as 
"endorsed out". Although in this instance, the "offender" would 
ultimately be caught out, due to the cumbersome nature of the 
urban African administration, a reprieve of months could be 
gained (Pose1,1989). 
The Western Cape's Coloured Labour Preference Policy was a 
regionally specific attempt to stem further African urbanisation. 
Between 1957 and 1962, 30,000 Africans were endorsed out of Cape 
Town, but economic growth and the demand for labour continually 
attracted Africans willing to defy influx control. In particular, 
the boom of 1968 to 1974, brought increasing numbers of contract 
workers, while the government froze township house construction 
and battled to bring the rate of evictions up to the rate of 
influx. The Crossroads informal settlement emerged spontaneously, 
as "illegals" clustered their makeshift shelters together, and it 
continued to grow. After innumerable evictions, clearances and 
illegal rebuildings, the settlement finally won official 
acknowledgement in 1976, but state and vigilante harassment 
continued into the 1980s (see Chapter Seven). By the late 1970s, 
the application of the Coloured Labour Preference Policy had 
crumbled under the weight of popular flouting by employers and 
workers. 
Nevertheless the combined effect of the state's disparate influx 
control measures through the 1960s and 1970s has been estimated 
as the prevention of a further urban growth of 1.5 to 3 million 
Africans (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). The growth rate of the 
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black urban population slowed from 6.4% from 1946 to 1950, to 
3.9% in the 1960s (Cilliers and Groenwald,1982, cited 
Terreblanche and Nattrass,1990). 
While this slowdown partially fulfilled one of the government's 
key political aims, it had more negative long term economic 
implications. Despite influx control, by the end of the 1960s, 
there was still an urban oversupply of illegal unskilled labour, 
but there was simultaneously a shortage of skilled African 
labour, required in increasingly mechanised production processes 
(see below). 
Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, believe that mechanisation itself 
was a response to the restrictions on the influx of labour, but 
it probably had more to do with the structural imperatives of 
South Africa's.integration with the world economy, and the inflow 
of capital following the reversal of Sharpeville. In any case, 
its result was to create, on the one hand, an enduring legacy of 
high unemployment among unskilled Africans, and on the other 
hand, an increasingly serious shortage of skilled urban workers. 
Through the 1960s, the more skilled employment of some blacks in 
the cities prompted a general increase in black wages, coexisting 
with rising urban black unemployment. 
From the 17th century to the early 20th century, the ideological 
motivation behind spatial segregation and black political 
exclusion in South Africa was broadly compatible with white 
economic activity. Agriculture was served by the retention of a 
large, unskilled, black workforce and assisted by that 
workforce's exclusion from the white towns. In those towns, 
mining and early industrial enterprises could meet most of their 
labour requirements with the skilled, urban white population and 
a semi- or unskilled, black migrant labour workforce, 
supplemented by those workers permanently present in the urban 
townships. However, the modernisation of the economy - its 
increasing reliance on commerce and the updated methods of 
manufacturing in particular - nurtured a fundamental 
contradiction between apartheid's modified form of segregation 
and South Africa's late 20th century economic performance. The 
contradiction had started to emerge in most sectors by the end of 
the 1960s. By the end of the 1970s, it was becoming apparent to a 
wider cross-section of South African society. 
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In the late 1960s, the gold mining houses, in spite of white 
worker protection and the job colour bar, could still maintain 
profitability through the use of cheap African labour from South 
Africa and neighbouring states. But coal and copper mines, in 
fiercer competition with overseas suppliers, were already taking 
on an increasingly mechanised form. Their requirement for a more 
skilled African workforce rose correspondingly. While it took 
slightly longer for the gold mines to share their concern for a 
more skilled black workforce, when they did so, they brought far 
more muscle to the campaign. 
In the gold mining sector, once the gold price had started to 
rise dramatically , from $35 to $800 in the early 1970s (Giliomee 
and Schlemmer,1989,76), the owners were able to escape their 
white workers' stran-glehold. The mining houses' new profitability 
encouraged a commitment to modernisation that would no longer 
tolerate skilled labour shortages for the sake of racial 
privilege. They were assisted in their determination by the 
convenient fact that white miners had also become relatively less 
politically important: in the early 1970s, the miners' political 
affiliation partially shifted away from the NP, to the new and 
relatively powerless, conservative Afrikaans Herstigte Nasionale 
Party (HNP), (Adam and Moodley,1986). By the end of the 1970s the 
gold mines had, by and large, "finally succeeded after a century 
in thwarting the job colour bar on the mines" (Giliomee and 
Schlemmer,1989,76), and some important mining concerns, notably 
Anglo-American, were stressing the cost advantages of a smaller, 
stable African family labour force to work increasingly 
sophisticated technology, rather than traditional unskilled 
migrants (Freund,1991). 
In the farming sector there was a longer tradition of racial 
labour domination and support for the NP to be overcome. Through 
the 1950s and early 1960s, large scale state support for 
agriculture continued, and the farming sector remained a key 
supporter of racial policy. By 1970, state aid constituted one 
fifth of the average white farmer's income (Nattrass,1981, cited 
Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). As long as production remained 
based on the use of relatively large quantities of unskilled 
African labour, the government could expect white farmer support 
for the key apartheid policy of influx control, and for the 
suppression of skilled and highly paid black employment. 
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Yet, by the end of the 1960s, the very support provided by the 
state, by helping to remove African tenants from the white farms, 
had facilitated a transformation of white farming, to a 
capitalistic sector employing fewer, and more skilled, wage 
labourers (Marcus,1989). The needs of large farmers were 
converging with those of manufacturers, as mechanisation reduced 
the importance of securing a large quantity of cheap labour, and 
therefore rendered influx control partially redundant. Instead, 
they required skills of their remaining black workers, which 
apartheid was not suited to provide. Cheap, untrained labour, 
they found, could ultimately be very expensive when dealing with 
delicate and costly equipment (Davenport,1991). In the 1970s, the 
South African Agricultural Union began to press for higher wages, 
improved working conditions, better training and increased 
-mobility for black agricultural workers. However, the less 
efficient, more marginal white farmers that still furnished the 
numerical bulk of the sector, tended to remain implacably opposed 
to these innovations. 
While apartheid's labour restrictions were gradually becoming 
outmoded for the mining and much of the farming sector, they were 
proving to be much greater obstacles to manufacturing growth, and 
that growth assumed increasing significance as the manufacturing 
sector overtook the primary sector's contribution to the national 
economy in 1965 (Davenport,1991). The tensions between 
manufacturing interests and racial economic restrictions had been 
manifest as early as the 1940s, but Malan, Strijdom and, to a 
greater extent, Verwoerd, in turn, had determined to reinforce 
racial separation, even at the cost of manufacturing growth. The 
shortage of skilled labour became increasingly evident in 
manufacturing in the early 1960s, when there was virtually full 
white employment, and whites were moving into the tertiary 
sector. Among those remaining in the secondary sector, it was 
remarked that the absence of skilled competition from cheaper 
blacks was leading to slackness, absenteeism and high staff 
turnovers (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
By the end of the 1960s, despite apartheid's regulations, more 
skilled work was being given to blacks in the cities, especially 
"Coloureds" and Indians. In 1970 the government legislated that 
the employment of an African in any position may be prohibited, 
but by this time, informal flouting of the colour bar was well 
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established (although many employers maintained, by agreement 
with white trade unions, a "floating colour bar", by which the 
racial pay differential would be maintained. In the gold mines, 
the benefits of increasing black productivity were passed on in 
the form of wage increases for the white workers). Manufacturing 
industry had found before the mines though, that with the 
modernisation of techniques, "low wages are not the sine qua non 
of profitability" (Price,1991,33). 
While apartheid's limitations on the production side were 
becoming apparent, its restraints on consumption were also 
causing more concern. Even in the 1940s, it was remarked by some 
observers (for example, Blackwell and May,1947), that, by holding 
down black incomes, South Africa's racial system was denying a 
large potential market to its industrial producers. While white 
domestic markets were still expanding and South Africa still had 
unimpeded access to external markets, the costs of the racial 
market restriction could be borne. But, by the late 1960s, 
wealthier farmers, gearing up for capital intensive production 
for the home market, had come to share the concern expressed by 
manufacturers over the preceding two decades: apartheid was 
helping to restrict black consumption, and therefore hindering 
profitability. 
For the manufacturers themselves, the white market for many 
consumer items was by now becoming saturated, with further sales 
mainly on a replacement basis. For example, by the end of the 
1970s the domestic car industry, in response to government 
encouragement for import substitution, had developed a production 
capacity of 400,000 cars per annum. But white sales were now only 
200,000 cars per annum and the numerically dominant black 
population was still generally too poor to provide a significant 
market for new cars (Price,1991,33). 
Even some of those producers who were not reliant on domestic 
markets had cause for concern by the late 1970s, as exporters 
found their links with external markets being severed by trading 
partners made hostile by apartheid. Industrialists came to 
particularly regret the Organisation of African Unity's boycott 
of South African goods, with its denial of access to the natural 
African market to their north. As the 1970s progressed, 
manufacturers came to perceive further contradictions between 
171 
apartheid and other, more subtle requirements for economic 
growth: internal political stability, external credit-worthiness 
and investor confidence (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
This account of apartheid's emerging impediments to economic 
growth contradicts a commonly held opinion about South Africa's 
economic performance and its relationship with apartheid. Marxist 
scholars have traditionally emphasised the rapid rates of 
economic growth that South Africa achieved in the 1960s, and 
stressed their coincidence with the period of the strictest 
application of apartheid. The inference that has frequently been 
drawn from these observations is that apartheid must have been 
conducive, rather than restrictive, of economic growth. Indeed 
the 1960s decade has often been used as the Marxists' most 
effective weapon in combating liberal assertions of apartheid's 
economic contradictions. The fact that the economy was 
flourishing just when black labour was most repressed by 
apartheid suggests that it was apartheid's function of cheap 
labour repression that facilitated economic growth. Thus, the 
Marxist view of the symbiotic relationship between capitalism and 
apartheid is confirmed. 
However, the mechanism by which the economy was seen to prosper 
from apartheid in the 1960s - the maintenance of cheap black 
labour - is illusory. As more skilled employment and trade union 
gains (see below) became available through the 1960s, black 
product wages were actually rising, rather than being held at 
extremely low levels. In the mean time, apartheid allowed white 
wages to maintain their advantage over black, despite the absence 
of a compensatory advance in white productivity. Thus the 1960s 
saw gradually declining profit rates and rising black wages 
(Nattrass,1990) - the reverse of what radical Marxians had 
believed. 
Moll, 1990, has gone furthest in challenging the received wisdom 
of a 1960s "apartheid boom". Growth over the period, although 
impressive, was in fact slower than that in many middle income 
developing countries (5 to 6%, compared to a 7.6% average for 
Brazil, Mexico, South Korea and Taiwan), and poor when South 
Africa's resource endowments and advantageous connections are 
borne in mind. After Sharpeville, South Africa had a relatively 
stable political system, a competent administration, a suppressed 
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working class, a skilled white population, good infrastructure 
and financial systems, easy access to overseas markets and 
relatively cheap local labour; yet its share of world 
manufacturing exports fell from 0.8 to 0.3% from 1955 to 1985 
(trade sanctions being a limitation only from the late 1970s). 
This relative failure was "partly because the apartheid 
superstructure impeded economic development and partly because of 
the constraining effects of a range of short-sighted and ill-
directed state economic policies" (Mo11,1990,271). 
Instead of encouraging exports, economic policy was directed at 
import substitution, which proved to contribute to a balance of 
payments deficit. Although local suppliers were able to displace 
imported consumer goods, the restricted size of the domestic 
market denied them the economies-of scale needed to produce their 
own capital goods. As they expanded local production then, they 
also swelled the imports of expensive capital machinery, 
nullifying the exercise of import substitution. Moll suggests two 
reasons for the reticence in pursuing export growth: the 
Afrikaner nationalist desire for autonomy from external links 
(especially to Britain) and the urge to limit the black 
urbanisation and proletarianization that a flourishing export 
sector would encourage. Even during the 1960s "golden age" of 
South African capital then, apartheid's limitations combined with 
those of government economic policy to hamper "efficient resource 
allocation" and prevent "firms from making full use of black 
workers" (Mo11,1990,290). Bunting, writing in 1967, believed that 
the government itself was aware of its limitations: "if there is 
one sphere in which the Nats (NP) have not yet been able to 
triumph as they would wish it is that of the South African 
economy" (Bunting,1986,369). 
The NP had minimal representation in manufacturing concerns in 
the late 1960s (Bunting,1986). From an early lack of political 
affinity, by the mid 1970s, more concrete opposition to the 
government's economic interference had emerged. Adam and Moodley, 
1986, trace the growth of an industrial "reform lobby" to 
concerns over the skill shortages, the restricted domestic 
market, the blocking of international market expansion and 
capital inflows and the undermining of confidence caused by South 
Africa's negative image overseas. Industrial concern was deepened 
by the failure of the government's attempts to accommodate 
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manufacturing interests through decentralisation. 
Even in the mid 1960s, Anglo American's Harry Oppenheimer was a 
prominent supporter of the opposition Progressive Party. He was 
joined by a wider group of industrialists in the 1970s. Hackland 
believes that Oppenheimer simultaneously gave support to both the 
NP and the PP, as a form of insurance in case the NP failed to 
protect capitalist growth (Hackland,1980, cited Lemon,1987,94). 
Nevertheless, Oppenheimer was vocal in his belief that "rapid 
economic development of South Africa would in the long run prove 
incompatible with the government's racial policies" 
(Lemon,1987,94). 
Bantu Education, purposefully stifling the accumulation of black 
skills, wasa prime candidate for reform in the interests of the 
economy. In 1953, only 1064 Africans graduated from university. 
The Bantu Education Act had since accomplished a deterioration, 
by killing the spirit of those mission schools that did offer 
quality education and by ensuring that the number of technical 
colleges for blacks fell from 54 in 1953 to 21 in 1954 (Giliomee 
and Schlemmer,1989). In the 1970s, as large companies diversified 
into manufacturing and commerce, the concentration of ownership 
increased. As a result, there was a more coordinated call from 
industry for a more skilled mass workforce. With 45% of a sample 
of large manufacturers stating that they had difficulties 
acquiring adequate skilled labour in 1977, and 80% by 1980, the 
government had little choice but to commit more of its resources 
to black education. In 1960, 54,598 Africans were at school and 
1871 at university. By 1980 the respective figures were 1,192,932 
and 49,164 (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989,117-8). 
This is not to say that, merely by being opposed to some aspects 
of apartheid, capital would bring about its downfall (along the 
lines of the Anglo American executive, O'Dowd's, thesis that 
economic growth, would in itself be an irrepressible force for 
greater racial integration). 
Capital is an adaptive creature: when conditions are imperfect, 
profits can still be made, and "the notion that the interests of 
maturing capitalism would dictate the shape of South African 
government policy is a rather crude form of economic determinism" 
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(Price,1991). Within "capital", the interests of the farming, 
mining, manufacturing and commercial sectors, were internally and 
externally differentiated. Similarly, for capitalists, apartheid 
represented more than just labour repression and control. The 
individuals comprising the capitalist class in South Africa may 
have been inclined, for instance, to oppose job reservation and 
the denial of skills to black workers, whilst supporting 
apartheid's social precepts and African spatial segregation and 
political exclusion. 
Nevertheless the general trend in employers' thinking in the 
1970s was marked by the Federated Chamber of Industry joining the 
Associated Chamber of Commerce and some members of the Afrikaans 
Handelsinstituut, to protest the cost and impracticability of 
Separate Development. "The previously separate interests of 
capital were now converging" (Lipton,1988,62). 
As the liaison of the main English and Afrikaans - speaking 
capitalist bodies indicates, crucial changes- had also occurred 
within the body of the Afrikaner volk. The 1930s Afrikaans 
economic movement had presaged a post 1948 strategy of state 
intervention to "uplift" the volk, especially through the 
utilization and protection of its manufacturing, commercial and 
farming capital. Apartheid's nurturing of these capital concerns 
to the point, in the 1970s, where they were established and 
flourishing, paradoxically brought their desire to remove the 
restraints on future growth that the apartheid system now 
represented. Politically influential Afrikaans capitalists had, 
by the 1970s, come to share economic concerns and interests with 
their established English counterparts, as they found themselves 
drawing level with them in terms of size and diversification. 
Afrikaans and English capitalists were, by the late 1970s, 
beginning to merge into a single, economically dominant class. 
With their accession to economic prominence, Afrikaner 
capitalists became more committed to a market economy, and less 
dependent on the political patronage and rigid racial and labour 
stratification of apartheid (Thompson,1985). 
The NP had already lost the support of many small Afrikaans 
farmers, forced off the land by its backing of modernisation, and 
denied increasingly expensive subsidies. To some extent, the 
shedding of this more conservative Afrikaans constituency to more 
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extreme Afrikaans political parties, released the NP to cater 
more for the newer Afrikaans commercial and industrial classes. 
By the late 1970s then, the restructuring of Afrikaans 
manufacturing, commercial and agricultural capital, had helped 
clear the road for apartheid's economic reform. 
In the 1970s, not only important members of the state's core 
constituency, but the state itself began to suffer more from the 
costs of apartheid. In 1970, Johannesburg's state-run bus service 
was 30% short of drivers and conductors due to the resistance of 
the white Municipal Transport Workers Union to "Coloured" crews 
(Lipton,1985). Even in 1953, the General Manager of the same bus 
department had estimated that, if apartheid transport was 
abandoned, half a million pounds profit could be made per annum, 
instead of running at a loss (Bunting,1986). Within the central 
state, the managers of ISCOR, SAR (railways) and the Post Office 
were calling in the 1970s, for labour reform, including abolition 
of the colour bar. From 1974, the SADF had to recruit black 
soldiers, and the increasing costs of apartheid were becoming 
manifest in a steadily increasing defence budget. 
The concerns of a growing group of capitalists were not 
sufficient in themselves to alter the course of government 
policy, but when combined with apartheid's more significant 
economic costs to the state itself and the material threat that 
the current political system posed to traditional NP 
constituencies, by the end of the 1970s, enough momentum was 
generated to initiate serious consideration of a reform of 
apartheid, insofar as it affected the economy. 
Security Contradictions 
By the mid 1970s, internal contradictions were encouraging a 
reconsideration of the economic aspects of apartheid. But the 
government only shifted decisively into a change of mood when a 
severe escalation of the external and internal security threat 
was superimposed on political and economic problems within the 
country. 
South Africa's external relations were under threat fundamentally 
because by the 1970s, the country was a "unique phenomenon: a 
pigmentocratic industrialised state" (Thompson,1985,191). Through 
176 
most of South Africa's history, its racial system of government 
had had its counterparts in other European colonies. But with the 
onset of independence for most of these territories, only South 
Africa and a neighbouring "buffer zone" to its north remained of 
racially discriminatory rule. In the 1970s, even this cushioning 
belt was to be removed, as Angola, Mozambique and, finally, 
Zimbabwe attained independence. 
South Africa was progressively isolated in world politics, and 
its economy correspondingly suffered from a severing of external 
links. However, the loss of South Africa's northern "cordon 
sanitaire" meant more than just a new status as a uniquely, 
explicitly, and relatively isolated racist state. It also exposed 
South Africa's borders to incursions of ANC guerillas from the 
sympathetic new black states to the north,-and assisted SWAPO in 
its challenge to the SADF occupation of Namibia. In the 1970s and 
1980s, Cuban aid to the recently established Marxist MPLA 
government in Angola allowed it to resist a South African 
invasion in support of Pretoria's favourite candidate for Angolan 
government‘ 
Within South Africa, the Soweto uprising, often seen as a 
dramatic and sudden revival of black resistance, had its prelude 
in the form of the unexpected strikes launched by Durban workers 
in 1973. Their actions highlighted the economic dimension of 
black resistance, which also fed into the more ideologically 
influenced Soweto uprising. 
1973 marked the birth of a trade unionism fundamentally different 
from that repressed in the 1960s. Whereas in the former era of 
trade union revival, never more than 2000 workers were involved 
in strike action in one year, in 1973, 100,000 participated, and 
since that year, the figure has never fallen below 14,000 
(Mitchell and Russe11,1989,232). The difference was primarily to 
do with a change in union structure from formal, and easily 
repressed, leadership representation, to a "vibrant system of 
factory committees that provide for the democratic involvement of 
the rank and file membership in day-to-day union affairs at the 
place of work" (Mitchell and Russe11,1989,233). 
The resurgence of strike activity and its new organisational 
structure must be sited in the broad economic context of the 
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early 1970s oil price shocks. African unemployment was increasing 
as both the government and the private sector retrenched, but the 
primary incentive to strike was provided by inflation. Between 
1971 and 1973 the price of essential commodities for black 
workers rose by 40% (Hemson,1978, cited Terreblanche and 
Nattrass,1990). 
It had taken from 1910 to 1959 for the general level of prices in 
South Africa to treble, but they did so again between 1978 and 
1986 (Wilson and Ramphele,1989,250). Wage bargaining - the normal 
recourse of workers - was a luxury denied to many blacks, so they 
were hard hit by a decline in real income (Khan, cited Wilson and 
Ramphele,1989,250). The poor were particularly affected by the 
rising price of paraffin - in the Transkei, over 10% of income 
was already spent or fuel. Between 1973 and 1980, the nationwide 
level of real wages fell by 16% (Wilson and Ramphele,1989,250). 
While falling real wages were of general concern, in Durban, the 
economic burden of the worker was further loaded. Economic 
consciousness and resentment had recently been nurtured in the 
region by local press coverage of the extent of the black 
population which fell below the poverty datum line and a 16% 
increase in bus fares between townships and the city was in the 
offing, generating talk of a boycott. As elsewhere and at other 
times, a mixture of traditional and "progressive" forms of 
action, was taken. The Zulu paramount chief, to whom many workers 
in the city still felt they owed their first allegiance, made it 
clear that he would support workers' action. 
The strikes were led by workers from the France Textile Group, 
notorious for its low wages and poor labour relations 
(Lodge,1983). Once the first strike had resulted in a wage rise, 
striking spread to other sectors and other parts of the region. 
the strikes tended to be apparently leaderless and of short 
duration. The absence of a negotiating body among the workers 
protected them from victimisation or cooptation by the management 
or the state (Lodge,1983). In the context of the shortage of 
skilled and semi-skilled workers - the category to which many of 
the strikers belonged - real economic gains were often 
forthcoming and general moves towards a non-racial "rate for the 
job" and the erosion of the "civilized labour" policy, followed 
from the outbreak of industrial action (Terreblanche and 
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Nattrass,1990). 
For the unions, the success of the strikes encouraged the wider 
adoption of a workerist, "grassroots" form of agitation 
(Lodge,1983), which irreversibly shifted the balance of power in 
Africans' favour. No longer was the most significant African 
power base largely restricted to the relatively small middle 
class group of teachers, ministers, clerks and their followers 
(Adam,1988), it was now centred at the core of South Africa's 
economy. In the long run, the shift contributed to the phasing 
out of job reservation and to the increasing power of black 
political movements with trade union associates. The greater 
influence of even unregistered black trade unions would force 
negotiations from employers and precipitate a repressive state 
response. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, police detentions 
reflected the trend of the increasing trade union threat: there 
was a rising number of arrests and beatings of trade union 
leaders, culminating in 1982, in the death in detention of the 
white trade unionist, Dr. Neil Aggett (Davenport,1991). 
While the general trend after 1973, was towards increased wages, 
the stabilisation of labour, and recognition of trade union 
viability, the behaviour of workers and employers remained 
greatly differentiated. Even within the mining sector, employers' 
attitudes varied significantly, with the Afrikaans Gencor and 
Goldfields resisting wage and trade union recognition advances, 
and the Anglo American Corporation adopting a "progressive" line. 
Throughout the sector, the migrant labour system remained intact 
(Lipton,1988). The workers' position was similarly incohesive. 
Seemingly progressive strike action continued to be accompanied 
by tribalistic ritual and factional politics which often flared 
into inter-ethnic violence within the workplace. The adoption of 
new forms of struggle against economic oppression had not 
excluded older traits of enmity amongst the workers (see 
Malan,1990,245-63 for one example from a 1985 mine strike). 
If the industrial scenario with which the state had to deal in 
the 1970s was confused, it is not surprising that its own 
response was ambiguous. The increasingly evident economic 
contradictions facing the state inhibited it from unmitigated 
repression of the organised African workforce, while the 
conservatism of its own white political constituency imposed 
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limits on the extent to which it could reform racial economic 
relations. "This strategic indecisiveness on the part of the 
state" was "one of the most significant factors which ... 
distinguished the development of black resistance movements in 
the 1970s from those of the preceding two decades" (Lodge, 
1983,326). 
But the context of rejuvenated black opposition in the 1970s also 
included the increasingly rapid rate of African urbanisation. The 
material deprivation of the new, urban born, African generation 
was in all too apparent contrast to white urban affluence. 
Through the 1960s and 1970s, economic forces encouraging 
agglomeration of the factors of production in the cities, had 
gained ascendancy over the ideological and political forces 
attempting to restrain African urbanisation (Smit et al.1982). 
The most evident manifestation of this urban growth was the 
proliferation of informal African settlements on the urban 
fringe. A survey of such a settlement, Vlakfontein on the 
Witwatersrand, indicated that most rural immigrants had moved to 
the urban area in the 1970s as a result of agricultural 
restructuring and rural tenant eviction, flouting the influx 
control regulations. But of greatest significance is the fact 
that a sizeable proportion of the inhabitants of these shacks had 
been born, and lived all their lives, in the urban area. This 
population's membership of a poorly paid, unskilled working class 
and the shortage of formal township housing, had conspired to 
restrict it to informal accommodation , and nearly a quarter of 
the population were employed only casually or in the informal 
sector {Crankshaw and Hart,1990). The government estimated in 
1981, that in Cape Town, 42.8% of blacks were "illegals" (Dewar 
and Watson,1982). 
For the young African generation born in the urban areas, these 
material conditions, in the face of white urban privilege, were 
increasingly resented. Exhilarated by the defeat of white regimes 
in Mozambique and Angola, this generation entered the mid 1970s 
with a receptive attitude to any ideology or organisation that 
offered a renewal of mass opposition to apartheid after the post 
Sharpeville years of quietude. "The generational shift was marked 
by a change in the demeanour of Africans towards whites: a change 
from deference to defiance" (Thompson,1985,192). 
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The urban African population however, did not cohesively shift to 
a new pattern of radical political action. Traditional forms of 
consciousness, carried to the cities by rural migrants, were 
handed down to succeeding urban generations too. Older ideals 
coexisted with the new in the townships, in much the same way as 
they did in the workplace. For instance, inyangas and sangomas 
retained a powerful influence in the urban settlements and 
traditional herbal medicine was transplanted to the townships, 
though it became wrapped in a western, commercialised form as it 
competed with western medicine for urban patients (Malan,1990, 
Rolf,1990). 
The Black Consciousness (BC) movement contained this blend of 
traditional and modern forms of expression. As a political 
ideology, mobilizing and regenerating unprecedentedly vehement 
opposition to the state, it was novel, but its self image rested 
upon a more traditional appraisal of African history and 
identity. In the cities of the 1970s, the roots of budding 
political resistance partially lay in a distant, older, rural 
African culture. 
The Black Consciousness movement's influence was greatest on the 
young, emergent, black middle class. The growth, during the 1950s 
and 1960s, of an African white collar class, cultivated on 
increased African education provision, facilitated a more 
politically conscious urban population. The BC philosophy 
originated among students dissatisfied with the white liberal 
National Union of Students (NUSAS) monopoly of anti-apartheid 
student protest. The South African Students Organisation (SASO) 
was formed as an assertive black alternative. Within SASO a 
philosophic and introspective movement developed, its activism 
being largely restricted to black community projects. The 
strategic and tactical questions addressed by the Africanists of 
the preceding two decades were largely neglected (Lodge,1983). A 
precondition for future, successful resistance was identified as 
being the removal of the psychological sense of inferiority to 
which black people had been reduced, under the influence of three 
centuries of white domination and liberal white paternalism like 
that of NUSAS. Indigenous cultural traditions would have to be 
tapped to allow the bonds of negative self imagery to be shaken 
off. 
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The movement developed as more than just an extension of the 
1950s Africanist ideology in two respects. Firstly, its 
ideologues recognised the reality of class divisions within the 
African community, and thus, the absence of racial solidarity. 
Secondly, it opened its structures and its sense of affinity to 
"Coloureds" and Indians as well as Africans. Its more inclusive 
approach was based upon an appreciation of common treatment under 
the white power structures. "More acutely than their 
predecessors, Biko and his colleagues understood the complexity 
of feelings engendered through subservience" (Lodge,1983,325). 
By rejecting the hegemony that white, Western ideology had 
assumed over blacks as they were incorporated in the white urban 
economy, the movement "enabled the masses of the people to detach 
themselves from their unthinking respect for white culture" 
(Magubane,1989,11). This was reflected in the development by 
black writers, of a new style of literary expression. The early 
1970s saw a revival of traditional African oral poetry. Township 
gatherings heard poems like Oswald Mtshali's "Sounds of a Cowhide 
Drum" read aloud. This poem in particular, reawakened a sense of 
a distant African cultural tradition, with Mtshali embracing 
"rural consciousness into his picture of dispossession" 
(Gunner,1988,228). However, traditional African poetry was 
extended to include direct, warlike invective against the modern 
South African state. 
Even within the structures of the "western" prose form, a new 
group of black writers manipulated and subverted hegemonic 
interpretations. Miriam Tlali, Ahmed Essop, Sipho Sepamala, 
Mbulelo Mzamane and Mongane Serote were all overtly urban centred 
and BC oriented. They wrote explicitly in order to "conscientize" 
their black readers. All their novels of the period refer to a 
complex of injustices perpetrated by the cohesive system of white 
repression: Bantu Education, the pass laws, the homelands, the 
urban housing backlog and urban deprivation, the violent and 
socially disintegrative behaviour inherent in township life and 
the overwhelming saturation of hopelessness. All saw the white 
response to black assertion as being a blend of fear, brutality 
and vacillation, and all incited the youth to demonstrate to 
their passive elders how the "white man's machine" of 
technological capitalism could be overthrown (Sole,1991). 
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Despite BC's appeal to the township youth, it never induced a 
mass based organisation to implement the resistance it 
encouraged. Its effect was more to galvanise the imagination and 
the belief that resistance could be fruitful after the lull of 
the 1960s. Its set of catch phrases, for instance, filtered down 
to a wider following (Grundy,1991), while an appreciation of the 
ideology itself was restricted to a more select stratum of the 
urban African population. The thinking behind BC diffused 
successfully among schoolteachers, priests and journalists and 
its themes were taken up in the press, in township cultural 
events and in black educational establishments. But, while this 
allowed the wider diffusion of its slogans and of its 
motivational power, it did not necessarily engender a widespread 
understanding of the ideological principles upon which they 
rested. The influence of BC on the Soweto revolt was mediated and 
diffused through a filter of popular interpretation, modification 
and simplification. 
The student originators of the movement were never able to fully 
enrol the wider community in their own attempts to defy the 
system, neither conceptually nor practically. The students of 
Soweto did not take on the wider grievances of rents, 
unemployment, inflation and working conditions as much as they 
were portrayed as doing by BC orientated writers. Even these 
writers, agitating for concerted and cohesive township action, 
pictured workers as "sheeplike, easily frightened, under -
politicized and more susceptible to the lure of homeland 
governments" (Sole,1991,195). There was not necessarily a clear 
articulation between the proponents of BC theory, and the mass of 
participants in township revolt. 
BC ideals were partially extended into the 1980s with the Azanian 
Peoples Organisation (AZAPO), which allowed for more of a 
"workerist" perspective, but in the 1970s, the BC movement's 
adherents often conveyed the impression that, if only the masses 
would follow the lead of the intellectuals and students, drastic 
change would ensue. In fact, many of the schoolchildren who 
initiated the Soweto revolt were probably not acting directly 
under the influence of BC's ideological imperatives, but 
according to initiative conditioned partly by the more tangible 
influence of BC slogans, but largely by the specific conditions 
in which they found themselves, in their schools and homes in 
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1976. 
Soweto's situation in 1976 was determined partly by economic and 
political forces affecting the whole of South Africa in the mid 
1970s, and partly by the specific conditions of life in South 
Africa's largest, sprawling township. South Africa's 
deteriorating economic performance was felt by township residents 
in an immediate and harsh way. The recessions of 1976 and 1982 
were both accompanied by a resurgence of township activism 
(Brewer,1989). The widening gulf between black economic 
expectations and reality was generating an increasingly aggrieved 
sense of material deprivation in all of South Africa's townships, 
and in Soweto, food and transport price rises were felt 
particularly harshly (Price,1991). 
Wider administrative changes also had a particular impact in 
Soweto. By 1971 the government had decided to ensure that 
municipal authorities, subject to the demands of local employers, 
would no longer vacillate in imposing influx control and 
encouraging decentralisation. Township administration was taken 
out of municipal control and handed over to Regional 
Administration Boards. Soweto's West Rand Administration Board 
(WRAB) received R2 million less in subsidy than was currently 
required to make the township self-financing. In response, the 
WRAB increased rents and cut spending on housing. It also 
recouped some of the revenue by charging lodgers' fees to those 
over 18 living with their parents in municipal houses 
(Lodge,1983). Yet, the WRAB managed to build only 2,734 new 
municipal houses between 1973 and 1978 (UF,1988, cited 
Lea,1982,200). The informal housing initiative taken by Africans 
themselves was being met with bulldozers and evictions. By 1976, 
Soweto had an average of 14 people per house. When such housing 
inadequacies were accompanied by a 25% rent increase in the first 
year of the WRAB's control, and further increases in the next, 
there were "ideal conditions for mass rebellion" (Price,1991,56). 
If macro economic and administrative changes provided the powder 
for the Soweto rebellion, educational issues provided the spark 
(see below). The state's expansion of urban secondary education 
had provided new terrain for political mobilization in black 
communities. While the townships themselves were under close 
supervision in the 1970s, the schools within them became one of 
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the few relatively open arenas for the development of a new, 
oppositional momentum (Wolpe,1988). Bantu education had brought 
increasing numbers of pupils into already overcrowded schools, 
which lacked adequate facilities and qualified teachers. Racist 
History syllabi and an absence of Maths and Science teaching 
contributed to disenchantment among pupils. The ideology of 
resistance that BC represented, in popular form, found a fertile 
recruiting ground (Hyslop,1991). 
While BC provided, in the background, an ideological basis for 
resistance, its organisational complement was absent over most of 
the country. In Soweto, the organisational vacuum was filled by 
the Soweto Student Representatives Council (SSRC). Eleven of its 
members were subsequently tried for their role in the Soweto 
revolt. Whereas educational protest in the 1960s had been led by 
parents and conducted with ANC guidance, in 1976, it was the 
students themselves, particularly the SSRC, who took the 
initiative, while parents and the externally based ANC were swept 
along by events (Wolpe,1988). 
The deeper economic concerns and tension of the community fed 
into the township's educational establishments, but it was the 
decision to make Afrikaans a language of instruction in the 
schools that prodded deep dissatisfaction into open rebellion. 
Hyslop, 1991, sees the Afrikaans language issue as a symbol of 
the underlying grievances, drawing an analogy with Freud's 
connection between conscious symbols and their inaccessible root 
in the unconscious. An attack on Afrikaans school instruction 
manifested more than a detestation of the oppressor's language 
and the difficulty of learning through it; it symbolised an 
assault on the very structures of oppression. Continuing the 
Freudian analogy, "as students themselves moved from a symbolic 
to a conscious understanding of their society, what had been 
repressed was no longer" (Hyslop,1991,111). 
What had started as a demonstration of revolt by Soweto students, 
spread through 1976, into a conflagration in many of South 
Africa's townships. Police brutality in dealing with localised 
instances of rebellion in Soweto, removed the inhibitions 
restraining sympathizers in other locations, and helped unleash 
the seething, repressed anger that was fairly universal. 
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In Cape Town, the 1976 uprising contained the first large scale 
"Coloured" rioting in South Africa's history (Western,1987). 
Here, Soweto's conditions - poor housing, overcrowding and 
unemployment - were replicated. Before 1976, many whites had seen 
"Coloureds" as being more akin to themselves in their political 
outlook, than to Africans. The rapid spread of rebellion from 
Soweto to Cape Africans, and thence to Cape "Coloureds" proved 
disillusioning. As in Soweto, the targets of youth attack 
spiralled from specific educational structures to the symbols of 
apartheid in general: Bantu Administration offices, African beer 
halls (implicated in the slogan "Drink Keeps us Down"), housing 
offices, civic centres, police stations and the houses of 
policemen and suspected informers, as well as their persons. 
The government's Cillie Commission of Inquiry reported the causes 
of the 1976 unrest as being the introduction of Afrikaans as a 
medium of instruction and the lack of competence of police and 
educational officials both in anticipating the effect of this 
innovation and in taking counter-measures. Brookes and Brickhill, 
1980, also focus on the impact of the educational changes. 
Unsatisfactory schools and the anger provoked by the obligatory 
use of the economically redundant and ideologically unacceptable 
Afrikaans language, are cited as the major causes of the revolt. 
Hirson, 1979, stresses the role of the precedent set by the 1973 
strikes in galvanizing working class militancy. For him, the BC 
movement only acted to divert energies created by this class, and 
dissipate them in a non-workerist struggle. But this is probably 
to conceive a direct connection where none exists. The strikes 
were over three years before the Soweto revolt, and Durban was in 
a very different regional context (Lodge,1983). Soweto's large 
African petty bourgeoisie and an incident in which hostel-
dwelling workers attacked the protesting students, militated 
against a strong link between workerist revival and the 
township's spirit of resistance. 
Kane Berman, 1978, goes to another extreme in placing the 
initiative for the revolt in the hands of BC activists. However, 
while their ideals were probably familiar in outline to the 
participants, and provided legitimacy for their actions, it was 
more the material, or as Price, 1991, puts it, the "situational" 
conditions in which they found themselves that provided the spur 
to action in 1976. This situation contained certain critical 
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elements: structural economic hardship, both directly for workers 
and indirectly for township residents, due to the requirement for 
self-financing local authorities; an oppressive educational 
context being made a significant degree further intolerable, and 
an expectation of political action and change to end the 1960s 
hiatus in resistance. 
The young, urban, black generation of the 1970s contributed by 
its resistance, to the economic and political contradictions 
which were already pressurising apartheid, and directly provoked 
the government's reappraisal of the system. The Soweto uprising 
was a dramatic departure from previously localised and momentary 
instances of resistance. It marked the beginning of significant 
and coherent challenges to state structures (Lodge,1983). The 
state's immediate response to the crisis was to leave 575 dead 
and 2389 wounded (not exclusively due to police action). The 
resistance, and the repression with which it was met, further 
deepened South Africa's sense of economic insecurity, and 
facilitated the re-emergence of the ANC as the primary focus of 
township political aspiration. The state's repression provided an 
impetus for hundreds of township youths to leave South Africa for 
training in the external ANC's armed wing and it was this 
hardened core of exiled, rebellious youth which, in the 1980s, 
would provide the personnel for the ANC's sabotage campaigns. 
In the remainder of the 1970s, repression dampened, but did not 
smother unrest in the townships. In the 1980s, South Africa 
became locked in a violent equilibrium between a government that 
could not possibly be overthrown and a spirit of mass resistance 
that could be temporarily repressed, but could not be 
extinguished (Sparks,1991, see chapter seven). The community-
based insurrectionist tactics of the 1980s were presaged in the 
formation in Soweto of the first Civic Association under Nthatho 
Motlana. Its organisation of a rent boycott after a further 100% 
rent rise in 1979, marked the transition to a form of resistance 
which would ultimately cripple apartheid's black urban control 
structures. 
The Soweto uprising's repercussions extended beyond South 
Africa's borders. It added further external pressures to the 
internal contradictions of apartheid. 
Immediately after Soweto, there was capital flight, talk of 
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sanctions and disinvestment, a slowing of white immigration and a 
deepening of the Balance of Payments crisis. For South Africa's 
trading partners, Soweto "revived the whole issue of 
international acceptability that Prime Minister Verwoerd had 
sought to lay to rest through the policy of Separate Development" 
(Price,1991,62). In November 1977, when the security threat was 
near its peak, the UN arms embargo became mandatory. By 1978, 
South Africa was cut off from new long term loans and foreign 
owned firms based in South Africa had begun to repatriate more of 
the revenue they earned there. A net inflow of $660 million in 
1976 had, by 1978, become an outflow of $1073 million 
(Price,1991,68), and in 1977, GDP rose by only 0.1% (Mo11,1989). 
Apart from the institutional response, South Africa suffered from 
a consumer boycott in the West, when the repression following 
Soweto made alternatives more acceptable than "Made in South 
Africa" items. In turn, the government's efforts to overcome 
mounting Western hostility played a crucial role in instigating 
the "Muldergate" affair - the misappropriation of public funds 
intended for overseas propaganda - which eventually forced Prime 
Minister Vorster's resignation and his replacement by P.W. Botha. 
Conclusion 
By the end of the 1970s, despite extensive ideological 
adjustments in the guise of "Separate Development" and the 
pragmatic development of impoverished separate homeland 
administrations, a fundamental paradox had emerged within the 
apartheid system. The set of laws accumulated over the last 
thirty years to guarantee white prosperity and security, were in 
themselves contributing to the undermining of these very goals. 
The modernisation of key economic sectors was being impeded by 
discriminatory laws adopted for white protection in an earlier 
economic context, and government attempts to encourage industrial 
decentralisation had done little to remove the constraints. 
Internal economic contradictions were reinforced by the damaging 
effect that South Africa's political modus operandi, and black 
resistance to it, had on external investor confidence, first 
after Sharpeville, and then after Soweto. 
The rising sense of black political strength in the 1970s was 
commensurate with an increasingly crucial black role in the 
economy. Black workers had realised their collective power from 
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the 1950s and in the 1960s, they initiated an unprecedented level 
of trade union activity. The 1973 Durban strikes and the Soweto 
revolt both reflected and catalysed further militancy. The fact 
that black resistance, rather than being progressively 
eliminated, was increasing in its scale and intensity with each 
discrete period of rebellion, made a secure economic and 
political future for apartheid unlikely. Nevertheless, the state 
could possibly have legitimated entrenched apartheid for longer, 
if the support of its own Afrikaans constituency had not 
simultaneously begun to fragment. 
Chapter Six  
The Reformulation of a Structure 
Introduction  
Botha came to the premiership in 1978 with the conviction that 
apartheid could be coherently reformed so as to ameliorate its 
economic contradictions, to pacify black urban resistance and to 
ensure continued white political and economic hegemony. In order 
to force through the reforms he envisaged, he first altered the 
nature of government in such a way as to strengthen his own 
position relative to the other elements involved in the 
formulation of state policy. With unprecedented individual power 
within the state, he began to take some of the directions for 
reform indicated by post-Soweto commissions set up by his 
predecessor, Vorster, and by his own advisory bodies. 
Botha's background in the Ministry of Defence had helped inform 
his perception of a South Africa undergoing a "Total Onslaught". 
An ideology based upon this perception emerged within the higher 
echelons of government. An onslaught, ultimately orchestrated by 
communist elements within and outside the country, could only be 
met by a "Total Strategy", involving a set of new alliances with 
the classes and groups who would defend the type of stability 
favoured by the state. Capital was one of these groups and it was 
envisaged that "Coloureds", Indians and even urban Africans could 
be encompassed in a struggle to fend off radical change. Many of 
Botha's initiatives during the 1980s were directed at forging 
such an alliance. 
While Botha's premiership was guided in its early stages by more 
of a blueprint for change than Vorster's was, the implementation 
of reform was still vacillatory and sometimes contradictory. The 
government was still, to a large extent, reactive rather than 
proactive in its reform measures. Elements in the reform package 
that seem, with hindsight, to have been components of a grand and 
long term strategy, were not necessarily devised in such a light. 
They were often the result of the unintended consequences of 
earlier initiatives, or of developments beyond the government's 
control. 
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This chapter is divided into three parts, which are broadly 
chronological in order, but with frequent temporal overlaps. The 
first part is an account of the adaptations which were made to 
government thinking and practice under Vorster, in the light of 
the Soweto uprising. Botha's preparations for reform and the 
development of reform ideology within the government are the 
subject of the second part. The third part recounts the policy 
measures which comprised Botha's reform package. African, and 
particularly, township, responses to these reforms, their 
unintended consequences, and the forceful resistance with which 
the state was met in the mid 1980s, plus concluding comments on 
the period, are left for the succeeding chapter. 
1. Post Soweto Realizations and Adaptations 
In the wake of the Soweto uprising, government commissions were 
appointed by Vorster to investigate the problems, and try to 
negotiate a way through the economic contradictions of urban 
apartheid. 
Soweto had thrown a spotlight on the difficulties of maintaining 
white political and economic privilege. But the problems were of 
a structural nature, inherent within the system of government. 
Urban administrative chaos was the necessary outcome of so many 
territorial and racial structures of government (44 in the Durban 
metropolitan region alone, (Lemon,1991)). A deplorable housing 
shortage, accompanied by mushrooming squatter settlements and the 
dislocation between workplace and home for•most of the city's 
population, were commensurate with the attempt to keep the city 
core white. Periodic upsurges in black resistance and a further 
deepening of economic contradictions stemmed from the conditions 
in which most of the city's population lived. Hence there was an 
underlying "conflict threshold evident from the mid 1970s" 
(Davies,1991,85), upon which the dramatic events of Soweto were 
superimposed. 
Four major developments were responsible for the government's 
perception that South Africa was at a threshold in the late 
1970s: apartheid's internal economic contradictions flowing 
ultimately from demography, the changing class interests of 
apartheid's core white constituency, the economic impact of 
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mounting international condemnation and the stresses and costs 
imposed on administration by bouts of heightened black 
resistance. In fact, in Habermas's phraseology, apartheid was 
facing both an economic and a legitimation crisis. 
The perceived economic basis of the state's difficulties resulted 
in a shift in government ideology over the next decade. "The 
ruling (groups) are ... now increasingly concerned with securing 
their material advantages ... rather than preserving their 
collective identity .. when 70% of the group are considered to 
be middle class, avoiding jeopardising this position vies with 
ideological relics" (Adam,1990,236). Adam and Moodley, 1986, also 
detect a shift in the source of legitimacy, from nationalist 
identity and racist doctrines, towards bureaucratic notions of 
law and order. The shift may represent more than a simple re-
evaluation; it may mark the descent into mere "survival ideology" 
(Adam and Moodley,1986,72) of a government in disarray over 
defeat in Angola, the Soweto uprising and the "Muldergate" 
affair. 
Whether as re-evaluation or last resort, Professor Viljoen, head 
of the vanguard of ruling group ideology, the Broederbond, asked 
after Soweto, "must we not think again in our inner circle about 
Dr. Eiselen's idea of a neutral or grey area with political power 
shared by white and non-white alongside a smaller, exclusive, 
white state?" (Williams and Strydom, 1979, cited Kuper,1988,43). 
In the late 1970s, government rethinking coincided with the 
advent of a broader split in Afrikaans ranks, facilitating moves 
in a reformist direction. A "verligte", or enlightened tendency, 
characterised the political outlook of some influential 
Afrikaners under Vorster's premiership. In the forefront of the 
movement, and adopting the most radical position, was an 
intellectual elite, nourished on the revival of Afrikaans 
education since the mid century, which both broadened the 
horizons of Afrikaans literature and followed a more humanistic 
approach to ethnic politics (Sparks,1990). In particular, the 
1960s and 1970s produced a generation of "radical" writers like 
Andre Brink, known as the sestigers ("Sixty-ers"), who had 
studied abroad and absorbed something of the revolutionary campus 
politics of the times. 
192 
The "verligte" group in general though, was more cautious in its 
departure from orthodox Afrikaans political belief, and it 
remained bound by a racially fragmented view of politics. 
Bunting, 1986, traces the divide within the polity between 
"verligte" and conservative "verkrampte", to Vorster's attempts 
from 1968 to meet black leaders of other African nations, and to 
allow black athletes to represent South Africa abroad. Apart from 
opposing these specific endeavours, the "verkrampte" wing of the 
NP was critical of Vorster's emphasis on overall white unity and 
dominance, rather than on the traditional concern for the 
exclusive safeguarding of Afrikaners. Integration between the two 
dominant white groups was only marginally less feared than the 
first signs of apartheid's relaxation heralded by the diplomatic 
and sports ventures. It was thought that such innovations, 
seemingly innocuous in immediate conditions, by abrogating the 
principle of maximum segregation, contained the seeds for a long 
term undermining of white, and particularly Afrikaans, supremacy. 
The "verligte" members of the NP were well aware of the power of 
a "verkrampte" reaction, and their "main objective ... was to 
reformulate the apartheid ideology within the party without 
forcing a split" (Giliomee,1987,376). Whilst the party would, 
after all, split, the growth of a "verligte" outlook in the NP, 
despite the "verkrampte" reaction, prepared the ground within the 
wider Afrikaans community for the reforms contemplated in the 
late 1970s. The movement also attracted some new electoral 
support to the NP from more liberal English speakers, and was 
influential in persuading Western leaders that structural change 
was contemplated, thereby delaying economic sanctions. 
While, within the state, certain ideological shifts were 
occurring, opening avenues for reform, they did not extend to a 
reconsideration of the racial basis of policy. The implicit aim 
of late 1970s and early 1980s reformism was to preserve white 
political and economic superiority under new conditions, even if 
its retention involved sub optimal economic performance, rather 
than to jettison it entirely. Under Vorster, the prejudicial 
legal measures to protect separate identities - the Mixed 
Marriages and Immorality Acts and the various pieces of 
geographically segregationist legislation - continued 
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unchallenged. 
Thompson, 1985, attempts to rationalize the fundamental lack of 
ideological progression, and the continuation of an academically 
outmoded conception of identity within the wider white society. 
By 1980, scientists had generally abandoned the racial paradigm, 
but the general public in South Africa, as in North America and 
Europe, lagged behind. It is after all, easier to understand an 
immutable division of the human species into distinctive 
physical, and coincidentally, cultural, entities, than it is to 
comprehend the concept of fluid populations, defined genetically 
and subject to continuous cultural and even, in the long run, 
physical change. The findings of late 20th century physical and 
social anthropology were less readily filtered through white 
society than were those of the late 19th century. Apart from the 
simple index of understandability, the fixed racial paradigm also 
satisfied a white sense of superiority and helped uphold white 
self-esteem, whilst complementing neatly, white material self 
interest. 
In Europe and North America, the real structures of society were 
overtaking such racially based conceptions of them, but in South 
Africa, the racial paradigm continued to be legitimated by 
reference to empirical observation. There were (and are) still 
great differences between rural African, and white, Western 
cultures. "Tribalistic" faction fights, the tension between 
migrant and urban workers and the endemic violence of township 
life, whilst all having conditions of impoverishment and 
oppression as their context, still provoked white fears of the 
unreliability and underlying barbarism of Africans. That ability 
and aptitude were commensurate with race could be demonstrated, 
as long as the background conditions were not investigated too 
closely, by the fact that blacks continued to do worse in their 
schools than whites in theirs. And in South Africa, cultural and 
attitudinal gulfs were deliberately perpetuated as an explicit 
policy goal. With school textbooks continuing to reinforce the 
notion of a fundamentally divided human group, for example, 
classifying "the African physical and cultural type" into 
distinct and timeless tribes (Muller,1969, cited Thompson,1985), 
it is not surprising that fixed ideological points of reference 
remained generally unshaken. 
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Views of history have played an important role in perpetuating 
racial fears in South Africa. With most popular, established 
interpretations of South African history being largely the 
history of racial and "tribal" conflict, a racial conception of 
contemporary political and social division becomes natural. "Most 
white South Africans have been able to ignore many of the new 
intellectual findings (recovering the historical flux of African 
polities) ... because they have represented changes from 
relatively simple to relatively complex explanations of human 
taxonomy and historical processes" (Thompson,1985,205). An 
extreme example of resistance to the academic undermining of 
established historical interpretation was provided in 1979, when 
Afrikaner Weerstandbeweging (AWB) members tarred and feathered 
the Afrikaner historian, F. Van Jaarsveld as he was about to 
deliver a lecture questioning the myth of the Blood River 
covenant. 
Even the introduction of television into South Africa in 1976 did 
not allow a non-racial message to be communicated, since the 
South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) was under tight 
government control. The late introduction of television indicated 
the government's fear that the new medium would bring 
Anglicization and non-racialism. There was consequently a heavy 
pro-government slant in domestic current affairs coverage and 
"its news services and commentaries, like those on radio, are 
thinly disguised government propaganda" (Thompson, 1985,48). 
Ideological constants would not allow the transformation of South 
Africa's system of white rule, but the system had at least to be 
relaxed if future economic wellbeing was to be secured. The 
state's response consisted of a partial return to the rights of 
which urban Africans had been deprived over the last three 
decades (Lea,1982). The government's philosophy can be reduced to 
the principle of making more rational economic use of those 
Africans who were already in the cities. It was anticipated that 
this would be commensurate with the removal of the major black 
urban grievances and stabilization of the political system. 
The housing shortage was the most visible urban problem. In the 
late 1970s, a reappraisal of African housing policy was 
encouraged by increasing international hostility to well 
publicized removals and "rustications", and by the particular 
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politicization of the housing issue in the townships (Dewar and 
Watson,1982). A change of direction was also required on economic 
grounds: the state clearly would not be able to bear the cost of 
formally housing all legal urban residents. 
Some township tenurial security was introduced with a 99 year 
lease scheme, although, in 1978, Building Society mortgage 
finance rules still barred the vast majority from taking 
advantage of the scheme. Within the Department of Cooperation and 
Development, a gradual acceptance of self-help housing emerged, 
to stabilize the accommodation of those outside formally built 
structures. In some areas, the pre Soweto pattern of squatter 
removals and clearances was reversed. 
A more tolerant attitude towards informal economic activity 
accompanied the recognition of informal housing. Activities such 
as brewing, the running of shebeens and street trading, 
previously regarded as an unwelcome African intrusion into white 
urban space, were increasingly seen as part of a stabilization 
programme for those Africans irreversibly present in the cities 
(Beavon and Rogerson,1982). The incorporation of such activities 
under official patronage also facilitated a much needed extension 
of the urban tax base (McGrath,1990). 
The state was not alone in initiating new housing projects. It 
was joined by the private sector in the form of the Urban 
Foundation (UF), backed by Anglo American among others. Lea, 
1982, argues that the UF has "more to do with the imperatives of 
the accumulation process than it has to do with welfare", being a 
"direct and rapid response by capital to the urban unrest" 
(Lea,1982,206). Its leading lights aim not only to defend capital 
from unrest, but also to spread the free enterprise ethic to an 
emergent black middle class, thus engendering both political and 
economic stability in the townships. Its programme then, is 
interpreted as being similar to the state's own under Botha. 
However, an unadulterated conspiracy theory of the UF needs 
modifying to take into account some genuine philanthropic 
impulses among its backers. In terms of its practical impact, the 
UF has financed and organised the building of formal housing and 
assisted in informal upgrading. Even relatively minor 
improvements in housing represent significant advances in the 
lives of many, and they can also contribute to the political 
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mobilization of those whose material insecurity previously 
mitigated against such activity. 
Apart from the promotion of housing improvement, a further area 
of post Soweto state reform was township administration. The 1977 
Community Councils Act allowed for a limited measure of black 
control over local affairs in the townships, implicitly 
confirming the permanency of the African presence in the white 
cities. For the first time, those with "section 10" rights were 
also allowed to change jobs within their Administration Board 
District without recourse to Labour Bureaux (Lemon,1991). 
More flexibility in the implementation of the Group Areas Act was
-
another response to the urban problems generated by apartheid. A 
1966 amendment to the Act had allowed areas to be proclaimed 
according to their use rather than the occupation of any one 
racial group. In the late 1970s, the clause was more frequently 
implemented, so that, by 1983, there were 26 mixed race, free 
trading areas; Durban, Port •Elizabeth and Kimberley having two 
each. Where racial occupation remained the criterion for zoning, 
blacks increasingly used white nominees to run concerns on their 
behalf within white group areas. Through the 1980s, de jure 
alterations recognising these developments lagged behind the rate 
of de facto change (Lemon,1991). 
Beyond the commercial use of white land, in the late 1970s, black 
employees in large corporations were the first to join the black 
foreign dignitaries and churchmen already living in white group 
areas. Gradually they were joined by blacks using nominees or 
front companies to occupy more luxurious houses in the white 
suburbs. 
This very restricted movement of an economic elite preceded the 
larger scale black occupation of the flats in inner city areas 
like Johannesburg's Hillbrow and Joubert Park during the 1980s. 
Whilst still extremely limited when put in perspective with the 
scale of black urban residence, the moves displayed the 
government's toleration of an erosion of Verwoerdian, 
fundamentalist apartheid. 
With a partial relaxation of control over urban black residential 
and economic strategies, came limited concessions in the black 
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urban workplace. The 1973 Durban strikes had revealed how the 
absence of organised negotiating partners within the workforce 
could render strike prevention and control hazardous and costly. 
In the late 1970s, the government began to offer recognition to 
black trade unions in order to incorporate them within official 
structures and channel their activities along supervised lines 
(Price,1991). The move sparked a debate among black trade 
unionists as to the alternative strategies open to them. 
Ultimately, the government's attempt at containment would largely 
fail, as trade unions became enmeshed in the wider township 
community struggle against the state. 
In a number of discrete moves, in the late 1970s, the state 
relaxed its own rules over black urban living and working. If 
there was a philosophy behind these moves, that philosophy can be 
said to have been one of containment. The Soweto uprising had 
revealed that the living conditions of most urban blacks under 
apartheid would never engender the stability needed for economic 
growth. With influential elements of the private sector already 
discarding apartheid labour practices and agitating for a more 
stable black urban workforce, attempts were made to ameliorate 
the conditions of this workforce. The majority of Africans would 
still be kept outside the core economic regions through influx 
control, but for those blacks already inside white urban economic 
space, concessions could be made to contain future instability. 
While the philosophy of containment was implicit in the series of 
discrete actions that the state took after Soweto, it was not 
explicitly revealed until the publication of two influential 
commissions' reports at the end of the decade. The Riekert and 
Wiehahn reports would provide the basis for Botha's attempts at 
reform in the 1980s. Initially, those attempts were a 
continuation of the ameliorative measures, directed at the urban 
black "insiders", pursued under Vorster. 
2. Preparations for, and the Ideology of Reform Under Botha 
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The procedures by which the South African state was run began to 
change on Botha's accession to power. Botha immediately set about 
centralising NP policy within the Cabinet. His dogmatic style of 
leadership ensured that, throughout his premiership, the 
government would take the initiatives, and only subsequently 
would the party be brought into line. Within the party, "no one 
dared challenge him, and this far reaching change was accepted 
with little overt resistance" (Schrire,1992,37). These 
developments justify a rather personal account of the Botha 
government's strategies. Botha himself was far more the initiator 
of a mentally preconceived strategy than previous Prime Ministers 
had been, and, as an individual, he was more responsible for his 
government's actions than his predecessors were for theirs. 
It was not just force of personality which effected the change. 
The structures of government were themselves modified to 
strengthen the Prime Minister's position. A Cabinet Secretariat 
and four permanent committees advised the Prime Minister, 
replacing 20 ad hoc committees set up under Vorster. One of 
Vorster's innovations, the State Security Council (SSC), became 
the most important of these committees under Botha. It developed 
as the key decision making body in the fields of security and 
foreign policy. To some extent, the SSC displaced even the 
Cabinet as the forum for determining government strategy. Under 
its supervision, a political/military apparatus was built to 
coordinate counter-insurgency. It was known as the National 
Security Management System (NSMS). The NSMS coordinated Joint 
Management Committees (JMCs), the territorial boundaries of which 
were those of South Africa's military districts (later becoming 
those of nine economic development regions). The JMCs were 
staffed by regional security officials and politicians. Their 
sub-regional offshoots were known as mini JMCs and they 
marshalled influential officials and security officers at the 
municipal level. The whole structure was devised so as to 
coordinate "on the ground", top-down initiatives from the SSC, 
for example implementing plans for black community assistance, 
and to relay local security related information back up the 
chain, so that the SSC could devise policy in the light of 
accurate intelligence from across the country. 
With power within the executive shifting to a more restricted, 
security conscious body, the civil service had to be streamlined 
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so as to ensure that initiatives would not be diluted in their 
implementation. For instance, the Bantu Administration "empire" 
was dismantled, and its functions distributed to other 
departments, effectively transferring power from civil servants 
to politicians (Schrire,1992). Nevertheless, one third of white 
workers and two thirds of Afrikaners remained employed by the 
state, and central initiatives could still be thwarted by the 
minor officials who were the local interpreters of the daunting 
morass of new legislation. 
The direction that central reform initiatives should take, was 
suggested by the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions. Each was 
concerned with different aspects of the economic utilization of 
urban blacks. The Wiehahn Commission was set up to investigate 
industrial labour relations, while Riekert led a commission 
advising on efficient labour supplies and productivity. 
The Riekert Commission was established in 1977 and headed by 
Vorster's economic adviser. Riekert's enquiries began with the 
observation that apartheid's spatial framework was being 
undermined by social and economic pressures which could not be 
indefinitely resisted. These pressures consisted of internal and 
international opposition to the homelands and their continued 
economic decline; rapidly increasing rural to urban migration, 
with the early 1980s drought in particular, overcoming the 
defences of influx control, mounting opposition to the pass laws 
in the cities and the increased political and economic power of 
urban blacks. The report was influenced by the dominant Western 
free market approach to economic systems. The fundamental flaw in 
the present system was perceived as being its failure to 
accommodate market forces. "Market failures" included uneconomic 
racial discrimination, the coexistence of skilled labour 
shortages and unskilled labour surpluses, the legally constrained 
mobility of labour and the inhibitions on domestic economic 
growth (Pickles,1988). 
The report called for simplification and rationalisation of the 
laws controlling the labour market, but the white paper based on 
the report made it clear that "the question to which the 
commission and the government had to find an answer was not 
whether there should be influx control, but what the right 
mechanism for influx control would be in South Africa's 
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circumstances" (cited Pickles,1988). It was argued that influx 
control could still be achieved with non racially- discriminatory 
legislation, by limiting the lawful, urban black presence 
according to the availability of housing and employment. 
Section 10 rights would be extended to more, currently "illegal", 
urban blacks, but the exclusion of further blacks from the cities 
would be effected by limiting the housing available and enforcing 
the ejection of "illegals" by fining their employers (Adam and 
Moodley,1986). Thus, the distinction between black "insiders", to 
whom legal urban employment and housing opportunities were 
available, and rural "outsiders", to whom they were closed, was 
reinforced (Nattrass and Terreblanche,1990). 
Those wha qualified for section 10 rights would be stabilized, 
and given a stake in the status quo, through the option (already 
in place) of taking a 99 year lease on their municipal 
properties. Further, the report recommended that they be no 
longer subject to a legal job colour bar, and that the "petty" 
apartheid discrimination of the Separate Amenities Act should be 
removed. Finally, the industrial decentralisation programme 
should be injected with new vigour in order to slow the rate of 
black urbanisation, without overtly racist influx control. 
The Wiehahn Report complemented Riekert's vision of a more 
privileged black urban, working class. Investigation into labour 
relations in the cities yielded the finding that greater economic 
stability could follow from the recognition of black trade 
unions, and their cooptation into a formalised negotiating 
structure. Wiehahn advised that legally recognised trade unions 
exclude migrant workers, but the government's implementation of 
this restriction soon gave way in the face of trade union 
antagonism. Wiehahn shared Riekert's view that job colour bar 
legislation should be abolished (Horowitz, 1991). 
Both reports were striving for an urban economy run along more 
efficient allocative lines than existing legislation would allow. 
Economic efficiency lay at their heart - Ashforth, 1990, noting 
that these government reports, unlike preceding ones (excepting 
the Fagan Report), spoke of urban Africans as units of labour 
first. Their "African-ness" was only a secondary quality. Both 
sought to give capital a freer reign in its use of black labour 
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by removing the unnecessarily discriminatory aspects of labour 
legislation that hemmed it in. 
Economic efficiency was a salient influence on Botha's overall 
policy direction, as his government appreciated more the 
difficulties of South Africa's economic context. The country had 
experienced a brief period of economic recovery in the early 
1980s, buoyed up partly by the revived fortunes of gold in the 
international economy. But, by 1983, it was becoming increasingly 
clear that the phenomenon would be short lived. South African 
capitalists had not escaped the constraints of their own 
particular political economy: "they worry about calm labour 
relations and they dislike operating in a siege economy, cut off 
from technology, innovation, easy capital flows and access to 
markets abroad" (Adam and Moodley,1986,22). 
With the established restrictions on labour utilization and 
market size and, after 1983, a deterioration in external terms of 
trade, the extent of capital's professed reformism increased. In 
1984, ASSOCOM and the FCI both made representations to the 
government against the detention of black trade unionists, and in 
1985, they produced a "Manifesto on Reform", which called for "a 
universal citizenship" and "meaningful political participation" 
for all blacks. In September 1985, several prominent businessmen 
visited ANC representatives in Lusaka to sound out their attitude 
toward South African capital. While the representatives of 
capital remained diverse in their political attitudes and in 
their relationship to the state, a clear trend in favour of 
reform became more evident in the mid 1980s, a trend which was 
implicitly predicted in the Riekert and Wiehahn Reports. 
Elements of South African capital had experienced the economic 
constraints of apartheid legislation since the 1960s, but the 
government showed a greater willingness to listen in the 1980s, 
as South Africa's economic position became more evidently 
jeopardised. After 1982, the government itself was forced to 
borrow from abroad, in short term, uncovered loans (Lipton,1985) 
and the onset of severe drought increased the need to draw on 
external finance for disaster relief and homeland grain imports. 
Foreign capital was not only required for rural relief; it was 
also needed to cover spiralling security costs, as black 
202 
resistance mounted again. However, the increasing violence and 
televised police brutality which resulted from security measures 
(see next chapter), brought domestic pressure to bear on South 
Africa's creditors, to deny renewal of the loans. In 1985, South 
Africa found itself confronted with a comprehensive package of US 
sanctions and the refusal of lending institutions to renew short 
term loans of $14 billion, which were due for repayment. The 
subsequent debt crisis precipitated a drastic fall in the value 
of the rand and the closure of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, 
with the declaration of a moratorium on many of South Africa's 
foreign debts. 
"Market sanctions", like those of the banks, pursued out of 
economic self-interest, were probably more damaging to the South 
African economy than foreign government-imposed, politically 
guided sanctions, but "both Finance Minister Barend du Plessis 
and the South African Broadcasting Corporation (often regarded as 
a government mouthpiece) have credited sanctions with pushing the 
government toward social reform" (Grundy,1991,71). Nevertheless, 
groups within the government continued to take a contemptuous 
view of sanctions, particularly in the light of ARMSCOR's success 
in building a domestic weapons industry once denied open access 
to external trade. 
Botha's government paid more attention to the desires of capital 
than preceding ones, realizing that some degree of economic 
vitality was required for political stability. But the government 
did not see radical reform in the interests of capital as being 
necessary. Instead the political strategy developed in the late 
stages of Vorster's prime ministership and elaborated under 
Botha, would be sufficient to generate economic improvement. By 
stabilising a black urban group, and incorporating it within 
economic structures to a greater degree through trade union 
rights, the removal of some discriminatory labour legislation, 
improved education and home ownership, it was thought that 
capital's requirements could be met within the general racial 
structures which the government sought to maintain as part of its 
political strategy. 
Nolutshungu, 1982, argues, from a Marxist perspective, that the 
crucial goal at the centre of Botha's initial strategy, was the 
co-optation of the black petty bourgeoisie. It seems more likely 
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that it was the geographically defined, multi-class, urban black 
group which was singled out for co-optation (James,1984, cited 
Adam and Moodley,1986). The key government agencies hoped that 
this group would prefer the benefits of immediate material gains 
in wages and services, to agitation for improved status within 
the racial state. A memorandum to the Prime Minister from the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines claimed that such a preference was 
already being expressed in the cities: "The emergence of a 
"middle class" with Western type materialistic needs and 
ambitions has already occurred in these areas. The mature, 
family-orientated urban black already places the stability of his 
household uppermost and is more interested in his pay-packet than 
in politics" (cited Kane Berman,1979,156). Despite the reference 
to a "middle class", the primary division that such a development 
would foster is urban-rural, rather than class defined. 
The extension of privilege to urban blacks was justified by 
influential figures drawn from within the administrative 
establishment. In 1979, the economic adviser to Botha, S. Brand, 
wrote in the Rand Daily Mail, that the government had to "open 
the system in order to save it and build upon it" (cited 
Lipton,1985,59). A 1986 Broederbond publication emphasised that 
"the abolition of statutory discrimination measures must not be 
seen as concessions but as prerequisite for survival" (cited 
Horowitz, 1991,80). 
The decision to advance the material cause of urban blacks so as 
to bring them "on side" encouraged a perception that white, and 
particularly Afrikaner racial ideology, already fragmented under 
Vorster, was being abandoned under Botha in the interests of 
pragmatism. Sparks, 1991, wrote "The Afrikaner revolution is over 
and all that is left of it is the politics of survivalism. The 
fortress of the volk is to be defended, but there is no faith 
within its walls" (328), while the South African novelist, 
Christopher Hope, expressed the same theme metaphorically: 
"Pragmatism was the spur. And desperation. Those who ran 
the factory found they just didn't have enough hands to go 
round. To work the machine, once upon a time you had to be 
white, over 21, dedicated to the party and to the 
preservation of Western Christian civilization and believe 
that the Afrikaners were God's anointed. Nowadays anyone 
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could mind the machine, as long as they were willing to 
keep shooting. This policy of desperation went by the name 
of progress" (C. Hope, "The Hottentot Room",1986). 
There was certainly no abandonment of a racially conceived view 
of societal order though, and what black incorporation was 
envisaged, was to be firmly on the government's terms and only 
for the purpose of continued white supremacy. This would involve 
the jettisoning of some redundant, ideologically inspired racial 
legislation, but no fundamental re-evaluation of the racial 
paradigm. However, in government circles, there was a significant 
ideological shift within this paradigm. Malan and Verwoerd's 
ideological drive to segregate was gone. It was replaced by the 
resolution that what most whites now had would be protected by a 
"Total Strategy", des:'gned to combat the "Total Onslaught" to 
which white supremacy was now being subjected. 
These concepts - of a Total Onslaught and a Total Strategy - were 
first enunciated by Botha as Minister of Defence, in response to 
the increasingly hostile environment of 1975. With neighbouring 
states falling to socialist black governments, the exiled ANC in 
close collaboration with the Communist Party, and internal black 
workerist mobilization gaining sympathy from communist states, 
South Africa's security establishment perceived the various 
threats to white superiority to be coordinated by communist 
inspired activists. The Total Strategy was designed to counter 
this complex of opposition by mustering "all activities -
political, economic, diplomatic and military". By 1977, the 
Defence White Paper had added "psychological" to the list of 
spheres in which counter-attack would occur (Price,1991,85). 
The outline of the Total Strategy was based on French counter-
guerilla activity in Algeria, explicated by Beaufre 
(Sparks,1991). Price, 1991, identifies its elements as being 
simultaneous reform, repression and wider, regional initiatives. 
Reform was required to ease apartheid's economic bottlenecks and 
to create a black urban grouping sympathetic to the status quo. 
This would guard the political stability required for renewed 
international investment. In this reform initiative, the 
involvement of private capital would be crucial. 
With capital made more amenable by the removal of apartheid's 
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hindering labour legislation and increased resources for black 
education and training, it was hoped that the rewards that 
capital growth would bestow on urban blacks, would contribute to 
their co-optation. 
It would have been naive of the government to assume though, that 
sufficient material inducements to stability could be distributed 
to urban blacks in the short term. The masses of the urban poor 
would have to be rendered quiescent, in the face of unequal 
structures of power and privilege, by other means, while the 
amelioration of their deprivation progressed gradually. While 
firm repression would not ease their grievances, it would prevent 
them from bursting forth in spectacular, and economically 
damaging outbursts, like that of the Soweto uprising. 
Security analysts within the government were aware of the fact 
that the level of repression required would depend on the extent 
of perceived deprivation and the degree of expectation for future 
change. Security force repression, using detentions, bannings and 
later, surrogate vigilante violence, would help lower political 
expectations, by demonstrating the power of the white state and 
its determination to control events. It also served to reassure 
the ruling party's white constituency - in the 1987 whites' 
general election, the NP slogan "Reform-yes! Surrender-no!", was 
convincing on the evidence of repression under a State of 
Emergency, and it helped prevent wholesale defection to the 
Conservative Party, formed from the extreme verkrampte wing of 
the NP in 1982 (Schrire,1992). In the early period of Botha's 
premiership, the contradiction between a path of internationally 
publicised repression (despite media censorship), and the goal of 
presenting a reformist and stable image to the world, was not yet 
appreciated. 
In order to neutralize the external threat posed by Marxist and 
ANC sympathising governments across South Africa's borders, a 
third dimension was added to the reform-repress package. This was 
a regional policy to establish a "constellation" of client states 
within the region, economically dependent on, and therefore 
politically amenable to the South African government. With South 
African economic and political hegemony over the entire southern 
African region, the government could not only enlarge markets for 
its own capitalists, but also demand that the ANC be denied the 
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opportunity to organise its external opposition and internal 
guerilla activities from anywhere near South Africa's borders. 
The government hoped that the dependence of proximate states on 
South Africa's economy would simultaneously prevent their 
advocation of further international sanctions against South 
Africa. 
The destabilization of independent economic and political 
progress, which would ensure these states' dependence on South 
African patronage, began with the collapse of their white 
regimes. The long catalogue of South African intervention in the 
region includes repeated SADF incursions into Angola in support 
of Jonas Savimbi's opposition UNITA movement, support for 
Muzorewa against Mugabe in Zimbabwe, the sponsorship of the DTA 
as an alternative to SWAPO in South African occupied Namibia and 
a litany of violent, destructive acts performed by South African 
backed RENAMO in Mozambique (see Hanlon,1986, Johnson and Martin 
eds.1989, Barber and Barratt,1990). While these actions did not 
necessarily ensure fully compliant regimes in the region, they 
did, by and large, help effect the non-functioning of the least 
stable, hostile neighbouring governments, particularly Mozambique 
and Angola. Nevertheless, South Africa's economic hegemony was 
resisted by surrounding states, its threat prompting the 
formation of the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) by Southern African states determined to forge 
a degree of economic independence from their aggressively 
dominant neighbour. The initiative was aided by Western 
recognition, and some material assistance. 
As part of its Total Strategy, in the early 1980s, the state, as 
we have seen, tried to involve capital in a more strategic role 
within the power bloc. A complementary goal, which gained more 
momentum as the decade wore on, was the withdrawal of the state 
from the extent of economic intervention which it had assumed 
under the NP. Price, 1991, argues that central state intervention 
was what distinguished apartheid from colonial segregation. It 
was the central state which had become the target of rebellion 
over the last three decades. Its partial withdrawal from economic 
and administrative intervention would both remove a focus for 
resistance, and effect a much needed reduction in government 
expenditure. A privatisation of the state's role could also 
dovetail with the strategy of coopting a black urban group to 
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support government and business. An early example was the 1983 
decision to sell off a part of the state's black housing stock. 
The goal of a home-owning, stabilized, black urban group was 
furthered in the Cape by the new "Coloured" area of Mitchell's 
Plain being made available only for purchase and not for rent 
(Mabin and Parne11,1983). 
Municipal house sales to occupants progressed slowly at first, 
but gathered pace towards the end of the 1980s, particularly in 
Soweto, where over 40% of the formal housing stock is now owner 
occupied, and elite areas like "Beverley Hills" have developed 
(Lemon,1991). The privatisation of public utilities was extended 
from 1985, becoming the "greatest structural change in the 
development of South African commercial history since the 
establishment of ISCOR in 1927" (Davenport,1991, 493). A 1987 
white paper laid guidelines for further state withdrawal and 
ISCOR itself was placed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in 
1989, with South African Transport Services and the Post Office 
to follow. Towards the end of the 1980s, a further motive was 
attached to this progression by some observers - that of leaving 
a future black run government with fewer economic assets under 
its direct control and thus, less potential for the 
redistribution of resources to blacks, in the way that the NP had 
used the state for Afrikaners. 
Government economic policy in the 1980s extended beyond the 
privatisation of key assets in line with current Western 
thinking, to include encouragement of more general restructuring 
of the economy. By the early 1980s, South Africa had encountered, 
along with many other states, the classic limits to an import 
substitution policy, following from restricted internal markets 
and the need to import capital goods. The government recognised 
that an initiative needed to be taken in finding new 
international markets. A 1985 white paper stressed the need to 
develop the manufacturing of a "balanced promotion of exports" 
(Wellings and Black,1986). Consequently export incentives were 
revamped and government assistance given to restructure certain 
targeted industries. To stimulate internal restructuring, tariffs 
and quotas on certain competing imports were lifted. Once again, 
the specific economic aim of the government slotted into its 
wider strategic and political goals. With closer links to world 
markets, there should follow an improvement in international 
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relations, and more sympathy for the reform package being 
implemented within the country. 
Through the combined components of the Total Strategy, Botha 
sought the same goal as his predecessor - the maintenance of the 
white political and economic supremacy that had been forged over 
three centuries, and consolidated under Afrikaner patronage in 
the Nationalist Party's apartheid years. Now though, the 
mechanisms of supremacy would have to change to accommodate new 
global and domestic circumstances. The reforms of Botha's 
administration were often criticised as being "cosmetic". 
To the extent that they reflected no other goal than the 
established one, that view is accurate, but, as Botha found to 
his cost, "the political, social and economic dynamics into which 
reforms are introduced may produce a significant erosion of white 
power nonetheless" (Price,1991,83). 
3. Reform Initiatives 
The new constitution, announced in 1983 and effected from 1984, 
was the first significant legislative step away from rigid, 
racial separate development, and tentatively, towards a fuller 
image of nationhood. "Coloured" and Indian political 
representatives were to join the business community and sections 
of the black urban classes, in a coopted amalgam with vested 
interests in the new system (Nattrass and Terreblanche,1990). As 
a strategic initiative, the new constitution was a perfect 
example of the problem-solving, "technocratic" image that Botha's 
government wished to project (Marks and Trapido,1987). 
Under the new political dispensation, two parallel houses were 
added to the House of Assembly (the white parliament). The House 
of Delegates would represent South Africa's Indian population, 
while the House of Representatives would accommodate "Coloured" 
MPs. Each house was empowered to legislate on its "own affairs", 
but these would be defined by the State President. What he 
defined as "general affairs" would be the province of the 
Cabinet, but legislation in general affairs would normally be 
passed by all three Houses. The office of State President itself 
would replace the office of Prime Minister, and the President 
would be emplaced by an electoral college of 50 white, 25 
"Coloured" and 13 Indian MPs, drawn from their respective Houses. 
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A President's Council, comprised of 10 "Coloured", 5 Indian and 
20 white MPs, plus 25 appointed by the President would advise the 
President on controversial legislation. 
The complexity of the Tricameral Parliament system was largely 
due to the fact that it was "designed to ensure that policy could 
be made and implemented regardless of the behaviour of the 
"Coloured" and Indian chambers" (Schrire,1992,65). Several 
inbuilt mechanisms would ensure this. Firstly, the President's 
Council, with a guaranteed majority of whites, would break 
deadlocks between the parliamentary chambers, and could therefore 
force through legislation opposed by the two black Houses. 
Secondly, the white House of Assembly was given the capacity to 
act as Parliament if the other two chambers failed to function. 
Thirdly, there was a.fixed 4:2:1 numerical ratio of 
white:"Coloured":Indian representation in the system, reflecting 
the population sizes of the three legally defined groups and 
entrenching white hegemony. Finally, the separation of these 
groups into discrete Houses made it "impossible for genuine 
cross-racial coalitions to develop" (Schrire,1992,65). 
Apart from the incorporation of "Coloured" and Indian 
representatives, however ineffectually, into the system of 
government, the new constitution had two other effects, one 
deliberate, the other unintended. The former was the formal 
consolidation of Botha's grip on the reigns of government. From 
being a Prime Minister alongside a non-executive State President, 
he was now executive State President, like that of the US. With 
the transition, Botha's closest security advisers won greater 
influence over policy, while the influence of the cabinet, the NP 
parliamentary caucus, Parliament and the civil service 
correspondingly diminished (Schrire,1992,42). 
The second effect turned out, in the long run, to be very costly 
for the new executive elite. This was the African reaction to 
being completely left out of the new central government 
dispensation (see next chapter). The only clauses in the Act 
relating to this majority were that "The control and 
administration of Black affairs shall rest with the State 
President", and that consideration of "Black affairs" would be 
the common concern of the Tri-cameral Parliament, since they are 
included in the definition of "general affairs" (Wolpe,1988,93). 
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The government's concessions to Africans were still only those 
which fitted the strategy of coopting the economically and 
politically crucial urban group. Initiatives at the level of 
local township representation complemented the strategy, but the 
national representation in Parliament of a numerically superior 
African population, went far beyond it. While this could be 
envisaged for "Coloured" and Indian populations smaller than the 
white population, not even a precedent-setting toehold in 
Parliament could be accorded to Africans. 
Botha's "securocrat" government be 	 that the crucial African 
classes - those already performing a vital economic function in 
white cities - could be co-opted by the amelioration of their 
political and economic position at the metropolitan level, thus 
preserving central political power for the white population and 
its "Coloured" and Indian "allies". The proposed changes in urban 
African administration were based on two principles suggested by 
Riekert's recommendations. The first was that influx control 
would be maintained, but in a less patently racist guise. Limits 
on urban housing and services, instead of the racially based 
legal code that was currently used, would ensure that few more 
Africans would migrate to the cities. Stadler, 1987, describes 
this development as a revival of "liberal" methods of 
segregation, eschewed by Stallard in the 1920s and Verwoerd in 
the 1950s and 1960s, but adopted in the light of late 20th 
century conditions of incorporation in a world economy. 
But plans to limit the expansion of the relatively privileged 
urban "insider" group were soon seen by the government to have 
been overly optimistic. The post-1982 recession and the 
consequent breakdown in rural labour recruitment, plus the 
economic state of the homelands, made access to the urban economy 
essential for many rural poor. Despite limits on housing and job 
availability, by 1989, there were an estimated 7 million informal 
settlers around city peripheries and an average of 15 people to a 
four-roomed house in the formal townships (Lemon,1991,20). 
With the failure of market forces to halt African urbanisation, 
an alternative component of government spatial intervention 
assumed more emphasis. The government once again turned to the 
decentralisation of industry as a force to deflect urban growth. 
In the 1980s, decentralisation was also pursued for an 
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additional, non-political reason. This was the P-W-V metropolitan 
region's shortage of water supplies - the result of intensified 
industrial agglomeration in a relatively arid environment. 
During the 1980s, Botha's government recast Vorster's policy of 
decentralisation into a more regional and functional framework. 
Botha's aim was no longer purely to decentralise to growth points 
in or near each homeland, tut to establish eight (later nine) 
Development Regions. The new regions cut across homeland borders 
and, for planning purposes, integrated sections of the homelands 
with the metropolitan centres to which they were already 
functionally linked (Lipton,1986). The system represented a step 
towards a more pragmatic planning of South Africa's economic 
,cconumi L.ally defined regions, containing both the 
metropolitan centres and their labour source regions, regardless 
of homeland boundaries, were to replace the Verwoerdian racial-
come spatial administrative divisions. Tor example, Durban's 
labour source region in the northern Transkei was included in the 
"white" city's metropolitan region. 
Within the nine regions, four types of industrial development 
areas were identified. From 1182, incentives were offered to 
processing and assembly industries to locate at Deconcentration 
Points (mostly near homeland borders) and Industrial Development 
Points. The Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) was 
established to facilitate private investment away from the 
Metropolitan Areas, and direct controls were placed on further 
industrial expansion in these areas, to replace the existing 
indirect fiscal controls. 
There is no consensus over the result of the policy. Some 
decentralisation followed its implementation (the decentralised 
areas' share of employment increased from 12.S% in 1372 to 19.3% 
in 1984), but the significance of, and motivation for this 
outcome are debateable. One viewpoint is that it was market 
forces rather than the government's intervention, which enticed 
industries to the target areas. The movement of labour intensive 
processes to homeland and border areas, where labour is cheap 
enough to improve competitivzHcoo .ith impucts, Iefluts uunuept5 
elucidated by Harvey, 1982 and Massey, 1984, on the increasing 
geographical mobility of capital and its changing technology (see 
also Gregory and Urry,1985). The industries which have taken 
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advantage of the decentralisation package do tend to be light and 
labour intensive - clothing and metal products in particular. 
However, generally, "efforts to redistribute population and 
economic activity are consistently undermined by the primate city 
and core region biases inherent in many sectoral policies -
import substitution, subsidised urban services, international 
terms of trade distortions etc." (Richardson, 1987, cited 
Tomlinson,1990,137). Before the new decentralisation package was 
announced, many small labour intensive industries had relocated 
from Johannesburg, to Durban and Cape Town for instance, but not 
to the areas favoured under the government scheme. Industrial 
relocation was largely deconcentration to "border areas" already 
integrated with the metropolitan cores, rather than wider 
decentralisation (Wellings and Black,1986). 
The fact that, after 1982, firms moved to the decentralisation 
points like Isithebe and Dambuza is best explained by the 
government's employment subsidies, making labour free, or even 
allowing for excess revenue to be made on it, rather than as a 
local reflection of the global restructuring of capital. Many of 
those firms that did relocate under the government's patronage 
were eventually to see metropolitan labour as ultimately cheaper, 
given the drawbacks associated with their new location. Once the 
government's monetary incentives are withdrawn, it is ouite 
possible that these companies may move back to core regions. 
For Botha's immediate strategy of containing urban African 
population growth, if the industry could not be moved to homeland 
borders on a large scale, an alternative was to encourage the 
growth of homeland towns near those borders, so that workers 
could service the metropolitan economy, but reside outside its 
administrative boundaries. By 1982, there were already over 
700,000 of these "frontier commuters", many making excessively 
long journeys to and fro work each day (Lemon,1982). To some 
extent these workers assumed the function of the migrant workers 
who had traditionally serviced the metropolitan economies 
(Tomlinson,1990). Where homeland borders were too far away for 
the growth of white South African cities to be deflected within 
them, informal settlements inside "white South Africa" were often 
planned at unnecessarily great distances from urban workplaces, 
while anti-squatting controls were enforced over land nearer the 
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cities. The remaining racially-based influx control legislation 
was finally repealed in 1986, but in a climate of black 
insurrection which made its repeal alone insufficient to meet 
expectations. 
Despite the state's pursuit of continued influx control by other 
"liberal" means, the fact of massive and continued informal 
settlement growth suggests that the state had in fact "lost 
control of the black housing situation and in losing that control 
another pillar in the urban apartheid edifice is crumbling" 
(Maylam,1990). However, informal, "liberal" influx control may 
have partially achieved its aims. Given that there is already 
extensive peri-urbanisation in the non-agricultural homeland 
fringes - a development actively encouraged by "liberal" 
apartheid - the removal of restraints on urbanisation may not 
result in rapid urban growth, and the "rush to the cities" once 
urban apartheid crumbled, predicted by some, may turn out to be 
illusory. 
The second principle of urban African administration was that 
some African political autonomy would be granted, beyond the 
functions of the existing community councils in the townships. 
African residents in the cities were to have their own Black 
Local Authorities (BLAs). The Black Local Authorities Act of 1982 
set up Village and Town -Councils, resembling white local 
authorities, for the townships. They would have more powers and 
autonomy than the Community Councils they were to replace. Black 
Local authorities were devised partially as an unofficial quid 
pro quo for African exclusion from the Tricameral system, despite 
the official government line that African representation was 
already provided for in the homelands. The Regional 
Administration Boards which had held responsibility for township 
control were abolished, and their supervision of the Black Local 
Authorities passed on to the provinces. 
However, the main source of the Administration Boards' 
independent revenue - sorghum beer sales - had dried up by the 
mid 1980s, with shebeens destroyed in the 1976 revolt, and many 
Africans switching their consumption to commercial lagers. As the 
BLAB assumed administrative responsibility for the townships 
(including the unpopular tasks of influx control and the removal 
of "illegals"), they found themselves unable to become, as the 
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government intended, self-financing. Their response to fiscal 
difficulty was a series of rent and service levy hikes; an 
important factor in the next, deepest and most violent phase of 
black resistance (see next chapter). 
The Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were a later element in the 
Botha government's adjustment of apartheid's spatial forms. The 
BLAs had, by the mid 1980s, become virtually unworkable across 
large swathes of the country. The 1980s township insurrection, 
detailed in the next chapter, accomplished their failure as 
legitimate, or even functioning institutions. By 1985, a more 
radical gesture towards urban African service provision and 
administration was required, from an internally and externally 
beleaguered government. The RSCs were intended to fulfil this 
role. 
Despite the evident rejection of the BLAs in the townships, the 
government still saw their fundamental weakness not so much An 
terms of their racially defined constitution, but in terms of 
their fiscal limitations (Lemon,1991). The RSCs would encompass 
the BLAs alongside white, Indian and "Coloured" local 
authorities, and coordinate redistribution of financial resources 
between these authorities. This would allow the upgrading of 
black townships using finance partially and indirectly drawn from 
local white areas, thus providing a more positive image for the 
BLAs. The administrative functions, lost in some townships to the 
informal civic and street structures of the - mid 1980s 
insurrection, could also be reclaimed by local authorities with 
enhanced fiscal clout. The RSCs can be seen as part of the 
"hearts and minds" component of the government's Total Strategy, 
their provision of urban services and utilities buyincalm in 
the townships. 
By 1987, eight RSCs were established. In Natal, at KwaZulu leader 
Buthelezi's insistence, Metropolitan Joint Service Boards, 
linking the province and homeland administrations, were set up 
instead. RGC members are nominated by the white, "Coloured", 
Indian and African local authorities within their administrative 
boundaries, but voting power is proportional to the level of 
services consumed by each local authority, Invariably leaving the 
white local authority's representatives with a controlling 
interest. In 1990, the voting power of Soweto, by far the largest 
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settlement in its central Witwatersrand Region, was only 17.27% 
on its RSC (Lemon,1991). However, consensus is often achieved on 
the boards of the RSCs without recourse to voting. Their finance 
comes from taxes on employment and turnover of local business, 
including state concerns, which contribute about half of the 
total budget (Lemon,1991). Since one of the functions of the RSCs 
is to redistribute spending from white to black areas within the 
regions, it was thought too politically sensitive to finance them 
from white rates. 
Money indirectly raised in white areas has nevertheless been used 
for the upgrading of township services. Yet there has been no 
noticeable improvement in the efficiency of the BLAs benefitting 
from J.L .-c r i name, and "there is little evidence that RSCs have 
won greater legitimacy for official local government structures" 
(Lemon,1991). This is largely because, to urban Africans, as well 
as academic observers, "it seems clear that their prime objective 
is indirect promotion of the legitimacy of official local 
government structures by means of their redistributive function" 
(Lemon,1991,25). Their imposition, without consultation, by the 
state and their reliance on the same racially based local 
authorities that had been rejected by black communities, rendered 
the RSCs similarly politically unacceptable. 
The government was finally forced to concede de jure recognition 
to some racially integrated local government structures in 1988. 
The rrao Oettlevent Areas (FSA) Act recognised pre-existing "grey 
areas" of inter-racial settlement in certain cities, and 
provision was made for the election by residents of their non-
racial management committees. Only whites could continue to vote 
on a separate roll for the local authority administrating the 
FSA. Even in August 1989, the government was continuing to 
encourage whites to report on black neighbours contravening the 
Group Areas Act outside of the FSAs, but the fact that little 
subsequent action was taken against these illegal residents, and 
that in many cases, their residence was then formally recognised, 
suggests that the goveinmeilt encouragemezt was motivated more by 
a desire to retain the conservative vote in the forthcoming 
election than by a continuing pursuit of residential segregation. 
Meanwhile, the NP and Democratic Party (DP) council in 
Johannesburg was requesting that the whole city be declared a 
FSA, thus by-passing the Group Areas Act, while Cape Town's 
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council was calling instead for complete exemption from Act 
(Lemon,1991). 
While the overall conclusion on Botha's reforms will be left to 
the next chapter, once the reaction to them has also been 
described, something of their "performance" in relation to the 
government's aims has been implicit throughout this chapter. 
Botha had inherited a set of economic recommendations from 
Vorster's premiership, and had tried to implement them as part of 
a wider, political "Total Strategy". But even a "Total Strategy" 
ocAild not predict and acco- 	 -odate the events which were to ensue 
when a continuing struggle against apartheid was combined with 
the partial reform of the system. 
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Chapter Seven  
Policy and Reality 
Introduction  
Many of the Botha administration's reform initiatives either had 
repercussions which were unintended, or simply failed in their 
implementation. Rather than being determined solely by government 
policy, the course of South Africa's economic and political 
development in the 1980s was dictated by a complex welter of 
dynamic and unpredictable factors. Both in broad outline and in 
local implementation, central state aims were rarely achieved 
before they were undermined or overcome by unpredicted events. 
The single most important reason why Botha's technocratic 
reformulation of apartheid failed to engender stability was that 
state policy was met in the mid 1980s by widespread township-
based ins6rrecticn. The -grievances behind black anti-apartheid 
mobilization on an unprecedented scale and the agencies and 
structures which helped mobilize black counter-state power, are 
the subject of the first section of this chapter. The second 
attempts to delineate the structural conflicts, between state and 
activists, and between black wiyemipativii* and tendencies, -valid., 
combined to create the conditions of violence characterising 
South African townships in the 1980s and early 1990s. The state's 
repressive response to insurrection, recent political 
developments in the homelands, and shifts in white attitudes 
resulting from the insurrection, are traced in the third section, 
providing the context for De Klerk's abandonment of apartheid 
structures. 
1. Grievances and Mobilization 
T.. -LI.. 4,,n17.- 
ill tile SUVO, ILAJLIM $ rVIurmiot. gc6iernment. encoth,Lerev vcncment 
resistance to its very authority. While the structures of 
government could not possibly be overthrown, and outright armed 
rebellion was unlikely to develop in the Gouth African context, 
form the mid 1980s, in specific places and for specific periods, 
the organs of the state were by-passed and displaced by popular 
township organisations. The events of August-November 1984, in 
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the East Rand (Vaal triangle) townships of South Africa's 
industrial heartland, are seen as a "watershed in contemporary 
South African history" (Price,1991,184). These events, which, 
with hindsight, presaged the dismantling of apartheid 
(Terreblanche and Nattrass,1220), manifested a fundamental shift 
in the balance of power, away from the state, and towards the 
black resistance movements. 
Giliomee and Schlemmer, 1989, have cited the government's own 
political initiatives as the partial cause of the rebellion. 
Botha's government embarked on reform just when the economy was 
beginning to resume its deterioration after the brief early 1980s 
reprieve. In the early 1980s, township inhabitants had been led 
to anticipate significant material improvements. Consequently, 
the sense of deprivation was relatively greater when significant 
material gains failed to materialize from the reform programme. 
In common with Louis XVI, Botha found that "The most dangerous 
moment for a bad government is usually that when it enters upon 
the work of reform" (De Tocqueville, "The Ancien Regime", 
Everyman Classics edition,1988). 
The government expected to cover the costs of township upgrading 
from economic growth. Instead, the 1980s became a period of 
economic stagnation as OPEC oil price rises, an Arab anti-
apartheid oil embargo, international recession, a falling gold 
price, and apartheid's own structural economic impediments took 
their to on South Africa's economic vitality. Crom 1266 to 
1986, GNP rose by under 4%, while the population increased by 
over 12% (Price,1991,159). It was therefore not only impossible 
to make good earlier material promises, but difficult to stop 
black living standards in general from falling. With rising 
inflation, leading to increased administration costs, Pretoria 
felt that it had no option but to make its township reforms self-
financing. Many township councils in the late 1970s were already 
on the verge of bankruptcy and the BLAB would have to raise rents 
and service levies to cover their costs. In the early 1980s, 
greater and greater chunks of income being appropriated in rent, 
became a salient feature of township life. In 1982 the situation 
was exacerbated as an IMF freeze on consumer subsidies led to a 
sales tax increase which shifted the fiscal burden onto the poor 
(Lodge,1992). The fact that the population of the townships was 
swollen by prolonged rural drought in the early 1980s, 
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contributed to the groundswell of discontent (Lodge,1992). 
The Botha government's initial overtures to the wider world 
proved just as unreliable as its economic strategy. The 
"organisational effervescence" (Price,1991) of the early 1980s 
was insignificantly hindered by the state as it sought to discard 
its repressive image and present a reformist image to 
international investors and foreign governments. Consequently, an 
"organizational foundation for a sustainable multi-class 
nationwide movement of liberation" (Price,1991,160) was laid 
during the early years of Botha's premiership. Even when the 
Mate did react to black zotilization with repression, it was 
precisely those black leaders who could, and probably would have 
moderated developing forms of resistance, who were detained and 
restricted (Giliomee and Schlemmer,1989). 
Within the black communiti-es, the earliest manifestation of a 
resurgence of defiance after 1976 came in township schools. For 
many, school was the primary point of contact with state 
restrictions and direct authority, and as in 1976, educational 
issues could not be isolated from the wider social and economic 
concerns of the township. With unemployment levels reaching 40% 
among the African population by the late 1980s, and 55% of the 
African population being under 20 years old (Lodge,1992), 
educational grievances became linked to wider mobilizational 
factors. The deteriorating conditions of education prompted the 
formation of the charterist Congress of South African Students 
(COSAS) and the BC orientated Azanian Students Organisation 
(AZASO) in 1979. The two organisations launched a schools 
boycott, beginning in Cape Town and, by 1981, spreading 
nationwide. 
The most obvious grievances of the Cape Town students were a lack 
of books, broken windows, a lack of electricity and the summary 
removal of three popular teachers. Their discontent was 
exacerbated with the refusal to re-admit pupils who had failed 
their matriculation exams and the use of SADF veterans in 
teachiN roles. With such grievances widespread, the boycott 
developed into a popular response. In Cape Town, student placards 
had initially proclaimed "Rights not Riots" (Western,1982) and 
for the first month of protest there were no casualties. Then two 
"Coloured" children were shot dead as they stoned white vehicles 
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at Elsies. The shootings served to polarise sentiments and, two 
weeks later, on the anniversary of the Soweto uprising, there was 
an almost total work stayaway in Cape Town, followed by large 
scale civil unrest. 
Wolpe, 1988, charts the subsequent course of the schools boycott 
in the Pretoria area. It began in 1983, with the demand for free 
textbooks to be provided in class, better qualified teachers, an 
end to corporal punishment and sexual harassment and the 
recognition of elected Student Representative Councils (SRCs). In 
a climate of general township unrest, the movement spread and the 
SRCs extended their aspirations from reform, to control over the 
education that Africans received. 
By 1985, in South Africa as a whole, C50,0-00 students were 
receiving no education. The government's Department of Education 
and Training began closing schools, while the boycott's leaders 
were detained, harassed and, frequently, killed. COGAG was banned 
in August 1985 and the SADF began to move not only into the 
townships, but into the schools as well (for a local instance of 
the conflict this caused, see Kentridge,1991, 104-109). What had 
begun as a boycott over specific educational grievances had 
mutated under the slogan "Liberation First, Education Later", 
into a 'Key corponent of insiirrection. "The boycott was no longer 
a tactic, it was a strategy" (Wolpe,1988,207). 
This evolution was by no means wholly welcomed by the leaders of 
wider black resistance. The debate over the appropriateness of 
the schools boycott as a strategy to achieve a more balanced and 
equal education was a significant component of 1980s resistance 
politics, with many concerned at the prospect of a future 
generation of totally uneducated urban youth, and, more 
i—ediately, the perception that the boycott was a goal in 
itself, which meant that no benefit could be derived from its 
negotiated end. 
In the light of these concerns, a National Education Crisis 
Committee (NCCC) was established by concerned parents. "To the 
students' cry of "Liberation Before Education" the NECC 
counterpoised the slogan "Education For Liberation" 
(Price,1991,212). The NECC began writing new History and English 
curricula in 1986, and in Soweto and parts of the Eastern Cape, 
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two days were set aside in some schools for an alternative 
education, the teachers being paid by the community. The 
envisaged education would be generally anti-capitalist in 
outlook. With this substitution of state structures by community 
ones, educational resistance entered the phase of insurrection. 
By the late 1980s, in the absence of state measures to 
conciliate, thousands of pupils remained outside school. 
The causes of the schools boycott fed into wider township 
or 	 and resistance early on, and the wider insurrection 
had already started before the founding of the NEM In the 
Western Cape, boycotting students directly helped to organise a 
community boycott of meat in support of striking workers. Soon 
after its inception, COSAS began to mobilize young workers and 
the unemployed as well as students. The boycott strategy itself 
was adopted in a wider range of actions, with a revival of the 
bus boycott in Durban and East London forcing capitulation over 
increased fares in 1982-3. 
Within urban African communities though, the most obvious 
generators of grievances in the mid 1980s were the BLAs. It was 
the experience of their administration which townships all over 
the country had in common, and which served to mobilize a 
nationwide response to local grievances. The Civic associations 
which articulated these grievances began as geographically 
limited, single, or few-issue organisations, but they developed 
as the skeleton of a national movement in black society. At 
first, in Soweto, local residents were organised Informally in 
neighbourhood associations which petitioned the authorities over 
specific local grievances - rents, fares and removals in 
partictilar {Price,1991). Such organisations extended into broad 
popular associations, initially in the Eastern Cape, Port 
Elizabeth and the Cape peninsula (particularly in the "Coloured" 
areas). In addition to tackling local problems like transport, 
rents and poor recreational and child care facilities, 
"alternative" newspapers were published. The movements were 
frequently successful in fulfilling immediate community 
aspirations, for instance wielding local pressure to get shelters 
for commuter bus stops (Lodge,1992). 
Wider political participation followed these immediate gains, but 
the shift to a popular mass base often occurred even where local 
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organisations were less successful, as the government's rejection 
of their petitions prompted the formation of a more organised, 
formal civic group. 
Police repression of the civic structures precipitated an 
extension of local grievances into anti-state politics in 
general. Continued local organisation and alliance with parallel 
groups in otter locations and other oppositional groups in the 
same locality, allowed the civics as an amalgam to become a new 
mass political force, infusing a "politics of refusal" among 
township activists and coordinating school, consumer, bus and 
rent boycotts as well as political stayaways. 
The organisational cohesion for an alliance of such locally based 
structures of defiance had emerged in 1983, with the founding of 
the United Democratic Front (UDF) in response to Africans' 
exclusion from the new constitution. The UDF was an umbrella body 
which incorporated community organisations as affiliates in the 
immediate anti-constitution-struggle. The state-sponsored 
election campaign for the BLAs allowed it space to campaign 
against their very -existence as a sutstitute for national 
representation, but its longer term objective was the development 
of a non-racial, unitary state. From its inception the movement 
was vaguely Charterist in philosophy, and it adopted the Freedom 
Charter overtly in 1985. 
The UDF's strength was derived from its interweaving of the 
various strands of resistance that township communities across 
the country had developed. Its founding conference included 82 
civic, 33 student, 338 youth (many local branches of Congresses), 
18 worker, 32 women's, 16 religious, 27 political and 29 other 
organisations (Price,1-981). "from tbe vantage -point of the state, 
the UDE was like a weed with deep roots" (Price,1991,179), and 
under UDF leadership, local and national political struggles 
became conceptually indistinguishable in the minds of many 
activists. 
By its very nature as a front t,umpi i0;ng many diverse units of 
organisation, the UDF's membership contained competing 
perceptions and prescriptions. Brewer, 1989a, identifies three 
main ideological tendencies within the Front. "Nationalists" 
mobilized around the figure of Nelson Mandela - almost as a folk 
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hero whilst imprisoned - and accorded the Freedom Charter a 
central place in the philosophy of the struggle. "National 
Democrats" were more socialist oriented. For them the Charter was 
a first step in a progression towards a socialist state, and the 
UDF's populism, a means to that end. The workers would be in the 
vanguard of this advance. This tendency was taken to an extreme 
by the "Gocialists" themselves, who interpreted apartheid as a 
particular form of Western backed imperialism: "Leninism may be 
dead in Eastern Europe but it is not dead in the townships" 
(Horowitz,1991,20). Many of the unemployed youth who supported 
the UDF adopted a political position towards this extreme. "For 
them the millennial alternative held out by the ANC/GACP's 
"vulgar Marxism" (a phrase of Johnson,1977) may be all the more 
compelling, removed as they are from the compromises and limited 
rewards of conducting their everyday existence within the labour 
process of a capitalist firm" Orewer,1303a,227). 
From outside the UDF, other influences penetrated the movement. 
While Africanists and BC sympathizers, who were philosophically 
opposed to the UDF's nonracial Charterism, remained separately 
organised, they had a significant ideological impact on the UDF's 
membership. 
Examples include the use of the word "Black" to include all who 
are oppressed by race in South Africa, the preference for the 
term nonracialism over multiracialism and the Africanist 
application of the for d "settler" to whites other than those who 
shifted their attitudes to become Africans too (Horowitz,1991). 
These appellations indicate more than just an influence over 
nomenclature; they represent the infusion of a Black 
Conscivusness/Africanist ideological stance into mainstream 
Charterist politics. 
To a greater extent than the ANC of the 1950s, the UDF of the 
1980s incorporated specifically women's struggles in its agenda. 
Membership of uor affiliated women's organisations like the 
Federation of Transvaal Women, grew as women leaders emphasised 
the overlapping of three spheres of oppression: race, class and 
gender. South African social structure, it was pointed out, is 
organised so as to inflict particular penalties on black working 
class women, with racial laws being applied to keep women and 
their reproductive potential out of the urban areas and in the 
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homelands, where paternalistic social structures prevail; with 
women concentrated in the lower paid sectors of the economy -
domestic service, agricultural and industrial shift work - and 
clustering in the low paying "border" industries; with a lack of 
maternity leave or benefit for many workers and with an almost 
complete absence of child care provision. Such pressures 
accounted for the unprecedented success in the number of women 
mobilized, and integrated with wider political resistance. 
Nevertheless, a disproportionate number of women, compared with 
men, remained unpoliticized during the insurrection, wishing 
merely to remain detached from political strife. 
The partial mobilization of a women's constituency was 
accompanied by that of an Indian constituency within the UDF. The 
Natal Indian Congress was revived after its post 1960s decline, 
to help organise a boycott of the elections for an advisory South 
African Indian Council in 1981. An 8% participation rate in the 
polls represented the first significant funnelling of local 
Indian anger into national politics since the 1950s (Lodge,1992). 
However, while the Natal and Transvaal Indian Congresses aligned 
with the UDF, most Indians preferred to remain apolitical, and 
"the serious Durban anti-Indian riots of 1949 and some much 
milder but threatening episodes in 1974, 1985 and 1990 have 
served to remind many Indians of the dangers that have befallen 
Asian communities elsewhere in Africa" (Horowitz,1991,82). Many 
Indians went towards the opposite extreme of those affiliating 
with the UDF, by withdrawing into political conservatism, 
especially those who had accumulated significant material 
possessions. 
In comparison, a greater proportion of "Coloureds" took part in 
UDF-orchestrated insurrectionary acts. Horowitz puts this down to 
a feeling of betrayal, felt by "Coloureds" as a result of the 
injustices imposed upon them by a state dominated by fellow 
Afrikaans speakers, in particular the massive forced removals 
they were subjected to in the 1960s. Yet, there was still a large 
proportion of the "Coloured" population that could be considered 
apolitical, even in the midst of an insurrection. 
Despite the variations in political mobilization, both within and 
between apartheid's racial groups, the UDF's campaign for 
"Coloureds" and Indians to boycott the national polls and for 
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Africans to boycott those for the BLAs, was largely successful. 
From November to December 1983, 21% of registered voters 
participated in the BLA elections, while 18% of "Coloured" and 
20% of Indian eligible voters took part in the Tricameral 
elections (Price,1991, cited 183). These results encouraged the 
civics to extend their ambit so as to by-pass BLAs in as many 
tcopc.,to as pvao;bic by dcvalupiuy oltc,“ative and informal 
systems of township management, extending even to informal 
courts. 
(However, as the level of township violence rose during the mid 
1980s, the extent of national leaders' restraint over the 
activities of such bodies became questionable). 
More than the partial racial alliance (also including an 
unprecedented level of white anti-apartheid commitment) that the 
UDF represented, it was its potential for economic disruption 
that made it powerful. In the 1980s, black trade unions 
coordinated skilled and economically vital manufacturing workers, 
in addition to the unskilled and plentiful workers that they had 
marshalled in the 1950s. ""Amandla ngawethu!" ("Power is Ours!") 
was a slogan inherited from the 1950s. Then it voiced an 
aspiration; in the 1980s it became an assertion" (Lodge,1992,30). 
The Federation of South African Trades Unions (FOSATU) was 
closely involved in the Vaal triangle rent boycott even before 
the more oliertly political Congress of South African Trades 
Unions (COSATU) was formed. On a national scale, it was partially 
due to the formation of COSATU in 1985 that a record number of 
working days were lost in strikes between 1985 and 1987. 
The piuu,=Daluu of trade unions to a position of strength in the 
1980s was also partly the result of the government's own reforms. 
The legalisation and recognition of black trade unions, as 
advocated in the Riekert and Wiehahn reports, was intended to 
bring their activities under control. In fact the trade union 
movement swelled as a result, from 39 non-racial unions with 
206,000 members in 1978 to 109 unions with 900,000 members in 
1986, and strike activity doubled by 1980 and doubled again by 
1GC2 (P11ce,13G1,1C3-4). Far from restricting themselves to 
workplace issues, as the government anticipated, the unions 
became increasingly involved in the material and political 
concerns of the wider black community. "Since race, not class has 
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been the primary basis for social discrimination and economic 
deprivation in South Africa, the political appeal of multi-class 
coalitions seeking liberation from racial oppression is very 
powerful" (Price,1991,164). Hence, many of the black trade unions 
could not help but become involved in struggles defined by the 
workers' and their community's race, as well as those on the 
shopfloor (see Lambert and Webster, 1988). In Uitenhage, for 
instance, from 1979 to 1901, Volkswagen shop stewards led the 
township civic association in a boycott of local suppliers. 
With the formation of COSATU, the main body of black industrial 
trades unions joined the political struggle as affiliates of the 
UDF. Through the unions, not only permanently resident workers, 
but migrants too, WETE mobilized, especially in the East Rand 
townships, over housing, removals, unemployment benefit and 
family rights. Brewer, 1989a, went so far as to say that "today 
it is the black trades unions who present apartheid with its most 
serious political challenge" (249), but it must be remembered 
that the unions' potential to wield tryncirvica ;fl,...coa=d thruut. 
the economic impact of wider political turmoil and instability, 
and the state's financial crisis. Apartheid's structural economic 
weaknesses rendered the government more susceptible to the 
pressure that black trades unions could bring to bear in the 
1980s. 
The UDF and its separate affiliates' organised political and 
economic opposition to the state went through a series of stages 
as campaigns were initiated, state countermeasures were responded 
to, and setbacks were suffered 'through the mid 1980s. The high 
profile campaign against the Tricameral and BLA elections from 
November 1983 to August 1984 was met by the security forces, with 
the detention of UDF leaders (see part three of this chapter). A 
shift towards more covert and locally based organisation was thus 
forced 'upon the front. 
As it was driven "underground", the movement's initiative was 
supplied more from below, particularly as its members were 
incorporated in the Vaal uprising in September 1984. It was "the 
centrality of the issue of rents, and the perception of 
councillors as sellouts" which "helps to explain why the first 
major violent confrontation occurred in the Vaal triangle" 
(Seekings,1988). Rents here had increased over 400% from 1978 to 
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1983, the greatest increases in South Africa (Price,1991, 159). 
The gap between the government's reformist-induced expectations 
and material reality was widening in these townships into an 
unbridgeable gulf, and into this highly charged atmosphere, the 
new constitution, excluding Africans from participating in 
central government indefinitely, was introduced. The revolt began 
with schoolchildren's attacks on official buildings and developed 
into a general rent boycott and a violent stayaway from work. 
Cy the end of the period of insurrectionist struggle (the story 
of which is continued when the state's response is considered 
below), the ANC was in a position to claim leadership of the 
anti-apartheid forces in negotiations with the government. That 
an externall -y based and banned organisation was able to formally 
re-enter internal South African politics at the end of the decade 
on such advantageous terms, was largely due to the ANC's 
popularity among those responsible for the insurrection, since 
1983, inside South Africa. 
Even in 1979, a shift away from the racially exclusive 
institutions and ideology of the BCM, and back towards the non-
racial, inclusive ideology of the ANC, was noticeable within 
South Africa (Lodge,1992). the Freedom Charter was adopted by 
many of the organisations which proliferated in the early 1980s, 
and two prominent BC exiles - Barney Pityana and Tenjiwe 
Mtintso - joined the ANC in 1979. During the insurrection, 
slogans, songs, flags and the rhetoric of the ANC were all 
revived at popular meetings, and allegiance to the organisation 
was expressed in various polls and surveys (Lodge,1992,43). 
The causes of this allegiance are diverse. The fact that only the 
ANC's armed wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe, offered significant 
"guerilla" opposition to the state's security forces, was a 
crucial factor: in 1979-B0, a series of attacks on government 
buildings, police stations and infrastructure, forming the ANC's 
strategy of "armed propaganda", culminated in the sabotage of the 
Sasolburg plant, which was of prime importance in converting coal 
to oil, of which South Africa was in relatively short supply; the 
execution of the ANC guerilla Solomon Mahlangu in 1979 provided 
MK with a martyr; a generation of CC exiles from 197C received 
training from MK due to the lack of a well organised alternative, 
and the infiltration of these guerillas back into the townships 
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in the 1980s gave the ANC a widespread legitimacy denied to the 
other resistance organisations. 
The non-racial philosophy also gained ground during the 1980s. 
What had been an unpopular ANC principle among many young 
Africans in the past, now became more legitimate. Adam and 
Moodley, 1993, argue that, in the late 1980s, the ANC's tradition 
of nonracialism was one of its most attractive features. However, 
while nonracialism may have been influential in attracting the 
support of an intellectual and academic group, the ANC's real 
strength lies in mass township support. That support is not based 
on its enlightened Aon-racial philosophy; if anything, the 
natural predilection of township activists and youth would be 
towards more exclusive and militant Africanism or socialism. What 
secures their support for the ANC is its role, via MK, as the 
only effective black opposition to apartheid, and its relatively 
successful diplomacy in exile. 
NeVertheless, the inclusion of whites in the black trade union 
hierarchy helped to establish a greater perceived viability for 
class, rather than racially-based resistance, and thus 
legitimised nonracialism for a number of black activists. The 
publication, by white revisionist historians, of studies of the 
1950s resistance campaigns contributed to the respectability of 
white involvement in the "struggle", as, to a much greater 
extent, did the sacrifices of many whites actively involved in 
UDF opposition. The easing off of state repression in the post 
Soweto climate of the late 1970s allowed the re-appearance of a 
"pantheon of ANC notables" (Lodge,1992) in resistance politics 
including the white Helen Joseph, Albertina Sisulu, Florence 
Mkhize of the 1950s anti-pass campaign, Steve Tshwete, Edgar 
Ngoyi and Henry Fazzie from Robben Island prison. All, on their 
return to public life, became involved in UDF orchestrated 
icsiatam.t, ,..viloylidating perceptions of a continuity of 
resistance from the ANC heyday of the 1950s to the insurrection 
of the 1980s. 
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2. Conflicts and Targets 
The township insurrection of the 1980s was far more chaotic and 
less orchestrated than any linear account can convey. Townships 
have always been seemingly randomly violent places, with 
inhabitants afraid to travel alone at night due to the 
depredations of the tsotsis and periodic bouts of faction 
fighting, in the context of material and psychological 
deprivation. But in the 1980s, the scale of the violence 
increased significantly, and it became endemic. Townships are 
still suffering from the round of violence associated with 
insurrectionary opposition to apartheid. While certain lines 
delineating conflicting parties can be drawn, the insurrection 
was marked by innumerable violent incidents which were only 
partially, or nothtng to do with the major structural antagonisms 
in black society. The most evident structural conflict - that 
between the state and the black organisations which opposed it -
is described first. 
A picture of the pattern of "unrest", as defined by the security 
forces, can be constructed from the police unrest report 
published by the Cape Times for four days in January 1986 (cited 
Smith,1987). The townships provided the focal points for unrest 
(25 out of the 34 incidents reported). Two incidents were in 
homeland locations and only one in a white residential area. The 
targets c1 violence were over 	 the piupeity or persons 
of perceived "sell-outs". A typical police report (not 
necessarily apportioning the blame for deaths accurately) is: 
"In Pearston, 2 men were seriously injured when a private 
home was stoned. Police used teargas to disperse the crowd. 
The residence and vehicle of a previous councillor were 
petrol-bombed. The vehicle was extensively damaged. Police 
used tearsmoke and shotgun fire to disperse the crowd. The 
crowd killed a man and another was injured. Police arrested 
16 men and one woman" (quoted Smith,1987). 
In December 1985, the Minister of Law and Order reported that 27 
policemen had been killed since September and the homes of 500 
black police destroyed (Smith,1987,157). In total, 175 people 
were killed in 1984 and 800 in 1985. 
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From 1976 to the 1980s, there was an underlying shift in the 
targets of violence, from the physical structures of apartheid to 
the people who represented the "system" (The Times, May 27,1992). 
The influence of the co-optive strategy of Botha's government can 
be seen here, particularly the resentment generated by the 
workings of the state's representatives in the townships, the 
BLAs. The councillors on these authorities became the most 
visible and accessible components of the repressive "system", and 
therefore, the prime targets for acts of violence. The 
ostentatious spending on homes and cars of some councillors 
aggravated the community's hostility more than simply being a 
symbol of the state could. 
The councillors' perceived responsibility for the rent and levy 
hikes of the BLAs and their image as "sellouts", "traitors" or 
"collaborators" ensured a level of antagonism sufficient for 
violent reprisals to be enacted by some, and condoned by many in 
the townships. Attacks on "collaborators" tripled between 1981-3 
and 1984-6 (Price,1391,1K1). Cy July 1305, only five.out of the 
38 BLAs were still functioning (Price,1991,197). 
Apart from attacks on state symbols and representatives within 
the townships, two other salient aspects of insurrectionary 
activity stand out: the role of public transport and that of 
funerals. 
Given the structure of the "apartheid city", public transport, 
servicing the white city centre with workers from the peripheral 
and externalised townships, "symbolised oppression and 
subservience" (Pirie,1992,172). For millions of black South 
Africans, commuting to work is an "everyday encounter with one of 
the most palpable creatures of apartheid" (Pirie,1992,172). The 
deplorable conditions on African trains and buses (particularly 
the long distance carriers ferrying "commuters" from the 
homelands) deepens the perception of public transport as an 
aspect of enforced inferiority. Public transport had always, like 
the townships themselves, been vulnerable to "criminal" violence, 
including theft and organised gang muggings, murders and rapes. 
During the insurrection though, commuter trains in particular, 
became important and politicized meeting places, when other 
forums were closed off by the security forces. Carriages were 
used inter alia, as churches, strike committee rooms and boycott 
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organisation centres. 
In the private transport sector, the informal organisation of 
minivan taxis (Kombis or "Zola Budds") became the focal point for 
independent African economic participation on the one hand (see 
Khosa,1990), and for further conflict in the townships between 
rival operators on the other. The kombis were less prone to the 
orchestrated violence of the trains, but subject instead to the 
violently dangerous manoeuverings of their own unlicensed 
drivers. They have become more popular, particularly in the last 
three years as commuter trains have become the sites of 
massacres, largely by Inkatha and/or security "third force" 
elements. 
Much of the energy which drove forward the acts of outright 
resistance and rebellion in the townships during the mid 1980s 
was generated at township funerals. Funerals lay at the heart of 
a cycle of violence which seemed to take on a momentum of its 
own. The killing of an activist by the security forces or 
vigilantes aroused a determination to perpetrate further acts of 
rebellion in the dead comrade's name. These acts often resulted 
in further killings, perpetuating the cycle. The toyi-toyi, a 
chanting, rhythmic trot performed at funerals and at virtually 
all township gatherings, reinforced the solidarity and spirit of 
resistance of its participants and elevated the courage of the 
individual, who felt him or herself as part of a formidable mass. 
The mass singing of the ANC's adopted anthem, "Nkosi Sikelel 
Afrika" as part of a wider repertoire of resistance songs, gave a 
sense of bonding with the struggles of that organisation's 
guerillas against the state, and helped reaffirm allegiance to 
the ANC itself. 
Even in the general insurrectionary climate of the 1980s, older 
regional variations in the spirit of resistance remained: 
"The continuities of Eastern Cape radicalism and the 
traditions of African nationalism have been symbolised by 
the banners of the banned ANC and CP of South Africa flying 
at the funerals of Matthew Goniwe and his associates in 
Craddock, an old nationalist centre; the strength of 
working class consciousness on the East Rand and also its 
ethnic division and violence have been equally demonstrated 
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in recent events; while once again Natal after a period of 
relative quiescence has seen the backlash of conservative 
forces against vulnerable groups, in part a product of the 
politics of cultural nationalism .. Deep rooted political 
traditions have been re-worked to meet the demands of a 
dramatically changing present" (Marks and Trapido,1987,61- 
2). 
The Vaal triangle, for reasons outlined above, became the arena 
for particularly intense conflict between police and other state 
symbols on the one hand, and UDF/ANC supporting "comrades" on the 
other. After state refusals to compromise on raised rents and 
levies, the Vaal Civic Association called for a strike which 
involved 60% of workers and 93,000 students. A harsh police 
reaction initiated a month long battle in which thousands of -
local activists were detained, 60 people killed, including 4 
councillors and R30 million in property destroyed 
(Price,1991,184). 
The Vaal uprising set the scene for a nationwide, low intensity 
civil war, characterised by the varying regional expressions 
described by Marks and Trapido, 1987. J.M. Coetzee's novel, "Life 
and Times of Michael K", 1983, portrays particularly well, the 
alienation felt by an individual in the strife-torn context of 
the eve of insurrection. 
As the insurrection developed, to nullify state power and create 
its de facto replacement by mass mobilization in certain portions 
of de jure state territory, it had some parallels with the Paris 
commune of 1871, Russia in 1905 and Hungary in 1956 (Price,1991). 
But the areas in which the state momentarily lost control were 
restricted to townships outside the mainstream life of the most 
powerful white constituency. Within these areas the ANC's tall to 
make the townships ungovernable was more reactive than proactive, 
since it was local inhabitants themselves who had displaced state 
control. Nevertheless, even Pretoria was admitting the existence 
of some "no-go areas". 
Direct conflict between representatives of the state and black 
activists was, however, offset to an unprecedented degree, by 
violence between different black movements and tendencies. The 
state attempted to divert as much attention as possible to these 
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conflicts, and away from those between activists and the security 
forces. But they existed independently of the state's spotlight, 
and some developed, with apartheid laws revoked, into 
destabilising fault lines which characterise South Africa in the 
early 1990s. 
During the mid 1980s, horrific acts of violence were not just 
directed against "sell-outs" within the community, but also 
against followers of the "wrong" line of resistance, and the 
divisions became more clearly delineated and etched into the 
fabric of township life in the insurrectionary climate. There 
were not only the old divisions of Africanist-nonracialist, 
national populist-"workerist"; there was also a heightening of 
disagreement over the acceptable degree of compromise with a 
government deliberately setting out to co-opt a strategic black 
social group. 
This disagreement flared between "collaborationist" organisations 
like Inkatha, the "Coloured" and Indian parliamentary parties and 
Sofasonke (the Soweto municipal party), as well as between them 
and the wider resistance movements. Within the unions there was 
disagreement over the mixtre of plant and community struggles in 
which they should be engaged (see Lambert and Webster,1988). 
Within the non-collaborationist organisations divisions continued 
over long term goals, notably AZAPO's socialist Azania or the 
UDF/ANC's liberal-democratic state, and over the political and 
economic position of the white population in a post-apartheid 
order (Brewer,1989a). 
Behind these evident political differences lay other influences 
which pushed their expression towards violent conflict. In order 
to explain the translation of political diff=i=vv=* intv 
violence, one has to be aware of a context of local struggles 
over scarce resources, particularly land, the presence of a-
deprived, unemployed and politicized youth comprising a large 
segment of township populations, the prevalence of poor housing 
and the exploitation felt on an everyday basis by blacks in the 
workplace. These factors, combined with the social dislocation 
brought about by urbanisation and, particularly, the breakdown of 
traditional family structure, are considered by Schlemmer, 1991, 
to be "background conditions", shifting the likely expression of 
political or other difference further towards a violent extreme 
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and eroding the normative restraints on murder. Superimposed on 
these conditions are "predisposing factors" such as the social 
dislocation of rural migrants in the urban youth subculture (Adam 
and Moodley,1993). 
In this climate, professed political differences undoubtedly 
provided a pretext for some acts of violence which had more to do 
with the settling  of peivflal o%,vic* air palt;t.;pot;vu ;1; t.timc 
(Lemon,1991). Overt political differences were often similarly 
superimposed on differences of ethnicity or of material status 
(particularly between formal township residents and informal 
squatters or migrant hostel residents). Once established, the 
violence often became self-perpetuating. 
While innumerable incidents of such violent conflict took place 
in all of South Africa's townships through the 1980s, two 
divisions stand out as being long-running and responsible for 
particularly heavy casualties: the conflict in and around 
Crossroads in the Western Cape in 1986 and, that between Inkatha 
and the UDF/ANC in Natal from 1985 to the present, which had (and 
has) the most serious impact. 
Xhosa migrants to the Western Cape who are denied access to the 
formal housing of the townships tend to form their squatter camps 
under "chairmen" of squatter communities. In many cases these men 
are the literal descendants of traditional rural headmen and they 
exercise a similar kind of relatively autocratic rule over their 
communities. They are generally respected and feared and are 
often brutal in their implementation of authority. Despite a 
common profession of allegiance to the ANC, in line with most 
formal township activists, there are sharp differences between 
these activists and the squatters on the peripheries of the 
Langa, Nyanga and Guguletu townships. Whereas the township 
residents are relatively literate, largely employed, and occupy 
basic, but at least formal housing, the adjacent squatters lack 
these attributes and are often tenants of the formal residents. 
Similar differences delineate many of the conflicts between 
blacks in South Africa, but in Crossroads it was the influx of 
new squatters, rather than the presence of a more privileged 
township population, which triggered large scale violence. 
The government's response to the increasing incidence of 
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squatting at Crossroads was the establishment of a new formal 
township at Khayelitsha and the extension of section 10 rights to 
the inhabitants of the squatter camps with schemes to upgrade 
their conditions. However, greater numbers continued to arrive 
and settle, particularly in the KTC area. Those who had been 
granted section 10 rights in Crossroads, and who were therefore 
being allowed to stay and consolidate their housing with 
government aid, became antagonistic to the influx of newcomers 
who thi-eatened their newfound stability and their prospects of 
receiving housing assistance. The established residents were 
mobilized under the headman, Johnson Ngxobongwana. Ngxobongwana 
was soon recruited by the state to attack and destroy the new 
settlements around KTC so as to prevent further squatter camp 
growth in the area. He pursued this goal with a "vigilante" force 
known as the "witdoeke" after the white scarves they wore. From 
May to June 1986, a small scale war was fought between witdoeke 
and "comrades" from KTC (Davenport,1991). During the conflict, 
the comrades often found themselves opposed not only by 
Ngxobongwana's followers, but by the state's security forces too. 
Ngxobongwana eventually founded a new camp a Drift Sands, which 
became his personal fifedom. But his adherents were soon in 
conflict again, with his successor as chairman in Crossroads, 
Jeffrey Nongwe, and the local ANC Youth Congress. The complex and 
dangerous situation descended further into chaotic instability 
with the emergence, in the late 1980s, of a taxi war between a 
squatters' Western Cape Black Taxi Association and the formal 
towship's Lagunya Taxi Associstio, which was patronised by the 
local civic association. The conflict, involving petrol bomb 
attacks and over 70 deaths, was waged over the disputed control 
of taxi routes crucial to urban African life. Since all the 
organisations lavolved in the Crossroads violence professed ANC 
sympathy, "one begins to glimpse how little meaning political 
labels (can) have beside the more fundamental laws of squatter 
life" (R.W. Johnson, Independent Magazine, August ICth, 1991). 
Of all the individual conflicts that can be delineated in the 
1980s, the conflict between Inkatha and the UDF in Natal was the 
most costly in terms of human life, being responsible for over 
four thousand deaths. In the 1990s, the conflict became 
transplanted and diffused, as part of a wider struggle, in the 
Transvaal as well as Natal (see below). This, most prominent, 
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conflict between black groupings in South Africa is more clearly 
defined by formally organised political structures, but even 
here, the material conditions dividing peri-urban from urban 
residents, inter-generational cleavages, and disparities in 
pi ;vile, and 
	
 to scarce resources, have a strong 
motivational effect. 
In the KwaZulu homeland, which is inter-digitated with Natal 
province, Mangosutto Buthelezi had, by the 1980s, established 
firm political control through the Inkatha organisation. 
Inkatha's patronage was necessary for many of the requirements of 
everyday life in KwaZulu, particularly land, so most inhabitants 
of the homeland found it expedient to belong to the organisation. 
But, crucially, Inkatha was also mobilized through a Zulu 
nationalist rhetoric, by which Buthelezi succeeded in instilling 
pride and dignity among many, mostly rural and peri-urban based, 
conservative Zulus (see Mare,1992). The movement encountered its 
limitations more in the formal townships around Durban and 
Pietermaritzburg. Inkatha's unwillingneSs to let these urban 
areas fall under the influence of the increasingly popular mr in 
the mid 1980s, was the background cause of the conflict, which 
became endemic, between supporters of the two organisations. 
To some extent, there was an earlier parallel to Buthelezi's 
conception of the political activity in these townships. from the 
1840s to the 1870s, the Zulu Kings Dingaane, Mpande and 
Cetshwayo, had sought to prevent their subjects from crossing 
into the Natal Colony to the south, where they would be outside 
their control. Many Zulus though, had made the crossing, in an 
assertion of their freedom to marry the person of their choice, 
or simply in an attempt to set up as independent head of 
tousehold (Brookes and Webb, 1907, Atkins 1333` Just as Duthelezi 
saw himself as the inheritor of the traditions of these kings, so 
he resented the loss of authority that independent political 
organisation by Zulu speakers in the Natal or KwaZulu townstips 
entailed. In the mid 1980s, as the township insurrection spread, 
the UDO"s civic structures found themselves increasingly arrayed 
against the township councils and BLAs, over which Buthelezi's 
Inkatha exercised a Auy4Atal mulivpul"y. 
Buthelezi's "moderate" resistance to apartheid, and his 
identification with the ANC, had ensured his popularity with most 
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black South Africans during the 1970s, when he seemed capable of 
filling the vacuum left by the crushing of the BCM. His 
participation in the homeland structures was justified as 
opposition from within the system, and his refusal to accept 
"independence" for KwaZulu could be interpreted in this light. 
But a dispute with the external ANC and his increasingly obilous, 
"totalitarian" grip on power within the homeland, began to 
undermine his popularity with students and politicized youth in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s. 
Flashpoints in the long and convoluted history of the war in 
Natal included; an early figtt at the University of Zululand, 
where students opposing Buthelezi's participation in state 
structures were attacked, and Inkatha attacks on UDF supporting, 
boycotting school pupils in 1980; the incorporation of the main 
Durban townships of i:waMaauu and Umlazi into KwaZulu, and the 
initiation of the COSATU backed SARMCOL strike, which was met by 
violence from Inkatha's rival United Workers Union of South 
Africa (UWUSA) in. 1985; the suppression of the UDF civic 
vi vonioation in the Pietermaritzburg township of Imbali, also in 
1985; and the forced recruitment campaign of Inkatha in 1987. 
But in between these specific instances of political conflict, 
violent encounters between Inkatha and Mr members were being 
perpetuated with attack and counter-attack, driven by a never-
ending series of retributive raids. In many areas the political 
labels of Inkatha and UDF were superimposed on other divides 
between the warring parties: squatters versus formal residents, 
or older, more traditionally oriented men versus township youth. 
Throughout, the conflict was characterised by the security 
forces' active or passive support for Inkatha. The KwaZulu 
homeland police (ZP) in particular, were very much identified 
with Inkatha. 
Buthelezi's personal character has often been cited as an 
important factor In the continuance of the conflict: "Chief 
Buthelezi does not appear to take the objectives of the various 
UDF and COSATU campaigns at face value ... (he) frequently claims 
that the actions of the progressive organisations are planned as 
a direct challenge to his political control over the region" 
(Kentridge,1991,221). He has often displayed his sensitive pride 
in the number of libel cases he has brought against such 
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commentators. 
The conflict in Natal grew from relatively discernable political 
cleavages through the 1980s into a chaotic and continuous series 
of seemingly indecipherable acts of terror. "Every incident makes 
some sense at the micro level, but at the macro level matters are 
less clear ... (it is) not a case of normal life plus some 
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(Kentridge,1991,14). 
The majority of the inhabitants in the region were non-
participants in the fighting, but they were inexorably involved, 
a$ intended or accidental targets on both sides of the conflict. 
The numbers of refugees seeking to flee the area was testament to 
the pain and disruption that the conflict caused. Tens of 
thousands were rendered homeless, and their ranks swollen by 
thousands simply seeking relief from the fighting and hoping to 
return to their homes shortly. An element in the interpretation 
of the conflict, always suspected, emerged more clearly during 
1991, as the scale and content of the state's assistance to 
Inkatha, extending, it is likely, even to military training, was 
revealed with the "Inkathagate" scandal. 
Some clear parallels exist between the conflicts of the Western 
Cape and Natal, which cast light on the general conditions of 
strife in the black areas of South Africa. In both cases, the 
conditions in which the peripheral squatters found themselves, 
having to compete for scarce resources with a materially 
advantaged, established, "insider" urban population, played a 
role in defining the parties to the conflict. In Natal, the 
"insider' township group was, since the 1950s, associated with 
ANC urban resistance, and in the 1980s, with the UDF civics. 
Inkatha, on the other hand, voiced Zulu migrant and squatter 
interests. Thus, political overtones developed to characterise a 
more universal socio-economic conflict (Adam and Moodley,1993). 
The form of social organisation of relatively recent arrivals to 
the urban areas also differentiated them. In Crossroads, conflict 
with formal township residents was not the prime issue, but both 
here and in Natal, squatters tended to be led by chiefs 
transplanted from traditional rural practice, while the comrades 
of the townships were of an entirely different political 
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character, being urban, socialistic and radical. These lines of 
division were reinforced by a generational gulf. The older male 
squatters saw in the youth mobilization and politicization of the 
urban areas, something of a defiance of the traditional 
paternalistic authority of the rural areas. 
During the 1980s, the number of squatters near the major urban 
centres of employment rose inexorably. In the homelands a 
combination of severe drought, a decline in real migrant wages 
succeeding the 1970s increase, and large scale unemployment 
following farm capitalization in the platteland, threw both 
single men and women and whole families off the land 
(Beinart,1988). Where recently arrived squatters have their 
ethnicity too, to set them apart from established residents, 
conflict over resources is all the more likely. "The fighting 
between those identifying as Zulu and Mpondo just south of Durban 
in early 1986, in which over 150 died - the largest death toll in 
any single incident in the last couple of years - is one grim 
example" (Beinart,1988,145). 
Apart from the distinction between newcomers and established 
urban residents, another clear dimension to both the n 
	  
vow uct'd 
and the Natal conflicts, was the role of the police. Police 
logistical and active military support was given, in both cases, 
to the traditionalist, anti-ANC/UDF party. This reflects a still 
prominent security force view that such parties can be extremely 
valuable as surrogate forces in counter-insurgency action. "The 
vigilantes were powerful allies of the South African state and 
could cripple or root out radical opposition groups more 
effectively than could the police"; while Inkatha had a genuine 
spport 	 wc.mially the vigilante leaders "lacked a 
compelling ideology and were unable to mobilize a popular and 
loyal social base. Nevertheless the vigilante phenomenon in the 
1980s demonstrated the surprising extent to which the South 
African -state was able to enlist, at least intermittently, 
powerful allies from within the black community" 
(Lodge,1992,169). 
Active security force support for one side in the conflict was 
usually complemented by inactivity on the part of the prosecution 
services and the courts in charging and convicting known killers. 
In Natal, several Inkatha "warlords", many with relatively high 
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positions in the organisation's hierarchy, were generally known 
to be responsible for acts of intimidation and murder, and were 
permitted to remain at large. On the other hand, no effort was 
spared by the police in hunting down and detaining or killing 
members of the movements opposing the vigilantes. But perhaps the 
most profound parallel between the conflicts of Natal and the 
Western Cape was the fact that most residents in both areas 
simply wished to stay out of the firing line, wherever their 
sympathies lay. 
The government placed particular emphasis on the role of 
ethnicity in the late 1980s. The obvious implication was that, in 
the absence of continued white political supervision, a feuding, 
ethnically divided African population could not be expected to 
elect a stable and sound unitary government. Partly because of 
its association with state propaganda, the role of ethnicity in 
the violence of the 1980s has been by-passed by many analysts who 
wished to preserve their anti-apartheid credentials. 
Nevertheless, it,has become more evident that there is an 
important ethnic dimension to some of the recent conflicts. 
While the commonly applied epithet of "tribal violence" is 
eminently unsuitable for conflict between politically, spatially 
and economically divided modern groups, an ethnic cleavage can 
often become the most clearly visible division between warring 
parties. The eruption of Zulu migrant workers onto the streets of 
Soweto, attacking youths, particularly in the 1976 revolt, and 
the Zulu attacks VII Mpondo migrants, tad a variety of causes 
associated with the alienation of rural migrants in an urban 
context, but in the minds of the attackers, the alien ethnicity 
of the victims was a most apparent characteristic of the "enemy". 
In J.L.  Natal war, many of Inkatta's 	 "foot-soldiers" have 
been galvanised more by the perception of the UDF/ANC as a Xhosa 
dominated organisation (even though it is Zulu adherents that 
they are fighting), than by the political motivations of their 
leaders. In 12:1Z, Ghangaan and Pedi fotight over the boundary 
between their respective "homelands", Gazankulu and Lebowa. Then 
in 1986, Ndebeli fought Pedi over a plan to incorporate the Pedi 
Moutse area, outside Pretoria, into the KwaNdebele homeland 
Oorowitz,ISS). The sc‘-vnt extension of the Inkatha - UDF/ANC 
war from Natal into the Transvaal brought a clear ethnic 
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dimension to the conflict which was absent in the overwhelmingly 
Zulu Natal, as Zulu migrant workers carried Inkatha's offensive 
into the Xhosa, Sotho and Tswana (as well as Zulu) speaking 
communities of the Vaal region. 
All of these conflicts involve political, social and economic 
differences as well as ethnic distinctions. Many have also 
involved security force fomentation, but "tile fact that ethnic 
affiliations were available for manipulation or encouragement 
suggests that ethnic violence is not just the product of the 
state's action in setting one group against another, but reflects 
the continuing importance of ethnicity" (Horowitz,1991,74). 
3. State Repression, Homeland Coups and White Responses 
In 1SCG, the year after the insurrection had begun in the Vaal 
triangle, Botha hinted that announcements introducing common 
citizenship and a relaxation of the pass laws would be made in a 
forthcoming speech to the Natal Provincial Congress of the NP. 
Such was the level of anticipaticm that the speech was 
transmitted live on television in the US, the UK and Germany. It 
turned out to be not only an anticlimax, but the guarantor of 
deep international disillusionment with Botha's reformism. 
tone throughout the 5-peach was defiant and defensive, and no 
concrete new initiatives were introduced. He pointedly refused to 
"lead white South Africans and other minority groups on a road to 
alienation and suicide" (quoted, Barber and Barratt,1990,322). 
Western opinion was struck by his insensitivity at a time of 
severe crisis for South Africa's internal and external political 
relations. It appeared that Botha had drawn back from his 
promised "crossing of the Rubicon" due to fear of an internal 
conservative reaction and personal resentment at external advice 
(Barber and Barratt, 1990,323). 
Botha's "Rubicon" speech, provoking rather than deterring 
international sanctions,was significant for the state's response 
to the township rebellion. It revealed a change in government 
thinking. In the light of domestic instability which would 
preclude economic recovery anyway, the government partially 
forsook its previous policy of mollifying international investors 
and governments, and orientated itself more towards internal 
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repression. Its subsequent restrictions on the reporting of the 
unrest were intended to limit the damage by hindering a full 
overseas awareness of the domestic situation, but they could not 
prevent a knowledge of the repressive measures that existed. The 
day following the speech, South African share prices plummeted 
and the rand fell 44.5 US cents. The Stock Exchange was closed 
and restrictions ware placed on outward capital flow. The speech 
provided the cue for Chase Manhattan's precedent in refusing to 
roll over maturing short term loans (prompted by shareholder, 
client and public interest group pressure in the U0). A 
Commonwealth "Eminent Persons Group" recommended government 
sanctions in 1986, having been alienated, whilst still on its 
visit to South Africa, by SADF raids on Gabarone, Harare and 
Lusaka ANC bases (see "Mission to South Africa: The Commonwealth 
Report", Penguin,:1986), and the US Comprehensive Anti Apartheid 
Act, forced through President Reagan's opposition by Congress, 
provided for further government-imposed economic sanctions. 
In the wake of the speech and •its indirect international 
reaction, the South African state threw its full weight behind 
domestic repression. Botha's NSMS was used as the primary vehicle 
for crushing the insurrection. An integrated strategy was pursued 
with, on the one hand, security forces seeking, detaining or 
"destroying" the enemy (establishing a pattern that the recent NP 
leadership found it hard to curtail), and on the other hand, a 
continuationof some material improvements to remove the socio-
economic basis for black alienation. "Hearts and Minds" 
propaganda, borrowed from the military, and "counterorganisation" 
at the local level to displace the civics, completed the strategy 
(Price,1991). 
As an example of the "positive" wing of counter-strategy, the 
Atlantis "Coloured" township in the Western Cape received food 
parcels and soccer tours for its children from the local JMC. 
Pamphlets and newspapers publicised such benign state activities, 
and accorded the credit to local "Coloured" politicians who 
worked within state structures. In Alexandra, new homes and 
utilities were constructed in 1989, and BLA councillors were 
given the credit. 
Meanwhile, the "negative" aspects of the state's reaction 
involved the use of treason and subversion laws against UDF 
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members and the outlawing of the NECC and its alternative schools 
courses (Price,1991). In the townships, the police had their 
ambit of repressive measures excessively widened to enable them 
to conduct war against the UDF. The 1986 State of Emergency 
rZegulations allowed first police commissioners, then non-
commissioned officers in all branches of the police to restrict 
the movements and access of people, or confine or remove them, 
and to control services, protect installations and distribute or 
withhold information. There was no public right to seek court 
interdicts restraining police personnel from such measures, and 
such acts were carried out with blanket indemnity 
(Davenport,1991). 
Police intervention in the townships was supported by the SADF 
(who were often preferred -by the residents for their relative 
moderation, many being conscripts rather than volunteers for such 
duties). To further assist in rooting out activists, black 
municipal police were recruited with brief training. Labelled 
"kitskonstabels" or "instant constables", they were put at the 
disposal of the black councillors. The kitskonstabels were often 
recruited rurally so that they lacked affinity with the township 
communities, and they rapidly established a reputation for 
extreme brutality. 
In 1985, 8000 UDF leaders were detained. The state's action 
resulted in the removal of most of the organisation's national 
and regional executives, if not directly, then indirectly through 
assassinations or emigration. The intelligence which enabled such 
measures was gathered by Botha's JMC surveillance and filtered 
upwards through the NSMS. In 1986, a further 9000 were detained 
in eight months. This figure was twelve times that of the Goweto 
period. 40% of the detainees were under 18 years old, most being 
members of street or area committees. The second largest category 
was that of members of the "people's courts" (Price,1991,258). As 
well as being detained, UDF members were banned or restricted and 
COSATU was prevented from engaging in "external political 
activities". 
Behind the overt clamping down on township political activity lay 
a shady and nebulous network of state structures, responsible for 
a campaign of harassment, disruption and assassination. The most 
notable of these bodies was the Orwellian-named Civil Cooperation 
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Bureau (CCB), set up to direct hit squads against civilian 
targets. At the start of 1989 there had been 113 attacks 
including bombs, arson and burglaries, against opposition 
organisations, with not one arrest following. Another aspect of 
the covert war was the use of the surrogate or "vigilante" forces 
whose role has been examined in the Western Cape and natal 
contexts. Other than the witdoeke and Inkatha "warriors", smaller 
bands of vigilantes like the Ama-Afrika in Kwanobuhle, near 
Uitenhage, were recruited from ranks of township groups that lost 
out in the insurrection. Such groups included black policemen, 
gangsters, small businessmen, traditional headmen and disaffected 
UDF members (the numbers of which grew as the UDF punished those 
responsible for the loss of community support through bullying), 
as well as squatters denied formal township privileges. A number 
of township residents were also disillusioned when their 
perceived right not to participate in political action was 
abrogated by militant activist pressure, applied to ensure 
conformity in "the Struggle". 
By mid 1987, a veneer of order had been returned to the 
townships. Yet, while overt insurrectionary activity had largely 
been halted, the UDF's grassroots substructure remained latently 
powerful. A liberatory, rather than co-opted political atmosphere 
could still be sensed in the townships, where there was "utter 
hostility and cynicism toward the government and its overtures" 
(Price,1991,266). The 1988 township elections were effectively 
boycotted (only 10% of eligible voters cast ballots), with over 
half the council seats going uncontested and no candidates at all 
offering themselves for 13C seats. While- the state had prevented 
a loss of official political power to the UDF, it had failed to 
secure its own legitimacy or consent for, or even the 
functionality of, its own structures. 
Rent strikes continued and trade unions could not be repressed 
with the vehemence directed against the UDF, given their role in 
the fragile economy. In June 1988, COSATU launched the biggest 
stayaway in South African history'in commemoration of the Soweto 
revolt. A th,== day ycncial otsik= r,do 70% effective in the 
manufacturing sector, and cost R500 million (Price,1991,267). In 
spite of the unions being made legally accountable for illegal 
strikes in February 1988, the government was still unable to 
either destroy or co-opt them. 
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It was also difficult for the government to stem the growing 
swell of church opposition, as ministers like Desmond Tutu, Allan 
Boesak and Frank Chikane stepped into the gap created by UDF 
suppression and spoke out against the government. Even the most 
conservative of the three Dutch Reformed Churches admitted the 
sin of apartheid. Meanwhile, a detainees' hunger strike was 
launched with 600 participants. As 100 were taken to hospital in 
a serious condition, international attention intensified and fear 
of their deaths prompted the government to withdraw from the use 
of large scale detention without trial. 13CC saw more guerilla 
activity than any preceding year and the schools boycott was 
perpetuated with over 90% of pupils absent in the Western Cape 
(Price,1991). The state's own black councillors began to demand 
the unbanning of resistance organisations and the release of 
political prisoners, in order to offer some sense of identity 
with the township communities and to avoid the continued dangers 
of a "collaborationist" tag (Price,1991). Finally, a new 
resistance front - the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM) - was 
,formed in the late 1980s, backed proMinently by church and trade 
union figures, to take over where the UDF had left off, with a 
fresh mass defiance campaign. 
The scale and cost of the repression required to restore even 
surface calm in the townships was a significant incentive for the 
new NP leadership to open negotiations with the ANC. The 
bureaucracy developed to implement Botha's Total Strategy was in 
itself enormously costly. In East London, central government 
policy was being filtered through 27 Working Committees, 3 
Regional Advisory Committees, 9 Joint Working Committees, 1 
Regional Liaison Committee, several ad toc task teams and an 
Eastern Cape Strategic Team (Lemon,1991). Under these 
multitudinous structures, "order has been restored, but with the 
probable deployment of one third to one half the standing army in 
the townships it is likely that the fiscal strain of sustaining 
white supremacy is to be much greater than in the past ... it is 
very unlikely that the republic will ever again, under its 
present rulers, restore its outward facade of political 
confidence and economic vigour" (Lodge,1989,226-7,226). 
With the continuance of almost complete township non-cooperation, 
the late 1300s were marked ty unp,0%-edyilt=d local  negotiations 
between township resistance organisation representatives and 
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local white government officials and businesspeople. 
Representatives of Soweto's rent boycotters, for instance, went 
through arduous and complicated negotiations with the 
Johannesburg municipality and local businesses, which resulted, 
by 1991, in a modus operandi for their future cooperation (for 
details, see Young,1989 and Swilling and Shubane,1991). 
Around the end of the decade though, the government had to 
respond not only to the state of insurrection in the townships, 
tut also to significant changes in the political composition of 
the homeland governments. Overall, these changes comprised a loss 
of the state's firm grip over the political process in rural 
areas to complement the outcome in urban areas. 
In the Transkei, a.coup led by General Bantu Holomisa in 1987, 
ended the rampantly corrupt rule of the Matanzima brothers. Cell, 
1988, suggests that Pretoria approved of the intervention, since 
it soon recognised the new government. However, Holomisa's overt 
ANC sympathies soon brought him into dispute with the South 
African government. In October 1989, he raised the issue of 
Transkei's reincorporation into South Africa and in October 1991, 
his government became part of a brief, ANC-PAC led "Patriotic 
Alliance" (Humphries and Shubane,1991). 
A coup also took place in Dophuthatswana, in February 1206. This 
time though, Pretoria swiftly intervened to restore "Life 
President" Mangope to power. The South African government's 
response was provoked by possible ANC involvement in the coup and 
the fact that Mangope's regime controlled tree mut. 	  
successful of the homeland states. Even' with the later unbanning 
of the ANC, the Bophuthatswana administration continued to ban 
pro-ANC demonstrations in the homeland and, in alliance with 
Inkatha and right wing whites, it sought a regional role under a 
new constitution. 
The Ciskei coup of 1990 displaced Lennox Sebe, who had assumed 
the title of President upon "independence". As with the Transkei 
coup, it was led by young army officers opposed to corruption, 
and it went unopposed by Pretoria. Initially, the new 
leadership's rhetoric followed Holomisa's, being critical of the 
Homelands' continued existence as separate entities. However, 
once the new President, Brigadier Oupa Gclozo, was established, he 
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began to reveal a hostility to the ANC and to enthuse over a new 
constitution and Bill of Rights for his "subjects" - developments 
which somewhat contradicted his earlier professed desire for 
reincorporation. October 1992 saw Ciskeian armed forces open fire 
on pro-ANC demonstrators at the border of the territory, and 
revealed the administration's final conversion to a desire to 
hold on to the reins of power within the homeland. 
Yet another military coup installed General Gabriel Ramushwana as 
the new head of the Venda state for the beginning of the decade. 
He too, professed a desire f .v, 
Even in the "self governing" states, under more direct South 
African government control, unrest developed in the second half 
of the 1980s, as inhabitants pressed for reincorporation. 
Incidents occurred in Gazarikuiu, XwaNdebele and Lebowa, where the 
local ANC was critical of Ramodike's presidency despite his 
expression of support for the movement (see Lodge,1992). By the 
early 1990s, the Kangwane leadership had already started 
preparations for reincorporation and Owa Owa seemed favourably 
inclined to it (Humphries and Shubane,1991). Only Buthelezi among 
the self governing homeland leaders claimed a place in post-
apartheid national politics, but while he was certainly able to 
ensure instability in the event of his exclusion, its position 
had been undermined, both internally and internationally, by 
Inkatha's increasingly evident use of violence, the resignation 
of Oscar Ohlomo, Inkatha's respected Secretary General, and the 
Inkathagate scandal of 199C-1. 
The general shift of homeland leaderships away from a position 
supportive of Pretoria and towards a profession of sympathy for 
the ANC represented a recognition of the wider shift in the 
balance of power. That homeland leaders should firstly want to 
proclaim support for the ANC and reincorporation, and secondly, 
should be allowed by Pretoria to do so, indicates the extent to 
wtict the South African government's systems of managing 
political, economic and social developments had become 
ineffective by the end of the 1980s. Indeed, while there was no 
possibility of the state being overthrown, it seemed that the 
government had given up hope of maintaining internal order 
without a State of Emergency. 
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The state's own white constituency was not as aware of the sea 
change that had taken place in the balance of power, both in the 
homelands and in the townships, as some politicians in the NP 
were. It is a remarkable feature of the insurrection that the 
sector of the population in whose interests the systems under 
attack had been formulated, generally knew little of the nature 
of the attack or of the detailed state of affairs in nearby black 
areas. However, despite a general lack of first hand experience 
of the insurrection (other than among security force personnel, 
including conscripts), developments in the townships did have a 
more suttle impact on the white population's sense of security. 
By the late 1980s, a general psychology of fear could be 
discerned in the white areas, and it was exacerbated by the 
increasing incidence of "non-political" violent crime, directed 
at whites by blacks. 
On the one hand, "concentrated in the incompletely controlled 
distant periphery and African formal townships the conflict plays 
itself out beyond the experience and out of sight of the white 
metropolitan core" -(Lemon,I291). In Pietermaritzburg, while 
pitched battles took place between residents of the formal 
Imbali, and the informal Slangspruit settlements, culminating in 
SADF intervention, white residents less than a kilometre away, 
separated by a Group Areas Act "buffer strip", went about their 
daily lives with only the presence of African women and children 
refugees in the streets and garden shelters of sympathetic 
households as indicators of the strife nearby (Wills,1991,102). 
J.M. Coetzee's novel "Age of Iron", 1990, portrays the average 
level of white awareness: 
"of trouble in the schools the radio says nothing, the 
television says -nothing, the newspapers say nothing. In the 
world they project all the children of the land are sitting 
happily at their desks learning about the square on the 
hypotenuse and the parrots of the Amazonian jungle. What I 
know about events in Ougulety depends solely on what 
Florence (the African maid) tells me and on what I can 
learn by standing on the balcony and peering northeast: 
namely that Guguletu is not burning today, or if it is 
burning, is burning with a low flame" (36) 
On the other hand, literary descriptions like this have in 
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themselves provided "another challenge to the bland assurance of 
the state" (Gunner,1988,231), and no matter how stringently the 
government censored news reports of the townships, an awareness 
of the political and economic instability into which South Africa 
was descending could not help but filter through to the white 
population. Despite their geographical separation, and their 
media insulation from the insurrection, the white sense of 
physical wellbeing and security was gradually undermined, 
especially when ANC bombings increased the rate of white civilian 
casualties from 3 in 1982-4, to 118 in 1304-0. "White" South 
Africa began to take on the trappings of a society under siege: 
public buildings were sandbagged and barricaded, metal detectors 
were installed at the entrance to supermarkets and periodic bomb 
blasts shattered windows inr busy downtown streets or crowded 
suburban shopping centres" (Price,1991,236). 
The growing white sense of insecurity was manifested in the 
emigration figures: 8,500 per annum up to 1984, in 1985, 11,401 
and in 1986, 13,711. In 1987, 57% of the white male students of 
Rhodes University had either decided to leave South Africa or 
were contemplating it, largely due to its political instability 
and conscription for township duty. In 1989, one quarter of the 
draft applied for deferment of service and 15% failed to report. 
38% requested exemption from township duty (Price,1991,238). The 
End Conscription Campaign became a growing force among 
disaffected whites, until it was denounced by Zefence Minister 
Magnus Malan as a national threat. 
The threat that the insurrection posed to white security 
undoubtedly contributed to a long term shift in white political 
outlook. In 1970, 70% of Mrs and 00% of 'voters had supported a 
"pure" apartheid line (i.e. the NP or HNP). The remainder (UP) 
favoured a move away from apartheid, but with continued white 
political control. By 1989, the NP had itself moved to this 
position and it now commanded 57% of parliamentary seats and 48% 
of the vote. But a further 20% of seats and votes went to the 
Democratic Party (DP), which adopted a position further towards 
"majority rule". This gave tte "reformist" parties combined 77% 
of the seats and 68% of votes. The "pure" apartheid line which 
had been dominant in 1970 was now upheld by only the CP and, 
insignificantly, by the HNP, the Cr having 23% of Mrs and 30% of 
voters (Price,1991,224). Even so, a 1988 survey showed that 80% 
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of white urbanites still associated majority rule with physical 
threat and impoverishment (Price,1991,244). Therefore, what seems 
to have underlain the white electorate's shift towards a more 
reformist stance was not the desire for a transformed 
sociopolitical future, but that for a return to stability. In 
this context, the NP's tough security policy proved an attraction 
for voters in the 1987 general election. Even the most "radical" 
of the white parliamentary parties - the DP - proposed that a 
future black-dominated central government should have its power 
to transform wealth distribution limited under a federal system. 
Conclusion 
Botha inherited the recommendations of the Riekert and Wiehahn 
Commissions set up by his predecessor to deal with the 
increasingly apparent economic contradictions of apartheid. Out 
of their reports arose a strategy of co-optation, by which white 
economic and political superiority would be maintained as 
apartheid was adjusted to modern economic reality. In alliance 
with capital, the state would ameliorate conditions for black 
urban "insiders" to ensure smoother economic development, whilst 
securing their gains from competition by effecting new "market" 
forms of influx control (Stadler,1987). Industrial 
decentralisation would also help to limit further growth of the 
urban African group. 
Wider political reforms would ease South Africa's international 
isolation and establish greater internal stability. But the 
Tricameral Parliament and Black Local Authorities proved largely 
polltically unacceptable, and -Ascr they were superimposed on an 
economic situation which was deteriorating despite 
decentralisation and urban reform, the result was far from co-
optation. The rhetoric of reform had, in itself, raised 
expectations which a deteriorating economic situation rendered it 
impossible to fulfil. Instead, the experience of impoverishment 
became all the more acute as the gulf between expectations and 
reality widened. Popular mobilization ensued. With a powerful 
economic and political role being played by the black trade 
unions, and with black urban communities refusing to pay the 
costs of their own administration, the state's initiatives were 
met with insurrection. A new ideology of resistance had emerged, 
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linking local and national political and economic grievances, 
and, with UDF direction, a coherent challenge was offered to the 
state's very presence in the townships (Price,1991). 
The extent of the challenge was sufficient to cause concern even 
to its initiators and beneficiaries. In achieving the 
ungovernability of the townships, a "brutal anarchy" (Times, May 
27,1992) became established. UDF and ANC leaders were aware of 
how the insurrection not only destabilized the South African 
state, but precipitated capital flight which could last longer 
than white minority rule. Political and economic instability did 
not just help bring the government to the negotiating table - it 
also rendered millions of young blacks brutalised and, perhaps, 
unemployable. 
As UDF - orchestrated internal resistance mounted, Botha's-
administration was increasingly influenced by the security 
establishment, with its perception of Total Onslaught. A dual 
reform-repress stratew was formulated to counter the 
insurrection, and the shift of government thinking became evident 
in Botha's "Rubicon" speech. In the mid to late 1980s, repression 
became the dominant theme, interspersed with periodic reforms, 
which helped only to further undermine the coherence of 
apartheid. 
In an unstable political and economic environment, De Klerk 
assumed the presidential office as leader of a reformist bloc 
within the party. He was more gersuinely aware of buo;licz 
interests than Botha had been and he recognised the need for 
negotiations with legitimate black representatives, notably the 
rev14ed ANC, to break international isolation, particularly as 
the MDM launched its new defiance campaign, and as white 
psychological security continued to decline. 
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Chapter Eight  
The Changing South African State 
Negotiations and Elections  
This penultimate chapter narrates the developments in South 
African politics since De Klerk's assumption of the presidency. 
Particular attention is paid to the reasons why the South African 
executive departed from established policy conceptions and 
initiated negotiations with the ANC. There follows a guide to the 
course of those negotiations and the historic elections with 
which they culminated. 
Botha resigned as party leader after a heart attack-in ING, tut 
with the intention of retaining the presidential position. 
However, De Klerk, as the new leader of the party, began to 
accumulate si.ipport for this position too. "Once De Klerk became 
party leader, the government was largely paralysed by the 
simmering conflict between Botha and De Klerk and by the need to 
prepare for the white election that 'bias to be held in September 
1989" (Schrire,1992,112). Pressures mounted on Botha's 
presidency, including the nationwide campaign for the release of 
detainees, the MDM's defiance campaign and the formation of a 
new, reformist Democratic Party. These developments alone 
conspired against Botha's continuation as President, but when 
they were accompanied by the retirement of key Botha supporters 
and NP "thinkers" including Chris Heunis, he realised that he had 
no option Jo-ut to resign, which he did, with ill concealed 
bitterness, in August 1989. He retired from the party altogether 
in May 1990. 
His successor almost immediately presented a dramatically 
different and reformist image to the world. The release from 
prison of prominent ANC members includirig Walter Sisulu, presaged 
a speech to Parliament in February 1990, in which De Klerk 
announced the unbanning of the ANC, PAC and SACP, the removal of 
restrictions on the UDF and COSATU, an end to the practice of 
banning individuals, the lifting of the State of Cmc. yvnuy and 
restrictions on the media, and the suspension of the death 
penalty. Ten days later, after 27 years in prison, Nelson Mandela 
was released. In June 1991, the Group Areas Act, Land Acts and 
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Population Registration Act were repealed, ending statutory 
apartheid. The NP set about recruiting black members and almost 
half the "Coloured" MPs in the House of Representatives joined 
the party. The pace of the changes even took members of the party 
caucus by surprise (Morris,1991,55-6). 
Explanations for these changes have ranged between two extremes. 
On the one hand are analysts who claim that De Merk's government 
had no option but to engage in negotiations with the ANC, due to 
South Africa's dire economic position and the failure of all 
preceding attempts to restore political stability and order 
(Price,1991, Wolpe,1988, Lodge,1992). On the other hand are those 
who perceive South Africa's economic situation to have been at 
least sustainable, and continued political repression to have 
been possible in the medium tern. According to this perception, 
De Klerk's moves towards negotiation were more contingent on 
particular domestic and international developments, making 
negotiations propitious In 1S90. An entry into negotiations at 
this point, rather than later, would render them far more likely 
to progress in the government's favour (Schlemmer,1990,1991b, 
Schrire,1992). Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the government 
would have seized the opportunity to negotiate, however 
propitious, unless previous initiatives to maintain white 
political and economic superiority and stability had failed. 
If negotiations were taken up merely as one of a range of 
options, that range tad narrowed considerably by the time that De 
Klerk assumed the presidency. 
Friedman, 1991, points out that for negotiations to have been 
entered into while the government was still able to remain in 
power without them, the government must have conc1aded that the 
costs of maintaining the status quo were not worth paying, and 
that it had a reasonable prospect of defending its core interests 
in a new system. Conversely, those excluded from power must have 
concluded that they could not overthrow the state in the 
foreseeable future, but that it was possible to achieve through 
negotiation, an order qualitatively different from the prevailing 
one. 
If negotiations were begun partially as a positive step due to 
propitious timing, they were also partially the negative result 
of the closing off of other options for maintaining white 
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minority rule in the long term. Apartheid, even Botha's 
"reformist" brand, had remained viable only as long as four 
conditions persisted: "1. the South African economy continued to 
be dynamic and growth oriented; 2. black South Africans 
acquiesced in white rule; 3. the international community was 
prepared to trade with and invest in South Africa; and 4. White 
South Africans remained broadly united and cohesive" 
(Schrire,1992,8). Each of these conditions was patently 
unsustainable by 1990. 
Narrowing Political Options 
The adaptations made to apartheid structures since the 1960s had 
all failed to acct/ 
	 -odate its polit;,01 and 	  
contradictions. The NP's Separate Development or 
"multinationalism" of the 1960s and 1970s and Botha's "selective 
incorporation" of a black urban middle class in the 1980s, had 
been ineffective in the face of continued internal political 
resistance, economic constraints and international hostility. By-
the late 1980s there was little momentum remaining in Botha's 
securocrat strategy. It 'had been rendered Impotent largely by the 
insurrection. The NP government had run out of options for 
further adapting white minority rule to changing internal and 
external political and economic environments: 
"Herein lies the dilemma facing (Botha's) regime: 
Shut off from the possibility of a coercive solution 
it can only hope to stabilize the political situation 
through reforms which will win support from important 
constituencies among black people. liowever,  given the 
configuration of white interests, notwithstanding the 
reformist postures of corporate capital and others, 
it can offer only extremely limited reforms. Since 
those reforms are concerned with black representation 
and not merely with redistribution by way of 
education, wages, housing and so forth, they 
necessarily provide the political conditions for a 
(continuing) resurgence of the mass democratic 
movement" (Wolpe,1988,109), and therefore, political 
and economic instability. 
In order to transcend this unsustainable situation, negotiations 
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leading to concessions beyond those heretofore acceptable to the 
"configuration of white interests" would be necessary. And the 
resurgence of resistance which occurred in 1989 helped usher in 
this realization. The MDM's new defiance campaign was launched in 
the context of the resegregation of public amenities by 
Conservative Party councils. White hospitals became the first 
target and black protesters were admitted for treatment. The 
protests remained peaceful until police killed at least 12 
protesters in Cape Town, precipitating a stayaway by 3 million 
workers in September 1989 and a march by 35,000 (the largest 
ever) through Cape Town, with similar processions in other 
cities. The choice of segregated hospitals as a target for 
demonstration, and of schools as the subject of verbal 
protestation, was shrewd. As the costs of maintaining their 
segregation mounted, many whites were coming to favour 
integration within these institutions. The closure, through 
under-use, of white hospitals and schools, contrasted sharply and 
evidently with the continuing over 	 of ,,u,,capundi. tlack 
facilities. The government's response to the decision by some 
white schools to admit black pupils was muted, since it was 
already considering integration if the majority of parents voted 
for it. This policy was subsequently effected. 
In contrast to the mid 1980s, when "the insurrectionary movement 
was being pulled into uncharted courses by cadres of youth in the 
streets of the townships, the popular protest in the late 1980s 
was choreographed and coordinated and seemed much more under the 
command of its leaders" in the MDM (Lodge,1992,114). The revival 
of organic resistance soon after the state felt relatively secure 
of its suppression of the mid 1980s uprising, emphasised the 
continuing instability that could be expected in the absence of 
significant political change. Further, as Price, 1991, points 
out, each successive peak episode of resistance - Sharpeville, 
Soweto, the 1984-6 insurrection - had a larger mass base, was 
more politically radical, lasted for a longer period and produced 
more costly international isolation. After each peak, the level 
of domestic political militancy did not return to the status quo 
ante, but remained higher. There was therefore a kind of 
cumulative effect of the main episodes of unrest on South 
Africa's international standing. The time lag between periods of 
major unrest was also diminishing, and the organisational 
capacity growing during each successive period, contributing to a 
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gradual, but perceptible decline in the quality of life for 
whites, both materially and psychologically (Price,1991). 
The state had not only lost the political initiative that Botha 
had been confident of in dealing with internal resistance on a 
national scale, it had also lost the control of local black 
administration that it had exercised through surrogate 
structures. ty March MI, about 40 informal civic associations 
were already involved in negotiations with Provincial 
authorities, stepping into the local vacuum left by the 
insurrectionary rejection of the BLAs (Anti-Apartheid News, March 
13S1). nu aylccrftcHt Ios January Val to establish a Metropolitan 
Chamber for the central Witwatersrand area, covering both 
Johannesburg and Soweto, was the outcome of the lifting of the 
township rent boycott in return for the writing off of arrears 
and the resumption of services at locally negotiated tariffs. It 
set a precedent for local government negotiations with civic 
structures across the country, accompanying central government 
moves towards negotiations with'the ANC. The local developments 
represented a profound shift in the balance of political power 
towards black organisations, further restricting the range of 
options available to the government at the centre. 
That range of options was also effectively constrained by shifts 
in political attitude within the government's white constituency. 
The 1903 white election made it clear that a continuation of 
Botha's policies would lead to further erosion of NP support to 
both the left and the right. On the left, a larger, relatively 
wealthy Afrikaans class, some elements of which formed an 
intelligentsia, had emerged. It was both socially and 
economically upwardly mobile, and a creature of the big cities 
(Schlemmer,1991b). This class, an extension of the 1970s verligte 
tendency, now showed a greater propensity than ever to vote 
towards the liberal left wing in white elections. The NP could 
only encompass these voters by itself shifting further towards 
this extreme, so as to occupy ground held formerly by the 
Progressive Federal Party, and now by the DP. Yet, on the right 
were more reactionary white voters, to whom the Conservative 
Party was becoming increasingly attractive. To escape this 
"pincer threat" (Schlemmer,1991b) to its dominance over the white 
electorate, De Klerk's NP had to move relatively quickly in the 
direction of reform, so as to both retain the reformist white 
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vote, and, through speed, minimize the coherence and level of 
organisation of the Conservative Party's opposition. 
Narrowing Economic Options 
Just as, if not more pressing than the challenges from black and 
white political traits, were the economic problems that De 
Klerk's administration inherited. If political difficulties alone 
could not influence his government to negotiate, when combined 
with economic considerations, the range of alternatives was even 
more restricted. 
By 1989, the government was in a "Catch 22" situation; "On the 
one hand the state's ability to successfully pursue its 
counterrevolutionary strategy required resources. These resources 
could only come from an expanding economy 	 on the other hand 
continuing with the repressive strategy threatened future 
economic growth" (Price,1991,273). 
By 1988, the brief economic optimism of the preceding year had 
teen reversed. 4Turing the 1987 "miniboom", Pretoria had attempted 
to raise the volume of exports and thus earn more foreign 
exchange. However, South Africa's dependence on imports meant 
that economic expansion soon brought 	 volume of 
imports and thus, greater claims on foreign exchange reserves. 
From 1986 to 1988, the import bill increased by 60%, while 
additional costs could not be met by borrowing due to sanctions 
(PrIce,M1). In SGO, the impact of sanctions was fully 
recognised for the first time in the annual reports of key South 
African economic concerns - for example, Trust Bank of South 
Africa, First National Bank, Rand Mines Ltd., and Standard Bank 
Investment Corporation (Price,1991). 
The 1988 Commonwealth proposals, accepted by all members but 
Britain, would begin a three stage "ratcheting up" of particular 
sanctions, designed to make it very difficult indeed for the 
South African government to reject demands for the effective 
dismantling of apartheid. Aside from such formal measures, by 
April 1988, one fifth of the British firms in South Africa had 
pulled out under mounting domestic anti-apartheid pressure and 
British investment had fallen from 6 billion pounds in 1980 to 
under 3 billion in 1986. From January 1984 to April 1989, 184 US 
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companies left, driven out by the threat of further Congress 
penalties like the double taxation of Mobil (Davenport,1991,464). 
However, formal government trade restrictions were not as 
damaging to the South African economy as informal financial 
reticence, since they merely resulted in a shift of trading 
partners from West to East. Financial constraints imposed by 
private tanks, acting according to their own perception of 
economic risk, led to a fall of the rand on the international 
money market from $1.36 in 1981 to $0.41 in 1989. South Africa's 
foreign debt increased to $20 billion by 1990, resulting, in 
1365, in rescheduling arrangements to avoid reneging, (Davenport, 
1991,465). 
The most serious impact of South Africa's Balance of Payments 
deterioration was that it precluded capital growth (see 
Kahn,1991). Growth had been below 2% throughout the 1980s, while 
population had beer increasing at the rate of 2.5% 
(Davenport,1991,465). With a soaring defence budget reaching R9 
billion in 1989, the administrative costs of apartheid "were - it 
seems - more damaging than contrived economic measures to the 
national economy" (Gave1+port,1391,405). Dut sanctions augmented 
the effect, particularly by forcing out foreign companies with 
important access to international markets and technology. 
The government needed an injection of new capital that would not 
just be exported again to pay off debt and buy imports, but the 
chief economist of SANLAM made it clear that "unless we get 
certain reforms hers we -vion't get foreign capital again. We have 
to at least show the outside world that we are moving in the 
right direction" (quoted Price,1991,275). When relative political 
calm returned after the mid 1980s insurrection, analysts realized 
that new investment still was not coming in to restore the 
Balance of Payments. Only a guaranteed long term political 
solution would give South Africa the perceived stability required 
for investor confidence (Schlemmer,1991b). 
The failure of Botha's economic policies and of political 
repression to restore structural stability, contributed to a 
political di-vision in the ruling elite. Ge.;u'ukAata saw further 
reform as too risky, since black "radicals" were too powerful. On 
the other side of the growing divide were those associated with 
economic and foreign relations policy, who stressed the risk to 
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economic survival of continued repression, and emphasised the 
role of reform in ending international economic isolation. It was 
this wing of the government that was increasingly backed by 
business and finance. 
For the reformist group, another of Botha's significant failures, 
was his professed aim of rationalising, and reducing the costs of 
government. Instead, the Tricameral Parliament, continuing 
duplication of administrative departments and increasing security 
and regional destabilization costs had led to an increase in 
government expenditure as a percentage of GNP from 21% in 1980 to 
32% in 1989 (Schrire,1992). It  was ironic that Botha, the 
efficient hard-headed administrator, who came to power determined 
to rationalize government, created a massive government structure 
that helped to undermine the South African economy on which it 
depended" (Schrire,1992,121). The blame for this malignant growth 
was placed on the restriction, after 1986, of the sources of 
government advice to the security establishment. 
On his election as party leader, De Klerk came to represent the 
critical, reformist wing of the party. On his accession to the 
Presidency, with a continuing high degree of centralised power 
(Morris,1991), he set about establishing control over the 
enlarged security establishment, especially the NSMS. In adopting 
the reformist line, De Klerk also chose to further the interests 
of business where, despite Botha's initial courting of capital, 
they had conflicted, especially after the "Rubicon" speech, with 
those of the previous government. The sector in general urged 
further reform on the government during the second half of the 
1980s for several reasons (Lee, Sutherland, Phillips and 
McLennan, 1991): 
The buzi u=00 acCtut'a 	 naa vuiucd must clearly in 1339, 
over the impact of black consumer boycotts and the implementation 
of separate amenities. Carletonville and Boksburg town centres 
were both subject to an almost complete black boycott due to 
their Conservative councils' decision to uphold the Separate 
Amenities Act. Business representatives across the country called 
for the complete removal of the act, rather than its selective 
imposition according to the dictates of particular couricils, 
while the Carletonville Chamber of Commerce lobbied Parliament 
and took legal action against the town council, which resulted in 
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the removal of "Whites Only" signs. The episode demonstrated both 
the political impact that a coherent business lobby could have, 
and the power of united black consumers. 
A second area of business concern was more general. Discontent 
was being expressed in 1989 at economic policy, particularly at 
excessive government expenditure, which prompted calls for 
rationalisation. The criticism of many b-kisiness leaders was 
expressed by Aubrey Dickman, Chief Economist of the Anglo-
American Corporation: "ideological concerns have taken precedence 
over economic exigencies" (Lee et a1,1991,103). 
Sanctions were a third cause for concern. In 1989, Chris Van Wyk 
of Bankorp updated an earlier report and estimated that sanctions 
had reduced the potential growth rate by 10%, leading to the loss 
of 500,000 employment opportunities (cited Lee et a1,1991,104). A 
professed concern over gross societal inequalities, particularly 
in education, contributed to the desire for significant change. 
rinally,.an I--ediate demonstration of the necessity of 
structural change was provided by industrial relations with black 
workers. A tentative alliance emerged between employers and black 
unions, against the government's 1989 Labour Relations Amendment 
Act. The alliance represented a recognition by employers of the 
inextricable link between the shop floor and the wider political 
concerns of the union members. It was appreciated by employers 
that stayaways and industrial disruption would not end until 
political satisfaction had been achieved by the workforce. 
Even under Botha, the concerns of business had overlapped 
significantly with those of reformists within the government. 
Their first triumph over the securocrats came in August 1988, 
with the signing of the Angola/Namibia accord. "From Pretoria's 
vantage point the accord represented both a pragmatic adjustment 
to a gloomy economic reality and an effort to alter that reality" 
(Price,1991,276). The administrative cost of occupying Namibia 
had assumed greater significance as the shortage of resources 
within South'Africa became more evident. The costs of military 
involvement against the SWAPO independence movement were raised 
even higher when Cuban troops and equipment moved into the 
besieged town of Cuito Cuanavale, in southern Angola, to repel 
South African forces. The battle served to highlight the failures 
of securocrat policies, which had proved unable to guarantee 
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either peace or economic security. By urging South Africa's 
extrication from an unwinnable war, the reformers in the 
government had achieved something of a coup and within two 
months, as a sign of renewed favour, South African diplomats were 
again visiting European countries (Price,1991). 
Having attained this success, the government reformist bloc 
focused on South Africa's internal situation. Tte question 
expressed by De Klerk - "do we want them (our children) to 
inherit new sanctions and boycotts?" (cited Price,1991,278) - led 
reformers within the party to the conclusion that negotiations 
with tlac,: organisations seen as legitimate ty much of the black 
population, were necessary to resolve South Africa's endemic* 
crisis. The black "moderates" with whom Botha had contemplated 
negotiations - mostly homeland leaders and councillors - wee now 
rendered largely irrelevant by the general "culture of 
liberation" that had developed with the insurrection. Given its 
ascension to a position of widespread internal and international 
political legitimacy, the ANC's participation would be required 
for a restoration of stability. The fact that it would command 
the support of many of the black trade unions also made its role 
in a future settlement crucial, am..c the trade union's success 
had "brought home to government the magnitude of the 
confrontation they faced if they forced the black community into 
"illegality"" (Guardian, April 20th,1992). The miners union 
leader, Cy-ril Ramaphosa's electicn as ANC Secretary  General in 
1991 was "a recognition of the role the trade union movement had 
played in bringing about the dramatic government reforms of 1990" 
(op city. Once negotiations with the ANC were accepted as the :ray 
out of structural crisis, De Klerk's initial, drastic reforms 
were inescapable. 
Thus, a lack of further options for the preservation of white 
minority rule and particularly, a lack of alternative ways out of 
structural economic crisis, can be seen as the prime influ=m.vo 
on De Klerk's decision to negotiate. However, Moll, 1989, argues 
that it is easy to overemphasise the role of economic 
deterioration. De Klerk's government would be aware that South 
Africa still had certain dependable economic securities. There 
was a strong food producing sector, huge mineral resources, only 
a limited dependence on oil, a highly developed manufacturing 
sector, significant technological know-how and a fair level of 
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local savings. If negotiations with the ANC were seen as too 
dangerous, they need not have been entered into yet, even as a 
last resort. Despite poor economic performance, the state could 
probably have held on to power in an unstable and conflict-prone 
political environment for some years to come (Brewer,1989b). The 
decision to negotiate could well have been the only option for 
restoring long term stability, but it could have been delayed. 
The reason it was taken in 1990 then, was not just because 
alternatives had failed for the goverment, but also because the 
timing was propitious. 
Negotiations as Choice 
While the 1990 announcements were dramatic, the political 
environment into which they were introduced had already been 
partially prepared for them by a series of prior adjustments, 
"The legalisation of the African trades unions in 1980; the 
abolition of influx control in 1986; the granting of full 
property rights to Africans in the common area of South Africa; 
tha openin'g of CCDs to occupational pursuits by all races; and 
the law providing for certain "white" areas to become areas of 
"free settlement" had the unintended combined effect that (by the 
late 1980s) government itself (had) destroyed the central 
purposes and principles of apartheid" (Schlemmer,1991b,22). A 
number of positive developments led De Klerk to identify 1990 as 
the right time for the completion of apartheid's legal demise. 
De Klerk embarked on "an attempt to secure a settlement under 
conditions which would enhance his chances of preserving the 
crucial political interests of his constituency". In this light, 
in 1990, "his strategic position was more favourable than it 
could be calculated to be ever again" (Schlemmer,1990,258). By 
negotiating now rather than later, the ANC would be more likely 
to accept the governmentiS "bottom line". It was the government's 
pc.uvut;w1 of internal, regional and international developments 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, that encouraged this 
understanding. 
Domestically, the 1989 election result was interpreted by De 
Klerk as a mandate for further reform from the 70% of white 
voters backing the NP and DP and this conclusion was actively 
diffused through the media. De Klerk was also emboldened by the 
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failure of the CP to do as well in the election as was expected. 
The domestic security situation had improved and, importantly, 
Western intelligence had suggested to De Klerk that the ANC was 
not as powerful as Botha had feared (Schrire,1992,133). 
Internationally, in the light of the traditional South African 
communist bogeyman, the crisis of the USSR in 1990 was reassuring 
for De Klerk. For many whites, the elimination of the Soviet 
threat, manifest in the ANC, was a consideration in favour of 
rapprochement. Within the region, South Africa and the USSR were 
even involved in a "working relationship" in the Namibian and 
Angolan negotiations. 
The fact that the US, USSR and Western powers had displayed an 
"even ;ended oppivaa" (Gchlemmer,1991b) in these negotiations 
(extending even to a favourable lack of reaction when South 
African troops killed hundreds of SWAPO guerillas moving outside 
their peace-brokered containment zones) raised expectations for a 
similarly benign attitude to internal negotiations with the ANC. 
The Namibian settlement had also won the government a degree of 
international respect, extending beyond the countries directly 
involved in the "solution", and De Klerk could rely on widespread 
moral support for internal negotiations. 
The Namibia settlement -had had the additional effect of pushing 
the ANC towards a more compromising position. It meant the loss 
of Angolan bases, with, given Mozambique's recent compliance with 
Pretoria, no prospect of re-establishment elsewhere in southern 
Africa. "Armed liberation became an absolutely remote ideal" 
U)cillemmer,ISM,17). 16t Ca MerA was aware that there was 
possibly no need to make fundamental socio-economic concessions 
in negotiations with the ANC anyway: 
"The "reasonableness" of Pretoria in abolishing legal 
apartheid has put great pressure on the opposition to 
respond in kind. International opinion 'wants Gout) 
Africa saved from another failed socialist 
experiment, and the prolonged recession further 
pressures the ANC to accept far-reaching concessions. 
It appears as if the ANC cannot but accept the 
democratic and constitutional clamps around its 
options. If the ANC were again to withdraw from 
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negotiations, as it did in May 1992, it would have to 
return sooner or later in order to avoid a descent 
into barbarism" (Adam and Moodley,1993,35). 
Within South Africa, even as the main party in government, it was 
appreciated that the ANC's capacity to redistribute and equalise 
material wealth between white and black would be constrained. The 
NP leadership under De Klerk was only too aware of the 
limitations: the fixed rate of investment had fallen from 32% of 
GDP in 1975 to 17% in 1991 and in order to redistribute, the ANC 
would need a growing economy; the organisation could not 
nationalise or deficit finance to such a degree as was 
anticipated by many of its followers, for fear of deterring 
investors; and the facts that white taxes were already high and 
that many blacks paid no taxes; would preclude much 
redistribution by way of taxation (Adam and Moodley,1993). 
The cumulative impact of these developments and realisations was 
to make it "abundantly clear that the strategic balance had 
shifted in favour of the South African government by 1990. The 
major price tad been the relinquishing of Namibia ... in early 
1990 the government could view the possible outcomes of 
compromise with the ANC far more positively than at any time 
since it came to power" (Schlemmer,1991b,17-18). 
Even in this context tholigh, the ANC would not be that easily co-
opted. In 1990, as a result of the insurrection, the ANC itself 
had far more coherent internal support than it had ever had 
before. While, in 1990, the timing of'negotiations was propitious 
for the government, the trend in black politics made them 
inevitable sooner or later. 
From President De Klerk to President Mandela 
The course of political change in South Africa during the four 
years from Nelson Mandela's release to the country's first ever 
nonracial elections could never have been charted in advance. 
Shifting alliances between seemingly irreconcilable opponents, 
the complexities of horse trading within, and behind the scenes 
of, the various negotiating forums, and the decisive impact of 
extraneous events such as the Boipatong massacre, the murder of 
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Chris Hani and the killings carried out by "Third Force" 
elements, ruled out any accurate predictions. 
The story of South Africa's early 1990s headline-grabbing 
convulsions and eventual political transformation will be set out 
here. First it is necessary to introduce the main "characters" of 
the plot - the political groupings or "blocks" which may or may 
not have been formally identified as political parties, but which 
cohered around shared, or at least overlapping, ideological 
standpoints during the interregnum between the onset of 
negotiations and the ANC government. Five such "blocks" can be 
identified: De Klerk's "new-look" NP, the ANC leadership, 
Buthelezi and Inkatha, other homeland presidents and various 
white right wing bodies. 
De Klerk's National Party and the ANC leadership were to find 
themselves thrown together in a common bond over the period - a 
bond brought about by their mutual desire to see a partial 
transfer of power from the former to the latter, with minimal 
disruption to South Africa's economic prospects. Their disputes 
centred on the extent of that transfer and its timing, not on the 
concept as a whole. 
Opposed in some measure to the entire course of political change 
were those who had stakes in the old system: homeland leaders 
like Mangope who wished for a continuing regional d om..cuuc, 
Buthelezi - a special case, whose "appetite for power" (Mare and 
Hamilton,1987), fed through the Inkatha political/war machine, 
would not be satiated by this, but would demand a national role; 
and various fractious amalgams of white "right .:nljel", whose 
agenda ranged from a return to the "labour racist" (Adam and 
Moodley,1986) ideal of Verwoerdian apartheid to the nationalist 
dream of a secessionist state in which the culture of 
Afrikanerdom was allowed to exist in isolation. Parties with 
lower levels of support like the DP and the PAC remained mostly 
peripheral to the process of transition, but intruded upon and 
shaped that process for discrete periods. 
In addition to the divisions between each of these "blocks" of 
political discourse, there were divisions within them. Particular 
media attention has focused on opening divides within the ANC. In 
making the compromises necessary for negotiations with a still 
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absolutely powerful state, the ANC leadership has, at times, 
alienated the militant activists and their representatives, who 
staged an insurrection in order to see the state pass into the 
hands of the movement - not to witness the moderation of its 
ideals and demands just when its position seemed stronger than 
ever. The fact that the PAC slogan "one settler, one bullet", 
became increasingly associated with ANC youth during the 
transition period is indicative of a desire for unhampered 
African government. 
However, to some extent, each of the other negotiating or 
resisting parties was also an edifice built on shifting sands: De 
Klerk was engaged in an internal struggle with securocrats within 
the ur. The leadership's difficulty sprang partly out of a dual 
role during the transition period, as both participant and 
referee in negotiations. As referee, the government wished to 
disassociate itself from the violent "dirty tricks" carried out 
on the party's behalf by its sec-urity and intelligence officials. 
As participant, to some extent, it benefitted from the disruption 
to the ANC's organisation caused by the war of attrition in which 
security personnel took a hand. it the benefits could only be of 
a short term nature, and when the violence directed at the ANC 
grassroots threatened to overturn the whole transfer, covert 
security operations had to be reigned in. 
The fractiousness of right wing organisations has already been 
noted, and it must be remembered that the white right wing is 
certainly not represented in its entirety by the fascistic and 
militaristic AWB whom the media find so fascinating: "for every 
rightist who breaks up a black picnic, ten anguish over their 
role in Africa. For every barfly telling Kaffir jokes, there's a 
pious householder praying for guidance. For every Terre'Blanche 
rattling sabres, there's a 3oshoff seeking good neighbours 
through good fences. For every CP farmer who donders (beats) his 
labourers, 20 deliver their babies" (Denis Beckett, cited Adam 
and Moodley, 1993,154). The spectrum of right wing opinion was 
fully manifested during the transition, in the plethora of 
organisations and fronts ttat the bloa produced. 
Even Buthelezi, it seems, experienced some difficulty in 
retaining his accustomed grip on Inkatha. As Inkatha's stand 
against participation in the constitutional negotiations, and 
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then the elections, and Buthelezi's increasingly evident links 
with security operations and culpability for mass violence were 
seen to be peripheralising the movement, there was a drift of 
support from within its upper hierarchy. Buthelezi's last minute 
dive into the electoral process was undertaken partially in 
recognition of the tendency. 
During these four years of flux, South Africa was experiencing, 
in condensed form, politically transforming processes which would 
be considered radical had they panned out over decades. It is not 
surprising then, that the political interactions involved were 
often paradoxical and inconsistent, and always highly complex. An 
account of these interactions during South Africa's remarkable 
interregnum follows. 
Getting Negotiations Started 
Even wyiie the NP leadership was preparing to enter into formal 
negotiations with its long time adversary during 1991, the 
state's security apparatus was executing a plan to bring that 
adversary to its knees. Based on the destabilisation of SWAPO in 
Namibia, the scheme was to bolster Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom 
Party as an alternative focus of black support to the ANC. If 
support was not forthcoming for Inkatha through peaceful means, 
then coercion would te used, a former GADF Major noting that, for 
military intelligence, "intimidation is the only thing that works 
in Africa" (Guardian,11.6.91). But military intelligence was more 
sophisticated than the quotation implies. In addition to training 
and unleasiling Inkatha inpis, "educational" programmes, with a 
subliminal anti-ANC/African message, were run in the 
predominantly "Coloured" Western Cape, and various other subtle 
media were used across the country to discredit the ANC. 
During July MI, press investigations began to reveal the 
outline of the covert initiatives that had already been taken by 
state security apparatuses. The "Inkathagate" scandal, as it 
became known, involved the directing of Inkatha "warriors" 
against identified ANC targets, and even whole ANC supporting 
communities; the provision of weapons, substantial funds and 
logistical support to Inkatha in its war; security force 
involvement, alongside Inkatha, in attacks on train commuters, 
designed to reduce still further the level of tolerance between 
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Inkatha and the ANC by provoking retaliation; the funding of 
Inkatha's UWUSA - rival to COSATU; and connivance in KwaZulu 
Police "hit squads". In the immediate aftermath of the 
revelations, it was widely assumed that Buthelezi's political 
career could not survive the embarrassment. After all, a self-
proclaimed "leader" of resistance to the state had been exposed 
as ore of its key collaborators, and a particularly vicious one 
at that. 
As the scale of covert security force support for Inkatha began 
to be revealed, the ANC's response was to push harder for an 
interim government. This would be coiiprico'f v. icpiczc,,tat;v0D of 
parties other than just the NP, and it would take control until a 
new constitution could be devised. However, the government 
responded only by demoting the ministers in charge of the police 
and army - Adriaan Vlok and Magnus Malan. 
While the Inkathagate revelations indicated the extent of 
resistance to transfer within the formidable state security 
network, there were signs that police forces "on the ground" 
would at least support the state against right wing opposition -
something by no means to be taken for granted. In August 1991, 
police fired on AWB members in Ventersdorp, 100 miles west of 
Johannesburg. The brown-shirted AWB men, after protesting the 
presence of De Merl: in the town hall by throwing tear gas at 
police, attacked a van containing four Africans. Their rescue was 
effected by the police with the deaths of two attackers 
(Independent on Sunday, 11.9.91). 
Comewtat discredited by its security forces' dirty tricks 
(reports of which continued to filter out even after the promise 
that action had been taken), and yet heartened by the support of 
police in the face of reactionary white protest, the government 
unveiled its constitutional proposals - immediately to have them 
rejected by the ANC for their blatant attempt to give minority 
parties as much power in a crucial upper house as the majority 
party. Against this backdrop of manoeuvres towards the opening of 
the real negotiations, the mass killing of both Inkatha and ANC 
supporters, and apolitical residents in the wrong place at the 
wrong time, continued. 
In November 1991, media attention was temporarily diverted from 
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the violence to the plight of South Africa's poor, with the 
organisation of a strike against the introduction of VAT for 
medicines, basic foods, water and electricity. The strike, 
possibly involving an unprecedented 80% of the entire black 
workforce, including, for the first time, farmworkers, was backed 
by the major black resistance movements and characteristically 
opposed by Inkatha. The turnout reflected not just the material 
hardship that the new tax would involve for low paid workers and 
the unemployed, but frustration that such structural economic 
innovation should be taken by a government in its last days of 
power, without consultation with the movement that would be its 
successor. 
Following the strike, a secret agreement was reached between the 
ANC and NP leaderships, paving the way to multiparty talks on a 
new constitution. In December 1991, formal constitutional 
negotiations began through the medium of the multi-party 
Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA). 
CODESA 
CODESA was formed to establish mechanisms for the drafting of new 
legislation leading to the constitution of post-apartheid South 
Africa. The convention was attended by 19 parties including the 
South African government, the NP (separately represented), the 
ANC, the :ACP, the DP, the Inkatha r-reedom Party, tricameral 
parliament parties and homeland government parties. Working 
groups comprised of representatives of these parties were to 
concentrate on particular issues such as constitutional 
frameworks, the nature of an interim government and the future of 
the homelands, but the Inkatha and Ciskei government 
representatives refused to sign CODESA's declaration of intent 
committing it to work towards a Unified, non-racial,democratic 
state. 
Soon after CODESA was up and running, De Klerk's warning of a 
right wing reaction, geared towards inducing concessions from the 
ANC, seemed portentous, as the NP lost a by-election in 
Potchefstroom convillcingly to the Conservative Party. De Klerk 
had previously portrayed the by-election result as a test of 
support for his reforms. In a rapid response to the outcome, the 
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NP leadership made the dramatic announcement of a nationwide 
white referendum on further reform, promising resignation in the 
event of defeat. Despite the opposition of the ANC, De Klerk was 
determined to publicly repudiate right wing claims to superior 
legitimacy. 
There is no doubt that the NP felt secure in offering the 
challenge of a referendum, bolstered by numerous opinion polls 
and by the knowledge that the electorate was aware of the 
potentially disastrous and bloody outcome of reversing 
negotiations already initiated. A referendum would also be 
preferable to an alternative OP-inspired general election,  in 
which the CP would be favoured by its support base in the over-
represented rural constituencies. Amid intense campaigning the 
date for the referendum was set as March 17th, 1392, and the 
question to be put to the white electorate was formulated: "Do 
you support the continuation of the reform process which the 
state president began on February 2nd 1990, and which is aimed at 
a new constitution through negotiation?". 
Largely isolated from the violence continuing to wrack the 
townships, but aware of it as a lurking zenaca inSrAith African 
society, 68.6% of the white referendum electorate, in an 85% 
turnout, voted "yes" to further reform. The result indicated more 
the fear of South Africa's inevitable spiral into unprecedentedly 
intense international condemnation and violent 0,..vilym;,, isolation 
in the event of a "no" vote, than an acceptance of ANC 
government. It also suggested faith in the NP's ability to hold 
out for a favourable dispensation for propertied whites under the 
future constitution. 
That faith seemed justified when, back at CODESA and within a 
week of the referendum, a confident NP demanded diluted power 
sharing proposals involving a merely advisory, rather than 
executive transitional authority, the disbandment of MK, and a 
delay in interim rule until violence had subsided. The virtually 
unanimous rejection of these proposals by the other CODESA 
delegates (the exception was Inkatha), forced the UP to 
temporize, and the following day, Buthelezi too came out against 
the proposals on the grounds that they would strip his KwaZulu 
homeland of authority. 
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By May 1992, it seemed that deadlock was approaching at CODESA. 
Broad agreement had been reached on a multi-party group to 
oversee moves towards nonracial elections, but the shape of the 
new elected parliament, was the subject of fierce disagreement. 
While the NP held out for a powerful upper house, formulated 
according to regional representation, to control the activity of 
a proportionately representative lower house, the ANC rejected 
the disproportionate strength this would accord the NP. The most 
fundamental disagreement though, was over the size of majority 
required to formulate the new constitution in the future 
parliament. The NP, hoping for about 25% of the vote in the 
elections (and therefore 25% of seats in the new lower house) 
wanted new legislation pertaining to the constitution to be 
passed only if 75% were in favour - giving the NP an effective 
veto. The ANC argued that a two thirds majority was customary and 
sufficient to amend the constitution, but it agreed to accept 
70%. With no compromise forttcoming from the VP, an ANC official 
described the government's programme as "loser takes all". The 
ANC response was to organize once more for pressurizing "mass 
action". 
The Breakdown of CODESA 
Cefore any further constitutional progress tad been made, one o 
the critical events of the interregnum occurred: the killings in 
Boipatong. On 17th June 1992, following a series of mutual 
attacks between Inkatha and ANC members, Inkatha hostel dwellers, 
assisted by police, went on - the rampage in the township south of 
Johannesburg, hacking to death 42 men, women and children, 
including a nine-month old baby (Independent on Sunday, 21.6.92). 
From 1989 to 1992, over 7000 blacks had been killed in political 
violence - more than during the wtole apartheid era “bid), but 
this was the first such incident to provoke a coherent government 
response: De Kierk's visit of condolence to the township was 
driven off by angry crowds. 
With constitutional talks ground to a halt and the state's 
security forces seen clearly to be continuing a war on the ANC in 
the townships, Mandela publicly called of further talks with the 
government on June 21st. Responding to the concerns of the ANC's 
supporters, many fi-ghting for survival or revenge against Inkatha 
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members, Mandela stated that he could "no longer explain to our 
people why we continue to talk to a government which is murdering 
our people" (Guardian, 22.6.92). The negotiations, upon which the 
media spotlight had been focused, had broken down, but the 
killing continued. 
Inkatha-dominated migrant worker hostels had become objects of 
fear and loathing within their surrounding Transvaal townships. 
The workers inside the hostels were aware of their vilification. 
They knew of the background political differences between their 
leader, Buthelezi, and the ANC leadership favoured by the 
townships; they lived in a tradition of hostel dweller - township 
resident cultural antipathy, and as a combative siege mentality 
was incited by Inkatha officials, assaults were launched on the 
surrounding community. The inevitable retaliation initiated-the 
next round of local violence. When ANC leaders toured the 
townships, the first demand with which they were met was not for 
schools, hospitals, land or jobs, but for guns with which to 
fight Inkatha. Incidentally, it was in this context, with her 
militant identification with communities at war, and with the 
very poorest of urban black society, that Winnie Mandela staged a 
political comeback following her conviction for kidnapping and 
her separation from the ANC leader. 
In the wake of Boipatong, the NP dropped its demand for a 75% 
majority for constitutional legislation to the n% previously 
indicated by the ANC as acceptable, but the ANC's mass action 
campaign continued with a march on government buildings to press 
for more rapid moves towards an interim government. 
In August 1992, as part of the campaign, up to four million 
workers stayed at home on the first day of a two day general 
strike. Accompanied by further violence and disputed claims over 
the level of suppoTt, the strike, together with subsequent 
marches involving 200,000 to 400,000 protestors, nevertheless 
served as a reminder that South Africa could never again be 
stabilised without ANC participation in a constitutional 
settlement. 
Following a purge of high rank; u seer ity 	 pciounimi 
implicated in the violence (but sparing many of those associated 
with Inkathagate), it was revealed in September that covert 
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negotiations had already begun between the ANC's Cyril Ramaphosa 
and the government's Roelf Meyer, paving the way for a resumption 
of official talks. The substance of the agreement was a specified 
time-frame for the devising of a constitution, and a mechanism to 
break deadlock over the majority required for constitutional 
legislation. The inference was that the government had abandoned 
a minority veto, perhaps in return for concessions on a regional 
character to the new constitution (Guardian, 5.9.92). 
However, even such tentative signs of a resumption in 
constitutional progress initially seemed premature when a new 
mass shooting occurred. In the Ciskei, the homeland leader Oupa 
Gqozo, backed by South African military intelligence, had become 
ever more vituperative as ANC supporters threatened to unseat 
him. In August, during the ANC's mass act:-on campaign, a 
	  • 	 ^nr. 	 • 	 that an ptuk.valult of oui vuv, nay mark,fleu on %,tmel, ucmailumg 
interim administration be set up in the capital, Bisho. It was 
only saved from being fired upon by homeland troops and police 
when it was persuaded, by Antoine Geldunhuys, the head of the 
Natiohal Peace Secretariat, togther with a UN observer, Jose 
Campino, to back away from the homeland border. But on September 
7th, there was no saviour. 
In a fresh march on Bisho, 70,000 ANC supporters were fired upon 
by troops from the homeland. The world's TV cameras rolled as two 
staggered bursts of gunfire left over 200 bloody bodies scattered 
along the homeland border. The firing, resulting in 29 deaths, 
had started without warning as a section of the crowd broke 
through razor wire fencing and headed for Bisho rather than the 
stadium allocated for the rally by a local magistrate. Mutual 
recriminations followed, with De Klerk blaming the inherently 
dangerous ANC tactic of mass mobilization and Cyril Ramaphosa, 
the collusion between South African and Ciskeian security forces. 
The moves towards resumed negotiations appeared, in the immediate 
aftermath, to have been reversed; but once again, the rhetoric of 
confrontation was followed by the revelation of behind-the-scenes 
contact. Four days later, the ANC announced that it was meeting 
the government to discuss the current level of violence. The ANC 
executive had decided that it could use Bisho to pressurize the 
government to make further concessions in restarted negotiations. 
As Ramaphosa and Weyer haggled over the question of amnesty for 
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past apartheid crimes and the release of remaining political 
prisoners - preconditions for the envisaged talks on violence -
tension was perceptibly mounting in Natal where Buthelezi saw his 
own position as homeland leader threatened by the same tendency 
that was aimed at Gqoza's unseating. During September, the 
Inkatha leader became increasingly bellicose, claiming that the 
ANC had effectively declared war on the Zulu by demanding the 
dismantling of the KwaZulu homeland, and infusing his supporters 
witt blood lust. While Buthelezi was speaking of the greatest 
threat to the Zulu nation since "the conquest of KwaZulu in the 
battle of Ulundi in 1879" (Guardian, 25.9.92), KwaZulu civil 
servants who were known to be sympathetic to the ANC were having 
tteir housesburnt down and their lives threatened. 
The Resumption of Talks 
By the end of September, compromise had been reached on the 
release of political prisoners. Further agreement on the means of 
devising a new constitution was followed by a mutual commitment 
to resume negotiations. At this point, Buthelezi angrily pulled 
out of the resumed talks. Intent on carving out a role of 
national significance in any future settlement, he was 
exasperated at restriction of agreement so far to theme NP and ARC. 
Realizing that his own political movement was being marginalised 
by talks between the real contenders for national power, his 
rtetoric became ever more inflamed witt "predictions" of violence 
and instability in the event of his being overlooked. Whilst 
avoiding direct calls to arms, in a meeting with Gqoza and 
Mangope of Soptuttatswana, Cuthelezi "foretold" ttat Zulus, 
synonymous in his lexicon with Inkatha, would violently resist 
any attempt to undermine their autonomy. In response, white right 
wing leaders including TreurnIcht of the CP hinted at a possible 
alliance with the homeland leaders, in mutual antipathy to the 
ANC. It could be said of both groups that they "know their 
influence is greater now than it will be after the first 
election, whist will cut them down to size or wipe them out 
altogether, and so they are making what impact they can. The 
country is being held to ransom by a desperate minority" 
(Observer, 4.10.92). 
A linked desperate minority still lurked within the security 
forces. In November, the Goldstone Commission, set up to enquire 
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into security force activity, publicised Military Intelligence 
plans to discredit ANC leaders with prostitutes, homosexuals and 
drug dealers. De Klerk was forced to sack the command of the 
security branch, a further purge following in December. The ANC 
moved quickly to apply pressure for constitutional progress, 
simultaneously offering the security forces guaranteed job 
security, retrenchment packages and pensions under a future 
government. The government swiftly announced a time frame for 
future elections: April 1994. 
With these fresh moves towards rapprochement between the two big 
parties, another marginalised political grouping - the PAC, made 
its presence felt. Amid continuing widespread murder in the black 
areas, November 1992 marked the first APLA (the PAC's armed wing) 
attacks on white civilians living in the disputed Transkei border 
I egion. As was ntended, 'ch. di.p,upuit;osiate media attention 
given to the deaths of four whites gave the PAC an opportunity to 
compare the differential value still accorded to white and black 
life in the "new" South Africa. 
Throughout the early months of ISS3 numerous talks continued: 
between the ANC and the NP on conditions for resumed formal 
constitutional negotiations, and between both parties and 
Buthelezi in attempts to secure his involvement without conceding 
him the political status that he demanded. Meanwhile the 
partially orchestrated violence of the townships contin-aed, the 
ANC releasing figures of 380 of its members killed between 
January and November 1992. In February 1993, the two "major 
players" agreed on a five year term for the new elected 
government - in other words, delaying the imposition of a 
constitution devised by that elected assembly until 1999. 
Following these significant strides towards a fixed agreement, 
the press began its evaluation of the last "wasted year" 
(Guardian, 15.2.93). Analysis s-aggested that De Klerk, in the 
wake of his referendum triumph over the conservatives, had pushed 
the ANC too hard over the minority veto (ibid). However, it seems 
I ikely that De Klerk had erivisaged such a veto all along - it was 
not simply an idea implanted with the achievement of a white 
mandate to negotiate. 
Undermined by its security forces' transgressions, which were 
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continually entering the public domain through investigative 
journalism and the Goldstone Commission, and facing severe 
economic decline as investors were deterred by violence (see 
below), the government had, by 1993, reconciled itself to greater 
ANC influence over the writing of a new, permanent constitution. 
The reconciliation had possibly been made easier by an ANC 
commitment to formulate the ,...unotitutiun by ,L.U11OUQ, eVen in 
the event of its fulfilling the legal requirements to write it 
unilaterally. 
With the outline of the elected body which would write a 
constitution becoming less hazy, and having achieved little 
through premonitions of war, Buthelezi decided to participate 
once more. The CP and the PAC similarly became involved in the 
new "nameless" talks (the acronym CODESA having become 
.2,,,..vptatle to these parties). 
Just as previously, when progress towards a constitutional 
settlement had been resumed, and with the almost routine killing 
continuing, a particularly salient violent incident intruded. In 
April 1293, the Mil chief of staff and SACP leader, Chris Bani was 
murdered by a white right winger backed by a Conservative MP and 
his wife. The timing was probably not coincidental. Hani was the 
second most popular figure in the country after Mandela (poll 
cited Independent on Sunday, 11.4.93), and his death resulted in 
the seething black frustration at continuing, directed killing, 
during the white state's dying months, erupting into rioting 
ate..,*5 the country. Mandela, speaking at ANC memorial services, 
was greeted with sullen silence when he stressed the need for 
moderation and chided ANC supporters for chanting "Kill the 
Farmer, Kill the Boer". Attacks on whites did indeed mount in the 
aftermath of the killing, most carried out by PAC rather than ANC 
supporters, though the brutalised youth of the larger movement 
largely condoned them. The period of turmoil brought the 
unprecedented sight of ANC officials desperately cooperating with 
police in attempts to restrain their supporters from further 
rioting and looting. 
Following the death of the CP's leader, Andries Treurnicht, and 
soon after Hani's assassination, four former police and army 
generals, led by Constand Viljoen, ex-Commander in Chief of the 
CACI', combined to varshal right wing opposition to further 
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constitutional concessions. To some extent, they succeeded in 
pulling together disparate strands of white reaction - the CP, 
the HNP and the relatively moderate Afrikaner Volksunie. The AWB 
remained politically sympathetic, but preferring the extra-legal 
rhetoric of war to the more considered path of the generals. 
Through the Concerned South Africans Crcw, (=AG), the new body, 
subsequently named the Afrikaner Volksfront, forged links with 
the homeland leaders similarly opposed to ANC government. 
July 1333, ni.ithelezi had refined the rhetoric of his 
resistance to democratic elections by claiming to represent a 
tradition of Zulu ethnic independence. The strategy required 
roping Buthelezi's nephew and many argued, puppet, the Zulu King 
Zwelithini into a more prominent role as the threatened monarch. 
The firm setting of the election date for April 27th 1-394 was 
followed by Ciithelezi's vehement objection and an associated 
upsurge in Inkatha-ANC killing, centring once again on the 
Inkatha hostels. 
When the draft interim constitution - essentially that which has 
in fact been implemented - was announced at the end of July 
(Guardian, 27.7.93), it was hoped that the provision for elected 
regional bodies to draw up their own constitutions would placate 
Buthelezi, since he could aim for the Natal/KwaZulu premiership. 
Other salient characteristics of the transitional constitution -
adopted for the elections and until the elected body could draw 
up a permanent constitution - included a national assembly of 4OG 
members. Two hundred would be elected from across the nation by 
proportional representation from a party list ballot, with the 
other 200 comprised of those elected in regional ballots, their 
numbers proportionate to the populations of the regions. There 
would also be a senate containing 90 members - 10 from each 
region, representative of the composition of the regional 
legislatures. New constitutional legislation tould only be passed 
under the new government if, in both the national assembly and 
the senate sitting together, it was ratified by two thirds of the 
members. Any party which attained VVCI five r,elt,ent uf the 
national vote, or 20 seats, would be entitled to cabinet members 
in proportion to its vote. The regional governments, reflecting 
pivputtiuns of the vote within the regions, would formulate their 
own constitutions (subject to national limitations) with similar 
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two thirds majorities. Their domain would extend over urban and 
rural development, taxation, law and policing, language policy 
and the media. 
Despite massive peace marches in the wake of the announcement, 
violence indicative of a descent towards civil war continued in 
the townships, with PAC gunmen extending it occasionally to white 
areas and white targets. Agreement on a transitional executive 
council (TEC) to oversee the path to elections for the new 
parliament, involved the ANC in a first taste of executive power. 
This too was followed by more seemingly random acts of terror, 
prompting the ANC to blame continuing "third force" activity 
aimed at upsetting each constitutional advance. If so, the tactic 
was unsuccessful: the idea of elections, under the agreed 
constitution, and on the agreed date, became ever more fixed in, 
most South Africans' minds. 
With the constitution finalised in November and passed by the now 
anachronistic tricameral parliament in December, while ANC and NP 
members partied in JohannestAirg, Cuthelezi and the Afrikaner 
Volksfront plotted their resistance. They were joined by Oqozo 
and Mangope as the TEC prepared to repeal laws recognising their 
"independent" homelands. Together, these groups in opposition 
formed a new political block - the "Freedom Alliance", whose 
representatives became involved in ongoing, but fruitless 
discussions with the government and the ANC. The celebrations of 
the Day of the Covenant, commemorating the Afrikaner trekkers' 
victory over the Zulu in December 1838, manifested exquisitely 
the ironies of the contemporary South African political scene. A 
ludicrous alliance of modern racist Afrikaners and self-
proclaimed Zulu leaders remembered their own version of events in 
1838, whilst maintaining united opposition to a democratic future 
for the rest of the country (see The Times, 19.12.93). 
When, in December, the TEC announced that all homelands would, if 
necessary, be forcibly reincorporated, the scene was set for the 
debacle of Bophuthatswana. On March 11th 1994, members of 
Bophuthatswana's police force, afraid of lcsing their jobs and 
pensions, and perhaps even their lives in the event of forced 
reincorporation, mutinied and marched on Pretoria's embassy in 
tie homeland's capital of Mmabatto, to -demand immediate, peaceful 
reincorporation. Under additional pressure from a civil service 
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strike and civilian demonstrations, Mangope fled from the city, 
effectively leaving its political control in the hands of ANC 
supporters. Opposed to homeland reincorporation, and seeing 
themselves as engaged in a military alliance with Mangope, armed 
AWB members gathered in pick-up trucks on the homeland border 
before dramatically intervening in an attempt to restore its 
president. 
Within hours, and minus three, they were fleeing from the 
homeland's police and army. The "warriors" of the right wing had 
driven in convoy through the town shooting over 40 black pa*acla-
by from their truck windows until they were corralled by the 
black police and driven off the streets. As one group was leaving 
though, shots continued to be fired at black stone-throwers. In 
response, a black policeman raked an AWB car with gunfire, 
killing one of the occupants instantly. In front of TV cameras 
and press, the two survivors, having failed to realize that their 
lives were still threatened by the policeman, demanded medical 
assistance. To the surprise of the journalists present, and even 
of the black spectators jeering "are you sorry now?", the 
policeman dispassionately shot the two men dead. As John Carlin 
of the Independent newspaper pointed out, the neo-Nazi Afrikaners 
had learned in their last seconds a lesson that they had resisted 
all their lives: South African blacks were no longer intimidated 
by white authority and violence. 
In the absence of widespread sorrow for the killings, and with 
SW co-operation in the removal of the remaining AWB men from 
the homeland, constitutional right wing leaders realized that 
they had reached the nadir of their opposition to the elections. 
Minutes before a midnight deadline, Viljoen confirmed that his 
movement, now called the Freedom Front, would be participating. 
Mangope was restored to what remained of the homeland presidency 
on condition that it be reincorporated following the elections, 
and that he allow free voting in the region. 
A month before those elections, with Buthelezi still holding out, 
via Zwelithini, for "Zulu autonomy", the Goldstone Commission 
reported that "third force" destabilization had been, masterminded 
by Colonel De Kock of the security police, assisted by three 
police officers in liaison with Inkatha officials. The deputy 
commissioner of police, Basie-Smit, the head of counter- 
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intelligence, Engelbrecht, and the CID commander, Le Roux, had 
conspired with Inkatha men such as Themba Khoza, to supply 
Inkatha with weapons and helped identify targets (Guardian, 
19.3.94). Once again, it was predicted that Buthelezi's political 
career could not survive association with a security force 
manipulated campaign of mass murder (Independent on Gunday, 
20.3.94), but once again his tenacity was underestimated. 
As Buthelezi prepared for armed resistance to a democratically 
elected South African state, his counterpart in the Ciskei - the 
only other remaining homeland leader opposed to reincorporation -
faced a police mutiny similar to that in Bophuthatswana. 
Following Gqozo's relinquishing of power, the territory was 
governed by administrators appointed by the TEC. The isolated 
Buthelezi, with some reason, now feared an ANC-coordinated plan 
to unseat him too. As De Klerk took half-hearted measures against 
the police chiefs implicated by Goldstone, fears mounted that, 
despite a widespread desire to vote indicated by polls in Natal, 
Inkatha would be able to mount effective resistance to elections 
in the region. 
With the tension between Inkatha and the ANC at its peak, Inkatha 
organised an armed march past the ANC headquarters in 
Johannesburg. As some of the marchers, unescorted by police, 
veered towards the ANC building, firing erupted from the ground 
floor and upper levels. In the ensuing melee, both outside the 
building and in other nearby locations, IC Inkatha men were 
killed immediately, and by the time the violence had subsided, 51 
people were dead. Buthelezi insisted that, in the light of this 
violence directed against his supporters, elections must be 
delayed, but tbe government ruled that out of the question and, 
with the TEC taking the initiative, declared a state of emergency 
in Natal to prevent further bloodshed there diverting the path to 
elections. 
Within Natal, however the fighting continued. Pressurized and 
galvanised by Inkatha warlords and rural chiefs, KwaZulu's 
villagers were stirred into war against the ANC. They were 
motivated to kill by Inkatha rhetoric of a threatened ANC/Xhosa 
takeover followed by the suppression of Zulu customs and the 
confiscation of land and even wives. When fears of this nature 
were combined with continuing chiefly monopoly over the 
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allocation of local resources, and coercion to participate, 
Inkatha's violence gained considerable momentum. The notorious 
Inkatha warlord, David Ntombela proved particularly effective at 
mobilizing impis through just such a blend of rhetoric and 
intimidation. In village meetings, at which attendance was 
compulsory, he would first excite the rendition of war chants 
with tales of ANC savagery, and then point his finger at those 
participating with insufficient gusto. Once his accompanying 
gunmen had persuaded all present to join in unreservedly, the 
village men would be launched against local ANC targets. 
But amidst all the evidence of these forces at play, it was 
perhaps easy to forget the underlying sense of ethnic identity 
wtict must have been reified to produce the violence. Even if 
this was Zulu killing Zulu, Inkatha's impis were acting partly in 
the belief that they were fighting for the preservation of their 
essential "Zulu-ness" against the alien influences which they 
believed had contaminated local ANC supporters. As Rian Malan put 
it, "one trusts one's instincts and mine maintained that there 
was more to Zuluism than ever dreamed of in the philosophies of 
white Marxists and Methodists" (Guardian, 13.5.94). A dramatic 
consequence of the regional conflict was geographical. As 
Buthelezi supporters drove out or killed ANC members from areas 
they perceived as their own, the process in reverse occurred in 
ANC supporting areas. Geographical polarization between the 
politically divided Zulu communities came to reflect the gulf 
between their political leaders. 
Buthelezi, having lost right wing, security force and other 
homeland allies, knowing that he stood no chance of gaining 
national power in the elections, and doubting that he could even 
achieve dominance in his declared region of KwaZulu/Natal, had 
desperately held out for some continuing role for an ethnic Zulu 
kingdom in which he could exercise post-apartheid power. But by 
March 1994, with a State of Emergency meaning that continued 
Inkatha inspired violence in Natal would meet with a coherent 
state military resporise, Cuthelezi's strategy tad reached the 
limits of its logic. It seemed certain that the elections would 
go ahead, and would be declared free and fair even without 
Buthelezi's participation, and in spite of the chaos that Inkatha 
could muster. In that event, the new central government would 
immediately cut off the funds which had directly sustained the 
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KwaZulu homeland structure and indirectly organised and armed 
Inkatha. With the SADF at its disposal, it could then rapidly 
crush continued armed resistance. Since the international 
community was united behind the electoral process in South 
Africa, Inkatha, unlike UNITA in Angola and RENAMO in Mozambique, 
could not rely on outside support. It simply could not sustain 
resistance to a new ANC led state. 
Yet, despite starting talks with the government and the ANC at 
the beginning of April, Buthelezi continued to reject offers of 
full recognition for the Zulu monarchy which, Mandela pointed 
out, would accord it more power even than that held by Queen 
Elizabeth. He refused to let Inkatha take part in the elections. 
In the final run up to the election, polls in the KwaZulu/Natal 
region suggested that Inkatha would win,21%, and the ANC, 44% of 
the black vote (Guardian, 11.4.94). If Buthelezi could have been 
confident of winning this regional "vote, it seems likely that he 
would have already succumbed. His eleventh hour refusal suggests 
that he was aware that the perception of widespread Inkatha 
support in the region rested partially on intimidation. 
In the days before the election, the ANC was also increasingly 
concerned about competition for another region - the Western 
Cape. This time the challenge came from the NP. Amidst 
allegations of racist electioneering, the NP could trust to the 
fears of the region's majority "Coloured" population that a 
regional ANC dominance would lead to preference for Africans, 
similar to the preference that they themselves had received from 
the NP under apartheid. In particular, much of the "Coloured" 
electorate was concerned at the possibility of an African urban 
influx and one-sided competition for housing, jobs and local 
resources. 
Exactly one week before the election, Buthelezi agreed to 
participate, choosing to accept watered down versions of the ANC 
and NP offers that he had only recently rejected. While Buthelezi 
claised that the volte face was the result of personal 
intervention by a Kenyan self-proclaimed diplomatic specialist, 
it is more likely that he was facing increased pressure from 
those within Inkatha - perhaps even Zwelithini - who stood to 
lose the influence granted them by Inkatha's genuine KwaZulu 
constituency if the movement ruled itself out entirely from the 
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next government. The interpretation centring on Zwelithini's 
personal opposition to further boycott was strengthened by the 
post-electoral revelation that De Klerk had unilaterally conceded 
a significant portion of KwaZulu's land area to Zwelithini 
himself, effectively excluding it from any future ANC land 
redistribution scheme. tven if the Inkatha movement as a whole 
could not win the regional premiership, proportional 
representation would give it some standing under the new 
constitution. But if it persisted in refusing to accept that 
constitution, there was absolutely nothing to be gained, and all 
to be lost. 
The Elections  
With Inkatha-ANC-violence subsiding in the light of Inkatha's 
climb-down, extreme right wiwdc.z, bereft of further creditable 
political opposition to the elections, began a bombing campaign 
on the day before elections began. 21 people were killed in 
Johannesburg and Pretoria on April 25th. On the next day though, 
the first black South Africans to vote in post-apartheid 
elections, went to the polls. These were special categories of 
voters including the elderly and disabled, allowed to vote a day 
before the rest of the electorate. Despite threats of further 
bombs and administrative chaos involving shortages of indelible 
ink to mark those who had already voted and supplies of the 
stickers by which Inkatha's late candidacy would be marked on 
ballots, the first day of voting was distinguished by its 
widespread euphoria. The same blend of anxiety over the logistics 
of registerirtg and recordin-g the votes of an electorate 0 
roughly (no one could be sure) 22 million, and multiracial 
rejoicing, characterised the rest of the electoral period. A 
further bomb explosion at Jan Smuts international airport was 
followed swiftly by the arrest of 31 right wing culprits. This 
marked the last intervention by groups violently opposed to the 
electoral process. 
Throughout the 27th and 28th of April, while enormous queues 
patiently awaited the chance to vote outside some polling booths, 
others, mostly in rural areas, had ballot papers but no voters. 
Allegations of vote rigging, particularly in KwaZulu/Natal, where 
Inkatha officials opened unofficial polling booths and included 
marked ballot papers with those of legitimate booths, continued 
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with the extension of voting into the early hours of the morning 
and, in some areas, the next day too. Even once the shambolic, 
but jubilant poll had been conducted, the counting process proved 
to be as exasperating as the voting. As results trickled 
excruciatingly slowly into the media, specific incidents revealed 
the difficulties of holding a free and fair vote - for instance, 
ballot boxes stuffed with neatly folded Inkatha votes and cars 
and warehouses containing official ballot boxes with genuine 
votes in them. Nevertheless, amazingly, South Africa had 
experienced two whole days on which not one violent crime was 
reported. 
Even with most of the national results in, evident ballot rigging 
in KwaZulu/Natal, mostly in Inkatha's favour, delayed the 
declaration of a final result. The region's results were 
eventually determined not by the votes cast at all, but by an 
agreement between the major parties to give Buthelezi just over 
half the regional votes - enough to become undisputed regional 
premier. In spite of the protestations of the local ANC 
leadership, which wished to genuinely contest the region, it 
seems that the national ANC leadership had decided that, by 
giving Buthelezi a significant role, it could secure more 
favourable prospects for peace and, therefore, economic 
stability. Buthelezi had recently implied that he would accept 
the count only if it was in his favour. Pallo Jordan of the ANC, 
invoking Lyndon Johnson's phrase in a slightly different context, 
could have been summa zing the party's policy towards Buthelezi: 
it is better to have potential troublemakers "inside the tent 
pissing out than outside pissing in". 
After numerous predictions that Buthelezi's political career 
would soon be over 	 his movement's role 	 violence and 115 
attempts at blackmailing the country through threats of civil 
war, he had achieved after all, more power within the region than 
he had had as homeland leader. Soon appointed as Nome Affairs 
minister in Nelson Mandela's new cabinet, he had also managed to 
secure an important national role. For the new ANC government, 
s potential to continue stirring violence is at least 
diminished, and he has responsibility for a difficult government 
role, for which he can take the blame in the event of failure to 
meet expectations. 
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The "new" South Africa then, would be governed for at least five 
years by the ANC under president Mandela, commanding 62.6% of the 
total vote - possibly through another negotiated electoral 
outcome, not quite enough to rewrite the constitution 
unilaterally. In a decision similarly geared towards 
international investment, the NP's Derek Keys retained the 
Finance post, while focif Meyer became Minister for l'To-vincial 
Affairs and Constitutional Development. The Deputy Presidents are 
Thabo Mbeki and F.W. De Klerk, and the radically popular Winnie 
Mandela has been brought on board in the relatively obscure 
position as Deputy Minister for Arts, Culture, Science and 
Technology. 
From this glance at the course of the last four years' dramatic 
political events, it would seem that De Klerk's NP has conceded 
more than it intended at the outset of the reform initiative. 
South Africa, despite a commitment to multi-party executive 
government for the next five years, has no entrenched clause 
protecting white, or even "minority" rights, and despite failing 
(or declining) to achieve the parliamentary domination required 
to rewrite the constitution unilaterally, the ANC has a firm hold 
on the assembly which will write South Africa's next constitution 
- something that the Nr sought throughout 1991 and 1992 to 
prevent. The outcome of negotiations which the NP first envisaged 
as resulting in a more limited kind of "power sharing", 
demonstrates the unpredictable dialectics involved in an entire 
political transformation. 
The Shape of the "New South Africa"  
With growing familiarity between negotiators from the ANC and the 
NP, the relative moderation and economic realism of the ANC 
leadership must have struck many members of the NP establishment. 
The ANC's early attempts to placate business interests and its 
shedding of the perception of nationalisation as panacea would 
have enhanced NP pcou= uf mind at the prospect of less restricted 
ANC power. But of equal importance in the tendency to concede 
more than was first envisaged, was the impact of extraneous 
events. The sheer scale of the VAT strike, the countrywide 
protestation at the Boipatong and Bisho shootings, and the 
genuine grief at the murder of Chris Hani, all contributed to the 
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realisation that vehement and nationwide support for an 
unhampered ANC government precluded economic or political 
stability under any substantially different order. 
But political and economic stability is by no means assured for 
South Africa. Firstly, the political credibility of the new ANC 
administration is not unchallenged. Questions over members' past 
behaviour are likely to fade as the party exercises power, but 
they have nonetheless vexed some political observers. Despite the 
suppression of an internal report, in 1993 it was revealed that 
there were incidents of routine torture at an external ANC 
training camp; there have been allegations of financial 
mismanagement and corruption in the ANC's financial arm, Thebe, 
and within the party's Social Welfare Department under Winnie 
Mandela; Nelson Mandela's personal intervention to prevent a 
police search of ANC headquarters after the March 1994,shooting 
on the Inkatha march has raised some suspicions, and there is 
annoyance within blects townships at the "yuppification" of ANC 
leaders, extending even to friendships with the likes of Sol 
Kerzner, the millionaire who made his fortune out of homeland 
casinos. Yet, in comparison with the known illegitimate actions 
of the NP and Inkatha, the ANC is on relatively secure ground. 
Political instability in the "new South Africa" is more likely to 
come from an inability to meet material expectations raised by 
the transition process than from the discrediting of leaders. Tte 
death throes of apartheid sent South Africa into economic trauma 
and the legacies of racial domination in land, health, education, 
transport and employment are all bitin.g more evidently now that 
their most obvious source has been removed. 
The Development Bank of South Africa has estimated that 9 million 
are now completely destitute and the ANC has been supported by 
these and others not just for its historic opposition to 
apartheid, but because of its promise to deliver material 
salvation, in much the same way that the NP did for the volk. 
With competition for the resources now at the ANC's disposal, 
scenarios disturbing for the prospect of future political 
stability can be posited. If high expectations are not fulfilled, 
the brutalised, conflict-accustomed youth could well turn out 
once more in opposition to the authorities, and Winnie Mandela 
has effectively promised to lead them. 
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As under apartheid, it is the established urban interests that 
are most likely to be successful in competition for the new 
state's resources. While COSATU and the still intact urban civic 
structures, which largely represent formal township residents, 
will be extremely powerful constituencies within the new body 
politic, less organised and less economically significant urban, 
squatters may find the pace of material improvement too slow. 
Traditional rural societies in the impoverished former homelands 
could find themselves even further neglected in the 
implementation of the ANC's economic reconstruction plan. 
The ability of the ANC to prevent its support base from dividing 
along spatial/economic lines lies in its capacity to fulfil each 
of its election pledges - to create 2.5 million jobs in 10 years, 
to build 1 million homes, to electrify 2.5 million households, to 
redistribute 30% of agricultural land and to improve drastically 
on black education and health care. A disproportionate focus on 
some of these goals at the expense of others could prove divisive 
between rural and urban areas, but even the attainment of rural 
goals like land redistribution could disadvantage some - for 
instance those who eke out a living by migrating to work on white 
farms. 
If it is to be successful in its material goals, the new 
government will require a A 
	
tuino.uund 	 vtAmum;%.. 
fortunes. Government borrowing already accounts for 6% of GNP 
(Independent on Sunday,24.4.94), so there is little hope for an 
expanding budget. Very low rates of domestic savings, no 
immediate prospect of a rise in employment and the long term 
difficulties faced by a primary product exporter (Financial 
Times, 22.4.94) all increase the dependence on investment from 
outside. It was the growing realization of these difficulties, 
not all brought about solely by apartheid, that edged the ANC 
into an economic rapport with the NP during negotiations and led 
to its relinquishing the prospect of nationalisation. 
The level of outside investment over the years of transition has 
been remarkably sensitive to political events. With the moves 
towards a negotiated future in 1990, the capital flight that had 
so perturbed reformists under Botha was reduced, but the 
uncertaizty induced by the breakdown in talks during 1992 led to 
outflows quadrupling again, until they exceeded 4% of national 
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income (Independent on Sunday, 24.4.94). With Inkatha's promise 
of armed resistance just before the elections, the rand fell to a 
record closing low (Guardian, 16.4.94). In order to secure future 
investment then, the government must first ensure political 
stability. Assuming it does so, the prospects look relatively 
good. South Africa has established legal and financial services, 
a relatively well developed infrastructure, a continental 
economic dominance, relatively low foreign debt (rescheduled in 
September 1293), and the world's second largest "emerging" market 
(Guardian, 30.4.94) to be untapped by the new government's 
reconstruction programme. The economic undermining of local 
government structures through rent boycotts - at least 
politically inspired ones - has also been called off. 
At present, investment in South Africa is being seen as high 
risk, but potentially extremely profitable in the short term. 
Immediate growth sectors are expected to be in construction, 
tourism boosted by pristine beaches, spectacularly beautiful 
scenery and safari wildlife., and life insurance. Institutional 
investors li'c the Prudential have already established in 
Johannesburg and white companies have proved keen to employ or 
even sell assets to black businesspeople, although this has had 
minimal impact on the enormous gulf between the overwhelmingly 
white formal business sector, and the crowded, but relatively 
unprofitable, black informal economy (Financial Times, 22.4.94). 
As South Africa emerged from its post-apartheid elections, it was 
clear that the government's ability to satisfy the material 
expectations of those who had suffered organised state 
discrimination for their entire lifetimes, depended on securing 
their political acquiescence. This was the realization that had 
spurred De Klerk's NP leadership to negotiate in the first place. 
But that acquiescence itself would require some satisfaction of 
material expectations - a "Catch 22" of the kind that has held 
the key to late 20th century South African social formation. The 
greatest political question facing the South African state today 
is how patient will the poorest and most alienated be? 
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Conclusion 
Conceptions of South African Socio-Political Formation 
This final chapter is not so much a summary; more of an attempt 
to infer from the foregoing narrative, the nature of the 
historical relationship between the South African state and wider 
agencies. Firstly, general theories of state formation and 
interaction with society are overviewed and applied to the South 
African case. Secondly, South Africa's social development since 
the colonial period is set in a wider geographical context. 
In this part of the thesis, I have attempted to describe and 
explain the historical formation of -;mportant South African 
political, economic, social and cultural structures. The often 
contradictory and continuously changing South African state has 
obviously had much to do with the evolution of these structures, 
but wider, socially generated agencies within South Africa have 
interacted with it, and with each other, to determine their final 
shape. In addition, many of the internal political and economic 
developments that have influenced South African social forms have 
either directly resulted from its interaction in a wider world 
economy, or have reflected developments occurring 
contemporaneously elsewhere. Here, a geographically informed 
approach can yield insights relatively neglected by the 
historians and soolologists whose won't: -;.nforlis such a large 
portion of the preceding account. Indeed, the influence of space 
and locality themselves, have generally been neglected in studies 
of South Africa's social formation. The chapter concludes then, 
with an attempt to set the preceding account of South African 
social formation in a theoretical context informed by studies of 
state-society relations, and of South Africa's position within a 
wider world. 
Theories of the State 
Given the perhaps unique importance of the state in shaping South 
Africa's human geography and social interaction, state theory 
should comprise a part of any general survey. The absence of such 
a component in many analyses led Mitchell and Russell, 1989, to 
emphasise the need for "bringing the state back in" (Mitchell and 
Russe11,1989b,315). The nature of the relationship between the 
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state and segments of the wider society has been a bone of 
contention between Marxists and liberals, each "school" having 
its own set of explicit or, more often, implicit and 
unarticulated assumptions. 
Early Marxist notions of the state tended to be ranged along a 
narrow spectrum, from functionalist (the state acts in the 
interests of the economic system as a whole) to instrumentalist 
(the state is the agent of whichever are the "ruling classes"). 
An example of the former position is that of Lea, 1982, who 
argues that the post-Soweto attempt by government to partially 
address tte 	 tousing stortage was entirely intended  t0 
"guarantee the conditions for continued capital accumulation". 
The work of Poulantzus was intended to escape such confining 
Marxist notions. Instead of the pliant agent of capital, the 
state for Poulantzus is the site of struggle between different 
fractions of the dominant classes. The dominant fractions of the 
buui vtuiv, cluuuldinv to "fiactiunalists" who based their work 
on Poulantzus, form a power bloc and contend for hegemony within 
it, sometimes, when deadlocks occur, seeking support from non-
bourgeois classes. The resulting alliances can produce state 
policies which appear to contradict the interests of capital; but 
such ostensibly anti-business policies are "ultimately in the 
real interest of capital" (Yudelman,1987,252). 
Fractionalist periodization of the South African state was 
"littered with "turning points" where the balance of power 
shifted between fractions" (Yudelman,1987,252), particularly 1924 
and 1948. Davis et al, 1976, provide illustration, with an 
account of the struggles between mining capital and "national" 
manufacturing and agricultural capital to dominate state policy 
on foreign trade. The implementation of protectionist policies 
indicated that national capital was hegemonic at a given time, 
while a shift towards free trade manifested the usurping of that 
hegemony by foreign (largely mining) capital. Despite 
Poulantzus's original aim of widening the state's agenda, 
fractionalist 'studies of fire South Afrioan state have still 
tended to portray its role as limited to that of political agent 
to whichever fraction was dominant (Wolpe,1988). 
While a Poulantzian analysis can be seen as "neo-Marxist", 
Yudelmall, 1967, points out that its divergence from liberal 
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analyses is not that great. Liberals have portrayed the state as 
trying to ensure a stable environment for competing groups in 
capitalist society. Such a framework has been adopted to its 
fullest extent in a liberal work by Lipton, 1985. Lipton argues 
that, overall this century, white labour and agricultural capital 
were the dominant influences on the state, despite the 1920-24 
dominance of foreign-owned mining capital and that of mining, 
manufacturing and commercial capital from 1939 to 1948. Her 
analysis departs from that of the fractionalists though, in her 
emphasis on the nationalist or ethnic formation of the dominant 
groups, rather than their economic nature. White, and 
particularly Afrikaner, workers and farmers' Interests could not 
be served by the operation of "free market" forces. The 
institutionalised racism of apartheid was largely an attempt by 
the state to intervene on behalf of these politically powerful 
"national" groups, by effecting unskilled black labour controls 
and the suppression of black producers and skilled classes. 
Lipton's emphasis on the political and ideological, rather than 
the economic nature, of the "dominant classes" leads to the 
conclusion that "South Africa's development since Union does not 
support the thesis that the state was the instrument of capital". 
The mining companies and other key economic interests, although 
economically dominant, were, at times when they were in conflict 
with white labour, the bureaucracy or weaker agricultural 
interests, overridden. The "foreign" nature of many of the 
economically dominant fractions of capital rendered them 
politically unsuitable for a close alliance with government, 
particularly under the NP. 
Although the stress on the political or ethnic nature of the most 
influential groups distinguishes Lipton's liberal analysis from 
the fractionalists (who did recognise national and foreign 
capital differentiation, tut put the onus on their economic 
role), her conception of the state shares the limitation of an 
implied pliability, a non-autonomous reaction to demands placed 
upon it, which has been criticised by observers such as Yudelmar1, 
1983, 1987, and Greenberg, 1987. 
Yudelman's main point is that liberal and Marxist theories of the 
state all see it as representational, regardless of whether they 
see it as representing the general interest, a particular class 
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or a particular group. His own feeling is that the state should 
be seen in some senses as an actor in its own right, although not 
entirely autonomous, due to the limited range of choices it has 
in seeking to satisfy its major constituencies. 
Before elaborating on Yudelman's perception of the South African 
state, it is necessary to introduce more universal approaches to 
the role of the state in capitalist society, developed by 
theorists such as Miliband and Habermas. Their ideas provide the 
framework for much of the more recent work specifically on the 
South African state. 
Miliband was concerned to accord the state more autonomy than 
that allowed by traditional accounts. For him "an accurate and 
realistic "model" of the relationship between the dominant class 
in advanced capitalist societies and the state is one of the 
partnership between two different, separate forces, linked to 
each other by many threads, yet each having its own separate 
spheres of concern" (quoted Graaff,199(,58).Greenberg's analysis 
goes further, as he "portrays the state as relatively 
disconnected from class interests and, instead of carrying out 
the dictates of fractions of capital, it imposes its own project 
on a quiescent and pliant manufacturing sector", while "Glaser 
and Posel came to similar conclusions though they attribute more 
weight to demands of capitalists in altering and shaping these 
policies" (Nattrass,1991,675). Following Miliband then, the state 
can be seen to possess more autonomy than fractionalists or some 
liberal analysts have granted it. 
While neo-Marxist accounts tended to emphasise the  	 rvle 
of whichever group most swayed the state, and liberals defined it 
by its political role, according to Habermas, "the independence 
of economy and politics in "early" capitalism has been replaced 
by their intersection in "late" or "advanced" capitalism so that 
a new system of concepts is required which is capable of 
clarifying the role of the state in "managing the various 
economic, political and socio-cultural crises of advanced 
capitalism"" (Habermas,1975, quoted Johnston, Gregory and 
Smith,1990,83). The duality of the state's political and economic 
concerns renders it susceptible to crises, both of legitimation 
in the eyes of its political constituents, and of economic 
accumulation. Its position is influenced both by political ideas 
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and by material economic reality. 
Legitimation and Accumulation in South Africa 
In the light of South Africa's mid 1980s insurrection, "analysis 
of South African conflict is now focusing on the state's 
legitimation crisis, its lack of accepted authority ... and 
increasing inability to perform its everyday functions without 
the exercise of naked force" (Yudelman,1987,250). But the state's 
legitimation crisis is accompanied by an accumulation crisis. 
With "the growing inability of the economy to generate the 
revenue or jobs necessary to underpin social or political 
programmes ... there is structural crisis in the economy itself" 
(Yudelman,1987,251). 
Due to the state's -concern with legitimation as well as 
accumulation, Yudelman sees it as not so much the instrument of 
capital, more a relatively autonomous agent which enters into a 
relationship of symbiosis -with capital. The state's 'concern to 
satisfy non-materially defined constituencies in society, as well 
as the conditions for capital accumulation, means that it does 
not submit itself pliantly to the caprice of whichever fraction 
of capital is dominant. 
The more general work of Weber also has ramifications for South 
African state theory. Weber emphasised the distinction between 
the state and the government, the former consisting of the 
executive, the legislative, the civil service, the judiciary, the 
police and army; the latter of the cabinet of the day. 
Dealing with the state first: Yudelman suggests that the South 
African state was "exposed earlier than most modern states to the 
necessity of resolving the tension between legitimation and 
accumulation" Mdelman,1907,2L31. The Tong term relationship of 
symbiosis between the state and capital in South Africa developed 
in the post Anglo-Boer War reconstruction period, under pressure 
of demands from the gold mining industry, and because of the 
concentration and homogeneity of capital in this early period 
(Stadler,1987), and it persevered despite changes in government. 
That the state did not entirely submit itself to the whim of 
dominant fractions of capital, was due to the similarly early 
need for legitimation: the concentration of political power in 
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the hands of ethnically defined Afrikaners, disproportionately 
found in the agricultural and working classes, led to large scale 
state intervention on their behalf. The state needed to 
legitimate itself within the white population, and Afrikaners in 
particular, through ideology and by broadening representation. At 
the same time, it needed to protect the accumulation process in 
order to ensure continued economic growth. "Because the state 
needed private enterprise to optimise the accumulation function, 
and because capital needed the state to perform the legitimation 
function, a relationship of mutual dependence was the natural 
outcome" (Yudelman,1987,253). 
Applying Yudelman's concept, we can see that, at certain times, 
the tension between the accumulation function and the 
legitimation function becomes manifest - for instance, during the 
1922 miners strike, when mining capital's imperative to erode the 
job colour bar conflicted with Afrikaans miners' political desire 
to retain it. in  ttis instance, Smuts's government of the day, by 
enforcing the demands of capital, lost out politically in the 
1924 election, but the long-term relationship of symbiosis 
between state and capital, by and large, remained intact. 
The distinction between state and government means that discrete 
political events initiated by the government are often, 
seemingly contradictorily, superimposed on the state's long term 
relationship of symbiosis. For Botha's government though, 
Yudelman believes that the symbiosis was strengthened by the 
entrenchment of a legitimation crisis stemming from both black 
resistance and a loss of Afrikaner working and middle class 
support for ineffective reformism. "Business has always had a 
large voice in deter ining policy, but the current mutually 
reinforcing economic and political crises and the government's 
weakness, have enabled business increasingly to influence 
fundamental policy changes instead of confining itself, in public 
at least, simply to reacting to government's initiatives" 
(Yudelman,1987,251). However, the general thrust of Botha's 
political strategy after 1266, was security, rather than 
economically-oriented, and business, unable or unwilling, due to 
a short-termist approach, to drive the government to radical 
reform, generally remained discontented with government policy 
formulation. De Klerk's government, to a greater extent than 
Botha's, has concerned itself with the real, long term concerns 
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of business. 
Capital's concern with the political situation has increased in 
proportion to the extent that it threatens the future of 
enterprise capitalism, especially via the expansion of 
international sanctions and the onset of a "siege economy" 
(Yudelman,1987,254), Afrikaner capital in particular became a 
part of the state's lagitization crisis in the 1980s, since it 
formed a component of the traditional "national" political 
constituency. English capital was less politically important, but 
integral to the accumulation crisis. Yudelman argues, however, 
that it is naive to allocate a degree of importance to the 
"political" and the "economic" with any a priori assumption. This 
is a matter for empirical enquiry. The issue is confusing due to 
the distinction between surface "political" actions of the 
government and the underlying economic relationships of the state 
and capital. 
For instance, despite the government's post 1346 overt support 
for white mineworkers and against mineowners over the issue of 
the job colour bar, the costs of retaining the bar on behalf of 
workers were effectively passed onto the workers anyway, via 
relatively stable wages and the mineowners' recruitment, with 
government support, of cheap,. foreign African labour. Thus the 
underlying relationship of symbiosis between the state and 
mineowners survived a government-imposed reversal for the 
mineowners. 
During the 1980s, Yudelman argues, the state attempted to extend 
the parameters of its legitimacy beyond traditional white 
constituencies, to encompass disenfranchised, but increasingly 
empowered urban, skilled and unionised black workers. But Adam 
and Moodley, 1986, believe that Botha's government was not so 
much trying to secure legitimacy amongst an economically powerful 
black population, realising that this was an unattainable goal; 
rather, it was attempting to secure compliance, without support, 
through increasing living standards. Botha believed that "the 
state does not need legitimacy or ideology to elicit compliance" 
(Adam and Moodley,1986). A more tangible effort to obtain 
legitimacy within the black population has begun with De Klerk's 
government. The present government inherited Botha's attempt to 
render apartheid a "dirty word" (Adam and Moodley,1986), but has 
296 
taken more direct steps to scrap the structures identified with 
it. 
Limitations of Theories of the South African State 
Beyond the specifics of legitimacy at the reform "moment", 
Yudelman's theory of the state centres around the concept of its 
symbiosis with capital. Symbiosis, although more sophisticated 
than early Marxist or Poulantzian thcul 	 icy of the state, can 
still be seen as simplistic in some regards. Despite Yudelman's 
stress on the distinction between state and government, his 
portrayal glosses over the contradictory relations existing 
within the body of the state's components. Wolpe, 1988, states • 
that these relations are themselves informed by struggle in the 
external political terrain. For example, the conflict between the 
pro-Botha security establishment and the reformist foreign 
affairs and Constitutional Development departments over the 
leadership of the NP government, took place within state 
structures and reflected wider divisions in Afrikaner society. 
While Yudelman emphasises the degree of autonomy possessed by the 
state in its symbiotic relationship with capital, Mitchell and 
Russell, 1989b, point out that "relatively little systematic 
attention has been given to the study of the state's ability to 
formulate and pursue its own policies in a hostile domestic and 
international environment" (134) - a particularly important 
LAJIRoVI for the Gotta period. Generally, most theories of the 
South African state address only its domestic parameters, 
overlooking the often crucial influence of other states and the 
geopolitical international system. A similarly neglected aspect 
of the state's autonomy is its attempts to cope with the 
unintended social effects of its own policies - for instance, the 
strong reaction from blaas against Botha's new constitution. A 
realistic theory of the state must also account for the 
historical inertia of "accidental" changes in the relationship 
between state and society. 
State theory itself, while necessary, is not sufficient for an 
interpretation of the formation of social structures in South 
Africa. The cultural, economic and political forces which have 
influenced social formation (and more limited state policy) can 
only be adequately addressed if, firstly, the legacies of 
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historical change are taken into account, and secondly, South 
Africa is set in a wider geographical context. 
This part of the thesis concludes with suggestions for lines of 
enquiry which could "fill out" conceptions of South African 
social formation. 
Historical Legacies 
The early colonial era, and the interactions shaping the Cape and 
its frontier's geography, remain crucial for interpretations of 
the development of social structures in South Africa. For 
Comaroff and Comaroff, 1991, the frontier period is a "prime 
context for explor-ing the relations among culture and power, 
hegemony and ideology, social order and humarT agency" (quoted 
Crush,1992,15). The most innovative work on the frontier period 
is now being accomplished by literary historians and 
anthropologists. But the "landscapes of meaning" introduced by 
literary studies like that of Coetzee, 1988 - tracing the role of 
landscape interpretation in the consolidation of racial 
exclusivity and privilege - are inherently vcuyl0phiCa1 and 
historical. 
Coetzee shows how, in their literature, Europeans revealed a lack 
of association with the African landscape. They imagined a 
landscape, in reality occupied and orally interpreted by 
generations of African polities, to be empty, and they filled it 
with European concepts and signs. Indigenous meanings were 
overlooked or dismissed in the construction of white South 
African culture. European conquest, as well as being military, 
economic and social, involved the "cultural and linguistic 
process of appropriation and suppression" (Crush,1992,15). 
Perhaps the essence of segregation and apartheid lay in the 
disparity of interpretation and meaning between cultures 
separated by time and by space. South Africa's social formation, 
in addition to transformations wrought t/ the penetration of 
capital, involves the tracing of this cultural disparity - one 
which resulted ultimately in the fabrication and maintenance of a 
racially divided space. Such a space was not unique to Louth 
Africa in the colonial period, and it was transformed and 
bolstered in the 20th century, but this does not make its 
provenance any less important. 
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A Geographical Context  
Looking at contemporary South Africa, "explorations of the 
relations between society and space ... seem rare indeed in the 
literature" (Mabin,1989,121). Mabin states that even geographers 
specializing in South Africa have not utilized newer theory in 
their own discipline, citing Massey's work on the integration of 
spatial structures, social relations and the international 
division of labour as an example of the missing theoretical 
background. 
South African geographers have reacted to criticisms of 
irrelevance and marginalisation in two main ways. On the one 
hand, they have become more involved in practical planning for 
post-apartheid reconstruction (for example, Rogerson et al's 1989 
comparative survey of urban planning). On the other hand, they 
have developed their appreciation and application of external 
currents in social theory. For Forbes, 1990, "developing 
geographical practice 'is a post-modern challenge because the 
discipline of Geography is, on balance, better equipped for the 
analysis of the subjectivity of place and of the environment than 
it is to global theorizing" (cited Ruuctovoi and McCarthy 
eds.,1992,5). 
Johnston states that places are defined by three components -the 
physical environment, the built environment and the people. Study 
of a place's people in particular, "involves their 
characterisation according to how the world of work is organised, 
how social life outside work is structured in its manifold ways, 
and how politics are constructed" .0ohnston,1991,97). Recent 
geographical theory has interpreted these characteristics of 
places within a wider temporal and spatial context. 
In an address to postgraduate geographers in 1991, Massey 
elaborated on a "New Regional Geography" which emphasised the 
relations between structures and processes which are specific and 
particular to the regiori, and those which are more general, but 
nonetheless shape social process and pattern within the region. 
Places are contextualised within a network of influences which 
reach across the globe. A dichotomy between the particular and 
general is not what is envisaged - rather, an explication of 
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their mutual contouring. Giddens advocates such a geography as 
being integral to the study of society. "The focus on countries 
as discrete territorial units needs to be replaced by the concept 
of nodes in a regional network. Such nodes, which might consist 
of cities, transnational companies, regions or continents, are 
connected to each other by multiple strands. These networks are 
layered onto each other, separable only by analytical 
crystallisation" (Giddens,1901, quoted Graaff,1991,C7). 
The approach has been seen, despite some drawbacks, as having 
relevance for South African studies: "though parochial and 
Curocentric in its geographical vision, tte localities  lterature 
does attempt to conceptualize the ways in which the general 
processes of economy, polity and ideology intersect with local 
conditions and structures of power to constitute distinctive 
local geographies" (Crush,1992,18). 
Within South Africa's borders then, a variety of agencies play 
out their socially shaping roles through their linkages with 
other agencies, both within and outside the city, region and 
country. A detailed study of these agencies, and how their intra-
and inter-national interaction has contributed to social 
formation, cannot be accomplished here, but at least, South 
African social formation can be set in a wider context: 
Coutt Africa's early colonisation by Europeans was a branch of 
the expansion of the early capitalist economy of western Europe. 
One component of this expansion in particular - slavery -
consolidated early assumptions of white racial superiority, at 
the -Cape and elsewhere. Cud.  assuTptions, alongside linguistic 
interpretations of African space, were part of the wider cultural 
accompaniment of the material order being established in South 
Africa. 
The late 18th and early 19th century British and Dutch 
occupations of tte Cape were early by-products of the age of 
European imperial competition (see Hobsbawn,1987). British rule 
of South Africa through the 19th century brought wider imperial 
influences to bear on South African society, for example, tirough 
urban form (Christopher,1989,1990), land allocation and racial 
philosophy (Dubow,1989). Twentieth century urbanisation and 
industrialisation were reflections of global developments, the 
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penetration of capital bringing the pressures of rural to urban 
migration, proletarianization and class formation and shifts to 
bear upon a racially stratified society and racially exclusive 
government. Mining capital's political power in the late 19th, 
and the first decades of the 20th centuries also had equivalents 
elsewhere. 
Resistance to the social and spatial order within South Africa 
was similarly moulded by more general influences. Urbanisation 
brought new forms of African resistance to white dominance,  and 
facilitated the integration of previously spatially discrete acts 
of confrontation. In the urban areas housing shortages, informal 
settlement development, economic recession - largely extraneous 
in origin, and unemployment all contributed to rapid 
politicization, as, in some cases, did philosophies of resistance 
derived from abroad. In many ways, apartheid represented an 
attempt to control and contain the universal phenomenon of 
urbanisation, within a particular racially stratified society. 
Whilst many of the influences moulding South African society were 
either local expressions of more universal processes, or had 
their counterparts elsewhere, their particular manifestation in 
South Africa cannot be explained without more locally sensitive 
analysis. Skinner, 1985, in a survey of the theoretical insights 
of some of the 20th century's greatest social "scientists', 
including Foucault, Kuhn, Habermas and Althusser, states that "if 
there is one feature common to all the thinkers I have singled 
out, it is a willingness to emphasise the importance of the local 
and the contingent, a desire to underline the extent to which our 
own concepts and attitudes have been shaped by particular 
historical circumstances, and a correspondingly strong dislike 
... of all overarching theories and schemes of explanation" 
(Skinner,1985,12). 
While Stadler, 1987, works largely within an "overarching theory" 
- that of broad Marxism, he also recognises the locally specific: 
"like other African countries, the marks of foreign exploitation 
of the economy during the early phase of industrial development 
remain in many of the features of (South Africa's) contemporary 
economy. Unlike them however, its wealth became increasingly 
controlled by domestic forces organising themselves within the 
framework of a powerful state" (Stadler,1987,10). 
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South Africa's integration with a wider world is possibly most 
obvious in an economic sense (Mo11,1990), but the fact that it 
reflects, even if in a particular way, processes occurring 
elsewhere, makes comparative study - in the fields of 
urbanisation, agriculture (especially the role of a peasantry in 
the future - see Davenport,1991,488), environmental change and 
demography - of much value. Comparative work is useful not just 
for an understanding of historical and present process, but for 
coherent planning for the future (Tomlinson,1990, 
Horowitz,1991) - something of which the legacies of apartheid now 
render South Africa in particularly in need. 
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Part Two 
A Critique of Formal Educational Materials on South  
Africa at the Post 16 Level.  
Introduction  
The aim of this part of the thesis is to review a selection of 
written materials designed to educate post 16 students about South 
Africa's temporal and spatial social formation. The initial 
problem is one of selection. There has been an enormous amount of 
"educational" writing on South Africacas a particular study, as 
an exemplar of wider issues, and even solely as a political cause. 
The concern here is to aialyze material-s written with a formal 
educational context in mind: history texts geared towards external 
examinations, packs developed for use in schools and colleges by 
NGOs and resources developed for A-level Geography students. 
However, there are a number of resources regarding South Africa 
designed specifically for use by students, which are excluded from 
this critique. These are materials whose aim is to explore only 
limited areas of social interaction In Goutt Africa, and ones 
which are not likely to be used widely in historical or 
geographical approaches - for example volumes of poetry and short 
stories. 
Criteria For Review 
In Part One, an attempt was made to present a coherent historical 
geography of South Africa. Guelke ("Historical Understanding in 
Geography", Cambridge, 1982), has argued that a study is 
historical not merely by presenting aspects of the past, but by 
selecting those past events and processes which have particular 
significance for the way that social structures and interactions 
have developed. Ifi Part One, the key events and processes as I see 
them, the ideologies and material motivations that lay behind 
them, and the geographies which resulted from them (and which in 
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turn influenced them), are traced through three hundred and fifty 
years of South Africa's past. It is my argument that a full 
understanding of social formation in South Africa must be grounded 
in this past comprised of selected moments and trends. A 
description of South Africa's major human spatial structures -
homelands, Group Areas etc. - is essential for students who wish 
to understand social interaction in the country, but to be more 
fully educated about South Africa, one should have an appreciation 
of what brought these spatial structures about. This involves more 
than just geographies of the past; it involves historical 
understanding in its own right, including a sense of chronology, 
of ideological evolution and of meta-theories of social structure. 
An educational text on South Africa which combines these elements 
is ambitious indeed, but it is hopefully the outcome of this 
thesis. The materials under consideration here are often much more 
limited in their goals, but all seek in some way to educate about 
South Africa. The extent to which they do so will be judged by the 
accuracy and completeness of their description of South African 
social structure and interaction, and the depth of their 
explanation of the patterns described. These attributes, in broad 
terms, are the criteria for the reviews which follow. Packs which 
have suggested activities are assessed according to how far these 
activities, in combination with the pack's textual content, will 
go towards engendering not only empathy or understanding of a 
situation, but also an appreciation of how that situation came to 
be. 
The structure of the text itself - the language employed and its 
appropriateness for learners - is the subject of the following 
part of this thesis, and will be mentioned only in passing in 
these reviews. 
The reviews have been placed in groups in the following order; 
NGO packs, the Leeds Development Education Centre's publications, 
specifically Geography education materials and History texts. 
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The materials selected for review in this section were those 
which teachers would have found readily available for 16 to 19 
year old use at the time of writing. They were comprehensively 
culled from library searches, bookshops, publishers' lists and 
NGO resource guides. 
Although the criteria for review used here are derived from 
the content and coverage contained within the account of South 
Africa's social and spatial formation in Part One, a coherent 
body of literature has been developed on the evaluation of 
bias in geography textbooks in general. Before resources 
specifically on South Africa are reviewed, this literature 
will be considered briefly. 
A number of articles have been written pointing to sexism in 
textbooks popularly used in schools during the 1980s. Wright, 
1985 (D. Wright, "Are Geography Textbooks Sexist?", Teaching 
Geography, 10, 2, 1985, 81-85) reviewed 15 such texts and 
found that three times as many men as women were found in the 
illustrations. Bale, 1982 (J.Bale, "Sexism in Geographic 
Education", in A. Kent (ed.) 'Bias in Geographical Education', 
University of London Institute of Education, 1982) paid 
additional attention to the vocabulary of the text, noting for 
instance that the generic "man" was often used to refer to 
humankind. The role plays that certain texts suggested also 
revealed a sexual bias and reinforced gender stereotypes. 
Connolly, 1993 (J. Connolly, "Gender Balanced Geography: Have 
We Got it Right Yet?", Teaching Geography, 18, 2, 1993, 61-
64), in a more recent review of 13 Key Stage 3 geography 
texts, used specific criteria to assess sexist bias: language 
(for instance, use of the generic "man" or "he"), gender roles 
in role plays, omissions concerning women and treatment of 
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women as an identifiable group. She concludes that texts have 
become less overtly sexist since the early 1980s, but that 
illustrations in particular still tend to focus 
disproportionately on males. 
More reviews have been produced concerning textbook bias of a 
racist or ethnocentric nature. Hicks, 1980 (D. Hicks, "Bias in 
Geography Textbooks: Images of the World and Multi-Ethnic 
Britain", Working Paper No./, and "Images of the World: An 
Introduction to Bias in Teaching Materials", Occasional paper 
No.2, University of London Institute of Education, 1980) 
formulated the hypotheses that "images of the 'third world' 
are likely to be ethnocentric if not racist", that "this is 
likely to take the form of a 'colonial viewpoint'", and that 
"contemporary issues are likely to be avoided" in school 
texts. 
A range of 30 popular geography textbooks were reviewed 
according to a number of specified criteria and ranked along 
two axes. The first axis plotted the location of the text in 
terms of its geographical paradigm - from "defense of the 
status quo" regarding inequalities and injustices through 
"liberal" to "radical". The second axis concerned 
"Perspective", and ranged from "racist" through "ethnocentric" 
and "non-racist" to "anti-racist". Hicks found a growing 
presence of anti-racist and radically-informed books, but most 
were still rooted in the status quo/liberal and ethnocentric 
approaches. 
Wright, 1983 (D. Wright, "'They Have no Need of Transport 
...': A Study of Attitudes to Black People in Three Geography 
Textbooks", in Contemporary Issues in Geography Education, 1, 
1, 1983) confirms Hicks's findings. Reviewing three popular 
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texts for 12 to 13 year olds, he states that all "were written 
from a white man's point of view" (11) and concludes that "an 
author may be anti-racist, yet his textbook can be 
unintentionally racist in its effects" (15). An example is 
provided by texts reviewed by Wright and Pardey, 1982 (D. 
Wright and D.H. Pardey, "Bias in Statistics and Statistical 
Maps: The Example of South Africa" in A Kent (ed.) "Bias in 
Geographical Education", University of London Institute of 
Education, 1982). Here, statistical and visual representations 
of South Africa in textbooks for children younger than the 
students with whom this thesis is concerned, including 
population distribution maps, maps showing historical 
migrations and exercises based on these sources, are 
interpreted as reinforcing the apartheid government's own 
version of demographic history. 
Similar analyses have been conducted on history texts. For 
example, Maw, 1991 (J. Maw, "Texts, Teaching Strategies and 
Ethnocentrism", in H. Fry, J. Maw and H. Simons (eds.) 
"Dealing with Difference: Handling Ethnocentrism in History 
Classrooms", University of London Institute of Education, 
1991), examined ethnocentrism in history texts dealing with 
the Soviet Union for 14 to 16 year olds. She identified those 
texts premised upon primary sources, with the possibility of 
"open interpretation" as being less likely to convey bias than 
narrative-based texts, and confessed that she finds it 
"difficult to envisage the form" that a text based on 
narrative, "but allowing for multiple interpretations" could 
take (37). That, however, is just what I hope to achieve (see 
Part Three and Appendix). 
Most of the writers of these reviews suggest methods for the 
detection of overt bias, and encourage teachers and students 
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to carry out exercises in its identification. (Of course it 
would be highly dubious to suggest that perceived bias could 
be 'corrected', given the inevitable subjectivity of the human 
agent.) But my focus is not on the detection of bias, for even 
this is to assume that the teacher or student can be a self-
appointed and independent judge. Instead, I wish to assert 
that students should be introduced to the notion of academic 
argumentation as a way of coming to terms with ideology. 
Familiarity with the discourse of academic argumentation 
heightens awareness of the subjectivity in all texts. If all 
narratives and explanations are accepted as but one among many 
possible such constructions (although with varying degrees of 
empirical support and internal consistency), then students are 
well equipped to deal with texts in a mature and responsible 
way. Furthermore, they are not encouraged to set themselves up 
as independent arbiters of bias in the work of others, and 
therefore, to imagine themselves as objective. Part Three is 
partly concerned with how such a standpoint can be brought 
about through the text itself. 
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1. Non-Governmental Organisation Packs 
"South Africa Youth Information Pack", Bishop Ambrose Reeves Trust  
(BART), (no date indicated)  
This pack, consisting of a set of posters, a broadsheet divided 
into a number of sections, and a resource list, is aimed at the 13 
to 19 year age range. The broadsheet's particular purpose is to 
provide "an overview of the key structures of the apartheid 
system", including "essential background information" (standard 
covering letter sent with pack). The smaller posters cover some of 
the topics on the broadsheet in more detail, plus some additional 
aspects of life in South Africa. 
The broadsheet gives a very glancing survey of South African 
history, beginning with the destruction of the Khoisan. This 
particular part of the account may actually hide as mch . as it 
reveals: at one point, it is stated that "Khoisan women were raped 
or taken as common-law wives by the early settlers. The 
descendants of those UTAGAS make up the majority of the more than 
three million "Coloureds"". This genesis of the "Coloured" 
population is obviously important, but perhaps it would be more 
revealing for the long term course of Soutt African history to 
have described how such inter-racial unions, even in the early 
days of the Cape colony, were heavily proscribed by the dominant 
white culture. The exaggerated implication of white settlers' 
wholesale rapine of the Khoisan could be misleading if it is taken 
to mean that inter-racial unions were the accepted norm. 
The fact that they were frowned upon by the lege on wbite 
culture is as revealing of the subsequent development of South 
Africa's racial systems as the fact of Khoikhoi oppression. 
The historical account moves on to discuss the era of 
industrialisation and its role in the incorporation of a black 
labour force under white- supervision. The intra-white struggle and 
the formation of a racially exclusive political system follows, 
but there is inadequate treatment of the development, and the 
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crucial role of Afrikaner nationalism. Throughout the account, the 
history of black polities is also omitted, not I think due to an 
earlier historiographical tendency to overlook its importance, but 
in order to present an image of a united black South African 
populace, homogeneously oppressed by whites. This is to ignore 
important black political, social, economic and ethnic divisions, 
and for the student, it fails to set black co-optation, and 
violence between blacks, in any explanatory context. 
The account of history on the broadsheet is necessarily very 
brief, and it is perhaps unfair to criticise it for omission, but 
given the importance of the past in shaping the present racial 
structures of South Africa, perhaps another of the posters could 
have provided further coverage of -key tistoripal developments. 
The rest of the broadsheet is devoted to separate portions 
uncovering other key aspects of South African society, the first 
being "Petty and Grand Apartheid". This section includes an 
account of the Separate Amenities and Group Areas Acts. Another 
section covers the injustice of Bantu Education, the role of the 
introduction of Afrikaans as a learning medium in the Soweto 
revolt, and the recent state of educational uncertainty and 
disorder. The population structure of the country is investigated 
in another portion of the broadsheet, with a pie chart showing the 
proportions in each racial category and a brief account of the 
pain caused by the Population Registration Act. 
In a section entitled "The Economy and Work", more historical 
context is provided with a look at the transition from slavery to 
Masters and Servants laws and the evolution of the migrant labour 
system, nurtured by mineowners with state support. The labour 
system's exploitation is made clear, but the more recent 
politically reformist influence of the skilled labour shortage is 
neglected. White affluence is then contrasted with the black 
housing shortage and inadequate standards of present accommodation 
in a section on standards of living. Importantly, the centrality 
of commuting to the lives of township workers is mentioned, as is 
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the even worse transport situation in the rural areas. 
A section on "The Land" covers the Land Acts and the bantustans. 
Their moves towards "independence" are interpreted as an attempt 
to transfer the international image and burden of the oppressor 
from the South African government to the homeland leaders. In the 
section "Protest and Oppression", the state's late 1900s 
repressive security legislation is coherently overviewed. Here, 
there is a mention of "the regime's black "collaborators" as 
targets of violence, tut none of the wider importance of co-
optation for government attempts at stabilisation. The SADF's 
various campaigns in the region are documented alongside the End 
Conscription Campaign in a section on war and dirty ticks. 
The portion on international support argues that sanctions helped 
pressurize the government, but importantly and accurately, it also 
st1czzv3 the role,of financial wittdrawal in response purely to 
economic prospects. 
British youths' wishes for a nonracial state and equal 
opportunities are expressed and the warning is given that 
"apartheid is not-dead", before ttebroadsteet concludes.with an 
assessment of current changes and the future. February 1990 is 
represented as the "first breakthrough" in the struggle against 
apartheid, but this is to ignore the process of adaptation, 
resistance and political and economic instability that was its 
context. It is stated that De Klerk-was engaged in a dual strategYin 
to negotiate with the ANC whilst undermining it through violence 
and the funding of rivals. However, there can be no certainty that 
this was the case. To what extent the security forces, which 
undoubtedly engaged in this kind of activity, were under the 
executive's control is difficult to fathom. There is also th fact 
of Inkatha as an established and autonomous opponent of the ANC to 
be considered. 
The posters accompanying the broadsheet are largely composed of 
photographs, tut each tics a short text. They are briefly reviewed 
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in their given numerical order: 
"Work" deals with migrant labour, disadvantaged black education, 
and conditions in farms, the homelands and the compounds. "Youth" 
contains the prologue of the Freedom Charter and quotes from South 
African youth on hopes for an integrated future. "The Land" looks 
at the Land Acts and the bantustans, with future conflict over 
their role predicted. "Health Care" has statistics on differential 
standards and spending and the malnutrition of blacks. "Sport" 
includes a brief ti story of tte boycott and its rationale and an 
account of the difficulties of non-racial sport given the legacy 
of apartheid. "Education" contains Verwoerd's oft-cited comment on 
the position of blacks in the economy and an account of Bantu 
Education and the role of Afrikaans instruction in the Soweto 
revolt. "Standards of Living" investigates domestic servants, 
informal settlements and the gap between rich and poor. 
"International Support" comprises a review of sanctions, Western 
trade and international solidarity witt anti-apartheid moements. 
"Media" has a good account of censorship, in which its 
implications for future elections are made clear. "Destabilization 
and Dirty Tricks" is distiaguished by a horrific photuuiouh uf 
murdered villagers in Namibia. It includes an account of the 
rising defence budget under Botha and the withdrawal from Namibia 
(put down, unrealistically, solely to the battle of Cuito 
Cuanavale). 
The strategy behind regional destabilization is not explained and 
there is nothing on the global political changes behind the 
Namibia settlement or its advantages to De Klerk. The NSMS's 
structures of repression during the insurrection are listed and 
"Inkathagate" is mentioned, but with the nature of Inkatha still 
unexplored. 
This pack is more informative than many: it at least tries to set 
South Africa's present structures in historical context, and its 
format makes the present situation for the majority of South 
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Africa's population more accessible to students. Descriptively, it 
is valuable and could allow students to visualise and empathise 
with the plight of many South Africans. However, its omission of 
the fractures within black society and of key historical features, 
notably the development of Afrikaner nationalism, mean that it 
needs to be supplemented with a "core text" for sufficient 
explanation of that plight. 
"The Kei Road Eviction: An Activity Pack For Groups",  
(after 1990), Wendy Davies, Oxfam.  
This is a role play pack based around an incident in which Oxfam 
were involved. Background notes explain how a number of black 
families were privately evicted when a white-owned farm changed 
hands. Participants are given detailed information, based on 
records of the eviction, including employment conditions and brief 
life histories of the real people they are to play in the 
exercise. These include those being evicted, the white landowners 
and others associated, but less directly involved in the dispute 
over the evictions. Some of these people are also portrayed in 
photographs. Other participants are "TV researchers", whose role 
is to put together a programme on the dispute using interviews 
with the role players. 
This is a valid and informative exercise. The photographs and the 
specific life histories, as well as the attempt to portray the 
white farmer's perspective all , contribute to the sense—of realism 
which distinguishes this role play. The aims expressed are empathy 
with the farmworkers, understanding of their legal, economic and 
social position, and consideration of possible action for change. 
This pack goes a long way towards fulfilling these aims, but for 
them to be achieved fully, perhaps it should be supplemented with 
more contextual material. For instance, one of the role players is 
told "You don't want to go to the Ciskei, because you are afraid 
of being beaten up by the police there", tut the rationale of this 
observation is not explained. 
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The pack is nevertheless enlightening on labour relations in 
agriculture generally, and, as a case study, would be a valuable 
part of a more extended investigation into the evolution of social 
and economic relations in South Africa. 
"School Boycotts in South Africa: A Simulation Exercise",  
BDAF, no date.  
"The simulation asks 'British pupils to empathise with South 
African pupils who have boycotted their schools because of real 
and deeply felt grievances". The role sheets provided are based on 
real lives and events, set in the context of the IGTOs and 1980s 
struggle in South African schools. 
Using the role sheets, students participating in the role play 
cite grievances to the "secretary" of the Students' Representative 
Council (SRC), who then confronts the "Principle" with them. The 
grievances are those which really characterised the conflicts over 
education, and pushed educational resistance to the forefront of 
wider resistance against apartheid in the last 20 years: the 
refusal to recognise SRCs, the shortage of textbooks, sexual 
tiarassment of students, victimization of politicized students and 
teachers, the high rate of Matriculation exam failure, the 
presence of the SADF in schools, police detention of students, the 
general inadequacy of "Bantu Education", excessive use by some 
teachers of corporal punishment and the imposition of age limits 
on the re-taking of the Matriculation paper. 
The Principle offers a response to the student demands and the 
role play continues with the students' discussion and choice of 
their ensuing course of action. 
The Principle's reply to the first declaration of grievances is 
respectful and moderate, agreeing to dismiss the teacher guilty of 
the most extreme personal offenses, but stating that recognition 
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of the SRC is up to the central government Department of Education 
and Training (DET), and making no response to the other 
grievances. The students are then posed with three choices - to 
continue a boycott of school, to go to the DET with their demands 
or to return to classes. Their decision determines the ensuing 
stages in the role play, leading to one of a number of outcomes: 
A boycott results in a police raid of a playground meeting and the 
death of a student. Other dilemmas ensue from this. A decision to 
hold a mass funeral for the victim results in a further police 
attack before the role play ends with the question "what .now?", is  
question posed at the end of each of the other avenues through the 
role play. A decision to encourage other schools to join the 
boycott leads to the closure of the schools, and a decision to 
demonstrate outside the police station leads to detentions, 
torture and a further death. 
For those students who decided to petition the DET, the reply is 
recei-ved that for the SRCs to be recognised, they must have within 
them the Principle, elected teachers and two representatives of 
the old prefect body. Other conditions are also set. The students 
must then decide to boycott, in which case the sequence is as 
above, or to accept, in which case two of the teachers on the SRC 
turn out to be members of a vigilante force which brutalises 
student activists. Their intervention leads to the detention of 
one of the students. 
A decision to accept the Principle's original response results in 
the installation of security guards, who prevent activists' access 
to the school. The students can then boycott (outcome as above) or 
help activists to force an entrance, which results in police 
action, detentions and another death. 
Throughout the role play, chance cards can throw up a COSAS or 
AZASO demonstration, an appeal from another school to boycott or 
an amnesty from the DET for Matriculation students. The role play 
concludes with groups making placards for a demonstration. 
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As an investigation into the causes of grievances in South African 
schools, the pack should work well. In a wider sense, it is 
probably quite successful in generating empathy for activists in 
South Africa. I would argue that, being grounded in the context of 
the real struggle in the townships, it is more successful on these 
terms than the more abstract role plays about oppression which are 
considered below, 
The pack does not, however, extend to developing an appreciation 
of how the unjust educational system of mouth Africa came about, 
nor of the nature of the wider system or pattern of resistance of 
which it was a part. For instance, the pack declares that "it is 
essential to the survival of apartheid that blacks remain a source 
of exploitable, cheap, unskilled labour". But in the 1980s, when 
the pack was produced, the NP leadership had come to the 
conclusion that apartheid could be preserved only if blacks were 
allowed to develop the skills needed for a modern economy. There 
is no recognition of such dynamism in government policy. 
The full significance of the schools boycott for wider resistance 
is also not appreciated. UDF leaders and parents at the time of 
the boycott became increasingly concerned about the disruptive 
effect it was having on the education of a whole generation, and 
as a strategy, it was criticised by prominent resistance leaders 
for evolving into an aim in itself, with no concessions to be 
gained from its negotiated end (see Part One, Chapter 7). 
Here, there is a more universal problem with educational packs on 
South Africa: a lack of appreciation of significant developments 
within the system of white rule and resistance to it. Not all 
reforms in the 1980s should be written off as cosmetic, for this 
is to imply that there was no precedent or context for De Klerk's 
radical reforms of the 1990s. An example drawn from this 
particular pack is that of Verwoerd's 1953 quote on the role of 
Bantu Education being used to describe the more dynamic (though of 
course, still unjust) system of the 1980s. In fact the expansion 
of African educational provision in the 1970s and 1980s, although 
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woefully inadequate, had extremely significant implications for 
black resistance and the entire future course of political events. 
Even the specific grievances addressed in this role play were very 
much associated with these changes. 
"The Child is not Dead: Youth Resistance in South Africa 
1976-1986", A. Harries, R. Diski, A. Brown, BDAF,1986.  
The introductory activity in this book contains a statement by an 
apartheid-supporting white South African, written in a letter to 
"Just 17" magazine: "Nobody has the right to criticize something 
they know nothing about". This is used as a lead-in for students: 
"how much do you know?" Students are then encouraged to reaa:on in 
order to know more. The account which follows is remarkable for 
its use of a wide array of primary sources and personal 
impressions of resistance in the 1970s and 1980s, and for the 
imaginative activities set out for students. If used competently, 
it should give students a clear impression of the rationale for 
the schools boycott, the violence with which it was met, and some 
valuable insights into the wider insurrection in the communities 
of which the schools were a part. 
Sources include quotes from Hirson's 1979 and Brooks and 
Brickhill's 1980 accounts of the Soweto revolt and from other, 
autobiographical, accounts of resistance or everyday life in the 
townships, extracts from newspaper articles and novels, a large 
selection of poems (many by youth),-case studies of events in 
different schools, and overtly biased narratives, for example from 
a children's book, to be analyzed for their ideological slants. 
Activities include the writing of newspaper reports, poems, short 
stories, radio and film scripts, conversations between people 
introduced in the sources and commentaries on photographs, the 
devising of walicharts, "research" on historical events such as 
the Battle of Blood River, the graphical presentation of data, 
pinpointing places mentioned in the text on a map, identifying 
bias and choosing alternative value-laden words and role playing a 
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white reporter seeking to persuade a white woman that, in spite of 
her belief, she does not really understand the country that she 
lives in. 
Generally these activities are fairly well supported by the 
information provided on youth resistance. However, I feel that 
some of the more imaginative exercises would be more educationally 
sound if a dccpc. historical context was known to the students. 
For instance, students' "newspaper reports" on the Soweto revolt 
would be better informed if not just the educational context of 
the revolt were given, but also its economic dimension. 
Students should additionally have a greater appreciation of the 
formulation of apartheid structures and resistance to them, which 
preceded the revolt. (It would also be advisable to ensure that 
any future editions of the book have the correct spelling of 
"Afrikaner"). 
When the transition is made from school rebellions in Soweto in 
1976 to those in Cape Town in 1980, there is no account of 
intervening changes in the nature of apartheid legislation. While 
the educational system that was being challenged had not changed 
inordinately, the administration of apartheid was not a monolithic 
block over the period: resistance and economic contradiction had 
already modified the approach of the government. Some historical 
background to Bantu -Education is provided, tut it underestimates 
the scale and pervasiveness of segregation before the apartheid 
era and overlooks the role of Afrikaner nationalism. Apartheid is 
portrayed purely as a design to keep Africans as a labour force, 
its Christian-Nationalist dimension being neglected. 
The book is a stimulating means of encouraging British students to 
come to grips with the situati-on faced ty their South African 
counterparts in the 1980s, and many of its ideas for activities 
are well worth applying in other contexts, but it does not address 
the wider development of political and social structures in South 
Africa. 
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"Education, Apartheid, Development: A briefing on Education in 
South Africa - Crisis and Change", World University Service.  
The booklet accompanying this pack contains a brief history of the 
Soweto revolt, the 1980s school boycotts and the founding of the 
NECC (see Part One, Chapter 7). Statistics on black educational 
failure are followed by the causer yahoo that the crisis in black 
education continues. Six display posters then investigate aspects 
of this crisis in more detail. 
Tire "tantu Education" poster has an introduction to the 1953 Act 
and the 1959 Extension of University Education Act, with 
Verwoerd's oft-cited comment on African education and photographs 
of overcrowded black classrooms. A second poster, dealing with 
"Uprising and Repression" and "Community Response", tells of the 
introduction of Afrikaans instruction and its response in Soweto 
schools in ig7C (not set in the wider context of the revolt) and 
the 1980s school-based resistance. Photographs of educational 
protests and a black boy behind bars accompany an account of 
troops in classrooms and the role of the NECC. The poster entitled 
"The Legacy of Apartheid" and "Worse for Women" details 
apartheid's discrimination in voting, expenditure, employment, 
land ownership and housing. The facts that girls from poor 
families are often absent from school due to household chores, and 
that women, often in low paying jobs, also comprise the majority 
of those who are illiterate, are stressed. 
The dismal state of black education, with poorly qualified staff 
and inadequate syllabi, is held responsible for an "alienation 
from the culture of learning" in the next in the series of 
posters. The dominance of whites in positions of responsibility 
and the fact that tic ISSO black matrioulation results were the 
worst ever, lead to the conclusion that more government action is 
needed than the present (1993) half-hearted moves towards a more 
integrated system. The NECC's own work in that l uold is the main, 
subject of the next poster, and the final poster is a montage of 
leaflets, posters, letters, photographs and badges demonstrating 
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British school and college support for black education in South 
Africa, with the need for further support emphasised. 
Written emotively by Mandla Langa, the pack presents an impressive 
synthesis of the current state of black schooling across much of 
South Africa. However, due to its very nature, and despite 
reference to the role of schools in wider resistance, it 
transcends the educational sphere very little. Within the subject 
of black education, it omits a key consideration affecting the 
outcome of black urban schooling - the role of wider township 
violence. From discussions with teachers in Natal in particular, 
where the fighting between Inkatha and ANC sympathizing elements 
was pervasive, it is clear that schools were all too easily sucked 
into the conflict. 
Notwithstanding the lack of qualified staff and resources and the 
poverty of syllabi, this violent rift, replicated in the school 
environment, can provide the greatest immediate obstacle to black 
education. 
2. The Leeds DEC 
"A Case For Change: Rights, Repression and Responses in South 
Africa", Leeds Development Education Centre, 1988  
The National Association of Development Education Centres 
organised its December 1986 newsletter around the issue of South 
Africa in education. The most prominent article in the newsletter 
was written by Leeds DEC, which has evolved somewhat of a 
specialism -in producing packs on South Africa for usa in schools 
and colleges. The article is instructive in setting out the 
philosophy behind this work. 
The Leeds DEC has a worthy aim - encouraging condemnation of 
apartheid. Bowever, accepting this as an ultimate aim, its 
approach - introducing an explicit bias in its materials - can be 
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criticised. "Enforced" condemnation may prove counterproductive, 
for many students will deliberately and understandably reject an 
opinion that they are told to have about an issue, being more 
willing to accept what is given as fact or interpretation and then 
form their own opinion on it. 
There is a strong case for education about South Africa to include 
explanations of the origins and development of apartheid. Once the 
system is understood in this fuller sense, then students can, be 
left to themselves to condemn it. But in the article, the Leeds 
DEC "admit to bias in our presentation ... we justify this by 
claiming ... to represent the viewpoint of Black South Africans to 
balance the bias to which most people are exposed most of the 
time" (3). 
However, it seems unlikely that most students have been exposed to 
much in the wsi of in-depth interpretation of Ocuth Africa,  and 
the images that they receive from the media would rarely be pro-
apartheid, even if they don't give the full picture from black' 
points of view. Any explicit treatment of south Africa in school 
or college is likely to provide the most intensive, or even only, 
conscious investigation of the subject for most British students. 
In this case, the Leeds DEC-material's-bias is not corrective, but 
initiatory. 
Emphasis is placed by the group on providing "the sort of 
information which we think students need in order to develop 
responsible opinions on the matter", but how can opinions on a 
matter be defined as responsible if no attempt is made to develop 
understanding of that matter, condemnation alone being attempted 
from the outset? 
Without an understanding of apartheid's origins and functioning, 
and the perceptions behind it, condemnation by itself is only a 
partial educative outcome. At one point in the article, it is 
declared that students should understand what drives blacks to 
participate in "necklace killings" of collaborators. This is a 
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valid aim, but it should be accompanied by the aim of 
understanding what brought the apartheid system about in South 
Africa. A pack intended for a younger age group than the one this 
thesis is concerned with - "A History of South Africa", Holmes and 
West, Leeds DEC, 1986 - is informed by an appreciation of the 
merits of this aim: "we felt that it was important to examine the 
attitudes of Afrikaaners (sic) and other white groups in South 
Africa in order that pupils might recognise the part which these 
wave played in determining where South Africa is today"; but the 
statement is spoiled by the implication that Afrikaners are 
something of a homogeneous block, and the aim does not.seem to 
have extended to materials for older stiidents. 
The group's activity packs on South Africa centre around role play 
as a means of coming to a greater appreciation of what it is like 
to live under apartheid. For instance, "the Soweto game about the 
1976 Soweto protest, faces students with some of the moral 
dilemmas they would come up against if they were South African" 
(3). It is my belief that such role plays care be counter-
productive, in that they encourage a facile assumption that a 
student can really imagine the situation of another, in a vastly 
different context, by being given only a very limited amount of 
background information. Cy universalising black South African 
experiences, such activities often fail to raise awareness of the 
extremity of a pervasively tense situation in particular places 
and at particular times. 
To avoid facile assumptions, role plays, if they are to be used at 
all, should be preceded by extensive research into the development 
of apartheid and its local and national impact (and by this time, 
they are often redundant as educational exercises anyway). 
Another expressed aim of the Leeds DEC group is to stress the 
links between South Africa and Britain, so as to establish greater 
relevance for British students, and raise awareness of parallel 
injustices here. Specifically, links of racism, sexism, trades 
unions and capitalism are mentioned. Sometimes, however, rather 
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tenuous links are established - for example: 
"the "resettlements" in South Africa ... have a parallel of 
sorts with the less publicised deportations of black people 
from this country to their "homelands". Are our immigration 
and citizenship laws any more just or less racist, or less 
overtly to do with protecting the accumulation of wealth by 
capitalists, than South African influx control laws?" (3). 
While "our" immigration and citizenship laws are frequently 
implemented in a racist manner, they are simply incomparable to 
South Africa's policy of removals. In South Africa, black people 
were forcibly removed from their established homes in urban and 
rural areas in accordance with overtly racist legislation, many of 
them being discarded in "tomelands which they had never seen 
before. Those who were unquestioned citizens of the country had 
their citizenship stripped from them and, in its place, were 
accorded citizenship of underdeveloped "nations" 1,c:k,uvu;zed by no 
country other than South Africa. It is misleading to draw 
parallels between the deportation of illegal immigrants from 
Dritain, even i f often conducted in a racist manner, with such a 
systematically and unashamedly racist, brutal and internally 
directed policy. 
Elsewhere, it is similarly implied that there are strong parallels 
between apartheid and racism in Britain. It should, however, be 
-made explicit that these arm-attitudinal parallels, not parallels 
between political systems. No matter how much one condemns aspects 
of it, surely one must recognise that the British political system 
is fairer in principle, and less overtly racist than the South 
African system has been. It is my argument-that excessively 
comparative comments like the one above, as well as establishing 
the injustices of many systems (which can be done in other ways), 
belittle the experiences of black South Africans who suffered far 
more intensely as a group under their government than do most 
black people in this country. Black people in Britain are subject 
to a great deal of informal, and frequently formal, racism and, 
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sometimes, brutality - but they are not the targets of an entire 
political system, expressly designed by the state to ensure their 
oppression. The implication that they are oppressed on the same 
scale as South African blacks is therefore educationally counter-
productive. 
In the same DEC newsletter is a comment by Bristol DEC which is 
more balanced and educationally sound: "The understandable 
temptation to meet the needs of our users with an "instant" pack, 
often based on partial or inadequate research, is one which in the 
long term can only work against the overall aims of DC 
(Development Education)" (6). 
"A Case For Change", Leeds DEC's pack on South Africa for older 
students, consists of a series of discrete activities, each with 
its own information and role play - type activity. There is a 
strong and conscious emphasis on human rights as the organising 
concept behind the work, but there is little attempt to convey an 
understanding of why the Western norm of human rights has not been 
accepted as a universal quality in South Africa. In an attempt to 
take Gott Africa as a case study of the wider, abstracted concept 
of human rights abuse, the historical causation of South Africa's 
particular social, political and economic structures is neglected. 
This is stated explicitly: "A potential danger in focusing on 
South Africa is that it may be viewed as a "special case"" (20). I 
would argue that that is exactly what it is. 
Although oppression occurs—elsewhere, it does not occur for the 
same reasons or in the same manner as in 'South Africa. One cannot 
deny the uniqueness of places simply because there are universal 
processes and patterns and because social outcomes in different 
places have similarities. 
Throughout the pack, the aim to combat Tacism and sexism in 
general displaces explanation and understanding of how these evils 
have come about and become established in South Africa's 
particular context. Whereas the goal of many suggested activities 
is for the student to put her/himself in the position of black 
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South Africans, not enough information about South African social 
structure and development is given for this to be done 
realistically. 
In all, the activities suggested in the pack should take about 13 
to 14 hours. They begin with an exercise to highlight the links 
between South Africa and the UK, which may well prove motivational 
for SOW6 students. The UN declaration of human rights is then set 
out, along with extracts from Mandela's 1963 speech and some facts 
about apartheid laws. One of the questions then set is "why has 
this situation (denial of UN human rights to South African blacks) 
developed?" - a crucial question. But, the data from which this 
question must be answered is merely a catalogue of apartheid laws. 
There is no historical account of how and why these laws arrived 
on the statute books, let alone of the social, economic and 
political processes which preceded, and set the scene for them. 
Subsequent activities are G1-eolly -y-ca)cd to 	 encouraging an 
emotive response from students, rather than an understanding of 
social pattern and process in South Africa. A few examples follow. 
Activity Cl is entitled "Oppression". Tte members of the student 
group are given roles by which a "system" is formulated. The 
"ordinary" people in this system are forced to queue for officials 
who make them undertai:e -meaningless activities in return for 
tokens. "Police" ensure that the system functions without 
rebellion. Thus the complexity of apartheid is reduced to an 
abstracted state of oppression. There is no attempt to understand 
oppression as a result of the real historical configuration of 
society in South Africa. 
Oppression abstracted from its social context in this way cannot 
be properly understood. 
Activity C2, "Soweto", mentioned above, attempts to give a more 
realistic context for a role playing exercise. A variety of 
scenarios, based around tic ISM introduction of Afrikaans as a 
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medium of instruction is presented, and certain courses of action 
are posited. By selecting options, students are then posed with 
new dilemmas and new options, so as to generate an impression of 
what it must have been like for black students of Soweto during 
the revolt. 
This path through a portion of a black South African life 
concludes with the student either as radical activist, guerilla, 
policeman, informer or "ordinary" worker. 
This exercise is at least set in a real context and at a specific 
time, and the dominant issues of the period are introduced, but 
the Soweto revolt cannot be understood merely as a reaction to the 
introduction of Afrikaans instruction, nor even as a long pent up 
outburst against the system as a whole. The specific economic 
pressures and ideological renaissance which preceded the revolt in 
the township, are omitted. There is not enough background 
information for A.L. 
 student to imagine accurately the state of 
mind of rebellious students (leaving aside the question of whether 
such an aim can ever be achieved). 
Activity C, "Repression and the Media", is a role play intended to 
highlight the real political differences behind "black on black" 
violence. It implies that ethnicity has only a "false 
significance", when, in fact, ethnicity, although not in itself a 
cause of conflict, can act as a real marker of conflictual 
identity and division (see Part One, Chapter-7-r 
Whilst, given the well intended ethos of the pack, some of these 
criticisms may seem pedantic, I believe that they are important. 
For an education about oppression in the real world to proceed, 
one needs to be aware of the context and development of that 
oppression. An understanding of the development of oppression in 
South Africa can indeed provide a basis for a greater 
understanding of oppression elsewhere (and vice versa), but such 
an understanding can only emerge initially from study of the 
historical development of a particular situation. To be truly 
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educational, a pack should set its topic in a context comprised of 
all the influences upon it. If a pack is to focus on oppression in 
South Africa, it should explain that oppression as well as, and in 
order to, encourage empathy with its subjects. 
3. Geography Materials  
The Geographical Magazine, Series on Southern Africa,  
March 1986 to April 1987  
This series of articles on southern Aft;t.o'zacuut aphi "ial 
development - a "synthesis to be put together carefully" 
(Griffiths, March 1986,117) - certainly does include attempts to 
portray the sources of South African social, political and 
economic oppression. The relative sophistication Cf these articles 
stems from the fact that they were written by university 
specialists, each presenting a specific topic in each article for 
students of the 16-19 age range. 
In an introduction, the series editor, Ieuan Griffiths uses 
journalistic accounts to -emphasise the relevance of South Africa 
(at the time of writing, South Africa was much in the British news 
due to the continuation of the township insurrection). An 
important article follows on population tzemposition, from the 
Khoisan onwards. Omer-Cooper then presents an interesting and well 
written article on -his- original specialism, the mfecane, with-a..— 
comparison of the Great Trek .tacked on. The Trek is set in a full 
historical context. 
The 19th century dispossession of land is exemplified with an 
account of the Anglo-Zulu war, somewhat spoiled by an unnecessary 
and romanticised portrayal of Buthelezi as the dignified 
contemporary inheritor of a Zulu tradition, and a proponent of 
non-violence. A subsequent article covers the Land Acts, the brief 
cash-crop response to the growing agricultural market by an 
African peasantry, and the contemporary problems of homeland 
323 
farming. This latter theme is explored in more detail in the 
following article, on agrarian crisis and change. 
Still within the primary sector, the next article in the series is 
a crucial and enlightening account of mining and its role in 
shaping a cheap migrant labour system. An article on the spread 
and political implications of the railways follows, before the 
structure and processes of change in South Africa's cities are 
explained, with some, but little reference to the historical and 
cultural origins of urban segregation. The role of the state and 
of external investment in South Africa's industrial development is 
then addressed by the South African geographer, Christian 
Rogerson. 
The succeeding article sets a- historically grounded analysis of 
the migrant labour system in a core-periphery framework. The 
geographical nature of apartheid, and its application at micro, 
meso and macro scales is emphasised in the last article by Anthony 
Lemon. He makes particularly good use of aerial photographs to 
show segregated urban structure, and includes an assessment of 
more recent reforms. His contribution concludes with a polemic 
against sanctions, including an argument that they would curtail 
rather than catalyse further reform. 
The series as a whole is concluded with a report by Ieuan 
Griffiths on recent (at the time of writing) political 
developments, including the stalling of Botha's reform programme-- 
and the rise in violent resistance. The full significance of the 
insurrection, even though it had already passed its , peak, was not 
yet fully realised. A pro-sanctions argument (in contrast to 
Lemon's) follows. It is unfortunate that, when the government's 
plight is being referred to, it is stated that: "the position of 
the Afrikaners is desperate", since it was partly a move towards 
reformism on the part of many Afrikaners, despite the resistance 
of others, which allowed the further erosion of apartheid. 
Overall, this series reinforces an earlier point: the more 
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sophisticated analysis of these articles is often greater 
testimony to the injustices of apartheid than the overtly 
condemnatory approach of other packs. For example, in the article 
on migrant labour, following an account of the rise and 
functioning of the system, all that needs to be stated is that 
"The former migrant worker resident in the Transkei ... has no 
legal access to the attractions of the city of Johannesburg 
beneath which he might have spent the greater part of his working 
life" (Griffiths, Jan. 1987,17), for injustice to be crystal clear 
(further injustices of the migrant labour system similarly become 
evident in the article). With systematic description and 
interpretation of the system, the degradation for individuals 
caught up in it can be clearly portrayed, and, what is more, 
substantiated. 
What the series covers, it generally covers very well. However, as 
an attempt at an overview of the development of South Africa's 
human geography, it still has gaps. For example, there is no 
interpretation of the cultural and material origins of early 
racism and the system which sprang from it at the Cape. The 
process of African dispossession in Natal is traced, but there is 
little reference to the similarities and differences in this 
process elsewhere. The role of industrialisation in shaping 
modified racial structures is adequately expressed, but the 
significance of the intra-white politics of the early 20th century 
in determining the legal expression of those structures, is 
overlooked. Beyond an intimation-of the subsequent cultural impact 
of the Great Trek, there is no account of the critically important 
development of Afrikaner nationalism and the NP. The political and 
geographical significance of black resistance, particularly in the 
post-Soweto period, is neglected. Finally, although a conflict of 
interpretation is hinted at in Lemon's and Griffiths' divergent 
views on sanctions, there is no explicit treatment of "schools of 
thought" and of interpretation of South Africa's historical and 
geographical development. 
This series is a much 'better analysis than most packs designed for 
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the age group, and it provides an excellent overview of South 
Africa's contemporary human geography, but I believe its focus on 
the historical development of this geography is generally too 
narrow. 
Update: Apartheid in South Africa, 1990, 3rd edition,  
D. Smith, Cambridge University Press,  
Queen Mary and Westfield College.  
"Update" is a series of "brief, frequently revised booklets on 
topics directly linked to the A-level syllabus and college or 
university courses" (iii). This contribution to the series, 
updated from a 1987 edition, is written by a geographer who has 
specialised in South Africa, particularly its urban 
characteristics, since the early 1980s. It is intended 
specifically as a study of the apartheid system and its own 
geographical consequences, rather than of wider aspects of South 
Africa's geography or history. Although there is a chapter devoted 
to explanations of apartheid (see below), its post-1948 emphasis 
does detract somewhat from a fuller understanding of the 
development of racial attitudes and spatial form in South Africa. 
Nevertheless, it is the best introduction to the basics of 
contemporary South African society available specifically for the 
post 16 range. 
The book is a very good source of recent statistical information 
on demographics, political attitudes; end indices of satisfaction. 
However, the treatment of apartheid shows a degree of 
insensitivity to temporal adaptation. Apartheid is defined in 
Verwoerdian terms, and in a subsequent period, reforms are 
portrayed being made to this previously, relatively static and 
monolithic system. This is to obscure the dynamic and 
unpredictable nature of both the ideology and the practice of 
apartheid - its continual revision and adaptation to internal and 
external developments. In particular, the policy of developing 
"independent" homelands is presented as a natural progression from 
the 1950s conception of apartheid, when in fact it was a 
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significant departure from original apartheid thinking (see Part 
One, Chapter 5). 
While there is significant discussion of the role of social forces 
in overcoming apartheid restrictions in the 1980s, less attention 
is paid to the social conceptions behind the formulation of 
segregation and apartheid, the fact of legislation being portrayed 
as self-explanatory. The crucial influence of intra-white 
political history in the construction of apartheid is glossed 
over, but the white political parties of the 1200s and their 
agendas are described with a map showing the distribution of their 
support. 
The book's greatest strength, unsurprisingly, is its description 
of South Africa's contemporary spatial pattern, with population 
removals, migration and homelands on a macro-scale, the Group 
Areas Act on a meso-scale and "petty apartheid" on a micro-scale, 
being clearly elucidated. Detailed case studies of the various 
types of removal undertaken to create this form, and journalistic 
accounts of specific places, consolidate the image of apartheid's 
spatial impress, while an account of the late 1980s "greying" of 
some urban areas allows an appreciation of growing contradictions 
within the system. 
The book is weaker on explanations of the political and 
particularly economic contradictions wtich-faced Apartheid from 
its inception to its collapse. For instance, the impatt-a 
progressively more comprehensive black resistance and its economic 
role is neglected, and despite tie statement that "the second half 
of the 1980s called into question the extent to which the White 
government and international capital continue to share common 
interests" (36), the strains produced by structural economic 
shifts, are generally left unexplored. 
The attempt to explain apartheid as a whole consists of a chapter 
which considers four alternative interpretations - the South 
African government's own rationale, a theory of racial political 
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domination (roughly equivalent to simplified liberal 
interpretations), an interpretation based on economic exploitation 
(roughly the "orthodox" Marxist account), and an analysis of 
attempts at the selective incorporation of blacks. It is argued 
that the order in which these perspectives are considered reflects 
"a changing understanding of apartheid with changing 
circumstances", although they are not "mutually exclusive" (30). 
Treatment of the "racial political domination" school focuses on 
the "divide and rule" strategy of the homelands. This is 
criticised in favour of the "economic exploitation" approach, 
which "sees racial domination as part of a broader system which 
has an economic purpose: that of facilitating the exploitation of 
cheap (Black) labour" (34). The preference for an "unreformed" 
Marxist view here leads to the misleading Statement that "the 
support of international capital may be regained - as long as 
Black, labour remains relatively cheap" (36). But, by the late 
1980s it was clear that the most Influential fractions of capital, 
within and without South Africa, no longer wanted simply cheap 
labour, but productive, and generally, more skilled labour - this 
newer imperative having significant implications for apartheid's 
functioning. The growing opposition to government policy on the 
part of domestic Afrikaans capital is similarly overlooked. 
With Smith's account of the final, and, implicitly, definitive 
interpretation of apartheid, based on Botha's "selective 
incorporation", the argument is put that, since the—practice of 
apartheid has changed in recent years, interpretations must also 
be adapted. But this is to imply that apartheid, until this recent 
change, had been an objectified, unitary and stable system, 
capable of being explained atemporally by an overarching theory. 
Behind the chapter's attempt to explain apartheid lays an 
ahistorical approach, resting on the assumption that apartheid's 
spatial form is the outcome of contemporary functionality. Hence 
there is little reference to the past and its legacies in the 
interpretations of apartheid adopted. 
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In reality, there has been no one apartheid system to explain, but 
many temporally specific modifications, reactions and initiatives 
to interpret. One needs not one theory for apartheid, 1948-1980s, 
and another for apartheid, 1980s onwards, but a multitude of 
interpretations to account for the dynamic and inconsistent 
attempts of successive governments since 1948 to impose a 
fundamentally segregated order on an evolving South African 
society. A more useful version of competing conceptions would have 
included, for instance, the growing reconciliation between 
liberals and Marxists, who, through synthesis, have achieved 
greater historical and sectoral specificity, as outlined in the 
introduction to Part One. 
While Smith's theoretical treatment of South Africa can be 
questioned (as could any other), what distinguishes this resource 
from others reviewed here is his pervasive understanding of 
apartheid's day-to day spatial functioning, derived from 
specialist and long-term study. I would argue that the historical 
and theoretical context of the description needs to be deepened 
for a sufficient post 16 resource, but in its own terms, as a 
description of apartheid's geography, Smith's book is excellent. 
Senior Geography, Standard 10,  
C.J. Swanevelder et al., 1989, Nasau Ltd., Cape Town 
This review, unlike the others in this section, is of a book most 
unlikely to be used to-BrAish schools and colleges. 3t is 
included for the insights it can yield about the writing of a more 
suitable text. The book is a South African government-approved 
text covering the standard -Geography syllabus for the age range 
with which this thesis is concerned. It is the "only recommended 
matric textbook in Orange Free State white schools and is used 
extensively in Bophuthatswana" 
	 Drummond and ,A.M. Paterson, 
"Apartheid in Geography Textbooks", Perspectives in Education, 
vol.12, no.2, 1991, 65-76). I am told that the text is relatively 
"liberal" and therefore more highly regarded by black South 
African teachers than most approved texts. Only the human 
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geography section of the book is reviewed here. 
The text is dense with (sometimes misleading) empirical detail on 
demography, types of agriculture, economic performance, world 
trade, and environmental influences on economic activity, and such 
data is usually interpreted in the light of one or other of the 
spatial models devised by Western geographers from the 1955s to 
1970s. Yet the book manages to ignore completely the overwhelming 
economic, social and political impact of apartheid policies. In 
fact, it is quite atn4wct ing how, throughout the book, even a 
mention of the most significant and tangible aspect of South 
Africa's human geography - the legacy of its manipulation by a 
coercive government - is evaded. The book demonstrates that 
"geographic discourse can be considered ... as the instrument of a 
vast scheme of mystification, the purpose of which is to hinder 
the development of political reflection upon space and to mask the 
spatial strategies of the possessors of power" (Y. Lacoste, quoted 
in Drummond and Paterson, op cit.). 
When urbanization and decentralisation are mentioned, influx 
control is not; when the skilled labour shortage is mentioned, 
black education and the job colour bar are not; when state support 
for industrialisation is mentioned, its restrictions on the use of 
black labour are not; when the economic effects of sanctions are 
mentioned, their cause is not; when the shortage of urban housing 
and long journeys to work for blacks are mentioned, their 
deliberate policy genesis'is not, and finally, when the regional--  
security threat to the government is described, neither its 
origin, nor the fact that the greatest security threat was 
internal, is included. 
The frequent invocation of deterministic models of.human behaviour 
is usually accompanied by allusion to racial differentiation, with 
a constant reminder that "the black peoples of South Africa can be 
regarded as developing communities" (400), whereas, by 
implication, the white population is "developed". For instance, an 
introduction to the demographic transition model is followed not 
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by South Africa's "position" on the model compared to, say 
Britain's, but by the separate positioning of the four apartheid 
racial groups within South Africa on the time-line 
deterministically drawn from the model. Having outlined the basic 
structure of the economy in terms of primary, secondary and 
tertiary activities, South Africa's "intermediate position" on a 
scale of development measured by the ratio between the sectors, is 
"explained in terms of this country's population composition where 
there are considerable differences between groups" (411). 
To summarize crudely, Human Geography is presented as partly the 
study of where places "fit" on a linear progression towards 
development (as indicated by outdated models). South Africa's 
particular "performance" on this scale is explained by the "two 
worlds thesis" -the fact that it contains on the one hand, an 
advanced and "developed" wtite population voup, and on the other, 
a large "backward" African population group ("Coloureds" and 
Indians being somewhere in the middle). Throughout, the role of 
apartheid in enforcing, sustaining and perpetuating relations of 
inequality between South Africa's government-defined racial groups 
is by-passed. While the question of the origins of these racially 
manifested differences is not overtly addressed, the reader can 
only assume that they are simply "natural". 
While such a text, one would hope, could never be used in British 
schools, :nor those of South Africa in the future, there is a need 
—to go beyond apartheid in geographical-or-historical study of the 
country. It was stated above that government intervention is the 
most remarkable and salient characteristic of the evolution of 
social and spatial form in South Africa. But it still does not 
constitute the entire sum of that form. To assume that it did 
would be to deny the power of human agency in resistance to the 
state as well as, among others, environmental, cultural and wider 
economic influences. Through its deliberate attempt to avoid 
reference to the most striking influence, and despite its 
deterministic invocation of discredited models and misleading 
statistics, this text does help identify other, less prominent, 
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but nonetheless relevant, influences on social structure and 
spatial form. For instance, the text stresses environmental and 
cultural impediments to efficient farming in some homeland 
districts. Of course, I am not saying that these factors outweigh 
thamiLich more important shortages of labour and capital, but they 
can be locally significant. Such considerations should be appended 
to an account of apartheid in order for any geographical or 
historical resource to be thorough i n its treatment of South 
African structures. 
4. History Texts 
"A New History of Southern Africa", 2nd edition,  
Neil Parsons, 1993, Macmillan  
This is a history textbook for final secondary/introductory 
university students. Questions at the end of each chronological 
chapter are geared towards the Cambridge International Schools 
Certificate, syllabus No. 2160, and many are drawn from past 
papers. The author's expressed aim was "to present ... academic 
"new history" in popular form for students of history in southern 
Africa, and for students of southern Africa elsewhere in the 
world" (v). Although "the details of history in this book are 
intended to be used by students as evidence to argue a particular 
interpretation of the past" (v), there is no specific treatment of 
varying interpretations or theories. The Preface to the 2nd 
edition explains that "the most distal-led- and comprehensive part of 
this book ... remains its coverage of later 19th century conquest 
and resistance". 
At the beginning of each of the book's main sections, the themes 
that underlay that section are set out. Tor instance the first 
part, dealing with the peopling of southern Africa from the Stone 
Age, is woven around the themes of adaptation to the geographical 
environment of the region, the fluidity of ethnic identity, the 
development of states and of social class, and the growth of 
overseas contact through trade. The explication of these themes at 
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the beginning of the section acts as a useful "pointer", holding 
together the ensuing narrative. To facilitate note-taking, there 
are frequent headings and sub-headings. In suggested role play 
activities, such as one surrounding a primary source on the 
marriage of a Dutch man to a slave in the early Cape colony, the 
point is made that "there is no right or wrong answer ... credit 
can only be given for disciplined and realistic use of 
imagination" (4). 
The text is consistently thorough and is evidently based on an 
extensive reading of southern African history. In reasonably 
accessible language, the "knowledge" (rather than the 
interpretations or theories) of specialist historians of the 
region is set out over 21 chapters, extending from earliest 
inhabitation to the negotiations of 1990. Apart from the list of 
essay titles at the close of each chapter, activities include the 
construction of ti.me-lines andliTavinary descriptions of everyday 
life, reactions to specific events in the words of contemporaries, 
or accounts of imaginary discussions between representatives of 
the various polities in conflict. Generally, such imaginative 
exercises are well supported by the factual detail of the text, 
ancillary primary sources, tangential inset boxes and 
chronological tables (although many of the activities are geared 
towards students in the regions being discussed). 
In places the detail becomes overbearing, with intricate accounts 
of the waxing. and,waning of various polities intersperszti-with the 
names of their leaders. Notwithstanding the themes introduced at 
the start of each section, there seems to have been little attempt 
to is5late or even emphasise those social developments and 
"moments" which were of particular importance in the subsequent 
formation of South African society. Rather, historical minutiae is 
included seemingly for its own sake. from a 'purely historical 
perspective, this is perhaps no bad thing, but given the present 
aim of enabling students to understand the development of South 
African society as it is today, more assistance could be offered 
in identifying those processes and thresholds which were of 
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particular salience for the subsequent course of South African 
social development. Many of the Cambridge Board questions, to 
which the text is primarily geared, require detailed knowledge of 
events, but are undemanding in assessing the significance of those 
events as markers for later social and political development. 
This emphasis on historical minutiae can go so far as to obscure 
an appreciation of the development of segregationist and apartheid 
ideologies. Regarding segregation, there is somewhat of a "top-
down" approach, portraying it purely as the result of early 20th 
century legislation. A deeper analysis of the historical evolution 
of segregationist ideology is required - an analysis lost here in 
the morass of legislative detail. When ideologOs the implicit 
focus, tine intensification of segregation to form apartheid is 
interpreted as a reaction to growing African nationalism. But I 
would argue that the political challenge of African nationalism 
only took hold in the subsequent era of apartheid, and that, in 
the 1940s, the initial apartheid idea of Malan's NP was more a 
reaction to Smuts's "liberalism" and the social threat of an 
urbanised African proletariat, than to organised African political 
resistance. 
Nevertheless, the thematic markers given at the onset of each 
section can be used as summaries of dominant processes - those for 
the era of -European conquest and resistance in particular: 
European imperialism, horse and gun technology, trading-based and 
military-based kingdoms, European missionary influence—and-Boer 
states in the interior. With tte omission of-soille of the detail in 
these chapters, and particularly, with more frequent explicit 
referral back to these themes, the book would, I believe be more 
useful, at least as far as my or at 	 for teaching South 
Africa is concerned. In this same 19th century section, the fact 
that, in their early history, the Boer states of the interior had 
no -monopoly of coercion over the African polities around them, and 
were in many ways similar to them, is, importantly, emphasised. It 
was the industrialisation of the white polities, both of the coast 
and in the interior, which gave them the power to mould future 
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social changes to their own model; not their inherent 
superiority - and the narrative makes this clear. 
There are, however, some intriguing omissions. The impact on the 
eastern frontier, and on the evolution of white racial attitudes 
as a whole, of the 1820 settlers from Britain, is neglected, and 
the settlers themselves are mentioned only in passing. -Organised 
Afrikaner nationalism, despite its significance for the 
implementation of apartheid, is not treated as one of the themes 
to be woven throughout the text, and, surprisingly, there is no 
mention of the 1973 Durban strikes which preceded the Soweto 
revolt and marked the onset of an upsurge in trade union 
effectiveness. 
In general, as the statement of emphasis in the preface denotes, 
the account of social and political developments since the 1970s 
is not as thorough or as well informed as that of preceding 
periods - for example, there is an implication that the ANC itself 
initiated the 1980s insurrection. There is though, unusual and 
refreshing use of African cultural sources - for instance the 19th 
century Tswana's observation that Mzilikazi was cruel to his 
enemies and kind to those he conquered, but that Doers destroyed 
their enemies and made slaves of their friends (114). 
In conclusion, with the few exceptions noted above, Parsons' text 
is comprehensive in terms of content, and makes a good reference 
source. It is clearly laid out-,--contains forward and baCkward-f' 
referencing (although there could be more of the latter regarding 
the themes set out at the onset of each section) and frequent 
subheadings, illustrations and maps, and it is written in an 
accessible style. However, there seems to be a lack of 
discrimination, especially in the section dealing with the 13th 
century, between historical minutiae and salient events and 
processes, making it difficult to grasp the key strands of South 
African social development. Dy attempting to convey the complexity 
of historical change in the region, the text often falls into the 
trap of assuming that concision equals simplicity (see Part 
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Three). 
The text is weak when it comes to the developments and motivations 
behind the final abandonment of apartheid, for instance, glossing 
over the economic contradictions at apartheid's core. 
While the questions and activities are sometimes imaginative, they 
tend to follow the same format throughout, with little variation 
in student learning exercises. Relatively few of the exercises set 
are based directly on primary sources, although they could be used 
at the discretion of the student. 
From a geographical perspective, insufficient attention is paid to 
segregation's and apartheid's spatial dimension and there are few 
regional and local examples of the impact of these spatially 
ordered systems. There is also insufficient treatment of the 
ruling group ideologies behind these systems, the currents of 
ideology being displaced by the detail of events. For all its 
limitations however, Parsons' book remains a worthy and impressive 
synthesis of historical knowledge about South Africa, and an 
important resource not only for A level and undergraduate 
students, but also for specialists. 
History of Southern Africa, Kevin Shilling-ton, 1987,  
new impression, 1993, Longman  
Shillington's text is aimed at-"0 level" or equivalent 
examinations in southern Africa rather than the A level students 
of Parsons. It is, however, noted that "at the same time it should 
provide a useful introduction for students studying southern 
African history at a more advanced level" (v). 
The narrative begins with the stone age settlement of the region 
and descriptions of Khoi and San customs and economic 
reproduction. The exercises at the end of each chapter are in 
three categories: Think, Discuss, Understand and Write (largely 
essay titles); Imaginative Writing (accounts of imaginary 
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scenarios based on the text), and Mapwork, Document Work and 
Discussion (responding to questions on specific sources or 
devising own maps, charts etc.). The prose is, like Parsons, 
accessible, and of a classically textbook "factual" style, 
interspersed with frequent sub-headings. 
There is sufficient historical detail in parts not to be over-
concise, and there is some degree of characterisation of important 
individuals like Moshoeshoe. I found the text to be generally more 
readable than Parsons, with less "superfluous" detail and a 
greater emphasis on the portentous. When the author's "opinion" 
does intercede overtly in the text, the effect is relatively 
striking: for example, the Langalibelele "affair", in which 
attempts to disarm a Natal chiefdom resulted in resistance, is 
described as "a clear case of whites overreacting through fear in 
the face of defiance by a small section of the overwhelming 
African majority" (95). 
The use of maps is particularly good, with most of the places 
mentioned in the text being marked on clear and a‘..,,caa 	 sketch 
maps. The coverage of historical events itself is comprehensive 
and the primary sources used are interesting. 
On the negative side, the "imaginative writing" exercises are 
sometimes too imaginative to be even remotely realistic - for 
example, an account of a meeting between Shaka, Mzilikaze, Sobhuza 
and - Sebetwane - a meeting that 'could never have occurred for the 
very reasons elucidated in the previous chapter on the Mfecane. 
(It would have been more useful to ask why such a meeting couldn't 
have occurred than what would have been discussed had it done so). 
With the odd exception, like that of the Langalibelele affair, the 
human motivations behind events are often taken as being self-
evident. The currents of South African social formation would 
have been more clearly revealed if these motivations had been 
addressed explicitly - in other words, if theory had been 
discussed. 
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Shillington's narrative, like Parsons', becomes more cursory, and 
more questionable, as it nears the present. For example, the 1976 
Soweto revolt is explained in the light of inferior black 
education compared to white - but this was a constant. What was 
not, was the expansion of black schooling, the economic 
environment facing young Africans and the 'cmciyvim.c vf a new 
ideology of resistance. The interpretation of the text is, in 
fact, insufficient for the reader to be able to answer the essay 
set at the end of the chapter: "What Were the Causes and Results 
of the Soweto Uprising of 1976?" (194). 
The claim that Inkatha holds the support of at least half the 
Zulus is indicative of the level of simplification and 
generalisation in the account of the 1980s (and I stick to this 
belief despite the declared election results from Natal). There is 
no mention of the shifts in government ideology or strategy under 
Botha, with reforms passed off as "cosmetic". Other than a 
reference to business concern over instability, there is no 
impression of the factors leading to the abandonment of apartheid. 
Shillington's text is a competently written, clear, and frequently 
engrossing account of South African historical development, but it 
is unable to convey a comprehensio-n of the structural shifts 
underlying the abandonment of apartheid, or of the pressures from 
which South Africa suffers today. Like Parsons, the activities 
tend to follow well worn formats, which in themselves are good 
learning mechanisms, but which could be varied for greater effect. 
A History of Southern Africa, C. Danziger, 1991, Oxford 
Like the two texts reviewed above, Danziger's is written with 
candidates for senior secondary school examinations in mind. The 
book has some features which are good explanatory tools, 
particularly the initial relief maps, photographs and accompanying 
text explaining the crucial environmental context of South African 
history. However, it is not as competent a history, nor as useful 
for students as the preceding texts. 
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Throughout the text, "points" or "factors" are frequently ordered 
in numbered lists, a characteristic which may be seen as 
facilitating revision, but which disrupts the narrative. In the 
early chapters there is a heavy emphasis on the relations between 
the VOC and Dutch settlers, almost to the exclusion of the 
development of early material and social relations between 
coloniser, slaves and colonised. 
Despite later reference to Khoisan wars of resistance, it is 
stated that early freeburghers expanding to the east "met with no 
resistance from the native peoples, as the loose social structure 
of the Khoi was being undermined by terrible smallpox epidemics 
and the San had long since teen forced by black, white and Khoi 
into less arable areas" (21). This is simply not true, and the 
fact that whites had already played a role in pushing San out of 
tte favoured areas suggests that they did indeed meet resistance. 
At other points in the narrative, it is similarly implied that 
Khoisan simply retreated into the interior in the face of 
advancing white settlement. Where the 1657 Khoisan war of 
resistance is discussed, it is stated that the war ended when 
"other Khoi forced the militants into making peace as they wanted 
to resume trade with the fort" . Later, Khoi "clans who had 
unwisely bartered away large herds had to adopt a San - like 
existence of raiding the cattle of other tribes and of the Dutch" 
(my emphases). Nigel Penn ("Land, Labour and -Live-stotWin the 
Western Cape During the 18th Century", in "The Angry Divide: 
Social and Economic History of the Western Cape", James, W.G. and 
Simons, M. eds., David Philip, Cape Town, 1989) documents the 
forced bartering of Khoisan cattle, in spite of insufficient 
remaining to maintain an independent means of living, and of 
Khoisan complaints to colonial officials. The "Dutch" cattle 
raided by the Khoisan, were in most cases themselves appropriated 
from Khoisan. 
The historical misrepresentation continues; the caption to a 
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picture of the Company slave lodge contains the information that 
Company slaves received a better education than most of the 
colonists. While this may be strictly true, if left unqualified by 
an observation concerning choice and the nature of that education, 
it conveys a somewhat distorted picture. At one point, even with 
the whole of the 19th century as the context, British interest in 
the region is put down solely to protection of the Cape sea 
route - not a mention of minerals or confederation until later. 
Aside from discrete moments in the text such as these, in the 
section dealing with further white colonisation, the book 
perpetuates an outdated variant of the "frontier thesis" (see 
Chapter One, Part One). 
The account of the mfecane, similarly, cannot be taken as an 
accurate reflection of turrent academic thinking. Its focus is 
almost entirely on the Nel avlla i ities of "great men" such as 
Dingiswayo, Zwide and Shaka, with no recognition of the structural 
economic and ecological crises which propelled the region towards 
increased conflict and state building. 
It is a sensationalism derived from that of European observers of 
the day which holds that under Shaka "anyone not able to work was 
put to death" (37), not historical "truth", in any sense of the 
term. Elsewhere, the same overemphasis on individual personality, 
and omission of structural change is apparent. Two more examples 
of inaccuracy will suffice. Indentured Indian labourers were 
brought to the Natal sugar plantations not .becauwso many 
Africans had left for the diamond mines that there was a labour 
shortage, but because local Africans could not be induced to 
abandon farming for plantation labouring. And the Chief Minister 
of Kwaailii, Olitilelezi, was not "elected in the Western democratic 
fashion" (65), if the banning of the most popular political 
movement in the region, and the fact that support for Inkatha was 
a necessity for land and security in many rural areas, are taken 
into account. 
Apart from misleading statements and interpretations, there are 
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great omissions. For instance, in the section dealing with the 
growth of Kimberley, virtually all that was significant about the 
town for future social development - urban segregation, the 
compound system, racial discrimination in the workforce, the rise 
of monopoly capitalism - is overlooked. 
Throughout the account of apartheid, the language used seems to 
partially justify oppressive legislation by portraying it as 
attempted solutions to "problems" facing the government. Nowhere 
is it implied that these "problems" were the result of its own 
agenda. An example is the statement that, in the 1980s, South 
African troops were "forced" to "violate South Africa's borders" 
in pursuit of ANC -guerillas. 
The conclusion is particularly bewildering, with statements that 
there have been no major wars in the southern African region for 
almost 70 years (Angola, Mozambique, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe?); nor 
famines or droughts (the early 1980s drought?); that the "South 
African economy ... is generally considered to be one of the 
strongest in the world" (persistent capital outflow, severe 
balance of payments deficit and negative per capita, and even 
absolute growth rates?); and that, in times of recession, blacks 
are more dependent on white goodwill, and therefore less likely to 
revolt (157C and 1984 were both periods of economic recession). 
The essay titles included as exercises are all listed at the end 
of the book. They are from both the Cambridge Board and the Kenya '- 
National Examinations Council and they are demanding mostly of 
factual recall rather than of analytical or synthetical skill or 
understanding. 
"Foundations of the New South Africa", John Pampallis, 1991,  
Zed Books, London and New Jersey 
 
This book was originally written for exiled South African students 
at the ANC's Solomon Mahiangu Freedom College in Tanzania, with 
341 
the express purpose of focusing on the history of resistance to 
white domination. The account begins with the 1860s - a rather 
confusing period with which to initiate the book. 
From the start, there is simplification of the array of 
independent and semi-independent polities inhabiting the region at 
the time, with "Tswana" and "Sotho" plotted unrealistically as if 
they were coherent polities rather than loose agglomerations of 
clans, chiefdoms and kingdoms, in defined territories on a map. 
However, the simplification is of a kind which I believe to be 
preferable, in the context envisaged, to Parsons' elaborate 
documentation. Nevertheless, the book is at its weakest in the 
section dealing with the 19th century. Terms such as "imperialism" 
and "capitalism" are taken for granted and insufficiently 
explained and exemplified, and the emphasis on conquest and 
resistance means that other, more portentous developments like the 
consolidation of segregationist assumptions and the fixing of 
material relations between racial groups, are relatively 
neglected. 
The account is clearly anti-capitalist in orientation, but, with 
the odd exception, the slant does not result in any obvious 
distortion of versions of history "accepted" by most specialists. 
However, the "wishful thinking" of united, progressive black 
resistance to apartheid does tend to obscure the high degree of 
ethnic consciousness within South Africa's black population, and 
the account of the early ANC omits reference to the leadership's 
attempts to preserve its relatively privileged position as an 
African middle class. 
The roles of the socialist resistance movements in particular, are 
stressed, and, in the consideration given to Afrikaner 
nationalism, its material dimension receives most attention, 
although cultural inputs are not neglected. The materialist 
emphasis, does however, need modification when it comes to 
interpreting apartheid itself. This is done largely through 
Wolpe's rationale of the maintenance of cheap African labour in 
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the face of reserve economy collapse. Fear of African 
urbanisation, including its cultural consequences, should be given 
more emphasis, as a focus on materialism alone is unrealistic. The 
dependence on the explanatory value of cheap labour supplies also 
leads to a tendency to overlook the important structural economic 
changes in the last decades of apartheid, notably the increasing 
need for skilled labour, and African wage gains (not least because 
of trades unions). 
The focus on resistance, as well as obscuring the role of economic 
contradiction in the demise of apartheid, allows significant 
changes in ruling group ideology and practice, particularly under 
Botha, to go unnoticed. 
Keeping these limitations in mind, the book has a number of 
implive attributes. The discussions in which it is suggested 
students participate are often innovative, and may be "open 
ended"; for instance, a debate on differences between Boer and 
British colonizers AS perceived by contemporary Africans. If the 
book's materialist slant is acknowledged, it can still be taken as 
a fairly reliable interpretive guide to most of the major social, 
economic and political developments in South Africa, at least 
until the 1960s. 
Its selection of "sources" for analysis is refreshing, ranging 
from extracts from-academic histories to clearly biased South 
African - school texts (with exerciSes'to -identify the author's 
political position) and popular songs. There is good use of 
backward and forward referencing, evident in a suggested 
comparison between Milner':s post -Doer War Anlici-zation of 
Afrikaners and the NP's decision to enforce instruction in 
Afrikaans in the black schools of the 1970s. A particularly good 
account of the 1913 Land Act and its consequences follows. 
One feature of the book that is worthy of note is that it is 
obviously written with the learner in mind. This may seem self 
evident for a textbook, but unless there is a real attempt to 
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explain, rather than to take knowledge for granted, textbooks fail 
to reflect the fact that their readers do not already know (see 
Part Four). A manifestation of expressed concern for the reader 
here is the clear exemplification, in an inset box, of the impact 
of overvaluation of South African currency in the 1933 economic 
crisis - an important development that many students would have 
difficulty with. 
The account is well, and clearly written, but the general 
narrative, like the primary sources, tends to concern itself more 
with resistance to racial structures than with the attitudes 
behind their evolution. In this sense, the book is ultimately 
inadequate as a guide to the formation of social structure in 
South Africa. 
Conclusion: Insights for a Post 16 Resource 
Many of the ieVi*'WS above have been overtly critical, but in any 
field, it is only by first identifying the limitations of current 
practice -that one can take the more positive step of 
reformulation. This section will be concluded with an attempt not 
only to identify what I see as common problems with available 
resources, but also to identify their positive aspects - aspects 
which, when combined with a consideration of suitable linguistic 
techniques and text structure in Part Three, can inform my own 
ensuing effort at resource construttion. 
Historical Formation  
If there is one criticism which can be applied to all the 
resources reviewed above except the history texts, it is 
insufficient consideration of historical legacies in the 
formulation of apartheid. While the apartheid system, or aspects 
of it, are described, with varying degrees of accuracy and 
effectiveness by all these materials, none is charged with the 
means of understanding the evolution of that system. While all, to 
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some extent, confront the reader with the injustice and brutality 
of apartheid, none sets this injustice and brutality sufficiently 
in the context in which it occurs. "White psychology" and the 
"apartheid mentality" are addressed by the better resources, but 
tte temporal course of their manifestation as a pervasive system 
of government, their reification, despite modification and 
adaptation, not least because of black resistance, in social and 
spatial forms, is sufficiently traced by none. -(A related problem 
is the frequent use of the term "the Afrikaners" when what is 
really meant is the government of the day or the state. The two 
are far from synonymous). 
The History texts tend to suffer more from:a lack of attention to 
recent structural shifts within South Africa, and an inability to 
make their "story" of social formation releVant to today's 
situation. To varying extents, they fail to isolate sufficiently 
those.historical traits which have most significance for the 
constitution of contemporary Soul) African society. 
Historical Theory 
With apartheid now banished from the statute books, it may seem 
irrelevant to trace its origins as a system of social regulation, 
but any South African will testify, whether wistfully or angrily, 
to its legacy. South Africa ten or twenty years from now will 
still be shaped by apartheid to a very significant degree and 
therefore its-origins are crucial to 'a contetporary understanding 
of South African society. Danziger's history is incomplete and 
inconsistent; Parsons', with a few anomalies, is comprehensive and 
Shillington's is more readable as well as comprehensive; but only 
Pampallis has a consistent (materialist) theoretical thread 
running throughout the text, and even this is an implicit and_ 
exclusive one. 
Some of the historical detail of these texts is essential to an 
understanding of South Africa's social structuring, and it 
provides points of interest and involvement for students, but it 
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should be complemented by a more coherent consideration of 
competing or compatible theories of social development. To put it 
simply, an account of theoretical disputes is needed to explain 
the "why?" of South African social development; these historical 
texts explain only the "how?" 
If apartheid's origins are to be fully addressed then, it must be 
partially through a consideration of theoretical interpretations 
of South Africa's historical development. 
An account of theoretical &tate is not only useful for 
elucidating the temporal formulation of apartheid, but is also 
educationally valuable in assisting students to perceive that 
there are competing interpretations, that there will te slants and 
biases, by omission or by commission, in materials purporting to 
explain South Africa and apartheid (including the one that 
presents these debates). Smith's book alone among the resources 
specifically designed for post 16 student use, attempts, but in 
what I see as a confusing way, to set -apartheid in an explicit 
theoretical context. 
Social Formation Beyond Apartheid 
A further common limitation of current resources is their 
partiality in focusing exclusively on apartheid, the implication 
being that apartheid constitutes the sum of human experience in 
South Africa. Yet, the influences on South Africa's social and 
spatial structures extend beyond apartheid and racfat ideology to 
encompass more ambiguous cultural, environmental and economic 
influences. (Of course, the South African text reviewed goes to 
the other, and, were it not so serious, ridiculous extreme of 
ignoring apartheid altogether). 
A related point is the importance of emphasising to students the 
salient legacies of apartheid for life in post-apartheid South 
Africa, both in the present and in the indeterminate future, (see 
Margaret Roberts, "The Ending of Apartheid: Shifting Inequalities 
in South Africa", Geography, Jan 1994, no.342, Vol.79, part 1, 53- 
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64). 
What I would see as a better resource then, would not only 
describe South Africa's spatial and social structures, but would 
also trace the development of systems of government based on 
racial differentiation and consider interpretations of these 
systems, focusing on ideological evolution, material exegesis and 
the relations between state and society. It wotild also address the 
economic, cultural and environmental influences that mould social 
and spatial forms outside of, or in direct opposition to, state 
manipulation or supervision.  The injustices of South African 
social reproduction would be made apparent in such a resource, but 
so would the mode of their genesis. 
Suds is-the conclusion drawn from a deliberately critical survey 
of existing resources. But these resources have positive lessons 
to proffer as well: 
Interest  
Leeds OCC's exercise of establishing links between South Africa 
and Britain is a way of stimulating interest in the subject on the 
part ofBritish students. I would however, seek to establish more 
substantial and less emotive links, focusing for instance on 
economic interactions and the impact on South African government 
rhetoric and action of the general shift away from overtly racist 
discourse in countries like Britain, rather than direct political 
comparison. 
A more consistent way of making South African society interesting 
for British students is the use of stimulating writing, resources 
and activities. 
Texts can convey a realistic image, useful for understanding 
current political developments, of the tension-wrouvilt, unstable 
and violent society of the years of apartheid's demise. This 
cannot be achieved through "dry" academic accounts alone, but with 
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the assistance of journalistic inserts such as those used in the 
Geographical Magazine series and Smith's "Update", students derive 
a more immediate, not to say interesting, picture of contemporary 
South African society. There is no reason why such approaches 
should not be extended to the past as well. 
The History texts demonstrate that primary sources and 
illustrations can both convey an impression of the wider social 
assumptions and attitudes lyin-g. behiA aeyi eyat inn ond resistance, 
and, through their immediacy, generate greater interest. 
Lemon's use of stimulating aerial photographs allows students to 
examine the segregated nature of Sout err:- _'z  contemporary urban 
areas, while Danziger's initial outline of South African 
environments, through maps and photographs, is accessible and 
contextually important. Sources such zs these could be 
supplemented by extracts from relevant literature, as used to 
exemplify aspects of white domination and black resistance in Part 
One of this thesis. 
The Schools Boycott and Kei Road simulations demonstrate that not 
all role -plays are relatively meaningless and a-contextual 
exercises. With sufficient background material and pre-developed 
understanding of a situation, they can help students to 
conceptualise the behaviour behind the events and longer term 
processes which shape South African society. They could even lead 
into more general debates-on the nature of interaction between 
structure and agency in the determination of historical change. 
"The Child is Not Dead" is a useful source of further imaginative 
learning exercises on South Africa, to complement and extend the 
note-taking, discussion and essay writing activities of the 
History texts. 
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Values 
The "moral" framework within which apartheid is addressed -
prominent in the materials of Leeds DEC and the resources of the 
charitable organisations involved specifically with South Africa - 
can be educational to an extent. While I would not agree that 
anti-apartheid "bias" should explicitly inform educational 
materials, for reasons set out above, I believe that some 
"disclaimer" of objectivity should be included in an educational 
resource on South Africa. 
Students, if they didn't already know, should be informed that 
contentious topics are being addressed, and that even such a:-
resource as the one that they are using, designed specifically for 
the purpose of formal education, should not be taken as being 
"neutral". 
Exercises based on a critical review of the bias in existing 
texts, like those in Fampallis, can be useful in ti is regard, as 
long as it is not suggested that the book in which these exercises 
are contained is itself "definitive" or unbiased. 
Maps  
Finally, and before moving on to an attempt to formulate a 
resource informed partly by the lessons of this review, a point 
about mapping. A resource developed within South Africa to provide 
a "People's Geography" alternative to accounts like that of 
Swanevelder et al, is "The Two South Africas: A People's 
Geography", Buman Rights Commission, 1992. This emphasises the 
fact that most maps of contemporary South Africa represent areas 
inhabited by whites in some detail, whilst omitting the 
infrastructure-deprived "shadow" tlack South. 
 Africa. 
Yet, "the omission of black areas reflects a distorted view of who 
the South Africans are, and where they live. It is an ideological 
statement about who is really significant, who really counts" 
(foreword). Before this publication, little if anything existed 
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"in the way of a co-ordinated geography that exposes the lie of 
contemporary maps and bridges the reality of the two South 
Africas". I would argue that a resource containing maps such as 
comprise this booklet, representing black townships and locations 
as well as the white towns they serviced under apartheid, is 
essential for a sophisticated 1G-19 resource on South Africa. 
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Part Three  
The Writing of a Text  
Introduction  
The construction of Parts One and Two of this thesis has left me 
with some idea of the content which I believe should be included 
in a text assisting older students to understand social formation 
in South Africa. Three aspects of this envisaged content and its 
ordering are most apparent to me at this stage: it will be 
chronologically structured as a periodization (as was my initial 
formulation of South Afrtcansocial formation in Part One); it 
will explicitly address theoretical conflicts in the 
interpretation of South Africa's history; and it will be 
consciously and overtly selective in the events and processes it 
describes - the criteria for selection being revealed to the 
reader (for example, see exercise, appendix, p.417). I would like 
to elaborate on, and justify these three attributes before moving 
on to discuss dimensions of an "ideal" text other than content. 
The most fundamental reason for a chronologically ordered text is 
that such a structure reflects my own understanding of South 
Africa's socio-spatial relations. This understanding rests on the 
metaphor of South African social formation as a palimpsest - a 
palimpsest comprised of layers of entrenched group interactions, 
patterned by structure and agency over time. I believe that only 
through the identification and explication of significant social, 
economic and political developments in each of a number of 
"layers" or periods (however these periods are delineated) can one 
attain a coherent, if simplified impression of South African 
social configuration. Such a structure does not reflect my on 
process of learning about South Africa - I did not read a series 
of texts dealing with successive periods of South African history. 
Nevertheless, as an internalised outcome of reading texts in no 
particular order, and of researching within South Africa, I have 
an imposed, ordered, mental "sense" of South African social 
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development that is chronological. The steps I took towards this 
sense were idiosyncratic, unrepeatable, and time-consuming, and it 
is their more ordered outcome (one of many possible outcomes) with 
which I wish students to interact. 
Secondly, I favour a chronological ordering because of its 
compatibility with the sub-discipline of Bistorical Geography, 
with which I would like to see A-level students made more 
familiar. It is time that static descriptions and deterministic, 
universal spatial models be replaced by the study of real places 
and_their empirical social and spatial patterning through time. 
My final reason for a chronologically ordered text is informed by 
the study of literature on the - relationship between reader and 
text - a study that constitutes the rest of this chapter. Despite 
post-modernist literary experimentation, chronological sequencing 
remains natural to narrative - tte form of text ttat is-most 
accessible to most readers; but it also allows the introduction of 
less familiar forms of discourse, such as argumentation, which 
will extend the "implied/intended reader's" competence or 
experience. The importance of such an outcome will be clarified in 
the following pages. 
The second attribute of my envisaged text's content is its 
explicit treatment of theory. Some of the reasoning behind this 
imperative is contained in the conclusion to Part Two. To recap 
briefly: consideration of debates over the interpretation of South 
African history can engage students in  attempts to understand why 
South Africa developed in the way that it did as well as how; and 
it can serve as a useful lesson on the absence of objective 
historical or geographical discourse, and on the detection of 
authorial ideology (for example, appendix, pp.453-45T. But there 
is an additional advantage of addressing theory in the text: 
competing tteories/interpretations can be used as the basis for a 
bipolar theme, often found in fiction, running through the 
narrative to encourage engagement (see discussion of Egan,1989, 
below). 
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The third envisaged aspect of my text's content is its revealed 
selection criteria. The text will not be an exhaustive history or 
geography of South Africa; it will be a discourse on those events 
and processes which I deem to have been particularly significant 
in moulding the most apparent contours of social and spatial 
interaction within contemporary South Africa. I believe that, as 
such, students should be informed of the basis on which events and 
themes have been selected for their consideration or "re-
creation". The reader should be informed of why the author feels 
that a particular, selected "moment" was is portentous (for 
example, appendix, Pp.44-446). In this way the distance between 
writer as source of semi-mystical authority and reader as learner 
is reduced, overcoming at least some of the difficulties that 
student readers have been found to experience (see Robson,1983). 
The envisaged text then, will be informed by these considerations 
of content and ordering. But there are two other attributes of the 
text which I feel ought to be considered before I begin its 
writing. The first is the nature of the activities which it is 
suggested that students should perform from their reading. The 
second, touched upon in the rationale of content above, and upon 
which the bulk of this part of the thesis hinges, is the 
structure, form and style of the text's language itself. 
Student activities are suggested in any text to facilitate greater 
familiarity with its expressed ideas (although these will always 
be mediated by student interaction - see below) and retention of 
its "factual" content, Empathy with the peoples introduced in the 
text is a necessary component of these aims. 
The greater the interaction and the degree of student involvement 
►n the suggested activities, it would seem, the greater the 
potential for student familiarity and retention. In order to 
prevent staleness of interaction, activities, and the sources upon 
which they are based, should be varied, and at times, involve 
"realistic" student imagination as well as factual summation. 
Facile assumptions can be minimised through the enrichment of 
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content and retention can be assisted with guided student writing. 
Such characteristics can be found in texts written without any 
specific reference to linguistic theory, but the attention of 
theorists has increasingly been drawn towards the purposes and 
attributes of what students write in response to the text's 
suggestions. The concept of genre in student writing has been 
developed most intensively in Australia (see for example Kress and 
Threadgold,1988, Martin,1989, Reid,1988, Threadgold,1988 and 
1992). Genre theorists hold that the act and the form of writing 
are very much conditioned by the purpose of writing—The venetel 
induction of students into the language of "adulthood" involves an 
appreciation of how language is moulded to genre, whether the 
genre be, for example, narrative, reporting, description, or 
exposition (see Martin, 1989). As a social process, writing should 
take into account for whom one is writing and why (for example, 
exercises, appendix, pp.4g7- and 616). 
If our text then, is to assist students not only in developing an 
understanding of South African social structures, but also in 
coping with and handling language more generally, its suggested 
written activities should be explicitly purposeful, and more 
importantly, of manifest relevance for the student. Examples of 
activities developed in accordance with "genre theory" are 
provided by Bleiman and Dickens, 1989, in a resource on Jean Rhys' 
novel, "Wide Sargasso Sea", developed for aglish A level 
students. Believing that writing activities should "allow students 
to learn the different processes of writing for different 
purposes" (S), they argue-that one should be aware of the 
rationale for each suggestion, including note-taking, charts and 
diagrams, creative or imaginative responses, more extensive 
critical writing, timed work and work arising from other, related 
texts. In an introduction for the student reader, it is expressly 
stated that the ensuing activities "should help you to approach a 
difficult text as active readers, confident enough to make your 
own meanings, tolerate uncertainty and suspend premature 
judgement" (16). i see no reason 'Ay just such a rationale should 
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not also inform the activities in an instructive text (for 
example, exercise, appendix, p.727). 
But what of the text itself - its structure and linguistic form? 
Here, some of the work of literary theorists, delineating the 
interaction between readers and texts, is of relevance. The 
literature in this field is extensive and directed mainly towards 
readers' interaction with fiction. 
In a restrictively selective overview, and drawing heavily on 
Carol RobsoWs MA thesis, I attempfin the remainder of this part 
of my thesis, to derive from this literature that which is of 
assistance in writing a formal educational text on South Africa. 
Reader and Text  
The act of reading has come to be understood by literary theorists 
as an interaction or transaction between reader and text, and 
investigations by experimental psychologists and educationalists 
among others have revealed an increasing array of influences, 
other than the text itself, on the nature of this interaction and 
on its outcome. While some of these influences will be touched 
upon in the following account, they are not fully explored since 
it is particularly the construction of the text which is of 
concern here. 
Robson, 1983, suggests that interpretations of the relationship 
between reader and text tend to adopt - one of three broad 
approaches. These she characterises as the "skills" approach, 
"views of comprehension developed by Cognitive Psychology", and 
the "holistic" approach. In the skills approach, the relationship 
between reader and text is perceived as being "one-way". 
Comprehension can be transmitted from text to reader 
(Thorndike,1971), with the reader as somettinl of a passive, empty 
vessel waiting to be filled with understanding from the text. The 
fact that, despite a uniform textual message, different readers 
acquire different comprehensions, is accounted for by the 
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possibility of the reader making mistakes in the interpretation of 
words, over or under-emphasising certain elements in the text, or 
failing to treat ideas gained as provisional - to be adjusted in 
the light of further reading. According to this perception, 
student comprehension of the text can be gauged simply by setting 
questions on it - and by supplying the answers to the questions, 
teachers lead students to the "correct" and definitive 
understanding. 
Expressed in such mechanistic terms, teachers might wish to reject 
such a notion;_yet, as Robson points out, "this model is the 
orthodoxy of Many teachers" (12). It is also frequently the 
implicit assurrotion behind educational research: for example, 
Lunzer and Gardner, 1979, investigating the efficiency by which 
understanding is "conveyed" from text to student reader, found 
that the critical determinant of comprehension was the reader's 
willingness to reflect on the reading matter. In a later account 
of the way in which learning from texts proceeds, the same authors 
similarly take it for granted that any problems experienced stem 
not from the text, but from the reader (Lunzer and Gardner,1304). 
Following the line of enquiry suggested by the skills approach, 
research has been conducted into the development of better reading 
skills, with strategies such as skimming, scanning and reflective 
reading being advocated for various types of study (Lunzer and 
Gardner,1979,4=4). Whilst the development of such "skills" may 
indeed assist many students, they are techniques founded on an 
assumption of simplistic reader absorption of content. As 
prescriptive methods, they, and the model from which they are 
derived, make "little allowance for any diversification of 
strategies which pupils' own background and knowledge might 
prompt" (Robson,1983,15). 
Since the "skills" model is not an interactive one, it offers 
little guidance for the formulation of the text itself. Indeed, 
there is an assumption that unless a text is "suitable" for its 
intended readership, it will not get into print in the first 
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place, "so text types correspond to certain kinds of reader 
expectation" (Lunzer and Gardner,1984). But Robson's point is that 
they often do not. Her research reveals that many student readers 
find great difficulty arriving at any comprehension of a great 
deal of texts, and that many of the understandings that students 
do develop from texts are distorted or oversimplified (see below). 
Texts themselves are more subtly complicated and multifaceted than 
mere containers of information to be tapped. 
While the skills approach hinges on the expectation that "what a 
text (literally) says is what it (figuratively) means ... this is 
at best a dubious assumption, increasingly so with the emerging 
corpus of scholarship from literary theorists on the character of 
textual discourse" (De Castell et al.,1989). This is not just a 
matter of textual deconstruction, but of the differential way in 
which texts tap the experience of readers. The skills approach 
assumes a neat transfer of meaning from text to reader, but "any 
successful transfer ... though initiated by the text ... depends 
on the extent to which this text can activate the individual 
reader's faculties of perceiving and processing ... In other 
words, it offers guidance as to what is to be produced, and 
therefore cannot itself be the product" (Iser,1978,107). What is 
needed from a text then, is greater anticipation of the 
interpretations it is likely to initiate in a variety of readers. 
Approaches to reader comprehension developed by cognitive 
psychologists are more sensitive to differential relationships 
between texts and readers with different backgrounds. They are 
based on a computer-processing model, with "data" inputed from the 
text to the memory of the reader. Reader comprehension derives 
from an understanding of this "data", and evidence of 
comprehension comes not from questioning, but from the ability to 
recognise and recall aspects of the text's message. Generally, the 
"form" of the text - for instance, story or argument - is retained 
and replicated in the "form" of the reader's recall. 
This suggests that familiarity with such forms assists 
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comprehension of the text's message. "Thus comprehension is 
assumed to depend upon prior knowledge structures" 
(Robson,1983,18). A recent example of such an approach is provided 
by Fairclough, 1989: "once we identify a text as an instance of a 
pattern, we happily dispense with the mass of its detail and 
reduce it to the skeletal shape of the familiar pattern for 
purposes of longer-term memory and recall" (160). 
These structures or patterns in the mind of the reader - ways of 
formatting content - could be seen as analogous to a computer 
program, designed to receive data from an external source. The 
form in which that data is received is determined by the receptive 
program. 
When comprehension is developed, the linguistic conventions in the 
text reflect the memory conventions of the mind, and the forms of 
the text, such as argument, narrative and propaganda, are 
"intuitively recognized" -(Robson,1903,20) by the reader, guided by 
his/her mental structures. "Thus comprehension is achieved through 
an interactive process between textual structures and the mental 
structures of the reader; this tends to be a matching process" 
(Robson,1983,20). Incomprehension on the part of the reader will 
be the result of a mismatch, resulting from a lack of recognition 
of the discourse structure or form (Kintsch and Van Dijk,1978). 
Robson sees the work of cognitive psychologists as useful - in 
that it accounts for the knowledge and expectations of the 
reader - but limited by the omission of wider, similarly relevant 
attributes of the reader - notably "intentions, feelings and 
imagination" (21). Taken on its own, the work has little practical 
guidance to offer an individual author in the stimulation of 
further reader comprehenslon, since "those who apply such models 
to reading in the subject areas stress the importance of 
developing the reader's prior knowledge networks, rather than 
his/her experience of the text" (21). 
Robson herself favours a more "holistic" view of reading as part 
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of learning. In such an approach, as with the cognitive 
psychologists, the interpretation of language as merely a means 
whereby "information is shunted from one person to another" 
(Smith,1982a) is rejected. But there is also criticism of a view 
of the reader's mind consisting of "stereotyped data structures" 
(Smith,1982a), and an acceptance of a wider range of variables 
affecting the reception of any text. 
Reading is seen as just one of many learning experiences which 
shape, and are shaped by, evolving mental constructs. These 
constructs are really working hypotheses which ar_e amended in the 
light of new, anomalous experience, or consolidated .and retained 
in the light of new confirmatory experience. The legacy of past 
experience of every kind informs the way new experiences, such as 
that of a text, are construed. 
This legacy is not immutable, but it will "orient (readers) 
powerfully towards extending their learning in ways consistent 
with it" '(Robson,1982,24) . Since each reader's past experience is 
unique, there will be a variety of individual strategies for 
learning from any text. 
The questions that students ask themselves in order to learn from 
a text then, are founded in their own past experience. Yet 
learning, by definition, involves an extension of this experience;----
and it is with this extension that a text should be concerned. The 
text can be "active" in extending and modifying expectations and 
in helping to instigate new -questions, so that reeding becomes "an 
exchange of meanings with an author" (Goodman, Goodman and Burke). 
For such a transaction to be successful though, the text must 
touch the reader's present experience or expectations before it 
can extend them. 
In instructional texts then, "it is the author's responsibility to 
initiate the development of expectations as the reader progresses 
through the book" (Smith,1982b), choosing a register appropriate 
to the reader's pre-existing expectations (Robson,1982). 
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Unfortunately, "orthodox" formulae for assessing the readability 
of textbooks do not rest on the assumption behind this view - that 
of reading as transaction. Rather, they focus on sentence length 
or the frequency of polysyllabic words (see Robson,1982, for 
references), omitting any consideration of the differential 
relationship between these aspects of text and the reader. In 
consequence, "there is no causal relationship between difficulty 
level as predicted by a formula and the actual difficulty a reader 
is likely to encounter" (Lunzer and Gardner,1979). 
The expectations that a reader brings to a text are multi-faceted, 
shaped by linguistic competence gained outside school (Luke, De 
Castell and Luke,1989), and involving "sense, emotional response, 
approval and disapproval" (Britton,1977). They are also influenced 
by the form of authority with which a text is endowed by the 
teacher (see Luke, De Castell and Luke,1989), and the mood and 
motivation of the student at the specific moment of reading. 
Indeed, some "critics and theoreticians of the 20th century ... 
have emphasised readers and their activity more than texts and 
their authors" and they "vary greatly in the standing they accord 
to the text and its writer" (Evans,1987). Whilst recognising that 
much of the text's message lies not entirely "in the text" though, 
the focus here must be on that which resides within it. Olson, 
1989, in his response to Luke, De Castell and Luke, addresses this 
concern: "the writing of texts is not a trivial matter. The task 
facing writers is not only to make texts assimilable; it is to 
make clear both the grounds for accepting claims as true and the 
grounds for granting persons, texts and institutions authority" 
(261). However, there is more that the writer can do, even if the 
text is necessarily going to be "reconstituted" by teachers and 
students in class. 
But before guidelines for the writing of a "successful" text can 
be delineated, we need a closer focus on the specific role of the 
text itself in the transaction of reading. 
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Textual Discourse and Language 
Egan, 1989, writing about science textbooks, emphasises the role 
of narrative or story in successful instructional text. Stories 
are defined by the fact that they have an "affective meaning" -
that is, they conclude when the reader knows what to "feel" about 
the sequence of events contained within them. In an enthralling 
novel, this outcome is derived from reader-text interaction and 
re-interpretation - activities encouraged by texts described by 
Eco, 1979, as "open" (as opposed to "closed", wherein a passive 
reader is simply entertained). 
Cco's appellations were applied specifically to fiction, but the 
story is the most fundamental mode of human expression and 
understanding of any sequence of ideas. As Rosen, 1994 puts it, 
"narrative is ... a universal method of giving meaning to 
experience. Like life itself, it is there, international, 
transhistorical, transcultural" (Barthes, 1982, quoted 
Rosen,1.994). Egan believes stories should be incorporated in both 
teaching and the instructional text. Similarly, in the context of 
a Geography text, Slater, 1991, offering guidance on note-taking, 
advises student readers to see the text they are "interrogating" 
as a narrative with plot and characters. The student's task is to 
isolate, relate and compare the roles of the characters (in this 
case contributors to eutrophication in the Norfolk Broads). For 
example, in the account of the Broads used for a model, "the 
experiments give us the overall structure of the unfolding story. 
They are the chapters of the story with a different 
character/variable featuring more prominently in each chapter" 
(13) (for example of role of story telling, see appendix, pp.4-
431 ). 
As far as historical (or historical geography) texts are 
concerned, deterministic, or "unreformed" Marxists think that they 
know the ultimate meaning of broad societal change, but according 
to Egan, "we cannot fix our affective response to (historical) 
events. They have too many sides, too many contexts, to allow 
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reduction of possible meanings to one precise meaning" (102). 
However, here there is a connection to be made with my earlier 
comments on the role of theory in the text. Competing theories 
attempt to fix exactly such meanings to historical processes and 
events. They are tte underlying threads linking the happenings of 
the story. While Egan is right that it is impossible to fix one 
precise meaning to history, I see no reason why there should not 
be a counterpoising of meanings in a successful text. Addressing 
the different historiographies of South Africa not only assists in 
engendering familiarity with the events and developments which 
have shaped South African society; it also proposes valuable 
meanings to the drama being enacted in the text. 
Egan further suggests that the most intriguing stories are those 
composed of binary "opposites", giving the example from Physics of 
teat's destructive capacity juxtaposed with heat's usefulness. 
Here, perhaps, a focus on interpretation or theory could serve 
another purpose - to define poles (for instance, of liberalism, or 
the emphasis on identity, and Marxism, or the emphasis on 
materialism) between which the story of South African social 
formation is told. Of course, the polarity must not be 
overplayed - this would be to ignore the complex and mutual 
contouring of these historical motivations, and to present an 
overly simplistic picture of theoretical debate. But at least a 
critical orientation along tteseaxes, it seems to me, could 
usefully be employed in an attempt to "open" the envisaged text 
for the student (for example, appendix, pp.6.a-653) . 
An emphasis on interpretational conflict as the binary (or 
multiple) opposite in a narrative raises the question of authorial 
presence in the text. Student readers themselves cannot be 
expected to isolate materialist and ideatidnal paradigms from the 
raw "data" of the text; they must be guided towards such poles of 
interpretation. Iser, 1974, notes a trend away from direct 
authorial guidance in the Cnglish novel. Whereas 18th century 
writers such as Defoe and Fielding would intervene in their texts 
to address the reader directly, assisting him/her to perceive 
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their meaning and negotiating him/her through the understandings 
which were the author's intent, "the reader of the modern novel is 
deprived of the assistance which the 18th century writer had given 
him in a variety of devices ranging from earnest exhortation to 
satire and irony. instead, he is expected to strive for himself to 
unravel the mysteries of a sometimes strikingly obscure 
composition ... the world presented seems to have no bearing on 
what the reader is familiar with" (Iser,1974,102). It could be 
argued that the tendency has rendered texts more "open" in Eco's 
sense, since a greater degree of reader interaction and re-
interpretation is necessary. Activity of this nature is of immense 
value for -learning, but bearing in mind the need for the 
instructional text to touch the expectations of the relatively 
"unaccomplished" student reader before encouraging the extension 
of this expectations, such a reader will probably benefit from a 
degree of authorial assistance in his/her attempt to "unravel the 
mysteries" of the text. 
Crismore, 1989, describing such authorial intervention as 
"metadiscourse", argues for its Iriclusion iii the text on the 
grounds perceived by cognitive psychologists (for example, 
Anderson,1977). They have construed knowledge as being mentally 
structured i r. rfon-linear patterns, or "schemata". The fact that 
texts must convey information linearly often arises in a 
disjunction for the reader. Metadiscourse - for example, "the 
important thing to remember is ...", or "I am arguing that ..." -
can serve as an overt instruction to the reader how to construct 
knowledge from the text (for example, appendix, pp.6'1,-65 1 .  
Adopting Robson's more holistic view of reading, the forms of 
metadiscourse help to make the text more akin to the expectations 
of readers wto are not "mature, educated, socially experienced 
adults" (Robson,1982,39). 
Robson also believes that a side-effect of metadiscourse's wider 
incorporation would be a diminution of the blatant plagiarism 
363 
found in many student essays. Plagiarism derives ultimately from a 
gulf between the text's "objective, unelaborated, straightforward 
style, emphasising the ideational function of language, with an 
anonymous, authoritative "author" reporting a body of facts as one 
proposition after another" (Crismore,1989,142), and the language 
to which students are accustomed. By narrowing the gap between 
this "textbookese" (Crismore,1989) and the pupil's own expression, 
metadiscourse facilitates student "translation" of the text in 
essays. 
Yet the author must be careful. Despite these valid arguments for 
the inclusion of language which "announces, directs and guides" 
(Williams,1985), an "overloading" of metadiscourse can be 
irritating: it can "bury the primary message or cause readers to 
react negatively to the text if used too mechanically or 
obtrusively" (Williams,1985). 
In an appropriate text then, there is a broadly narrative 
structure, but within this structure, other forms of discourse, 
such as argumentation, are "taught". Poles of interpretation are 
subtly counterpoised in the no..0t;ve, and between these poles, 
the reader is guided explicitly, but unobtrusively, by authorial 
intervention towards the understandings that the writer considers 
appropriate. 
Before moving on to consider the linguistic patterns by which 
these ideal features are produced, a note on textual organisation: 
Frequently, it is assumed that texts for students should have 
certain organisational features: frequent headings, "advance 
organisers" like previews of ensuing content and the prominent 
placing of central ideas (see History texts reviewed in Part Two). 
Evaluating such devices, Robson, 1983, concludes that "sometimes 
inexperienced readers are shows' tote dependent on the more 
explicit clues provided"; but other inexperienced readers are 
"hampered or unaffected by explicit "clues" because they are not 
"sensitive" to them and uannut use them" 04). In other words, 
such organizational features only impact in ways relative to the 
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reader's experience and expectations. They are, in themselves, 
less important than the language of the text. Nevertheless, it is 
worth noting a point put by Crismore, 1989: no matter what the 
framework of organisation of a text is, the more apparent that 
framework, the more likely it is that its content ideas will be 
retained. 
Having outlined the discourse requirements of an ideal text, it is 
necessary to consider how they might best be achieved through the 
language of the text. Halliday and Hanson, 1976, look at the 
"cohesion" of texts. Variables related to cohesion include 
"repetitions, omissions, ouuu..=liuco of tertain words and 
constructions which have in common the property of signalling chat 
the interpretation of the passage in question depends on something 
else. If that something else is verbally explicit then there is 
cohesion" (Halliday and Hasan,1976). For example, reference to 
findings already mentioned in the text (backward reference, for 
example, appendix, exercises, pp.587 and 61'0 and to those about 
to come (forward reference, for example appendix, pp,5CY55-4-) is 
"essential to the expression-of a clear thread of meaning in any 
text" (Robson,1982,34). Textual discourse is also furthered 
through the use of conjunctions such as "then", "next", 
"furthermore", "moreover" and "therefore". However, it must be 
noted that many of these examples are components of a particular 
type of "factual prose - notably the structures of argemeot" 
(Robson,1982,35), with which student readers may not be very 
familiar. Many will overlook the significance of these "cohesive 
pointers". Robson therefore views not only the text as a whole, 
but also its specific quality of toteslon, as an interaction with 
the individual reader. 
Davies and Widdowson, 1974, note that the visual appreciation of 
movement which occurs in spoken discourse is a vital part of the 
intimate exchange of meaning. Students will be more familiar with 
discourse along these lines than with textual discourse. For the 
unseen writer's text to approximate as closely as possible to this 
exchange, there must first be an elaboration of the metadiscourse 
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introduced above. But perhaps the most fundamental way of 
approaching in a text, the kind of spoken, animated discourse to 
which students are accustomed, is through the vitality of the 
writing itself. 
Hull, 1985, compares a Biology textbook extract, written as a 
"store of information awaiting retrieval", with a text written 
enthusiastically by David Attenborough on the same phenomenon -
the emergence of a butterfly. In the former account, the text has 
a "lack of voice", it "seeks no contact, but waits to be entered". 
But through the sheer enthusiasm of his writing, Attenborough 
"speak(s) vitally and teaches tbe reader" (102). There is 
certainly no reason why "voiceless neutrality" should be integral 
to the textbook. Even in the absence of metadiscoursal "contact" 
with the readership, the writer can still inform with what Hull 
describes as "warmth". 
In an investigation of the "impact" of History, Geography and 
Biology texts on a number of sixth form students, Robson 
exemplifies the limitations of current texts. The sentences in the 
History text studied "do not so much relate to the reader as 
assume a shared viewpoint" (62, emphases in the original). 
Generally the text draws "on the discourse competence of a reader 
sufficiently familiar with evaluation and argument to be 
appreciative of their expression in a "oorreotly" impersonal style 
and able to mobilize extensive historical knowledge of previous 
and current periods organised at the level of general 
classifications" (62-3). The "successful" reader of this textbook, 
like many others, already "knows what most learners are trying.to 
find out" (64). 
The Geography text analyzed by Robson also assumes a knowledgeable 
reader, able to establish connections, for example, between maps, 
text and tables, with minimum guidance. A familiarity with certain 
geographical terms is taken for granted. Analyzing another, 
Australian, Geography textbook, Kress, 1080, found the same 
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assumption: its "lexical and syntactic features ... construct (the 
reader) as a certain kind of reader; in this case a "fellow 
scientific geographer" (39). Further, in Robson's Geography text, 
"the rhetoric often eliminates or reduces to enumerated "problems" 
or "factors" ... processes of reasoning and particularly relations 
of cause and effect, thereby encouraging a passive reception of 
"facts"" (66). 
A related point is raised by Hull, 1985, who argues that attempts 
to make content more accessible to students by simplifying and 
condensing language - "slenderizing the grammar" of the subject - 
only makes the subject matter "more elusive and arbitrary" 
(Hu11,1985,78). Condensed statements may be recognised by a 
competent reader as simplifications merely for the purposes of 
shorthand, but it must be assumed that student readers do not have 
the prior knowledge that would tell them that "this is a 
simplification". It is wiser, if more costly, to be explicit and 
specific in statements to 1=wlici..D, 'tither than to write in a 
style that is "post-complexity and is properly called formal" 
(Hu11,1985,107). 
Robson's Biology text (to use just such post-complex shorthand), 
in contrast to the History and Geography texts, had a more 
personal writer-reader relationship. It used phrases such as 
"think for example ..." and "we must examine", and before assuming 
knowledge of technical or specific terms, it would define them and 
then use them only transitionally. Where different words were used 
to describe the same phenomenon, this was explained. Here "gaps" 
in the text were filled through explicit invitation: "imagine", 
"think" or "consider". The reader's competence is not assumed, but 
is extended through using the-text. 
Robson's interviews with students confirmed her own impression of 
the three texts. A student generally regarded as able used the 
History text in the manner that it must be assumed the author was 
expecting, filling in the "gaps" from her own erudition. Yet the 
text did not "help her extend her learning" (75), since material 
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that had not already been touched on in class was overlooked in 
recall. 
A lack of the knowledge and expertise assumed by writers of the 
History and Geography texts led "weaker" students into attempts to 
simplify the message of the text, often resulting in distorted 
understandings. These texts were "actually "teaching" ... 
incompetence" (80). Here, empirical references in the text are 
relevant. Hull notes that pervasive allusions to examples from 
familiar experience in the text can help to avert reader 
misconstruction. Without such references, students "will employ 
... expressions in terms of real-life situations they know, rather 
than in terms of the formal concepts they are only beginning to 
grasp" (Hu11,1985,16). The "contact features" of the Biology text 
were seen by the students themselves as facilitating an, extension 
of their knowledge'and they were specifically aware of how it 
drew on their pre-existing competence. 
It is this extension, on the one hand of pre-existing knowledge, 
and on the other, of textual competence, that distinguishes a good 
textbook from those which perpetuate stasis and those which 
present an unbridgeable discourse gulf to the reader. It is 
easier, however, for a text to initiate new content knowledge, 
than it is for it to extend discourse competence - the ability to 
,c‘..vuft;*z and replicate forms of textual structure such as 
argumentation, rhetoric and exposition. A more inclusive, ideal 
index of "readability" than those discussed, and dismissed, above, 
would measure the capacity of the text to actively familiarise the 
reader with the linguistic conventions of "academic" texts: "texts 
could, and should, help initiate readers into the conventions of 
their discourse" -Mobson,1963,44), or, as Kress, 1989 puts it, 
"the function of the writer is to construct texts which confirm or 
alter the manner in which particular texts are read" (18). But the 
natural question of how raises problems. Fundamentally, 
familiarity with textual discourse comes only from accumulated 
experience of reading other texts. If a single text is to assist 
this process disproportionately, it must effectively teach the 
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reader how to engage with itself. The fact that texts can do this, 
is remarked by Umberto Eco: 
"It seems that a well-ordered text presupposes a model of 
competence coming, so to speak from outside the text, but on the 
other hand, works to build up, by merely textual means, such a 
competence" (Eco,1979,51). 
Iser, 1974, argues that just those devices of cohesion and 
metadiscourse described above enable the text to assist in the 
building of this competence. By "manoevering" or "stimulating" the 
reader into certain activities, "the opportunity for establishing 
connections - for filling the gaps left by the text itself" is 
created. Through such activity, the potential or actual gulf 
between textual, and accustomed reader discourse itself can be 
gradually filled (for example, appendix, pp.45ft-461). 
The Implied Reader and the Ideal Textbook 
If the key to a "successful" text lies in its identification with 
the current attributes of its reader, and the extension of those 
attributes through "vital" writing and metadiscourse, then 
firstly, the text's "implied reader" must be profiled, and 
secondly, the characteristics of "vital writing" must be 
delineated. 
As far as the reader is concerned, Iser, 1978, states that "In the 
first instance, we have the "real" reader, known to us by his 
documented reactions; in the second, we have the "hypothetical" 
reader, upon whom all possible actualizations of the text may be 
projected. The latter category is frequently subdivided into the 
so-called ideal reader and the contemporary reader. The first of 
these cannot be said to exist objectively" (27). The ideal reader 
shares the author's every meaning and replicates his/her "code" in 
its entirety, effectively rendering the act of reading redundant. 
Real readers are of the type described by Iser as contemporary, 
but while "undoubtedly there", they are "difficult to mould to the 
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form of a generalisation" (op.cit.,27). As far as the writer is 
concerned, there is only the "implied reader", with "no empirical 
outside reality". He/she has "roots firmly planted in the 
structure of the text; he is a construct and in no way to be 
identified with any real reader" (34). 
We have seen that new textual experience is derived from the 
restructuring of experience that the individual reader has already 
"stored". For the textbook as well as the novel, "the text must 
bring about a standpoint from which the reader will be able to 
view things that would never have come into focus as long as his 
own habitual dispositions were determining his on 	 and 
what is more, this standpoint must be able to accommodate all 
kinds of different readers" (35). If reading a text is such an 
idiosyncratic process, how is the textbook writer to identify, and 
write for, an appropriately conceived implied reader? 
While Iser focuses on the ambiguous, literary implied reader of 
novels, Wolff's concept of the intended reader is, in fact, of 
greater concern to the textbook writer (Wolff,1971, cited 
Iser,1978). The intended reader is "the reader which the author 
has in mind". These semantics however, get -us little further since 
the intended reader is still hypothetical. Whilst we cannot 
profile exactly the intended reader, we can at least outline the 
general characteristics of the group to which the intended reader 
of our envisaged post 16 textbook belongs. The group will probably 
be studying for further education exams or in the initial stages 
of taking a university degree or other higher education 
certificate. (If the real reader is not of this group, then he/she 
will be curious enough about South Africa to read the book of 
his/her own volition). 
Whilst possessing the general discourse competence required to be 
in such a situation, members of the group will.not necessarily be 
avid readers, and may not therefore have developed the familiarity 
with texts that some current textbooks assume. 
Our intended readership does not encounter text as a "container" 
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of meaning; it supplies knowledge as the text is read 
(Slater,1989). The group will therefore appreciate textual 
assistance in extending both content and discourse knowledge. 
Whilst most accustomed to spoken (and therefore, partially visual) 
discourse, its members are relatively familiar with narrative 
discourse, but will need guidance in developing an awareness of 
rarer discourse forms. 
Such assumptions can be made about the subject and discourse 
competence of the intended readership group, but these are not the 
only attributes which shape the reception of a text. In order to 
"fill out" ideas of the likely impact of the text on an intended 
readership, one must also account, as- far as possible, for certain 
ideological characteristics of that readership. Obviously, this 
cannot be done to any degree of refinement since the subjects of 
such an investigation are, after all, only "implied", or 
"intended". But one feature of student ideology that car, be 
expected, and could be challenged in the text, is the tendency to 
stereotype, for instance along the lines of gender. 
Stephens, 19S2, points out that "narrative structure is an 
ideologically powerful component of texts". Since the reader is 
effectively "subjected to the authority of the text", even if "the 
meaning of a text may ... -be constituted as a dialectic between 
textual discourse and a reader's pre-existing subjectivity" (0), 
it can be easy for the him/her to assimilate its ideological 
assumptions. The ideological power of the text is similarly 
stressed, only at greater length, by Fairclough, 1989. Stephens 
concludes that teachers should seek to situate students partially 
outside the texts they use, to enable them to "interrogate" the 
text (see appendix, pp.4C1-4 ►Q). Since this does not always 
happen, many textbooks continue to impart stereotypes, which are 
also part of the cultural currency of wider society. By reflecting 
such stereotypes, the text effectively reinforces and perpetuates 
them. While implicit racial stereotypes - the subject of overt and 
widespread attack - are on the wane in modern texts, implicit 
gender stereotypes remain common. 
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Focusing on gender in school literature, Gilbert and Taylor, 1991, 
argue that texts, "both in and out of classrooms - can best be 
seen as discursive products, positing particular speaking 
positions, and ... as Chris Weedon (1987) warns, (they are) 
necessarily involved in the construction of gendered 
subjectivities" {42). "Everything we do (and write) signifies 
compliance or resistance to dominant norms of what it is to be a 
woman" (Weedon,1987,86-7, quoted Gilbert and Taylor,1991,42); that 
is, there is no neutrality in text. 
A further attribute then, must be assigned to our intended 
readership: Along individual lines, it will be either resistant 
to, resigned to, or accepting of, certain gendered, or other 
culturally (see Turvey,1992) identified group roles. What our text 
has to say (or, just as importantly, what it omits to say, 
(Gilhert,1904)) about those roles:could be significant in 
moulding reader consciousness, even if only by establishing a 
challenge to be dismissed in the light of previous experience. 
So much for the intended readership - it is difficult to say more 
of a hypothetical abstraction. Through "vital" writing and 
authorial intervention, the envisaged text is expected to extend 
this intended readership's subject and general discourse 
competence. While some general features of "vital" writing have 
teen mentioned in the above discussion of textual discourse, it 
remains to elaborate on them. 
Jakobson, 1960, classifies the components of a speech event into 
six groups. Written communication can also, but often doesn't, 
contain these components. They are: an addresser, whose function 
is emotive; an addressee, whose function is conative (voluntary 
association with the text); the context, the function of which is 
referential; message, the function of which is poetic; contact, 
the function of which is phatic (conveying pleasantries or words 
not designed to carry meaning); and code, the function of which is 
metalingual (relating explicitly to the language used, for 
example, defining). In Lunzer and Gardner's view, textbooks are 
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primarily to convey content, and are therefore confined largely to 
the context aspect of communicative language (Hu11,1985). 
But there is no reason why a textbook, like a novel, should not 
incorporate each of these components in order to establish 
learning. Confined to its referential function, "textbookese" 
becomes "essentially sterile, an extraordinary written language 
contrived as if in a spirit of irony especially for educational 
purposes" (Hu11,1985,213). The example of Attenborough's text, 
mentioned above, serves as a reminder that texts can be 
instructive as well as, to some extent, poetic - provided the 
"poetry" derives from "natural" authorial enthusiasm rather than 
from a strained and irritating attempt at "style" for its own 
sake. The incorporation of all of the functions of a speech act 
then, can be seen as part of our definition of good. textbook 
writing, as much as it is part of the structural analysis of good 
novel writing. 
One further example of the parallels between what literary critics 
have regarded as attributes of good writing and what our analysis 
of readers and texts reveals to be good textbook practice: Just as 
"no author worth his salt will ever attempt to set the whole  
picture before his reader's eyes ... for it is only by activating 
the reader's imagination that the author can hope to involve him 
and so realize the intentions of  the text" (Iser,1974,282, on 
Virginia Woolf's discussion of Jane Austen), so, as is argued 
above, no textbook writer worth his/her salt will attempt 
concision of content to such an extent that exploration by the 
reader is precluded. 
Can historical/geographical textbooks for students then, really be 
comprised of a stimulating, multidimensional, guiding narrative? 
Can they really teach content without excessive concision? Can 
they touch the reader's present competence, and by explicitly 
inviting the reader to fill the gaps of the text, extend that 
competence? Ideologically laden and auttoritative as they are, can 
they challenge damaging preconceptions without being alienating? A 
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partial answer lies in the past. 
A generation of history books, subsequently discredited on 
ideological grounds, held at least some lessons on style. 
Fitzgerald, 1979, "notes that, at the turn of the century history 
textbooks had single historian-authors, who typically wrote 
readable, memorable textbooks with stance and an effective style" 
(Crismore,1989,142). She argues that they wrote this way not 
because they were engaged in a conscious attempt to do so, tut 
because they genuinely "had something to say" about history. The 
result was "natural, personal, opinionated, vivid, lively and 
interesting". These are the same qualities whith distinguish 
Gibbon's and Carlyle's texts as great history, even if their 
interpretations have been dismissed by subseqUent practitioners. 
Histories with similar qualities began, according to Fitzgerald, 
to disappear from US schools in the 1930s as "objective" 
textbookese displaced lively expressions of authorial opinion. To 
some extent histories and geographies of the supposedly objective 
variety have fulfilled an important function. They have 
consolidated the unatteptability of overtly Taoist, and to a 
lesser extent, sexist and "classist" expression in texts. But a 
newer generation of historians than Gibbon and Carlyle has 
demonstrated, through its own lively and varied expression, that 
!!acceptably" opinionated historical content can be conveyed with 
vibrancy (see for instance, Schama's "Citizens", Cannadine's "The 
Decline and Fall of the British Aristocraoy" and Packenham's -"The 
Boer War"). 
In some senses, this discussion has led to a dispiriting 
conclusion. If all that was -required for -an ideal text was an 
attention to the detail of textual organisation, the inclusion of 
metadiscourse and -certain phrases associated with "cohesion", and 
the movement in the text from empirical narrative into other forms 
of discourse, all with an ideologically "sound" flavour, then the 
writing of my envisaged text would be simply a matter of labour 
and perseverance. But, whilst these concerns are vital, they are 
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not enough. My conclusion, whilst dispiriting for an author who 
does not consider himself to be a great writer, must be the 
obvious one - that an ideal text would also be beautifully 
written. Yet a text does not have to be ideal to be successful. 
While not every author can be a Schama, a Cannadine or a 
Packenham, every author can at least muster the enthusiasm to 
express as entertainingly as possible, the message that is to be 
invested in a book. This will not guarantee reader untierstanding 
or retention, but, along with careful regard to the 
characteristics and the needs of the intended reader, it will 
help. 
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Having considered the wider implications of textual discourse 
and style, it is possible to identify further limitations in 
the current materials on South Africa for 16 to 19 year old 
students reviewed in Part Two. 
While many are written in a lively and engaging style (for 
example, "The Child is Not Dead", BDAF and "Education, 
Apartheid, Development", World University Service), none give 
attention to introducing students explicitly to the discourse 
of academic argumentation. 
This has a number of implications. Firstly it means that the 
student reader is inadequately prepared to deal with the 
message of the text (particularly with a dense text 
constructed in academic discourse, such as Parsons' "A New 
History of South Africa"). Secondly, while texts such as 
Pampallis's "Foundations of the New South Africa" encourage 
students to identify bias in other materials, none attempt to 
equip the student with an awareness of the conventions of 
academic argumentation as a whole. Yet, it is this ability to 
weigh interpretations which is the best armour against 
ignorance, not the false expectation that the student can be 
made the objective judge of bias. 
While these texts may indicate that other resources are rooted 
in particular ideologies, few admit to their own partiality. 
Smith's "Update: Apartheid in South Africa" probably comes 
closest with his explicit treatment of competing theorisations 
of apartheid. 
The text which forms the appendix of this thesis is intended 
to overcome the discourse constraints of current materials on 
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South Africa (which are, of course more universal), as well as 
those deficiencies of coverage identified in Part Two. 
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Overall Conclusion 
Part One of this thesis was an account of South Africa informed by 
two interwoven considerations. The first was to trace the origins 
of the distinctive apartheid polity, and the second, to examine 
the relationship between social process and spatial form 
throughout South Africa's modern history. The account is 
comprehensive and, in some respects, original. But it is written 
in the language of academia, for adults who have benefited from 
education and have learned the capacities of discourse recognition 
and reproduction. 
Although these abilities will remain unobtrusive and implicit in 
most readers, they are nevertheless a valuable, and relatively 
rare outcome of years of reading texts. Many students never 
develop them and are effectively prohibited from deriving great 
value from texts such as that of Part One. 
The aim of this thesis then was to render the insights contained 
in a text like that of Part One accessible to students who are (or 
should be) in-the process of acquiring discourse capacity and, by 
so doing, assist in the further development of that capacity. In 
other words to teach about South Africa and simultaneously to 
teach about the derivation of value from texts. 
Taking the first aspect of this joint programme - that of teaching 
about South Africa - in Part Two, I examined currently available 
students texts on the country. From my critique of these texts I 
derived some insights concerning the coverage and "content" of a 
better text. 
I decided that a text was needed which went beyond condemnation of 
apartheid and which explained the evolution of segregation in 
South Africa, and its culmination in apartheid. Whilst writing the 
thesis, it became clear that the demise of apartheid and the 
institution of an ANC-led government would similarly have to be 
explained. 
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A better text than those currently available, I decided, would 
also place further emphasis on the spatial structures which 
accompanied and helped shape social and political change, and on 
more universal economic and social features which originated from 
"outside" the apartheid system, but which still affected life in 
South Africa. 
None of these threads of South African historical development 
could be really understood without an explicit consideration of 
theoretical contention. I identified two theoretical strands which 
could provide a basis for examining academic disagreement over 
South Africa - one surrounding the relative contributions of human 
agency and inherited social structure; the other concerning a 
previous debate between Marxists and liberals. 
In Part Three, some of the decisions already taken in the writing 
of Part Two were confirmed in the light of literature on readers 
and texts. A consideration of theoretical dispute could reveal the 
lack of objectivity and ultimate authority in the text whilst 
providing a "bipolar" theme to assist students in the derivation 
of meaning from the narrative. Further, the examination of 
competing interpretations would allow students to be introduced to 
forms of discourse other than simple narrative. 
My reading of work such as Robson's suggested that an explicit 
treatment of such "adult" forms of discourse in a student text 
could greatly assist students in coming to terms with these less 
familiar structures of language. Indeed, it has been suggested 
that just such an introduction could overcome many of the 
difficulties which inhibit the understanding of older students in 
any curriculum subject. 
This assistance with discourse competence was not simply an 
extension of my original aim to write a text on South Africa - it 
was integral to that aim. If my text on South Africa was to 
effectively teach the "content" which I had identified as being 
valuable, then it would have to begin within the present 
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linguistic capacities of its readers and, in order to introduce 
them to the more academic argumentation which would be necessary 
in explaining segregation and apartheid, actively extend those 
capacities. 
Continued analysis of the literature on readers and texts 
suggested further attributes of texts which should be adopted for 
competent teaching. In the appendix - my own student text - I 
have incorporated them. There are certain "advance organisers" -
warnings of the content to come, explicit guidance in handling and 
interpreting the textAmetadiscourse), and a questioning of the 
ideological assumptions of the reader. I have also tried to infuse 
the text with my own enthusiasm for the subject rather than 
deliberately stifling it for the sake of an apparent academic 
objectivity. 
I have suggested student exercises of two types. Firstly, there 
are those concerned with "filling in the gaps" which characterise 
any text. Consideration of these can enhance understanding both of 
discourse in general and of the specific message of the text at 
one point. Secondly, there are exercises concerned with revision, 
contemplation and learning of "content". 
Finally, it remains for me to evaluate the suck.cbc ond failures 
of my student text. 
I feel reasonably secure that it is an advance on previously 
published material on South Africa and I believe that it could 
assist students to learn about the development of that fascinating 
society which manifests the extremes of the human condition. But I 
also hold that it does more than most student texts to introduce 
students in an overt manner to the complexities of argumentation 
and other discourse with which they will have to struggle in their 
studies. 
However, these very successes result in the severest limitation of 
the exercise. it was impossible to achievethe important, but 
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wide-ranging, twin goals of initiating an understanding of South 
African social and spatial relations and facilitating the 
comprehension of discourse, in a short text. Given the pressures 
of the curriculum with which most 16 to 19 year old students have 
to deal, 'there simply would not be the time for most to derive the 
real benefit of poring over a text such as this. This is why, 
paradoxically, tte outcome of this thesis - the student text - is 
less likely than its starting point - the academic account of 
South Africa - to be published and widely read. Nevertheless, it 
has insights which i believe to be valuable for education, and 
_insights which could be applied in the "real world", even if not 
in such a coherent package. 
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